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The cover of this book shows the drawing of a boat. Without any contextual in-
formation, the drawing inspires different interpretations about what the vessel 
represents: without cargo, passengers or equipment on board, its connotation re-
mains unclear. When transcript proposed the cover to me, and when I discussed 
it with colleagues, one ventured that the drawing seems like a patrol boat meant 
to detect something suspect. Due to this notion of enforcement that she sensed, 
she advised not to use it. Others took the drawing for a refugee boat and thus 
found it well-suited to the title of this book. The ambiguity that the drawing of an 
empty vessel of a certain shape and size is able to evoke led me to decide on it. 
The actual vessel, on which the drawing has been modeled, came to be pub-
licly known when it fell victim to an arson attack: on the night of November 9, 
2018 it was set on fire and virtually destroyed at its location in Wittenberg, Ger-
many. To this day, the police presume it to be a politically motivated act of vio-
lence based on both the historical date and that they found Germanic runes from 
the right-nationalist network Reconquista Germanica inscribed on the boat. 
The vessel had come to Wittenberg as an exhibit during the Reformation an-
niversary in 2017. A student group from Salzburg and their anthropology profes-
sor had organized a shipwreck from Sicily and installed it in Wittenberg as the 
“antithesis” to the exhibition’s topic “gates of freedom.” Wittenberg’s mayor de-
scribed the vessel’s role and function for Wittenberg as inspiring public dis-
course on the treatment of migrants and refugees in Europe. Following the arson 
attack, reports emphasized that the boat had brought its passengers – 244 wom-
en, men and children from Eritrea – unscathed from Libya to Sicily. 
The watercraft: a monument or even memorial, a shipwreck, an object of art, 
a hero, an innocent carrier of refugees and a target of a politically motivated act 
of violence. The cover drawing shall evoke the ambiguities, the flexible meaning 
and oscillating reference of the visual and verbal metaphor of a small boat. 
  
In order to analytically understand a phenomenon, the question cannot be limited 
to the nature of what we see but also has to analyze the nature of how we do our 
seeing. I thank the preview editors’ team at transcript for the cover proposal and 









1.1 YOUR HUNTER AND HELPER: SURVEIL AND ASSIST 
 
In the early hours of October 3, 2013, one week before the European Parliament 
was to vote on the operating rules of the European Border Surveillance System 
(EUROSUR), a 20-meter trawler capsized off the Italian island of Lampedusa. 
On board the vessel were over 500 migrants, reportedly from Ghana, Somalia 
and primarily from Eritrea. The vessel had sailed from Misrata, Libya, for almost 
48 hours and was about 600 meters off the coast of Lampedusa when it faced a 
distressing situation: the vessel had begun to take on water, and, in order to at-
tract attention, a passenger set fire to a blanket. Unfortunately, petrol that had 
spilled on the deck ignited and the vessel caught fire. Some passengers jumped 
in the water to avoid the flames and others moved to one side, causing the boat 
to capsize. The vessel started sinking with the majority of passengers in its hull; 
those passengers who managed to escape the trawler fought to stay afloat, some 
for more than three hours, clinging onto empty water bottles or the corpses of 
fellow passengers. 
Fishermen were the first to reach the scene. They managed to take 47 mi-
grants on board and alerted the Italian Coast Guard, who set out for the emergen-
cy response. In total, 155 persons were rescued from the scene. The salvage 
work went on for ten days. By October 12, divers had retrieved a total of 359 
dead bodies from the vessel, which had sunk 47 meters below the water’s sur-
face. Pictures of body bags lined up in the port of Lampedusa and of numbered 
coffins in the island’s hangar replaced the usual images of an overcrowded boat, 
stuffed with African migrants, which commonly accompanies Western news on 
maritime migration to Europe. 
The Lampedusa shipwreck of October 2013 marks a caesura: firstly, it had 
been the accident with the highest death toll involving Europe-bound migrants 
aboard a boat until that date; secondly, it changed the public debate on European 
Union border policies as it directed the claim for European search and rescue op-
erations toward border enforcement agencies. However, can your hunter be your 
10 | Mediated Bordering 
helper? And where is the border at which the distinguishing decision is taken, 
where is it decided whether you are being hunted or assisted? 
During that night of October 3, 2013, the hunter had not surveilled well 
enough. A vessel jam-packed with more than 500 migrants had almost reached 
Lampedusa without being detected. Thus, the friend was sent out for rescue and 
condolences. Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta declared the victims Italian citi-
zens post-mortem and announced a state funeral. Meanwhile the hunter did what 
he had to do: the public prosecutors in Agrigento launched investigations into the 
infringement of the applicable migration law against each of the 155 survivors.1 
 
In parallel, the European Parliament (EP) held plenary sessions in Strasbourg 
(from October 7 to 10, 2013) and voted on the regulation establishing the Euro-
pean Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR). EUROSUR stood both for in-
tensified surveillance practices and an increased surveillance apparatus, along 
with the (visual) integration of national surveillance information into a common 
situational picture.  Both the EUROSUR network, which facilitates the exchange 
of information and is used to generate situational pictures, and the legislation 
concerning its operating rules have been gradually developed between 2008 and 
2013. Both network and regulation put forward the rules for the exchange of 
border-related information. They establish the “communication formats” (Eric-
son/Haggerty 1997: 33) of border surveillance and control and thus “provide the 
means through which the police think, act, and justify their actions” (ibid). They 
program EU border policing. 
The Lampedusa tragedy directed unexpected attention to the EUROSUR 
Regulation. The question of whether surveillance served the hunter or the helper 
                                                           
1 The details of the event as summarized and described here are based on a selection of 
various accounts in the press (Yardly/Povoledo 2013; Braun 2013; Davies 2013; Mes-
sia/Wedeman/Schmith-Spark 2013; Rühle 2013; ANSAmed (N.N.) 2013; Associated 
Press (N.N.) 2013). Details concerning the number of people, their nationality, the 
point of departure, the duration of the journey as well as details on the distress situa-
tion and the emergency response are not always consistently reported. Accounts of 
survivors which have been in the news one year after the tragedy (Nelson 2014; Mit-
telstaedt/Popp 2014) shed light on the actual distress situation and the struggle to stay 
afloat; they particularly render the situational assessment by Deputy Prime Minister 
Angelino Alfano somewhat irritating in which he claimed that “it happened close to 
shore […]. Had they been able to swim, they would have been safe” (quoted in Yard-
ly/Povoledo 2013). 
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occupied public attention.2 The EP Greens, who had attempted in vain to inte-
grate a rescue obligation into the EUROSUR Regulation, strove for its renegotia-
tion. It was hoped that the high number of fatalities would pressure legislators 
toward not passing a regulation for more surveillance without an explicit obliga-
tion of rescue. Yet, on October 9, 2013, the European Parliament passed the op-
erating rules of EUROSUR without an explicit obligation of rescue. The Council 
of the European Union (EU) adopted the regulation on October 22, 2013, and 
since December 1, 2013, EUROSUR is operational. Surveil and – if necessary – 
rescue remained the lowest common denominator. 
It was a coincidence that the disaster of Lampedusa preceded the parliamen-
tary vote. For EUROSUR, however, this resulted in a spin of its legitimizing nar-
rative. Thus far, EUROSUR was framed as merely a “technical framework” or 
“tool.” In fact, it had been difficult for its critics to attract public attention to its 
political ingredients and repercussions. Moreover, during negotiations between 
the European Council, the EP and the European Commission (EC), member 
states had been reluctant to accept any mention of “saving lives at sea” as part of 
new provisions. 
Now, under the impression of the 365 migrant fatalities, EUROSUR empha-
sized the prospect of contributing to saving migrants’ lives at sea. EUROSUR 
“will make an important contribution in protecting our external borders and help 
in saving lives of those who put themselves in danger to reach Europe’s shores” 
declares Cecilia Malmström, then Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs, 
on the occasion of the EP’s vote.3 Better surveillance paired with interagency 
cooperation was framed as the all-in-one solution: By detecting migrant vessels, 
both illegal immigration and migrant fatalities were to be prevented. Thereby, 
the potential amicable gesture of the hunter’s tool supports its necessity. 
However, distinguishing between illegal immigrants and shipwrecked per-
sons, and thus the decision to be a hunter or helper, occurs situationally. Yet, 
                                                           
2 A commentary which strongly pointed out this ambivalence has been published by 
Deutsche Welle (Berger 2013). Its German heading “Eurosur – Dein Feind und 
Helfer” (Engl.: Eurosur – your friend and assistant) inspired the title of this section. 
3 At the occasion of the EP’s vote, Malmström explicitly established a link between the 
tragedy of Lampedusa and the objectives and potentials of EUROSUR. The commis-
sioner advances a formulation that hints at the controversies between member states 
concerning immigration policies: “The EU and its Member States need to work hard 
to take decisive measures and show solidarity both with migrants and with countries 
that are experiencing increasing migratory flows” (Malmström 2013). 
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surveillance as an allegedly non-invasive measure as well as the multi-purpose 
aim of detecting small boats are framed as being detached from the political pro-
cess of sorting vessels’ passengers. Situational awareness provides an overview. 
Surveillance is, in fact, thought of as a way to direct operations and resources. 
Effectively, “you are not going to collect information, if you are not going to 
act.”4 Hence the question whether surveillance mechanisms are programed to-
ward preventing illegal immigration or toward saving lives at sea surfaces once 
again. What do law enforcement officers want to do once they spot the boats? 
One means, conflicting ends, and the vessel as a mobile target. 
 
The migrant vessel and the European Border Surveillance System, the small boat 
and the big system of systems: these two sites are not only opponents in the cat 
and mouse of border surveillance and control. The boat can also be interpreted as 
the ‘humanitarian subtext’ and proof of EUROSUR’s necessity. The two empiri-
cal chapters of this study examine the EUROSUR and the migrant vessel as sites 
of EU bordering. Both sites are institutive for the emergence of an external bor-
der to the EU. They are mediators to the emergence of a supranational EU bor-
der, in the sense that they catalyze and craft a level of Europeanization which 
hitherto and otherwise had been impossible. Examining this level of suprana-
tionality through two of its mediators, this study is about the emergence of an ex-
ternal border to the EU. 
 
 
1.2 MEDIATED BORDERING: THE OBJECTIVES, 
PREMISES AND STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
 
Tackling an object of inquiry which itself is under construction challenges the 
methodology of a study. How to approach an object of inquiry which itself does 
not exist? … But wait a minute: doesn’t it seem as if there is an external EU bor-
der? 
Referring to the notion of a territorial state border, an EU border does not ex-
ist. The EU neither has a territory, nor is it clearly delineated where Europe ends 
geographically. However, the absence of a geopolitical border cannot only be at-
tributed to potential difficulties in routing it. The notion of the territorial border 
has not only been challenged at the empirical level; it has been deessentialized in 
                                                           
4 EUROSUR Project Manager at Frontex, personal interview (May 15, 2012). 
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(political) geography (van Houtum 2005; Elden 2010a, 2010b, 2011), interna-
tional relations (Agnew 1994, 2008; Scott/van Houtum 2009), sociology (Wal-
ters 2002, 2006; Wimmer/Glick Schiller 2002) and by studies from cultural an-
thropology (Anzaldúa 1987; Sahlins 1989; Paasi 1996; Pries 2008).5 Political 
borders cease to be conceptualized as lines, as the “natural” confinement of na-
tion-states. Subsequently, a study which examined the EU border by comparing 
it to the territorial state border and which was in search of the edges of EU terri-
tory, of lines, maps and their defining peace treaties, could no longer be carried 
out empirically (Walters 2002: 563-565). Theoretically and methodologically, 
such a border would appear obsolete. And still, even without a delineated EU ter-
ritory, the operative effect of an EU border seems to be existent. How can this 
kind of political border be characterized and investigated? 
 
The possibility of conceiving of political borders in terms of a post-territorial, 
post-modern, post-national or post-Westphalian constellation presupposes that 
political borders exist beyond the modern understanding of political control, and 
of authority as territorial sovereignty. “This is not self-evident,” argues Georg 
Vobruba (2010: 434), pointing to an understanding of borders and territory that 
sees them as mutually constitutive. In fact, the figure of the territorial border has 
condensed the modern principles to an extent that hinders concepts of territory 
and border which are not mutually constitutive (Elden 2011; Allies 1980: 9). The 
attribute territorial is taken to qualify as political. 
This epistemological challenge finds inspiration in the empirical example of 
the external border(s) of the EU. Moreover, one can observe how the empirical 
example of the external borders of the EU has altered the epistemological and 
methodological premises of border studies (Scott 2011). Just as the EU has been 
thought of as “nothing less than the emergence of the first truly postmodern in-
ternational political form” (Ruggie 1993: 140), its border constellation provides 
an empirical example of how political borders can be thought beyond the territo-
rial state. 
Correspondingly, the search for an adequate methodology goes on: How do 
you study a border without knowing where to go for research and what to study? 
Do I have to travel to Gibraltar or Lampedusa to research the emergence of an 
EU border? Or rather to the Evros, the Greek-Turkish border crossing and con-
tact zone? Or rather should I travel to Brussels, or visit the Frontex Headquarters 
                                                           
5 The disciplinary assignment should not be read too rigidly, as contemporary border 
studies understand themselves as interdisciplinary (cf. Newman 2006a). 
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in Warsaw. Who should be my interview partner, i.e. who do I consider most 
relevant as an actor of bordering? Who is bordering? Apparently: there is no geo- 
graphical answer to the question of the strategic research object in border studies 
and the corresponding field of research. 
The methodological uncertainty is further complicated by the spectral charac-
ter of any border. Not only does the EU have no clear territorial border, borders 
are generally characterized by their phenomenal indeterminacy and fuzziness, 
which is to say that there is no phenomenon of a border as such (Cremers 1989: 
38; Vasilache 2007: 38-47). Andreas Vasilache notes that the odd and at the 
same time particular character of any border is “that it unfolds its effects through 
its presence and materiality, but consistently loses this presence whenever it be-
comes the subject of contemplation itself” (Vasilache 2007: 40). Accordingly, a 
border only “becomes always tangible only as a proxy” (ibid) or through repre-
sentations. The border appears as something (Cremers 1989: 38). Yet, which 
things maintain an indexical relationship to a given political border? As what 
does the respective border appear, and as what should it thus be researched? Are 
there strategic, that is, preferable objects of inquiry when analyzing a political 
border? 
 
During the last three decades, the emergence and effectiveness of an EU border 
has predominantly been studied either as institutional integration or as practices 
of exclusion and subversion. 
Conceptualizing a political border as a contract and methodologically taking 
it for its institutional integration entails analyzing a contract and investigating its 
level of integration and institutionalization. Consequently, one has to examine 
further agreements and amendments, and consider to what degree EU regulations 
and directives have been absorbed into national legal settings. Correspondingly, 
research on the external borders of the EU has focused on the 1990 Schengen 
Agreement, its Convention, amendments and its integration into the EU body of 
law. These analyses are underpinned by an understanding of border as institu-
tional integration. But are political borders contractually established institutions 
that exist beyond their in actu operationalization? Is a border socially effective 
by elite decision? 
Rather than the mere document of the contract, or the map, I am interested in 
the production of these things, as they mediate a given political border: this is to 
say that they stabilize a network of references and tasks, align obligations, and 
thereby establish the power that is necessary for a political entity to enforce bor-
ders. The development of the EUROSUR network, which will be analyzed be-
low, provides a valuable example of a map that is not only produced by a “new” 
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technology (GIS-generated digital map), but which also “maps” the operational 
area of a postnational border. Its development and its map will not be analyzed 
as representations of the border. The emergence of the EU border will rather be 
analyzed via the EUROSUR development phase. 
The second proxy used to study borders is spatial practices and interactions. 
In the course of the spatial turn, and its emphasis on spatial practices and border-
ing practices, borders, too, have been analyzed in actu. By this I refer to a focus 
on practices of exclusion, discrimination and segregation for a deduction of bor-
der characteristics. From this perspective, borders are “dispersed a little every-
where” (Balibar 2002b: 71) and no longer where they used to be, that is at the 
border-line. This perspective is underpinned by an understanding of borders as 
interaction between border police and border crossers. These studies have pre-
dominantly been ethnographic. As apt as the description might be from the per-
spective of experiencing bordering, do borders exist as spatial practices? Are 
they constituted by their violations and control, and thus the cat and mouse be-
tween border police and border crosser? Would they not exist without these prac-
tices? 
I take issue with this praxeological approach of analyzing borders with a fo-
cus on practices of exclusion, discrimination and segregation. This isn’t to say 
that these practices do not occur in the context of border management and border 
policing. However, borders are neither produced nor reproduced “bottom-up” on 
a daily basis; it is not border guards who produce the border through their patrol-
ling routines, nor is it border violations which shape its constitution. Also, politi-
cal borders are not as volatile as an emphasis on bordering practices might sug-
gest. Therefore, neither the production of borders nor its reconfigurations should 
be analyzed from the perspective of spatial practices. Without intending to solve 
the chicken-or-the-egg question, I nonetheless argue that in the case of borders it 
makes sense to actually start the analyses with the things that mediate them, with 
the interobjective presence of political borders. Even if political borders are man-
made, it is through technical mediation, and not through situational interaction 
that they unfold social effectiveness to a permanent, that is, relatively stable and 
durable extent. 
This study is informed by the two aforementioned perspectives and by vari-
ous analyses conducted under their premises. Yet, it proposes a somewhat differ-
ent approach. As outlined above, the construction of an external EU border will 
be analyzed from the perspective of two of its mediators: the EUROSUR and the 
small boat. The methodology thus draws on Bruno Latour’s distinction between 
intermediaries and mediators (see particularly Latour 1993: 79-82, 2005: 37-42, 
106-120). It takes on board the premise that selected research objects (in this 
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case the EUROSUR and the small boat) do not merely “represent,” “manifest” or 
“reflect” the object of investigation (in this case an external EU border), but sub-
stantially bring it about, engineer and tune its quality and form. 
According to Latour, an intermediary “transports meaning or force” without 
transforming it, while mediators “transform, translate, distort, and modify the 
meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry” (Latour 2005: 39). This dis-
tinction particularly changes how a researcher looks at an object of inquiry. Tak-
ing the difference between silk and nylon as intermediary – the example is 
Latour’s (ibid: 40) – a researcher sees this difference as “transporting faithfully” 
(ibid) the social meaning that silk was for high-brow and nylon for low-brow. 
Silk and nylon are looked at as indicative or reflective of a particular status. Tak-
en as intermediary, the shine, fabric, touch and feel of silk in contrast to that of 
nylon renders the social difference tangible; while the piece of cloth remains 
“wholly indifferent to its composition” (ibid). Taken as mediator, by contrast, the 
composition is what the researcher focusses on. He or she then examines how the 
chemical and manufacturing differences between silk and nylon fabricate and es-
tablish that which is socially effective as a tangible class difference in the first 
place. 
If borders are thought of as intermediaries, this entails that their tools, guards, 
fences, institutions or practices are thought of as manifestations, representations 
or illustrations of the border as such. Meanwhile, understanding a border as a 
construction of mediators, its guards, institutions, contracts, surveillance gadget-
ry, and control practices are analyzed with regard to their crafting, stabilizing 
and assembling of that which is socially effective as the political border in ques-
tion. Analyzing a given border as intermediary would only allow describing the 
two identities which are marked and separated by it. Its political performance 
could not be explicated. Analyzing mediators, by contrast, allows studying and 
explaining the fabric and the quality of a political border. In order to enquire 
about a border’s program, its sorting mechanisms and decisions, its markers and 
tools need to be considered, deciphered, and unpacked with regard to their con-
stitution. As a methodological perspective to border studies, this allows for atten-
tion to be paid to the rules, morals, fantasies, cohesions, institutional corridors, 
political compromises and technical fixes that become part of a border’s fabric, 
as they are inscribed in the political construction of the border and its “tools.” 
From the many mediators that are currently constructing an external EU border, I 
have selected two, which craft the border to a salient extent. 
In sum, a border does not exist, bordering is mediated. Therefore, I attempt 
not to study the emergence of an EU border as, but rather via its tools, markers, 
enforcers, contesters. Taken as mediators, the migrant vessel and the EUROSUR 
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will be analyzed with regard to their contribution in the construction of a politi-
cal EU border. It shall be examined in how far they transform, distort, and shape 
supranational border policies. Framing these sites as mediators, it is argued that 
they transform and reconfigure the EU border in a unique way. In other words, it 
is assumed that without EUROSUR there would not be this level of supranation-
ality, and that without the migrants’ boat, there would not be this kind of supra-
national mandate. It is a kind of journey that is mediated by the boat, and certain 
kinds of policies which are composed and delegated by the EUROSUR. These 
things are in the mix when the decision between hunter and helper is made. 
This study examines the construction and crafting of a supranational border 
from the perspective of two of its mediators: the European Border Surveillance 
System (EUROSUR) and the migrant vessel. The leading question of this study 
for the emergence of an external EU border is thus translated into the study of 
two empirical sites understood as its central mediators. Thus, the objective of 
this study is twofold: firstly, the emerging supranational, external EU border is 
analyzed as an example of a post-Westphalian, post-modern, post-national politi-
cal border. This epistemological objective is a contribution to thinking about po-
litical borders beyond the modern state. Secondly, the external EU border is con-
sidered an intermediary imagination. Its already operative level of supranational-
ity is mobilized, relocated, furthered, and legitimized by means of its mediators. 
Examining their design, this study unfolds how the kind and quality of the politi-
cal border, which the EU shows, is crafted, shaped, produced and eventually sta-
bilized. 
 
1.2.1 Structure of the Study 
 
This book is divided into three parts. Following the introduction, Part I discusses 
concepts, theories and methodological challenges to the study of borders in gen-
eral and the study of the construction of a supranational EU border in particular. 
Chapter 2 examines in how far the Schengen Convention constitutes an empiri-
cal novelty and whether it has (already) triggered a supranational EU border. I 
will then review selected analytical assessments of the Schengen Process, which 
draw on the example of Europe’s borders while describing the reconfiguration of 
political borders in general. Critically engaging with these analyses, chapter 3 of-
fers a general discussion of the distinctive conceptual characteristics of political 
borders, by analyzing the relation between thinking and researching borders. 
The following six chapters constitute the empirical parts of the study at hand. 
Part II (chapters 4 to 6) examines the making of the European Border Surveil-
lance System, EUROSUR, as a result of two parallel processes: the ICT-based 
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network and the legislation concerning its operating rules. Both products gradu-
ally developed between 2008 and 2013. The EUROSUR development phase is 
equally the period of investigation. Chapter 4 dissects the graphical user inter-
face (GUI) of the system and thereby describes the setup of the EUROSUR IT-
network; chapter 5 retraces the political negotiations which led to the 
EUROSUR Regulation. Chapter 6 discusses in what respect the technical net-
work mediated the political process. I will discuss in how far the mere develop-
ment phase of the EUROSUR has enabled the mobilization of the limits to bor-
der policing, and has increased competences on the side of the Frontex agency. 
Furthermore, the analysis will assess how the composition of an external border 
is mobilized and tuned by the denomination of a space called “pre-frontier” area. 
Part III (chapters 7 to 9) follows the vehicle of the small boat both through 
the trends of Europe-bound flight and migration and through images, perceptions 
and surveillance efforts on the site of the European spectator. Chapter 7 gauges 
the particularities of boats and ships as means of transport and technology of 
movement taking into account their peculiar relationship to the medium of the 
sea. Analyzing the earliest empirical case of the appropriation, reception, and 
perception of boats and ships in the context of flight and migration, namely the 
case of the Vietnamese boat-people, the chapter extracts the political significance 
of the vehicular facilitator. Chapter 8 starts by describing the trends in Europe-
bound migration by sea since the 1990s, including the numbers of deaths at sea. 
Section 8.2 then provides a detailed analysis of the verbal and visual reference to 
the “refugee boat” as unseaworthy, small and overcrowded, while section 8.3 
takes issue with this seemingly self-explanatory image and summarizes the dif-
ferent narratives, fantasies, and judgements projected to the hybrid of the refugee 
boat. Chapter 9 probes the vessel’s role in distinguishing the migrants’ legal sta-
tus. The analysis focuses on those legal arguments which revolve around the 
vessel itself: the vessel as stateless, as in distress, as suspicious, and thus as a 
target of surveillance activities. This allows testing the hypothesis that a prioriti-
zation of the vehicle in legal and operational reasoning – while at the same time 
bypassing or postponing addressing the human cargo – allows for operational 
practices which otherwise would have been difficult, if not impossible, to justify. 
Overall, I consider how far the hybrid of refugee boat acts as an integrating, if 
not mandating, figure in the construction of a supranational EU border. The ref-
ugee boat, in this arrangement, no longer crosses or subverts the border; it virtu-
ally is (at) the border. 
The study concludes with chapter 10, which summarizes the findings and 
works out the characteristics and qualities of the external EU border. In conclud-
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ing, the chapter finally shows the specific, if not constitutive, ambivalent features 
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throughout this work both emotionally, and practically by exchanging ideas, 
reading and discussing parts of the manuscript and helping me out with the de-
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Mediated Bordering. Thinking  
and Researching Political Borders 

 
2 European Spaces – Schengen Borders? 
 
 
2.1 SHIFTING BORDERS 
 
When speaking about borders in and around Europe, one often refers to the 1985 
Schengen Agreement along with its 1990 Implementing Convention, its amend-
ments, and development within the EU legal framework.1 Schengen is the epito-
me of border policies in Europe. 
The term Schengen stirs up associations of both the abolition and the prolif-
eration of borders. This peculiar ambivalence, however, has been built into the 
Schengen Process from its beginning. When the “Agreement […] on the gradual 
                                                           
1 The Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Un-
ion, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual aboli-
tion of checks at their common borders [hereafter cited as Schengen Agreement] was 
signed by representatives of the Benelux countries, France and West Germany on June 
14, 1985. The Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement [hereafter cited as 
Schengen Implementing Convention (SIC) or Schengen Convention] was signed on 
June 19, 1990. On September 1, 1993, it entered into force. The SIC only took practi-
cal effect on March 26, 1995 after different technical and legal prerequisites were in 
place. The Schengen Agreement and Convention are international agreements. Both 
were transferred into EU law in the form of Protocols to the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
i.e., the Treaty of the European Union [hereafter cited as TEU], which entered into 
force on May 1, 1999. Since then, the Schengen Agreement and Convention are pub-
lished in the Official Journal of the EU (OJ L 239/1, September 22, 2000, p. 11-18 and 
19-62). Elspeth Guild argues that it is however still justified to continue to refer to 
“Schengen rules” due to “the continuity of the acquis although technically it has been 
subsumed into the legal bases” of the EU (Guild 2001: 2, original emphasis). This cor-
responds to the general usage of the term “Schengen rules” or just “Schengen” which 
is also adopted in this work. 
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abolition of checks at their common borders” was signed by representatives of 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France and West Germany on June 14, 
1985, it was first and foremost thought of as a step toward peace, stability, and 
freedom in Europe. The five signatory states individually went ahead toward ful-
filling Article 8 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which requested European states to 
work toward a common market.2 The latter would essentially be based on four 
freedoms of movement: of goods, of capital, of services, and of persons. As the 
founding treaty of the European Economic Community (EEC) envisioned, Eu-
rope – as a peace project – would concretize along the practical, economic free-
doms of market integration. In fact, while in the 18th and 19th century, territorial 
borders essentially and literally grounded the European construction (Febvre 
1988; Branch 2011), Schengen (initially) proposed the reverse: it constructed 
Europe on de-bordering. 
For such a border treaty to even be possible, something had to have changed 
fundamentally in the meaning and functioning of political borders. This change 
in the perception of political borders started evolving after the end of the Second 
World War. After 1945, reconciliation was no longer achieved by separating two 
countries, but by integrating their economies. This has been promoted by the 
1948 Marshall plan, taken up by the Schuman Declaration, and institutionalized 
via the 1951 foundation of the European Coal and Steal Community (ECSC) 
(Kreis 2010: 90-93). Economic interdependency between European states was 
thought to peacefully integrate previously bellicose states; as such it was the 
functionalist answer to two World Wars. Borders related to the European con-
struction were understood as an economic issue and problematized as barriers to 
the peaceful integration of states into a common market. The historian Georg 
Kreis commented that, in post-1945 Europe, “national borders are something 
negative and overcoming borders is something positive” (ibid: 86). In this “func-
tionalist philosophy of peace” (Burgess 2009: 136) the free movement of indi-
viduals was of major importance to the European construction. 
Even though the area constituted was termed “Schengen area” rather than 
“Europe,” passport-free travel translated a sense of freedom to the everyday life 
of the people of Europe. Likewise, the European Commission stressed in May 
                                                           
2  The Treaty of Rome, officially called the Treaty Establishing the European Economic 
Community (TEEC), is the founding act of the European Economic Community 
(EEC). It was signed on March 25, 1957 and came into force on January 1, 1958. 
Art. 8 (1) TEEC states that “the common market shall be progressively established 
during a transitional period of twelve years.” 
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1992 that the free movement of individuals was essential to the idea of a peo-
ple’s Europe by rhetorically asking: 
 
“What purpose would Article 8a serve if individuals were still to be subject to one or other 
of the current controls or formalities? How would they perceive the change if it were lim-
ited to the legal environment of firms?”3 
 
In fact, freedom of movement of individuals was perceived as the citizen-
friendly element in the European integration process. Similar to the later intro-
duction of the Euro as a common currency, Schengen brought about changes 
which were directly visible (demolition of stationary border posts) and experi-
enceable in everyday life (and during holidays) of European citizens (Siebold 
2013: 12).4 That way, freedom of movement translated into a benchmark of a 
peaceful Europe. At the same time, the abolition of borders, the “Europe without 
frontiers,” took shape as the “new mythology” (Raffestin 1992: 158).  
 
2.1.1 The Twin Imperative of Freedom and Security 
 
The abolition of borders and the principle of free movement came, however, 
with the “twin imperative of Schengen” (Walters 2004: 683): that of greater se-
curity. Yet, this imperative did not so much act as a constitutive principle per se, 
but rather as conditio sine qua non to the realization of free movement. Concerns 
over the free movement of individuals had effectively impeded the goal of the 
common market among EEC member states. This is illustrated, for instance, by 
an inquiry conducted by the UK’s House of Lords Select Committee on the Eu-
                                                           
3  Abolition of border controls, Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament. SEC(92) 877 final (May 8, 1992), [hereafter cited as 
Abolition of border controls, SEC(92) 877 final]. 
4 Angela Siebold's impressive study of the history of the Schengen process and its re-
ception in French, Polish and German print media demonstrates the spirit of Schengen 
on the basis of comprehensive materials. Siebold provides a detailed insight into the 
political tensions as well as public expectations and fears that accompanied the 
Agreement. She examines the impact, which the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 had 
on the Schengen process, and its reception in the three countries. Her study is particu-
larly valuable in tracing how, post-1989, external borders were increasingly charged 
as a security issue (Siebold 2013: 115-139) and in how migration became to be con-
ceived of as “border crime” (ibid: 279-327). 
26 | Mediated Bordering 
ropean Communities into the completion of the internal market.5 Elspeth Guild 
summarizes the Committee’s report in the following way: 
 
“It [the Committee] received evidence from various officials who made it clear that an in-
ternal market without frontiers was fully possible for goods, services and capital. The 
mechanism of the frontier for goods: customs controls were capable of abolition and re-
placement by random checks. However, border controls on persons could not safely be 
abolished. The reason: this would give rise to an increased security risk.” (Guild 2001: 9) 
 
While random checks on goods and services appeared feasible and without side-
effects,6 an easing of controls on persons provoked uncertainties together with 
the somewhat vague fear of relinquishing control over what is going on “inside” 
one’s national territory. The citizen-friendly element was thus the most uncom-
fortable and worrying aspect for public administrations and security agencies. 
Moreover, in the light of vague risks, different national security authorities rang-
ing from police to border guards to military were uncertain about their job de-
scription, their mandates and competences in the new context. Security agencies’ 
concerns thus stemmed from reconfigurations of both the subject and the object 
of security. In other words: both threat conceptions and competences were read-
justed. On the one side, the threat of migration as a transnational crime shaped 
up; on the other site, the fear of losing competences and control gained strength. 
After signing the Schengen Agreement, signatory states took five years to 
ratify it in their national parliaments, and to formulate the 1990 Implementing 
Convention. The latter only took practical effect after another five years. On 
March 26, 1995, national borders fell to the five signatory states and the two new 
contractors, Italy and Spain. Passport control at the borders between those coun-
tries was no longer a standard procedure. Even though Schengen continued to 
function as a pan-European narrative of freedom and rapprochement after the 
1989 fall of the Berlin Wall and the successive collapse of the Soviet Union, un-
                                                           
5 House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (1992): Border Con-
trols on Persons, 22nd Report of Session 1989-1989 (HL paper 90), London: HMSO. 
6 Checks on the movement of goods and services had successively been abandoned 
among EEC member states, custom policies were already harmonized in July 1968 
(Hobbing 2006: 170). This is to say that in terms of customs regulations, EU countries 
share, in fact, a common external border. However, the fact that this does not foster 
the image of a common border stresses the dominance of person’s mobility for the po-
litical integration of border policies in Europe. 
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certainties and notions of threat intensified with the construction of Europe no 
longer being reduced to its part west of the Iron Curtain. In French and German 
print media, the fear of an increase in criminal activities and an influx of “thieves 
and illegals” was initially portrayed as coming almost exclusively from the East 
(Siebold 2013: 273-275). However, in the course of the first ten years of the 
Schengen Process, the scenario of raids and incursions of criminal gangs from 
the East became discursively conflated with the theme of migration. In this 
course, the principle of free movement was related to the act of crossing external 
Schengen borders; at the same time, migratory endeavors of all kinds to 
Schengen states, including the search for asylum, were often summarized as 
“border crime” (ibid: 279). Different commentators witnessed a securitization of 
migration, that is, a political and societal framing of migration as a security is-
sue.7 Jef Huysmans, for instance, pinpointed that public debates were dominated 
by the projection of possible side effects: “one expected that the market would 
not only improve free movement of law-abiding agents, but would also facilitate 
illegal and criminal activities by terrorists, international criminal organizations, 
asylum-seekers and immigrants” (Huysmans 2000: 760).  
In fact, while mobility became part of the self-conception on the part of Un-
ion citizens, the free movement of non-Europeans across Schengen borders – 
classified as Third Country Nationals since the 1990 Schengen Convention – 
was greeted with the suspicion of illegality. Moreover, the term “migration,” en-
compassing the doubt about its legality, was increasingly reserved for movement 
across Schengen external borders, while European citizens’ movement was 
framed as “mobility” and an expression of freedom (Benedikt 2004: 12). At the 
same time, Schengen border crossings were conceived of as a transnational 
phenomenon, “which is neither attributable to a classical military threat from the 
                                                           
7 The diagnosis of a securitization of migration is “largely uncontested” (Ger.: weit-
estgehend unbestritten) in the literature on EU migration policies (Ratfisch/Scheel 
2010: 90). However, the concept of securitization is not always applied and referred to 
in the social constructivist sense of the Copenhagen School, which focusses on speech 
acts (Buzan/Waever/Wilde 1998), but more frequently developed from a Foucaultian 
analysis of governmentality which has been developed in critical distinction by the so 
called Paris School around Didier Bigo (1996, 2002), Jef Huysmans (2000, 2008), and 
Thierry Balzacq (2005; 2008). Paradigmatic studies on the securitization of migration 
have been provided by Ceyhan/Tsoukala (2002); Aradau (2004); Şemşil (2008), 
Bourbeau (2011), and Basaran (2011). For a discussion on the concept of securitiza-
tion cf. Roe (2012) and Balzacq et al. (2015). 
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outside, nor to domestic crime” (Kaufmann 2006: 38). The new transnational 
risks were embodied by different figures: the masses of illegal immigrants, crim-
inals, the mafia, and terrorists. What unites them is the attestation of being trans-
nationally organized, of operating in international networks, and of being diffi-
cult to locate or interdicted in their movements or purposes. Being transnational 
renders them “the central issue of internal security” (ibid). As a consequence, the 
completion of the common internal market brought along the operational field of 
internal security, which Didier Bigo has described and criticized as being based 
on a security continuum: 
 
“[T]he issue was no longer, on the one hand, terrorism, drugs, crime, and on the other, 
rights of asylum and clandestine immigration, but they came to be treated together in the 
attempt to gain an overall view of the interrelation between these problems and the free 
movement of persons within Europe.” (Bigo 1994: 164) 
 
Bigo’s central thesis is that the reconfiguration of the security field is not to be 
interpreted as a response to new threats, but as something that emerged from 
within the security field itself (Bigo 1996). He further claims that the securitiza-
tion of migration is not the reason but the effect of a proliferation of control poli-
cies and technological infrastructure (Bigo 2002: 73). Bigo’s thesis is supported 
by a 1988 Commission’s report on the progress made with regard to Article 8 of 
the EEC treaty. The Commission reported a situation in which traditional border 
checks had lost their functional purpose between EEC member states and in 
which a common denominator for different policy fields and administrations was 
sought. Meanwhile, the free movement of persons was described as a cross-
cutting theme touching upon different policy fields: 
 
“For several years now, because of the complex nature of the issues involved, the many 
and varied aspects of the problems involved have been discussed in a number of different 
fora (the Schengen Group, the Trevi Group, the Immigration Group, Political Cooperation 
meetings, the Council of the Ministers and the Council of Europe). This review of the 
work being done in these somewhat disconnected bodies is intended both to clarify the ra-
ther confused picture and to refocus the strategy so as to keep the overall programme, and 
each individual part of it, on target.”8 
                                                           
8 European Commission (1988): Communication of the Commission on the abolition of 
controls of persons at intra-community borders, COM(88) 640 final (December 7, 
1988), [hereafter cited as Abolition of controls of persons at intra-community borders, 
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The above passage shows that the national authorities and administrations behind 
these “somewhat disconnected bodies” which were used to operate in parallel at 
the same border, were now supposed to operate “elsewhere.” 
In the territorial frame, the border is considered the locus of legitimate inter-
vention by law enforcement authorities – intervention taking place in fields as 
diverse as immigration, transportation, and commodity exchange. At the border, 
these regulations occur in parallel and in combination. As the common locus of 
intervention is rescinded, a common program among the different authorities and 
administrations was felt necessary. That which was previously united geograph-
ically would now be merged by a common vision, an “overall programme.”9 
 
In consequence, the gradual abolition of common borders among Schengen sig-
natory states prompts the fear of suffering a loss of legitimate possibilities to in-
tervene and to regulate access to one’s territory and welfare state. This sovereign 
anxiety prevailed even though present frontier controls were described as “large-
ly ineffective” by the Commission. 
 
“What we are looking for are better controls and we believe they exist. […] the Commis-
sion has never said that frontier zones should be ‘no go’ areas for the enforcement agen-
                                                           
COM(88) 640 final]. For a contemporary legal opinion on the Schengen Agreement, 
cf. Erhard Stobbe (1989). 
9 The “overall programme,” which was still in development in 1988, took shape in the 
creation of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) in the Treaty of Amster-
dam 1999 and concretized in measurements in the Tampere (1999-2004), the Hague 
(2004-2009) and the Stockholm Programme (2009-2014). The format of detailed, 
multi-annual programs with concrete objectives has been abandoned after 2014. With 
the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon evening the pillar system, and thus the distinction between 
intergovernmental arrangements and communitarian policies, Justice and Home Af-
faires now subsume the “somewhat disconnected bodies” under the heading of inter-
nal security. In the Post-Stockholm Process the general (now European!) principles in 
Justice and Home Affairs are at issue. The Commission presented its strategic vision 
in its Communication “An open and secure Europe: making it happen” (COM(2014) 
154 final). For documentation and analysis of this process, see particularly Jörg 
Monar’s annual analysis of Justice and Home Affairs, first published in 1999 in the 
Journal of Common Market Studies. In addition, Christian Kaunert and colleagues 
(2012) have discussed whether “European Homeland Security” offers a unifying pro-
gram. 
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cies. If evidence or reasonable suspicion exists, of course an individual can be stopped or 
apprehended. But what must go is the routine, mindless interference with the great mass of 
ordinary innocent travellers going about their legitimate business.”10 
 
On the one side, “innocent travellers carrying on their legitimate businesses” 
should not be molested by control procedures; at the same time “better controls” 
turn into a prerequisite to the seamless travel of “the great mass of ordinary in-
nocent travellers”. In this logic, the seamless travel of bona fide passengers rests 
fundamentally on the effectiveness of migration and border control as well as the 
urgent prerequisite to sort out the male fide passenger.  
To balance the loss of systematic control along national borders, compensa-
tory measurements were established beyond the geographically mediated trans-
formation of control. These compensatory control measures consisted of police 
cooperation, cooperation in dealing with criminal matters, judicial assistance, 
common visa procedures, and the establishment of the Schengen Information 
System (SIS)11, among other provisions. Further compensations, or rather redis-
tribution of control and responsibilities, were fixed in the 1990 Dublin Conven-
tion and its subsequent amendments of 2003 and 2013.12 
                                                           
10  European Commission (1988): “Halfway to 1992: The Commission takes stock,” 
press release from November 9, 1988. 
11 For an analysis of the development process of SIS (and SIS II), the implementation of 
the SIS in France, Germany and the Netherlands, and a discussion about the remedies 
for third country national, see Evelien Brouwer (2008). For a critical discussion on the 
SIS II, see the Statewatch analysis by Ben Hayes (2005). 
12  At the center of the Dublin system is the rule that asylum applications have to be pro-
cessed by the EU member state in which the applicant first entered. From its begin-
ning, the system has been criticized for unduly burdening countries at the outer limits 
of the union and “protecting” landlocked member states. Member states that are inland 
such as Germany and France receive a disproportionate number of applications. The 
system has been convicted of exacerbating the principle of non-refoulement (German 
Federal Constitutional Court, Order of the Second Senate of January 25, 2011 - 2 BvR 
2015/09 -, para. 1-3) and continues to provoke a discussion about whether a fleeing 
person should be allowed to choose the country for his or her asylum application. For 
a thorough discussion of the latter argument, see Stephen Legomsky (2005). For a 
pointed critique of the Dublin system and a discussion of different cases against it, see 
Sílvia Morgades-Gil (2015). Since the summer of migration in 2015, controversies 
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As Ruben Zaiotti notes the compensatory measures acted as “litmus test” 
(Zaiotti 2011: 144) to the regime of free movement. In consequence, a repressive 
European migration and border control regime is sketched out as a prerequisite 
to the waiving of checks at internal borders. In sum, from its beginning, security 
concerns dominated the operationalization of the Schengen cooperation to an ex-
tent that commentators clearly saw “ministries of Interior, border guard, police 
and customs agencies in the driving seat” (Jeandesboz 2009).13 Albeit successful 
as a Pan-European narrative of freedom and rapprochement, “Schengen” effec-
tively became associated with a proliferation of control, with restrictive asylum 
and migration laws across Europe, and in parts also with a fortification of the 
European Union. For the first 15 years of the Schengen acquis, Mechthild Bau-
mann even sees a paradigm shift from freedom to security in the operationaliza-
tion of the Schengen Process and comments that “that which began as the 
thought of a Europe without border controls resulted in a highly institutionalized 
security union” (Baumann 2008: 29). Of the twin principles of Schengen, securi-
ty turned out to be the parasitic twin. The parasitic twin affected the becoming 
and institutionalization of Europe’s borders as it charged the imaginary of the 
external border and its need for controls with the suggestion of a migration-
induced security deficit. 
 
2.1.2 If Not a Border, What Do the Schengen Rules Constitute? 
 
From the beginning, the notion of “external borders” evoked both twins: freedom 
and security. Even though the Schengen rules did not change the classic concept 
of statehood or the concept of frontiers in international public law (Müller-Graff 
1998: 15), they did, however, contribute to the blurring of the classic distinction 
between internal and external security. The distinction between “internal fron-
tier” and “external borders” introduced by the Schengen Implementing Conven-
tion modified the meaning and functioning as well as the quality and dimension 
of political borders in Europe. 
                                                           
over the Dublin regulations, the distribution of refugees and migration within the EU 
have increased among EU member states. 
13 Earlier accounts of this development include Monica den Boer and Laura Corrado’s 
(1999) analysis of the incorporation of the Schengen rules into the EU legal frame-
work and Virginie Guiraudon’s (2003) account of the securitization of immigration 
policies in Europe. 
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According to the Schengen Implementing Convention (hereafter cited in the 
text) “internal borders” are “the common land borders of the [Schengen states], 
their airports for internal flights and their ports for regular ferry connections ex-
clusively to and from other ports within the territories of the [Schengen states] 
and not calling at any ports outside these territories”. Complementing this, “ex-
ternal borders” were defined negatively as Schengen states’ “land and sea bor-
ders and their airports and sea ports, provided that they are not internal borders”. 
However, the attribute “external” was not meant to indicate the new locus of 
common (Schengen) control. As border controls were supposed to be waived be-
tween Schengen states, controls were meant to happen “elsewhere.” The intro-
duction of a reference called “external border” was evasive rather than restruc-
turing. Initially, the classification “external borders” was presented as rather 
formal and neutral, as it meant to “avoid the sensitive issue of who should be le-
gally responsible for their management” (Zaiotti 2011: 71). In the context of the 
ECC, by contrast, “external borders” have been evoked as “community borders” 
and been offered as “symbols of a new collective European identity” (ibid: 81).14  
Nonetheless, in the Schengen context, the reference to “external borders” 
turned into a problematization of “security deficits” caused by the abolition of 
internal controls. The two questions of Who would be in charge? and On what 
legal basis? remained both sensitive and unresolved issues – and continue to be 
today. With regard to the question of “which actions should be taken at Commu-
nity level and which should be left to intergovernmental cooperation,” the Com-
mission recommended that “attention should be focused on practical effective-
ness rather than on matters of legal doctrine.”15 The legal document that wanted 
to dissolve and reorganize the borders in Europe led to a proliferation of security 
practices while putting on hold the common legal ground. 
                                                           
14 The 1985 Adonnino Reports are considered historical evidence of the vision of “A 
People’s Europe.” The report of June 1985 contains a proposal for a Europe which 
would be more experienceable and visible to its citizens in everyday life. Many of its 
proposals, such as the European flag and anthem, European passport and driving li-
cense were taken up. The Committee for a People’s Europe was set up by the Europe-
an Council meeting in Fontainebleau in June 1984. The reports were named after the 
committee’s chair Pietro Adonnino a former Italian Christian Democrat Member of 
the European Parliament (cf. Teasdale 2012). 
15 Abolition of controls of persons at intra-community borders, COM(88) 640 final,  
para. 14. 
European Spaces – Schengen Borders? | 33 
Figure 1: The Schengen Area in July 2019 
 Source: Wikimedia Commons16 
 
Even though it is cartographically representable, Schengen does not constitute a 
political entity within territorial frontiers; nor does it lay out a Europe without 
frontiers. The Schengen area is not even congruent with Europe, neither in its 
geographical nor institutional scope.  
Geographically the Schengen area (not territory!) is constituted by its mem-
ber states. Yet, EU membership and the application of the Schengen rules and 
privileges do not routinely correspond with each other, even though the 
Schengen acquis was transferred into EU Law with the 1997 Treaty of Amster-
dam. Instead, different spaces of affiliation and cooperation exist within Europe. 
The application of the Schengen acquis and EU membership are still different 
                                                           
16 Wikimedia Commons, at: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Schengen_Area_ 
Labelled_Map.svg (accessed July 15, 2019). The work has been released into the pub-
lic domaine by its author, CrazyPhunk. 
34 | Mediated Bordering 
frameworks for cooperation. In July 2019, the Schengen area consists of 22 of 
the 28 EU member states, and is encircled by 7,721 km of land borders and 
42,673 km of sea border. 
The 1985 club of five has thus gradually expanded; Spain, Portugal and Italy 
already joined the Schengen states when the Schengen Implementing Conven-
tion was brought into force in 1993. They were thus among the first countries to 
implement the Schengen acquis. Even though Greece signed the acquis in 1992, 
its full application, and thus the removal of border controls with EU member 
states, was not realized until 2000.17  In 1996, the Schengen acquis was to be ap-
plied in Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Iceland.18 Sweden, Denmark 
and Finland abolished border controls in 2001. Norway and Iceland are not EU 
members, but are part of the Nordic Passport Union and have been officially 
classified as associates with the Schengen area and activities since 1999.19 The 
other two non-EU countries to have negotiated their associative status, Switzer-
land and Liechtenstein in 200820 and in 201121 respectively, together with Nor-
way and Iceland, are part of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Two 
EU member states, the UK and Ireland, have negotiated opt-outs from the 
Schengen acquis when the intergovernmental agreement was transferred into EU 
law with the Treaty of Amsterdam.22 As a result, for every regulation concerning 
Justice and Home Affairs, individual negotiations need to be held with the UK 
                                                           
17 Council Decision of December 13, 1999 on the full application of the Schengen acquis 
in Greece, in: OJ L 327 (December 9, 2000), p. 58. 
18 Decision of the Executive Committee of 22 December 1994 on bringing into force the 
Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 19 June 1990, in OJ L 239, 
December 22, 1994, p. 130-132. 
19 Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Ice-
land and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latter’s association with the imple-
mentation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, in: OJ L 176, July 
10, 1999, p. 36. 
20  Council Decision of November 27, 2008 on the full application of the provisions of 
the Schengen acquis in the Swiss Confederation, in: OJ L 327, December 5, 2008, p. 
15. 
21  Council Decision of December 13, 2011 on the full application of the provisions of 
the Schengen acquis in the Principality of Liechtenstein, in: OJ L 334, December 5, 
2011, p. 37. 
22  Council Decision of February 28, 2002 concerning Ireland's request to take part in 
some of the provisions of the Schengen acquis, in: OJ L 64, March 7, 2002, p. 20. 
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and Ireland.23 For newcomers to the EU, opt-outs are not possible. Instead, EU 
membership obliges to work toward the fulfillment of the Schengen acquis. To-
day, EU membership thus precedes the opportunity of free movement which is 
related to Schengen and the fulfillment of its requirements. 
The first enlargement round in 2004 encompassed ten countries, namely Es-
tonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Cyprus. In 2007, Bulgaria and Rumania joined in the so-called sec-
ond round of eastern enlargement. The latest accession was Croatia in 2013. 
Bulgaria, Rumania, Cyprus and Croatia do not fully implement the Schengen ac-
quis; internal borders with the EU are still controlled. Finally, the micro-states 
Monaco, San Marino and Vatican City do not participate in Schengen activities. 
However, they are de facto part of the Schengen area as free movement is possi-
ble with a Schengen visa. Schengen’s geography is this mediated by a complex 
set of rules and affiliations. 
 
On the institutional level, the external borders represent two political entities: the 
national member state of the EU, and the supranational European Union. They 
are thus justifiably characterized as “double encoded” (Ger.: doppelcodiert)24. 
The political meaning of double encoded borders translates to a situation where 
shared responsibilities multiply and centralized competences are reduced. Exem-
plary of this new take – and also of the early confusion about it – is Friedrich 
Heckmann’s 1996 circumscription of the new European policies he saw trig-
gered by the Schengen rules: 
  
                                                           
23  The negotiations on the “Brexit,” i.e., the terms and conditions of how the UK will 
leave the EU, are not controversial with regard to the control of persons. As both the 
UK and Ireland do not implement the Schengen acquis, a Brexit would not change the 
arrangement of identity checks along the border between the UK and Ireland. It 
would, however, require customs control. 
24 The term “double encoded” (Ger.: doppelcodiert) has been termed by Andreas Müller 
in his doctoral thesis, which is quoted by Georg Vobruba (2012: 97, 99, 136). Mau-
rizio Bach describes the border constellation as “institutional supercoding” which is 
characterized by “processes of superposition and asymmetrization” Bach (2010: 165-
171). Stéphane Rosiere recognizes a three-leveled sovereignty between the regional, 
the national, and the community level, which is characterized “by a post-modern 
graduality, more than by classical isonomy” (Rosiere 2002: 52). 
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“Every state has less borders in the previous sense of the term. At the same time, however, 
each state has become co-responsible for more borders and must, for the sake of its own 
security […], take an interest in the different borders [that are now relevant, S.E.]: the 
Oder-Neisse line has also become France’s new eastern border, Germany has to take inter-
est in what happens of the Strait of Gibraltar, everyone is interested in Italy’s borders with 
the Schengen area, and also in what is going on between Italy and Albania.” (Heckmann 
1996: 12, emphasis added) 
 
Less borders within Europe means more common concerns. Cooperation in bor-
der enforcement is considered to be “in the interest of one’s own security” 
(Heckmann 1996: 12). This reciprocal understanding and arrangement of securi-
ty is at the center of the Schengen acquis. Correspondingly, the Head of Re-
search and Development at Frontex considers this proliferation of responsibility 
for external border security to be the “consequences of having Schengen”: 
 
“It is not about how good you are at your part of the Schengen external border. The idea 
should be that we create a similar level of control and awareness at all parts of the border 
because only then it works. I mean, if you’re in Germany you have a very high standard, 
you check everything you have everything under control, but what does it mean if in 
France they don’t do it? Your backdoor is open.”25 
 
To close the backdoor, Schengen rules are established as rules of cooperation 
among member states. The need for an increase in cooperation, however, is not 
caused by an increase in cross-border crime. It is implied in the agreement to 
leave the task of control to any member state at the outer edge of the Schengen 
area. Hence, Schengen creates, conceals and anchors the “stringent necessity to 
cooperate with regard to securing the common EU external border” (Vobruba 
2012: 135). Or as Boldizsár Nagy puts it, Schengen “compelled [member states] 
to harmonize” (Nagy 2006: 105). Consequently, the Schengen rules – the acquis 
communautaire – do not fix an external border to the European Union. Rather, 
its external borders (note the plural) “mark the scope of the application of the 
European law as well as the extent of the European space of institutionalized in-
tergovernmental cooperation” (Bach 2010: 171). Effectively, the Schengen rules 
do not constitute an EU border per se, but a “cascading interdependence” 
(Zielonka 2006: 3) which demands cooperation in different policy fields. More-
                                                           
25 Head of Research and Development at Frontex, personal interview (May 27, 2011). 
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over, an external EU border is not erected as a result of land surveying or demar-
cation, but rather from the required cooperation of institutions. 
 
In sum, the transfer of control from internal to external borders clearly is more 
than a geographic shift. It triggered institutional transformation with regard to 
the meaning and functioning of borders in the EU, as it meant conducting a 
common mandate while being under national legislation and budget. But how 
does this work in practice? Would the mandate of border guards remain national 
while at the same time their ‘job description’ was communitarian? In fact, the 
Schengen constellation is constantly concerned with the tension between the na-
tional and the European level. This is a tension which became manifest, for in-
stance, at the occasion of the Lampedusa tragedy of October 2013 described in 
the introduction to this study. Italy’s Deputy Prime minister Angelino Alfano 
stated that “the toll is unfortunately a tragic one” and declared the shipwreck “a 
European tragedy, not just an Italian one” (quoted in The Telegraph (N.N.) 
2013). Declaring it a European tragedy calls for sharing the burden and for Eu-
ropean solidarity. At the same time, it diverts responsibility as Lampedusa acts 
as the gate to Europe and not Italy alone. If, however, Lampedusa were officially 
considered a European and not an Italian island, this would not only affect any 
proclaimed responsibility but also budget, logistics and the distribution of arriv-
ing migrants and refugees. 
What did and what do the Schengen rules thus constitute? The Schengen 
Agreement and Convention neither redraw any boundaries, nor do they fix a ter-
ritory. The two legal papers, the Schengen Agreement and its Implementing 
Convention, did not bring about a legal authority for an external EU border and 
it did not create common border policies. What Schengen constitutes is the need 
for cooperation in border, migration and asylum policies. Unlike Latour’s de-
scription of a process of inscription, in which “paper always appears at the end” 
(Latour 1986: 17), these two papers thus mark the beginning (and not the con-
cealment) of displacements and mobilizations of competences in security poli-
cies in the EU. John Torpey has worked out that the Weberian state which mo-
nopolizes the legitimate means of violence is being amplified by the monopoly 
of the legitimate means of movement (Torpey 1998, 2000: 5). Schengen set this 
dual monopoly at disposal. It requested that decision over the movement of peo-
ple be mutually recognized between Schengen signatories. 
The apparent geographic shift detached the competence to restrict the liber-
ties of person without a reasonable suspicion from the locus of the geographic-
administrative border. To a certain extent, the exceptional competence of the 
border was displaced to an “elsewhere” and mobilized to relativize the monopoly 
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on the legitimate means of movement the purpose of mutual recognition in this 
area. This demonopolization was expressed in two ways. First, national borders 
at the outer edge of the constituted area were no longer merely a subject of na-
tional, but of European concern. The mutual recognition of decisions at the ex-
ternal borders resulted in an urge to standardize migration, asylum and border 
control policies. Second, the legal borders of individual rights “as regards the po-
sition and crossing of borders now derives not only from the national law but al-
so from European community law” (Guild 2001: 3). Both rights and competenc-
es are no longer commonly united on a territory and separated vis-à-vis other ter-
ritories by a border. The incongruity between rights and competences is the cen-
tral feature of postnational borders in Europe. 
The discordance on which border control is based by way of the Schengen 
Agreement has been aptly described by Tugba Basaran’s distinction between the 
geography of territory as a basis of political mapping and the geography of law 
and the space of government (Basaran 2008: 341, 2011: 1-8, 44-48): the legal 
borders of rights are still territorial, as obligations vis-à-vis third country nation-
als are limited within a territory. The legal borders of policing, however, are mo-
bilized in so far as competences no longer stop at the geographical border line as 
rights do. As the territorial congruence between the legal borders of rights and 
the legal borders of policing has been diffused by way of the Schengen arrange-
ment, different forms of operational cooperation and practical assistance were 
mobilized without a new European institution or a common legal authority. 
Effectively, the Schengen Process results from a transformed understanding 
of the meaning and functions of political borders and has in turn contributed to 
the reconfiguration and redefinition of how borders are understood and opera-
tionalized in Europe. This has further changed the way borders are theorized, 
imagined, experienced, and researched. It is hence no coincidence that the empir-
ical example of Europe’s borders has left its mark on the epistemological and 
methodological premises in border studies. In the following, I will discuss prom-
inent interpretations of Europe’s borders and the Schengen Process with regard 
to their contribution to the epistemological and methodological change they 
brought to the study of political borders in general. Étienne Balibar and Jan 
Zielonka provide early examples for a transformed understanding of borders, 
which triggered a shift in how and as what borders have become to be researched 
since the 1990s. As Georg Vobruba systematizes Zielonka’s take on borders, I 
also review his interpretation as a relatively recent analysis of the “postnational 
border constellation”. Although Giorgio Agamben’s work does not deal with a 
border conception, his homo-sacer triology has influenced both academic and ac-
tivist takes on the effects of the EU’s border on refugees and their rights and thus 
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offers an ancillary analysis of its qualities. Last but not least, I examine the net-
work analogy with regard to its contributions to border studies, particularly as it 
is advanced in the early studies of Didier Bigo. I have selected these authors be-
cause their contributions are classic examples of a transformed understanding of 
borders and, in consequence, have pioneered a transformed research design. 
 
 
2.2 EUROPE AS BORDERLAND WITH POLYSEMIC, 
HETEROGENEOUS, AND OVERDETERMINED 
BORDERS 
 
Étienne Balibar’s analysis of Europe’s borders has been particularly influential. 
His descriptions of the vacillating nature of borders have acquired a classic status 
(Balibar 1998). Moreover, his way of theorizing borders has altered the contem-
porary understanding of borders in general: borders are now studied as practices 
of control, exclusion, selection and subversion; they are studied “wherever the 
movement of information, people, and things is happening and is controlled” 
(Balibar 2002b: 71). Even though Balibar’s work has been more influential 
among continental scholars than Anglophone scholars, Chris Rumford sees him 
as the “leading theorist of Europe’s borders” (Rumford 2011: 37). In fact, the 
works of the French philosopher have affected contemporary understandings of 
borders beyond academia. The notion of ubiquitous borders (Balibar 2002b: 71) 
has been picked up by non-governmental organizations and activists alike to cri-
tique practices of social marginalization, racism and xenophobia – all matters of 
concern to Balibar – as daily occurrences in EU border policies. 
Balibar’s conceptualization of the vacillating nature of borders has provoked 
a reassessment of the relation between borders and space. According to Balibar, 
borders can be considered the point of crystallization with regard to the constitu-
tion of political space. Subsequently, analyzing them has allowed Balibar to dis-
cuss the state of democracy, as well as the concepts of citizenship and identity in 
relation to Europe. Throughout Balibar’s works, the border appears as a “meta-
institution,” which conditions all other institutions in a democracy and thus en-
compasses its antinomies (Celikates 2010: 70). Although Balibar’s thoughts on 
borders are part of his wider philosophical discussions of democracy, violence, 
universalism and citizenship, the following review restricts itself to those texts 
that explicitly deal with the borders of Europe. I will work closely with his texts 
in order to detail Balibar’s conception of borders beyond the mainstream reading 
of borders being “dispersed a little everywhere” (Balibar 2002b: 71). 
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Balibar’s first piece on borders was a book contribution in 1998 entitled “The 
Borders of Europe”. Therein Balibar elaborated on the vacillation of borders, ex-
plicitly breaking with the European consciousness of a single real identity and 
the border as “a supersensible ‘thing’ that should be or not be – here or there, a 
bit beyond (jenseits) and just short of (diesseits) its ideal ‘position,’ but always 
somewhere” (Balibar 1998: 216-217, original emphasis) With this contribution, 
Balibar clearly challenges the need to localize borders. In the lectures and texts 
that followed – the essay “World Borders, Political Borders” (Balibar 2002b)26 
and the monograph Politics and the Other Scene (Balibar 2002a)27, Balibar con-
tinuously reflects upon borders in relation to citizenship, identity, and democracy 
in Europe. His characterization of a border as overdetermined, polysemic, and 
heterogeneous (he uses the latter term as a synonym for vacillating) offers a sys-
tematic take toward a transformed understanding of borders, which diffuses no-
tions of the geographic border-line. 
The overall interest and political impetus of Balibar’s oeuvre is the concept 
and the possibility of transnational citizenship and the attempt to “civilize the no-
tion of cultural identity” (Balibar 2009: 202). He analyzes the functioning and 
enforcement of political borders with regard to these concepts. In its reception, 
his threefold characterization of political borders as overdetermined, polysemic, 
and heterogeneous, has seen a systematic bias for the latter two features. I shall 
thus deal with them in a first step, and then turn to the characteristic of overde-
termination. Reviewing Balibar’s characterization, I intend to trace why the two 
characteristics of polysemy and heterogeneity resonated more with EU border 
studies than the characteristic of overdetermination, which has been rather ne-
glected. 
 
2.2.1 Polysemy and Heterogeneity of Borders 
 
The polysemic character of borders captures the plain fact that borders are expe-
rienced differently by different people. Likewise, the crossing of borders requires 
different means from different people. While the latter notion points to the dif-
                                                           
26  The essay is a translation of a lecture which Balibar delivered in French on October 4, 
1999 during his invitation to the “Institut Français de Thessalonique” and to the De-
partment of Philosophy at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. 
27  The monograph includes two chapters on borders (“What is a border” and “The Bor-
ders of Europe”), which have been reviewed broadly but seldom been contextualized 
into the frame of his political philosophy on political space and citizenship. 
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ferentiation of legal titles, the first aspect alludes to its phenomenological virtue. 
A person from a rich country not only benefits from citizenship in a welfare 
state, but is also by means of nationality allowed a “surplus of rights – in particu-
lar, a world right to circulate unhindered” (Balibar 2002a: 82). The experience is 
one of seamless travel, of freedom from inconveniences. For a poor person from 
a poor (Muslim) country, by contrast, traveling is a hassle, starting from the visa 
procedures and the guarantee to be documented, to the checks, looks and suspi-
cions during movement. Pointing to the difference “between those who ‘circulate 
capital’ and those ‘whom capital circulates,’” Balibar sees borders as operators 
“of an international class differentiation” and as “instruments of discrimination 
and triage” (ibid). This is to say that social inequalities are not only reproduced 
and stabilized by means of borders, but that border policies function to privilege 
some while cutting off others (right to move). According to Balibar, this bears a 
“world apartheid, or a dual regime for the circulation of individuals” (ibid, orig-
inal emphasis), as the privileged have the ability to not only travel but also have 
a monopolized definition of the legitimate means of movement. 
Balibar sees the polysemic nature of borders resting on a fundamental am-
bivalence of the role of the border vis-à-vis the state. The differentiation execut-
ed by border personnel at the border supports “the notion of national citizen and, 
through that notion, a certain primacy of the public authority over social antago-
nisms” (Balibar 2002a: 82). Border guards thus not only enforce privileges, they 
represent them. Yet, with an increase in transnational traffic, public authority 
(generally, the state) is caught in the “contradictory position of having to both 
relativize and to reinforce the notion of identity and national belonging” (ibid, 
original emphasis). This double-bind illustrates that border work is a decision on 
whether movement is allowed or restricted. According to Balibar, the selection 
criteria converge not least with social inequality and racism. The differentiation 
or selection that borders operationalize has also been circumscribed by others. In 
fact, most authors identify political borders with the function of selection and the 
regulation of membership. Ulf Hedetoft, for instance, introduces the metaphor of 
the “asymmetric membrane” in order to evoke the image of borders being identi-
fied by their essential function “to protect against unwanted entrance […] from 
the other side” (Hedetoft 2003: 152). In a more technical tone, different German 
sociologists have circumscribed political borders as “sorting machines” (Mau 
2010) and “selection machines” (Kaufmann/Bröckling/Horn 2002: 7).  
Effectively, border policies present themselves differently to different peo-
ple, which results in a scattered application of rights. Furthermore, border poli-
cies play out their functions differently, not only to different people but also to 
“‘things’ and ‘people’ – not to mention what is neither thing nor person: viruses, 
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information, ideas” (Balibar 2002a: 91, original emphasis). Balibar formulates 
the “empirico-transcendental question of luggage,” which asks “whether people 
transport, send, and receive things, or whether things transport, send, and receive 
people” (ibid, original emphasis). 
The figurative question of luggage is indeed an inspiring concept to differen-
tiate power while at the same time sticking to the ambitions of symmetric an-
thropology: who moves – the airplane or the passenger?, who is moved – the mi-
grant or the refugee?, who carries/is carried?, what carries/is carried – in the case 
of a boat: the water or the vehicle?, and what about carrier sanctions and the ar-
rangement of luggage during return flights? I by no means intend to adopt a dis-
respectful tone when taking human beings for “luggage”. Rather, I attempt to 
gauge a systematic concept by which the power dynamics around the legitimate 
means of movement and the rules of transportation can be explored further. For 
it is not only about the allowance to move – as was the case for Torpey’s exam-
ple of the passport – but also about the resources, capacities and vehicles to do so 
and to be transported en route. Determining whether politics are applied and 
rights guaranteed for the carrier or the luggage is an important distinction to 
characterize the mode of politics at work on this age of migration and mobility. 
 
Let us go back to Balibar’s characterization of political borders and his second 
characteristic: the heterogeneity of borders describes the changing nature of bor-
ders as a transformation from a localizable phenomenon to a vacillating one. Ac-
cording to Balibar, borders “are no longer localizable in an unequivocal fashion” 
(Balibar 2002a: 91). Without a localizable anchor to control practices, the term 
border “is profoundly changing in meaning” (Balibar 2002b: 71). Yet, counter to 
notions of a borderless word, Balibar opposes that rather than disappearing, 
“borders are being both multiplied and reduced in their localization and their 
function; they are being thinned out and doubled, becoming border zones, re-
gions, or countries where one can reside and live” (Balibar 2002a: 92). This di-
agnosis of a vacillating appearance or apparition of borders as areas, points, or 
situations offers a conceptual departure from the borderline as the only imagina-
ble spatial form of political borders. In this context, the following quotation has 
acquired an almost archetypal status. 
 
“The borders of new politico-economic entities, in which an attempt is being made to pre-
serve the functions of the sovereignty of the state, are no longer at all situated at the outer 
limit of territories: they are dispersed a little everywhere, wherever the movement of in-
formation, people, and things is happening and is controlled.” (Balibar 2002b: 71) 
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The resulting proliferation of borders has been accepted and reproduced widely 
among border scholars. To a certain extent, Balibar has given an answer to 
Georg Kreis’s (2010: 86) question of “what remains of borders once they have 
been suspended.” What remains is practices of control, the sovereign compe-
tence to restrict the liberties of others. The difference is that the asymmetric 
power of policing which had been restricted before to the locus of the adminis-
trative border line is now extended to situations which are defined as border 
crossings. Balibar illustrates this “heterogeneity” or “vacillation” of borders by 
deploying spatial metaphors, some of which describe the new spatiality of bor-
ders by simply negating its “old” territorial state, but maintaining the need to lo-
calize them. Borders “are no longer at the border” (Balibar 1998: 217). At the 
same time, the heterogeneity of borders stems from a corresponding proliferation 
of control competences. Securing borders is equal to securing sovereignty – that 
is, borders are not marginal or peripheral “to the constitution of a public sphere 
but rather are at the center” (Balibar 2002b: 72). In terms of political space as 
public sphere, borders are a central institution. In terms of their locus and the lo-
cus of practices of inclusion and exclusion, borders are “dispersed a little every-
where, wherever the movement of information, people, and thing is happening 
and is controlled” (ibid: 71). Studying borders means researching control prac-
tices and the struggles they provoke. The focus is on encounters between en-
forcement authorities and deviants. 
Additionally, the concept of the vacillating border does not localize the Other 
as a foe on the other side of the border. With his elaborations on “the other sce-
ne,” Balibar remains consistent with his conceptualization of borders as well as 
in his construction of the alterity projected by vacillating borders. Drawing on 
the Freudian notion of the “other scene” as “the representation of the essential 
heterogeneity of psychic processes,” Balibar (2002a: xii, original emphasis) 
evokes “the no less essential heterogeneity of political processes”. 
 
“[T]he other scene of politics is also the scene of the other, where the visible-
incomprehensible victims and enemies are located at the level of fantasy. Secrecy, coun-
ter-information, and fantasmatic otherness must have some common root; at least they 
produce conjoint effects.” (Balibar 2002a: xiii, original emphasis) 
 
The primacy of imagination applies here as well. The other appears in imagining 
him or her, and not through contact or encounters. 
Overall, the reception of Balibar’s analysis has been dominated by dissolving 
the geographical-physical connotation of political borders and shifting it to an 
understanding of borders as social practices. The new ubiquity of borders has in-
spired new research agendas. Effectively, the characteristic of heterogeneity has 
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been read and researched as practices of social and racial discrimination. How-
ever, with an increasing number of practices being studied as border, it has been 
“obscured” (Johnson et al. 2011: 61) what a border actually is. Even though I 
share this critique, I doubt that it can at all be determined what a border actually 
is. This is due to the spectral character of any border, which will be further elab-
orated in section 3.1. 
 
2.2.2 Overdetermination and the World-Configuring 
Function of Borders 
 
With the characteristic of overdetermination, Balibar emphasizes more than the 
mere acknowledgement of borders being cultural and historical products – a de-
scription he considers “commonplace of history textbooks” (Balibar 2002a: 79). 
Any border is overdetermined in so far as it is never “the mere boundary be-
tween two states” (ibid). A border incorporates an interrelation to an imagination 
of global order. Each individual border sanctions, reduplicates or relativizes the 
world ordering ideology, or “super-border” (Balibar 2009: 195). 
Any given political border is legitimized and stabilized by echoing the super-
border. As a consequence, it incorporates a “double meaning, local and global” 
(Balibar 2009: 201, original emphasis). The “‘partition’ or ‘distribution’ of the 
World space” enacted by means of operationalizing a border “reflects the regime 
of meaning and power under which the World is represented as a ‘unity’ of dif-
ferent ‘parts’” (ibid). For example, as a synecdoche for the separation of the 
world into East and West during the Cold War period, the Berlin Wall illustrates 
the idea of overdetermination almost as an ideal type. The confrontation between 
capitalism and socialism is the super-border for the individual borders between 
camps, blocs, and states. Balibar also mentions the example of the European co-
lonial empires, which overdetermined political decompositions between the 1494 
Treaty of Tordesillas and the Cold War period.28 According to him, the durability 
of borders largely stems from their world-configuring function, and thus from 
the rationale and the imagination of order that is dominant in world politics. 
“Without the world-configuring function they perform, there would be no bor-
ders – or no lasting borders” (Balibar 2002a: 79, original emphasis). According-
ly, what stabilizes political borders is not to be found their material robustness or 
terrestrial grounding. They are stable rather because they have become internal-
                                                           
28 Carl Schmitt (2003 [1950]: 86-100) identified the modern overdetermination as global 
linear thinking. 
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ized as an “essential reference of […] collective, communal sense” (ibid: 78) and 
are thus thought of as natural, good, necessary, or even existential. 
Moreover, the philosopher emphasizes that a border’s overdetermination – 
that is, the fact that a border “is always overdetermined, and in that sense sanc-
tioned, reduplicated and relativized by other geopolitical divisions […] is by no 
means incidental or contingent; it is intrinsic” (Balibar 2002a: 79, original em-
phasis). Without a particular worldview, no border of this particular kind would 
emerge. The kind of border narrowly depends on political ideology and imagina-
tion of the world, which is intrinsic to border policies. According to Balibar, 
what happens at Europe’s external borders says more about how we look at the 
world than about what is happening in the world. He underlines the relation be-
tween an imaginary pattern of political space (worldview), and the concrete re-
ality of border policies and the practices of border control. 
 
While I have discussed Schengen borders from the perspective of negotiating the 
national and the European frame of border policies, the characteristic of overde-
termination adds the question about distinguishing a rationality of order on a 
global scale. In the context of an emerging border to the EU, the question of 
world-configuration understood as the search for the super-border and an ideolo-
gy that bestows the practical division of the globe with a sense of legitimate or-
der is left indeterminate and un-ascertained. Balibar, however, sees competition 
with regard to bestowing rationality to the bordering process in Europe: compet-
ing frames formulate the super-border. In the Alexander von Humboldt lecture 
titled “Europe as borderland,” which Balibar gave at Nijmegen University in 
November 2004, he presented an analysis of different schemes of the spatial-
political projections which are at work in the political organization of space and 
borders in Europe.29 Balibar sees “four different (and conflicting) schemes of 
projection of the figure of Europe within the global world” (Balibar 2009: 190, 
original emphasis): the clash-of-civilizations pattern; the global network pattern; 
the center–periphery pattern; and the crossover pattern. These “four conflicting 
patterns of ‘political spaces’” (ibid: 194, original emphasis) differ both in their 
construction of Europe and their representation of borders. According to Balibar, 
different patterns are “associated with opposite policies concerning nationality 
and citizenship, residence and mobility, activity and security: in short, they are 
                                                           
29 The lecture was published as an equally titled essay in Environment and Planning D 
in 2009. Quotations have been taken from the 2009 article rather than from the 2004 
lecture. 
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opposite ways of ‘constituting’ Europe (or, possibly, resisting its constitution)” 
(ibid, original emphasis). The figure of the border is turned into the hallmark 
with regard to the concretization and manifestation of that concept. He argues 
that each pattern: 
 
“is not only a way to figure a ‘political space,’ involving a different idea of the intrinsic re-
lationship between politics and spatiality, it is also a different way to understand what a 
‘border’ exactly means, how it works and how it is reproduced” (Balibar 2009: 201). 
 
The first pattern of differentiation is the clash-of-civilizations pattern (Balibar 
2009: 194-196). Operating on a civilizational super-border, this pattern deploys 
notions of Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” and Carl Schmitt’s 
“Grossräume,” and differentiates along an essentialist understanding of religion, 
culture, and belonging. The figure of the border might be phenomenologically 
fuzzy and dispersed, but its legal and political operationalization is sharp. The 
political border appears as guarantor of law and order and requires terrestrial 
grounding as a clear line of demarcation. Imagining political space and political 
border in terms of the second, the global network pattern means thinking politics 
in terms of connections, flows, and processes of circulation. As a result, the pro-
jection of the global network “embodies the idea of a limit of traditional repre-
sentations of political spaces, the reaching of a point where the political space 
becomes hardly representable” (Balibar 2009: 196). Projecting the center-
periphery pattern to the political space of Europe means sketching interdepend-
encies and strategic alliances. In accordance with world system theory, the cen-
ter-periphery pattern evokes the EU with border areas, zones, or marches ar-
ranged as concentric circles. Balibar sees these images being productive when 
EU enlargement and integration is discussed. This pattern also underpins the 
analysis of the European Neighborhood Policy (EPN). In this projection, politi-
cal borders are instruments and institutions of political diplomacy and bargaining 
and express the reach of European integration. Fourth, the crossover pattern cor-
responds to Balibar’s vision of “Europe as a borderland”. Albeit critical about 
the state of Europe, the philosopher evokes the potential of Europe as a border-
land, a “land” which constructively lives on the in-between status and radical 
democracy; with the heterogeneity of issues, religions, people and cultures of its 
place. A “land” of liminality which thus goes for radical democracy, rather than 
exceptional decisions. As a borderland, the construction of Europe has an inte-
grative and civilizing potential. Because it offers a meeting point for the many, 
Europe is always becoming. In Balibar’s vision, the heterogeneity and differ-
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ences of people, cultures, and religions in Europe will neither clash nor integrate, 
but demand an “unending process of translation” (Balibar 2009: 209). 
 
“‘Borderland’ is the name of the place where the opposites flow into one another, where 
‘strangers’ can be at the same time stigmatized and indiscernible from ‘ourselves,’ where 
the notion of citizenship, involving at the same time community and universality, once 
again confronts its intrinsic antinomies.” (Balibar 2009: 210) 
 
Balibar’s own conception of “Europe as a borderland” – a notion he formulated 
as a vision and a conceptual basis for radical critique – resonates with the politi-
cal will of an open Europe despite all odds. 
In sum, a central aspect of Balibar’s border conception is his diagnosis that 
the authority to enforce borders is no longer located and thereby restricted to the 
territorial border as a geographically defined administrative place. Sovereignty 
has split, both with regards to its “targets” and with regard to its function, and al-
lows for ubiquitous (border) control practices. This leads to a proliferation of 
control practices in kind and in location. Balibar thereby directs attention to 
those forms of sovereign control that “prevail” despite the Schengen induced 
abolishment of internal borders within Europe, and despite the announcement of 
a borderless world. With his emphasis on the vacillation and ubiquity of borders, 
Balibar stresses that borders are not abolished nor dissolved, but rather trans-
formed and multiplied. However, the reception of ubiquitous and vacillating 
borders, as well as the diagnosed proliferation of borders has obscured what their 
political character actually is. The vague conflation (and sometimes suggestive 
inversion) of geography and polity, geographic-juridical borders and practices of 
security personnel (be it border guards, police, or civilians), led to a translation 
of spatial metaphors into the realm of political constitutionalism. Balibar ap-
proaches borders as practices of segregation, of subversion and control, of vio-
lent inequality. In doing so, he could show that bordering not only occurs along 
territorial lines. In addition, dissolving them doesn’t dissolve discrimination and 
violence. Yet, in turn, this wide understanding contributes to a conceptual uncer-
tainty with regard to the political border, its field and object of research. 
 
 
2.3 EUROPE AS EMPIRE WITH MEDIEVAL, 
COSMOPOLITAN OR POSTNATIONAL BORDERS 
 
Conceiving of Europe as an empire deviates strongly from Balibar’s notion of 
borderland, particularly with regard to the envisioned role of a political Europe 
in the world. While the notion of borderland embodies a sort of low threshold 
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dealing with alterity, the concept of empire works “to maintain the fiction of a 
‘high point’” (Rumford 2011: 90). In a borderland, borders are the point in time 
and space where things can turn into their radical opposites. They demand radi-
cal democracy yet elicit a global apartheid. Under these premises, thinking and 
researching political borders means examining the struggles of daily practices of 
border enforcement and subversion. It can also mean encountering radical exclu-
sion and discrimination; these “findings” are in turn related to the constitution of 
the border. By contrast, borders in an empire are fuzzy and soft. They are negoti-
ated and negotiable arrangements, which can be examined by looking at institu-
tional decision-making, legislation, and processes of regional integration. 
The description of Europe as an empire has been deployed most influentially 
in two quite different works: first, in Jan Zielonka’s (2006) Europe as Empire: 
The Nature of the Enlarged EU and second in Ulrich Beck’s and Edgar Grande’s 
(2007) Cosmopolitan Europe. The deployment of the term empire is justified on 
opposite premises. In the case of Zielonka, it was a critique on the tone in EU en-
largement policy in the case. In the case of Beck and Grande, it was as invoca-
tion of the “last politically effective utopia” (Beck/Grande 2007: 2).30 While 
Zielonka describes the EU as neo-medieval empire with a scattered public sphere 
and scattered legal zones, Beck and Grande envision the EU as a cosmopolitan 
empire, which bears the potential of universal integration, but lacks its construc-
tion from below. Whereas Zielonka uses the term with the impetus of “a polemic 
response to the mainstream literature on European integration” (Zielonka 2006: 
2), Beck and Grande affirmatively use the term to call for a cosmopolitan Eu-
rope. 
According to Beck and Grande, statehood and sovereignty (Ger: Herrschaft) 
can be reconceptualized with regard to the political form of Europe, namely 
“through a new conception of empire freed from imperialistic and nationalistic 
connotations, one which must be opened up in a cosmopolitan fashion and reori-
ented toward consensus and law” (Beck/Grande 2007: 94). Zielonka, by contrast, 
deploys the term to precisely criticize the imperialistic behavior of the EU in its 
neighborhood policies (even more pronounced in Zielonka 2008, 2013a, 2013b). 
The efforts of the EU in its neighborhood are “truly imperial in the sense that the 
EU tries to impose domestic constraints on other actors through various forms of 
                                                           
30 A thorough discussion comparing the two works and their different notions of empire 
has been provided by Chris Rumford. He concludes that “empire (in any formulation) 
is not a satisfactory framework within which to understand European transformations” 
as it cannot get rid of the hybris of the high point (Rumford 2011: 90-109, here 90). 
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economic and political domination” (Zielonka 2008: 471). The metaphor of the 
empire – once deployed to criticize and envision – is used to depart from the 
Westphalian model of state as the ideal of polity and as the analytical frame for 
the study of the political, cultural, economic, and legal transformations of an ‘ev-
er closer’ Europe. 
 
2.3.1 Thinking Beyond the Westphalian Model: 
Neo-Medieval or Cosmopolitan Polity? 
 
Despite their opposite inclinations, both perspectives depart from a perceived in-
adequacy of the Weberian state as a model to analyze contemporary EU polity. 
The role of borders comes into play when the empire defines its shape and limits, 
as well as in its relation to the environment. Zielonka presents the neo-medieval 
alternative while Beck and Grande’s advocated alternative is cosmopolitan. How 
do these different analyses of the construction of Europe relate first to the notion 
of Europe’s borders and second to the Schengen rules? 
Generally, the works of Zielonka are less concerned with the nature of Eu-
rope’s borders as such. The appearance of borders is rather taken as symptom of 
EU polity, which Zielonka examines with regard to the Union’s enlargement 
process and its neighborhood policy in the East and the Mediterranean. As a con-
sequence of the enlargement process, but also as general implication of the EU’s 
neighborhood policy, clear lines of demarcation are given up and the notion of 
“soft borders in flux” (Zielonka 2006: 2, 167) is adopted. Enlargement not only 
constantly sets European borders and thus the notion of a defined and stable po-
litical entity at disposal. Moreover, according to Zielonka, “enlargement renders 
the rise of the European state impossible” (ibid: 9).  
Zielonka draws the conclusion that European polity should not be analyzed 
by superimposing a comparison with the Westphalian model of polity. He sug-
gests the ‘neo-medieval empire’ as an alternative lens. By applying the medieval 
paradigm, three aspects gain visibility. First, a divergence in the different func-
tions of borders from one geographical (territorial) border line to the overlap of 
different authorities. Second, a polycentric system of authority and multiple loy-
alties. And third, the imperial and “evangelizing” character of EU relations in its 
neighborhood (Zielonka 2013b: 5-6). By describing Europe’s borders in resem-
blance to a “medieval” setting, the taken for granted geographical or territorial 
connotation of borders is opened up for a way of thinking political borders be-
yond the Westphalian state. 
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“One of the advantages of the medieval paradigm is that it represents a perfect contrast to 
the dominant Westphalian paradigm. The Westphalian paradigm is about the concentration 
of power, sovereignty and distinct identities, while the medieval one is about overlapping 
authorities, divided sovereignty and multiple identities. The Westphalian paradigm is 
about fixed and relatively hard borderlines, while the medieval one is about soft border 
zones that undergo regular adjustments. The Westphalian paradigm is about military im-
positions and containment, while the medieval one is about the export of laws and modes 
of governance.” (Zielonka 2013b: 6) 
 
In this perspective, borders are not part of foreign relations. They are part of 
neighborhood policy, for without the Westphalian state; there can be no such in-
ternational system. Similarly, Beck and Grande strongly emphasize the need to 
strip off the “conceptual straightjacket of methodological nationalism” 
(Beck/Grande 2007: xii). And still, according to Beck and Grande, Europe as 
cosmopolitan empire31 inevitably comes with five dilemmas: the universalistic 
dilemma, the integration dilemma, the insecurity dilemma, the boundary dilem-
ma, and the peace dilemma. Embracing the notion of cosmopolitan borders 
would then mean to accept Europe’s “boundary dilemma,” that is, the dialectic 
“of opening and closing of borders” (ibid: 261-262) and of overcoming and pre-
serving the national. It would mean accepting “shared uncertainties and shared 
dilemmas” (ibid: 263). 
This identity-generating dedication and transfiguration to dilemmas, that is, 
to concepts and situations offering two options – none of which brings a satisfy-
ing result – is essential to Beck’s and Grande’s construction of Europe. This re-
silient dealing with antagonisms also underpins the notion of “borderland” put 
forward by Balibar. Balibar (2002a: 82), however, differentiates between the po-
tential of a vision of European policies and the (what he terms) “double-bind” of 
contemporary EU border policies. 
While Balibar cautions the anti-democratic condition of the border itself, in-
dependent of the political entity which operates it, Beck and Grande problema-
                                                           
31 Beck and Grande (2007: 60-71) identify ten features fundamental to the European 
Empire: 1) asymmetrical political order, 2) open and variable spatial structure with 
flexible and mobile borders, 3) multinational societal structure, 4) integration through 
law, consensus and cooperation, 5) welfare versus security, 6) horizontal and vertical 
institutional integration, 7) network power, 8) cosmopolitan sovereignty, 9) ambiva-
lence of delimitation and delineation, and 10) emancipatory versus repressive cosmo-
politanism. 
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tize whether a society “whose key features is the political variability of its geo-
graphical boundaries” still counts as one society (Beck/Grande 2007: 94). 
Both Zielonka’s as well as Beck and Grande’s elaborations on Europe’s bor-
ders address the idea of the Union’s borders. Meanwhile, the Schengen Agree-
ment and its rules for the operationalization of border control are put aside, either 
as an example of geographic differentiation in the case of Beck and Grande 
(2007: 247), or as an envisaged “hard border regime” of which “a growing body 
of evidence suggests that the system is unduly harsh, impractical, and at odds 
with the Union’s main foreign policy objectives” (Zielonka 2006: 3). In 2013, 
Zielonka repeated that “[i]n contemporary Europe borders are also remarkably 
fuzzy despite the Schengen system” (Zielonka 2013b: 5). In both conceptions, 
Schengen borders thus differ from the borders of the European Union. This is 
demonstrated when contextualizing the standard quotation used when referring 
to Zielonka’s portrayal of Europe’s border: “[i]n due time, […] will probably be 
less territorial, less physical, and less visible” (Zielonka 2006: 4). However, this 
characterization is preceded by a discrimination between the idea of the Europe-
an Union and the Schengen Process – “indeed, the Union is likely to end up with 
soft border zones in flux rather than with hard and fixed external borderlines as 
envisaged by Schengen” (ibid). While his assessment of Europe’s polity takes up 
the non-finality of the Union, and while the “soft borders in flux” stand for the 
possibility to negotiate and design foreign policies, Schengen, in Zielonka’s 
view, stands for the reverse impetus, that is, the search for clear and fixed exter-
nal borderlines and for the notion of a fortress Europe. In his view, not a  
 
“‘fortress Europe,’ but a ‘maze Europe’ is likely to emerge […]. In such a ‘maze Europe’ 
different legal, economic, security, and cultural spaces are likely to be bound separately, 
cross-border multiple cooperation will flourish, and the inside/outside divide will be 
blurred. In due time, the EU’s borders will probably be less territorial, less physical, and 
less visible. They will not look like fortified lines on the ground, but like zones where 
people and their identities mingle. In this sense, they will resemble the borders of a neo-
medieval Europe rather than the borders of a Westphalian Europe.” (Zielonka 2006: 4) 
 
The construction of Europe and the Schengen system work on conflicting prem-
ises with regard to their respective constructions of Europe. Focusing on the Un-
ion’s polity under the condition of Eastern enlargement, Zielonka analyzes the 
institutional forms of a construction of Europe. 
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2.3.2 Europe and its Postnational (Border) Constellation 
 
Georg Vobruba, whose research aims to sharpen the conception of political bor-
ders beyond the territorial and Westphalian frame (Vobruba 2010: 434-435), ab-
stracts a large number of Zielonka’s observations to formulate the conception of 
“the postnational border constellation.”32  Drawing on the works of Maurizio 
Bach and Rainer Lepsius, the sociologist advances an analysis of Europe’s bor-
ders as object of negotiations in the process of European institutional integration. 
From this perspective, borders are conceptualized as institutions. Vobruba 
gauges the characteristics of the postnational constellation by analysis of the 
transformation of political sovereignty and of political borders. In his exposition, 
the term “postnational” points to a political setup in which different spatial 
frames compete.33 Thus, in the postnational constellation, this competition un-
derpins and reconfigures the functioning and meaning of political sovereignty 
and political borders (Vobruba 2012: 5). In the case of the European postnational 
constellation, Vobruba notes that institutional integration is increasingly Europe-
an, while social integration remains national in outlook. The institutional integra-
tion is thus further advanced than the integration of the people. The tension be-
tween the national frame and the European frame is amplified by two factors: 
First, Europe’s integration-elite and the common European man or woman are 
not aligned by the direct representation of interests. It comes to a situation in 
which the elites are trying to convince the people that European integration 
would be beneficial to them. These attempts, however, elicit skepticism rather 
than trust, for their perception is that national sacrifices are requested for a com-
mon Europe. Second, the national elites refer to the European frame in a manner 
that helps them score in the national frame. According to Vobruba “political 
spaces are constituted by the mutual interrelation of institution building and so-
cial relations” (ibid: 3). The (political) space between an institutionally ever in-
tegrating Europe and the number of national actors reluctant to European social 
integration is full of tension.  
                                                           
32 The postnational constellation has been described by Jürgen Habermas in an essay 
collection (2001 [1998]). At the center of Habermas’s concern is the democratic or-
ganization of political representation and control following the congruent form of the 
nation-state. Vobruba does not take Habermas’ normative stance; he is rather interest-
ed in the observation of institutional change by ‘the people’ (Ger.: die Leute). 
33 In 1993 Hermann Schwengel already formulated that the competition of spatial frames 
will be central to European politics (Schwengel 1993). 
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“The sociology of Europe incorporates the different perspectives on these tensions in a dif-
ferentiation between the national and European levels, and relates them to institution-
building.” (Vobruba 2008: 34-35) 
 
The tension between the national and the European level is thus an endogenous 
factor to the emergence of the EU’s external border as institution. Therefore, 
Vobruba argues that Europe’s borders are best analyzed from the perspective of 
a European sociology, which focusses on the competition between the national 
and the European policy level as a spatial frame for the fulfillment of needs. Ac-
cording to Vobruba, European sociology should be developed from the starting 
point of this tension – that is, from the “difference national/European” (Vobruba 
2008: 34). The described tension can be seen more clearly under the premises of 
a transformed concept of political sovereignty, which Vobruba presents as “legit-
imized by output” (Vobruba 2012: 58). In brief, postnational sovereignty is 
based on the evaluation of the performance of governance. The national and the 
European political ‘caterer’ compete for acceptance and the public attribution of 
sovereignty. 
Against this methodological background Vobruba (2010, 2012) presents a 
threefold characterization of the postnational border constellation: First, under 
the condition of the postnational border constellation, political borders no longer 
condense all functions of social closure, but are rather characterized by their dis-
sociation. He argues that “processes of functional differentiation across space” 
alters the functioning of segmentary, political borders (Vobruba 2012: 111). 
Second, under the condition of a postnational border constellation, the operation 
of border is subject to negotiation. Borders are thus subject to and dependent on 
negotiations (Ger.: verhandlungsabhängig). Third, in the postnational constella-
tion, the permeability of political borders is operated hand in hand with selectivi-
ty. In other words: Borders are characterized by a selective permeability. In 2010 
Vobruba described the dissociation of different functions of social closure – once 
condensed in the political border of the nation-state – with reference to Maurizio 
Bach (2010: 159), who draws on Max Weber’s remarks on open and closed so-
cial relations (Weber 1972: 23-35). Vobruba sees that the  
 
“functions of borders to define economic, cultural, linguistic and political spaces – and 
where applicable to close them – are no longer merged. It is rather the case that a complex 
pattern of overlapping, yet not coinciding, spaces is developing.” (Vobruba 2010: 443) 
 
In certain respects, the dissociation of the different functions of social closure is 
not only a characteristic of the postnational border constellation, but brings it 
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about. The first is both impetus to the latter as well as its characteristic. In con-
sequence, individuals and groups negotiate their access to privileges or rights, to 
economic relations or political participation, along different boundaries and affil-
iations. In the case of Europe’s borders, this dissociation is partly triggered by 
the constituting four freedoms of the European Communities: the free movement 
of goods, persons, services and capital. These four freedoms have not only in-
spired the dissociation of labor and capital from national economies (Vobruba 
2010: 439), they also render the responsibilities and competences of social and 
legal systems ambiguous, unclear and diffuse. 
The description of overlapping spaces, which are also to be found to a certain 
degree in Balibar, Zielonka, Beck and Grande, describes the new neither in terms 
of form nor content but rather in terms of overlaps and simultaneity; according to 
Vobruba, however, this remains unsatisfactory. 
He first observed that the functions of closure are no longer coinciding at 
borders, portraying the phenomenon, following Bach, as a characteristic of the 
postnational border constellation in 2010. He then spelled out this process in 
2012 with the help of the theory of functional differentiation, asking for the re-
quirements and qualitative changes that functional differentiation pose on seg-
mentary, political borders. Vobruba suggests that “processes of functional differ-
entiation spanning manifold spaces” (Vobruba 2012: 111) change the function-
ing of segmentary, political borders (that is, nation-state borders). For, as differ-
ent institutions and actors observe functional differentiation and thus think in 
those terms, this kind of differentiation occurs in addition to the traditional dif-
ferentiation whenever political borders are enforced. In the course of time, na-
tion-state borders are not only reconsidered, but also given a new mandate. 
The second attribute of the postnational border constellation consists in the 
empirical observation that border policies depend on negotiations and that their 
permeability is subject to bargaining agreements. Even though borders have al-
ways been subject to political bargaining, the issue concerns the routing and the 
geographic course of borders, which was seen as resistant to negotiation. The 
dependence on negotiations in the case of the postnational constellation is differ-
ent: the negotiations do not revolve around the course of a given border which 
would require the acceptance of the two parties on both sides; they rather con-
cern the quality and the functions of social closure (Vobruba 2012: 102, empha-
sis added). In this frame, the conditions attached to mobility across a given bor-
der are far more cumbersome and contested than the course of that border. 
Moreover, these conditions are part of political negotiations on development aid, 
trade agreements, readmission agreements, and the like. The right to move has 
turned into a traded resource that is particularly at stake in the EU neighborhood 
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policies. According to Vobruba, the essentially new characteristic in this constel-
lation is that a core object of statist sovereignty has turned into a matter for nego-
tiations and transnational cooperation (ibid: 102). At the same time, this also 
means that the monopoly on the legitimate means of movement (Torpey 1998) is 
challenged, in the sense that it is not only transferred to the European level but 
subject to international diplomacy. 
The third attribute concerns the permeability of borders. Even though it is 
common ground that borders cannot be hermetically closed, their permeability 
both justifies border control and proves it inefficient. However, the characteristic 
of selective permeability (Ger.: selektive Durchlässigkeit) does not merely stress 
that access is regulated by the sovereign authority, access and mobility rights are 
rather negotiated between governments or administrations and their counterpart, 
in the sense of the second characteristic. In the postnational border constellation, 
the permeability of political borders thus entails an active selectivity. In the case 
of Europe’s postnational border constellation, the question of who is allowed to 
move and cross Europe’s borders is negotiated between European governments 
and their counterpart in third countries. The modern understanding of sovereign-
ty is thereby contested, as the selection at the border is no longer undertaken by a 
state. The selection and its criteria are rather themselves negotiated between the 
parties on both sides of a border (Vobruba 2012: 106). As a result, the permea-
bility of Europe’s borders is exposed to political and diplomatic negotiations. In 
this context, the Other turns into a strategic partner. 
Finally, institution building in European border policies is described as a 
process of “deficient institutionalization” (Ger.: defizitäre Institutionalisierung), 
a compromise based on the lowest common denominator. Deficits in the process 
of integration must constantly be fixed, thus spurring further integration. This in-
crementalism can either be evaluated as a muddling through or as a quite prag-
matic approach to get things done.  
Methodologically these different analyses entail that borders are analyzed as 
negotiated and negotiable institutions. To the researcher both the bargaining pro-
cesses as well as the policy results are of concern when studying the develop-
ment of the EU external border as institution. Under this methodological premise 
the focus departs from a given border being identified with the specific functions 
it fulfills, such as migration control, customs control or the protection of a com-
munity from foreign threats, and falls back on the border as an institutionalized 
process (rule) to legitimately claim authority (cf. Müller 2013). 
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2.3.3 Sovereign Europe, the Border as Exceptional Institution, 
and Bordering as Exceptional Practices 
 
Taking an approach that is in some ways diametrically opposed, the Italian phi-
losopher Giorgio Agamben developed his argument not in terms of the reach of 
institutionalized common EU rules, but rather with regard to exceptions to the 
rule of law, and the observation that the exception is becoming the rule. 
Agamben (1998, 2000, 2005) initiated an analysis of Europe’s borders that 
foregrounds legal structures and sheds light on the relation between individual 
and power, which, he, in his Homo-Sacer-series, explores as the interrelation be-
tween sovereign power and bare life. His conceptions of “bare life,” “homo 
sacer,” “exception,” “the camp,” and “sovereign power” attracted explosive at-
tention. Moreover, in this reading of Agamben’s work, the refugee began to ap-
pear as the constitutive figure of the border itself, while, at the same time, the 
concept of the homo sacer offered to theorize what was empirically contested 
along Europe’s borders. Through the lenses of Agamben’s work, the border or 
rather its constitutive practices of selection are conceived of and analyzed as ex-
ception. In this way, the border is analyzed both as institution – when its excep-
tional power is spotted and as practices of subversion, struggle, and contestation 
– when rights are claimed in vain. 
Elspeth Guild already argued in 2001 that “[t]he individual with rights accru-
ing from the different levels is the catalyst for the redefinition of European bor-
ders” (Guild 2001: 3). Agamben successfully proposed concepts for studying 
these reconfigurations. Agamben’s generalized exception has been reframed as 
the generalized biopolitical border by Nick Vaughan-Williams (2012) who lo-
cates the border “where exceptional measures, practices and characteristics for-
merly associated with borders between states in the conventional sense become 
routinised and dispersed throughout global juridical-political space.” (ibid: 108) 
Although this has been widely debated (cf. Rajaram/Grundy-Warr 2004; Darling 
2009), Agamben himself did not propose Europe-bound refugees or migrants as 
an example of homines sacri. He did, however, take on board Hannah Arendt’s 
observation of rights being only applicable to those individuals who are still in-
tegrated in society and in the state-system: the citizens. Agamben argues that 
“the paradox is that precisely the figure that should have embodied human rights 
more than any other – namely the refugee – marked instead the radical crisis of 
the concept” (Agamben 2000: 18). Recently, however, his priviledged position 
in EU border and migration studies has been subject to greater critical scrutiny 
(cf. Schindel 2017; Whitley 2017; Owens 2009).  
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2.4 NETWORK EUROPE 
AND NETWORKED (NON-)BORDERS 
 
When it comes to unbundling the spatial imagination of the territorial container, 
and with it the notion of the Westphalian state, the metaphor of the network and 
the description of the network society have provided a widely accepted alterna-
tive. In fact, imaginations of networks “dissolve the classic images of the state as 
a machine, as an organism or as a territorial body” (Kaufmann 2007: 7). The 
graphical model by which the notion of network represents the ordering of polit-
ical and social relations is “a flatly hierarchized, modularly arranged, and com-
municative tightly coupled matrix” (ibid). In the imagination, relations are based 
on communication, on flow, are themselves flow. Electronic communication 
technology unhitches the terrestrial ground as the basis and medium of sociation. 
While territorial spaces are characterized by the quality of being exclusive 
(Simmel), networks are non-exclusive, as individuals and groups can be part of 
different networks at the same time. The network metaphor is thus also deployed 
to evoke notions of individual freedom and of emancipation (not only from the 
local). It stresses possibilities and choices, rather than circumstances and exclu-
sivity. Networks are essentially detached from territory or terrestrial obligations 
or restrictions. However, if political relations, if the state’s body is imagined as 
network, what happens to its borders? Where are the limits in the assignment and 
ordering of modules and communication hubs? Is there a place which political 
borders hold, in the fluid world of network? 
In 1993, John Ruggie already described a “space of flow” as the “nonterrito-
rial global economic region” which is “premised on […] the ‘sovereign im-
portance of movement,’ not of place” (Ruggie 1993: 172-173, quoting Lat-
timore). This space of flow, which according to Castells (2008: 42) is the materi-
al basis of the network society, is “operating in real time, [and] […] exists along-
side the spaces-of-places that we call national economies” (Ruggie 1993: 172). 
When Ruggie and also Castells selected the term to describe a relation of flux 
and movement, their examples did not primarily refer to individuals and the free 
movement of persons, but were concerned with industrial production and the pe-
culiar characteristics of global chains of production. Networks initially were 
thought to supersede national economies. Kenichi Ohmae’s (1990) borderless 
world is an interlinked global market; the political function of borders is obsolete 
in this scenario. What Ruggie, Castells but also other globalization theorists 
haunted during the 1990s, was the question whether global was an obstinate 
phenomenon, a space of its own, beyond territory or, as some framed it, deterri-
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torialized. Worldwide economic interconnectivity seemed to suggest just that. 
Ruggie observes 
 
“a remarkable growth in transnational microeconomic links over the past thirty years or 
so, comprising markets and production facilities that are designated by the awkward term 
‘offshore’ – as though they existed in some ethereal space waiting to be reconceived by an 
economic equivalent of relativity theory. In this offshore area, sourcing, production, and 
marketing are organized within ‘global factories,’ in some instances ‘global offices,’ and 
most recently the ‘global lab’ – real-time transnational information flows being the raw 
material of all three.” (Ruggie 1993: 141, emphasis added) 
 
To some extent, global in this formulation as offshore meant “elsewhere.” Else-
where, where the tax system is more convenient, and where workers’ rights are 
less demanding for the employer. Elsewhere is beyond local or national obliga-
tions. Elsewhere is beyond the control of the public sphere. Global as non-
territorial appears as the space without restrictions, neither of terrestrial gravity 
nor of national bureaucracies or legal systems.  
With regard to the network’s applicability to political spatial forms, Balibar 
notes that “the global network also embodies the idea of a limit of traditional 
representations of political spaces, the reaching of a point where the political 
space becomes hardly representable” (Balibar 2009: 196). However, this is not 
the case for political relations which can be imagined as networked or imagined 
to function in a network-centric way. This is at the bottom of Bigo’s analysis of 
Europe and its borders. In 1996 Bigo saw that the practices of control and sur-
veillance that the police enacted with individuals in Europe were reconfigured 
toward networked policing and remote control (Bigo 1996: 13). This transfor-
mation is based on and expressed by multiple changes: changes with regard to 
the objectives of surveillance and control, with regard to technology, with regard 
to the legitimate location of surveillance and control, and with regard to the con-
ception of security. In his analysis, Bigo relates the rise of the new field of inter-
nal security, which he traced in the Schengen Agreement, the Trevi Group and 
the Europol, to the organizational reconfiguration of security agencies in Europe. 
His central question has been, whether the ‘new’ network centric approach can 
be interpreted as a response to the emergence of transnational criminal networks 
and the perceived necessity of prosecution across borders, or second, as an effect 
of increasing Europeanization or third, whether the reasons are to be found with-
in the security domain itself (ibid: 15). His answer: the restructuring of police 
work across Europe does not respond to new threats, but endogenously invents a 
new field of operation. This field is sketched as transnational, erratic and itself 
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unpoliced, and thus requires new forms of policing. Both the notion of internal 
security and of transnational risks mutually strain each other. Bigo describes this 
scenario which is at the bottom of the security field as a security continuum. 
Bigo’s central argument which he continues to develop until today, is the in-
creasing self-sufficiency of the security field as a (transnational) network (see 
particularly Bigo 1996, 2000, 2006, 2014). 
The image as well as the functioning of a political border change in this per-
spective: “Rather than the edge or the wall, the border becomes a strategic node 
within a transnational network of control” (Walters 2004: 682). Walters de-
scribes Bigo’s border conception as “the rise of the networked (non)border […] 
in which networks of control come to substitute for the functions that were pre-
viously physically concentrated at the border” (ibid: 679-680). According to 
Walters, Bigo sketches a “networked (non)border” which is constituted by “a 
joint responsibility and the locus of a new practice of police cooperation” (ibid: 
682) rather than a dividing line. Stefan Kaufmann, who also draws on Bigo’s 
concept of securitization when analyzing the reconfiguration of EU borders, em-
phasizes, in addition to changes in organization and justification, consequences 
for the topography of political borders. Unlike others who saw control practices 
de-territorializing, Kaufmann (2006) identifies three characteristics of the new 
border regime which follow from the locus of specific control practices: first, a 
forward displacement (Ger.: Vorverlagerung) of the border which is realized by 
policies and military forces who exceed and redefine their area of author and 
field of operation; second, a tightening (Ger.: Verdichtung): of the border, in 
which border control “has been transformed from the control of border crossing 
points to a permanent surveillance of the entire line” (ibid: 37) and third, an in-
folding (Ger.: Einstülpung) of the border: control and surveillance, formerly exe-
cuted by the border police, is appearing within the public sphere, albeit strategi-
cally dislocated. Facilitated by technological and information networks, which 
could be operated privately or by police forces, border control penetrates the in-
side of a nation-state. Balibar’s ubiquity of borders is ‘tamed’ by this border to-
pography. 
The border is either organized as a network or it is overcome by networks. 
Doris Schweitzer’s analysis of Manuel Castells’s concept of a network-society 
shows that the topography of a networked society allows for a radicalization of 
bordering processes. In the context of border studies, the term “assemblages” 
(Ong/Collier 2005; Marcus/Saka 2006) refers to the distribution of bordering 
practices and institutions across geographical space, on different political scales, 
and through technologies. Ultimately, the term network is as dazzling as it is 
omnipresent. The thing that shall be described by the term network seems how-
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ever, “imprecise, contradictory and indefinite” (Kaufmann 2007: 8). In this re-
gard, the net appears, similar to the sea, as opposite of the land (Schweitzer 
2011: 57). As part of a network, even law enforcement might occur elsewhere. 
And elsewhere implies beyond the line. 
With regard to the European construction, the network metaphor also goes 
beyond the notion of a homogenous space. European is rather an attribute to the 
cities and hubs within a global connection. However, with regard to the invoca-
tion of threats and risks, the notion of network has provided the basis for a recon-
figured notion of security and, in turn, different legitimate locations to the au-
thority and competences of border polices. 
 
 
2.5 EUROPE’S BORDER(S): NOVEL POLICIES, NEW 
PERSPECTIVES, CHALLENGED METHODOLOGIES 
 
In modern politics, the concept of political borders is inextricably linked to the 
figure of the line on the one hand, and to the concept of territory on the other. A 
line of demarcation – be it as cartographic abstraction or military installation – 
indicates the scope and reach of sovereign power. Political borders thus define a 
spatial mandate and mark the limits of a particular order. It is this mandate that 
distinguishes them from other markers of social stratification and functional dif-
ferentiation. And it is this mandate which prevails, while modern concepts of po-
litical organization and political space are deconstructed, reassessed and recon-
figured both in the social sciences and in politics. 
From the 1970s onwards, the notion of a border being grounded or located, 
has drained away from its compression in the symbolic and graphical form of a 
territorial border-line. And since the 1990s, analyzing borders does not work 
without at least verbally departing from the model of the Westphalian state in its 
Weberian description. Often this is succeeded by evoking a transformed spatiali-
ty of political borders and by describing a detachment of ‘the border’ from ‘terri-
tory.’ Now, that borders are no longer where there used to be, researchers are re-
quested to relocate the research field. Where to conduct research on the external 
border of the EU? And what to choose as object of investigation? Is a political 
border – if not territorial – a disembodied research object? 
Throughout the analyses reviewed in the above sections 2.2 to 2.5, the way in 
which spatial metaphors and imaginaries serve to unbundle the notion of the ter-
ritorial border and the ideal of the Weberian state have been examined. However, 
the examinations have also shown that the locus of the physical border is not of 
central concern to the different authors they are concerned with the state of de-
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mocracy (Balibar) the quality of Europe’s internal polity (Zielonka, 
Beck/Grande), or the general tension between the European and the national lev-
el (Vobruba). Other analyses have focussed on the discrepancy between the vi-
sion of Europe as a lawful project and the discriminatory access to individual 
rights (Agamben). Moreover, the network metaphor has proven to be concerned 
with the self-sufficiency of the network itself which does not provide a vision of 
Europe. 
Overall, the works reviewed above have proceeded to analyze political bor-
ders as something: as institution, as practices of selection and exclusion, as ex-
ception to the rule of law, as organized network or apparatus. They all come with 
the impetus to deessentialize and denaturalize political border, thereby ultimately 
describing what substitutes the territorial border. Schengen provoked the oppor-
tunity and the necessity to conceptualize borders without territory in breaking 
with the equation of geographical borders marking political authority. With re-
gard to the novelty the Schengen rules mark, “the new” can be identified by two 
parallel reconfigurations: 
 
• The authority over the legitimate means of violence is no longer monopo-
lized, but organized in a polycentric fashion, which is to say that enforce-
ment personnel, surveillance tools and patrolling strategies are no longer al-
located in or at the expanses of a national territory (code: geography), but 
according to communitarian needs (code: occurrences or migratory pres-
sure). This demonopolization results in an incongruity, if not discrepancy, 
between the border police mandate – that is, legal border of policing, and 
the legal borders of individual rights. 
• At the same time, another monopoly manifests itself: the authority over the 
legitimate means of movement appears with the institutional necessity (that 
of Schengen) to pool the resources at the supranational level. Thereby an 
emphasis on migration and mobility policies accumulates. However, the au-
thority over the legitimate means of movement – the latter being framed and 
expressed as rights of the individual(!) – is highly contested both with re-
gard to its application, distribution and enforcement practices. 
•  Analyzing the interplay of these monopolies is gauging a new mode of poli-
tics, which goes beyond territorial and bio-political characteristics. The 
emergence of viapolitics has been sketched by William Walters (2011, 
2014, 2015), and will be further assessed in the two empirical chapters of 
this work.  
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In so doing, this study of the emergence of an external EU border does not 
look for a substitute of the territorial border; nor will I trace its novel spatial dis-
tributedness but rather explore two construction sites of the EU external border. I 
will not analyze the history of these sites as breaking with the border itself; in-
stead, I will analyze how these sites mediate that which is socially effective as 
the EU external border. For every site crafts the kind and quality of the border in 
a particular way. Empirically speaking, how does this new EU border under con-
struction acquire acceptance, stability and validity? Methodologically speaking: 
how is it possible to get a graspe of political borders? Setting forth the argument 
that the spectral character of any border requires a methodology that focuses on 
the processes and results of mediation, the following chapter expounds the meth-








In the introduction to this study, I have already noted that the methodological un-
certainty that one encounters when researching an external EU border is further 
complicated by the spectral character of any border. This spectral character re-
fers to the phenomenological indeterminacy and fuzziness of borders in general. 
This is to say that there is no phenomenon of a border as such. Consequently, 
borders are only tangible and experienceable by their proxy or representation (cf. 
Cremers 1989: 38; Vasilache 2007: 38-47). The methodological uncertainty of 
the concrete case – the EU external border – is thus further complicated by an 
epistemological uncertainty concerning the study of political borders in general. 
In the following, I will explicate what I term ‘the spectral character of a border’ 
and ask, in a second step, about the methodological consequences of researching 
the EU external border(s). This section thus explores the relation between think-
ing and researching political borders. 
 
 
3.1 THE SPECTRAL CHARACTER OF ANY BORDER 
 
Spectral is an attribute attested to phenomena which cannot quite be grasped, the 
presence of which could be contested or doubted due to constant volatilization. 
A ghost is present as one or many apparitions, rather than as a reality. To a cer-
tain extent, the thought of it is more powerful than its materiality. 
Can this attribute aptly be applied to political borders? Political borders con-
cretize in walls, fences, surveillance gadgetry, border guards or lines of demarca-
tion. These appearances are quite manifest, immovable, adamant, obtrusive, and 
sometimes hardly surmountable. Their legal-administrative decisiveness, their 
constructional strength and robustness bestow a concreteness, objectivity, and 
durability – and, in parts, also irreducibility – to political borders. At first glance 
this may contradict the notion of spectrality. Borders are not wafts of mist or 
phantasmagoric shadows through which one could pass or march through. They 
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are rather accurately measured, clear-cut, and brutally real. And yet, we do not 
encounter the border per se, but the official enforcing it; we do not touch the 
border per se, but a wall of bricks or barbed-wire fence; neither do we cross the 
border itself, but the line of demarcation or the physical installation of the bor-
der-post. That which appears to us as political border is but its abstraction, repre-
sentation, or appresentation (Husserl): while the cartographic border-line ab-
stracts and thereby epitomizes the course and the grounding of borders,1 the bor-
der guard represents what Dimitris Papadopoulos and colleagues have described 
as “double-R axiom,” namely the simultaneous definition of “positive rights and 
representation within the national territory, and the non-existence of rights and 
symbolic presence beyond the nation‘s borders” (2008: 6, original emphasis). Fi-
nally, different material border installations – fences, flags, gates or chicken 
feathers attached to a bar (the examples are Cremers’s 1989: 36) – appresent and 
thereby make visible, define and mark territories so that they become socially 
perceivable and effective (Cremers 1989: 29-37). 
Like a specter, which “appears to be present itself during a visitation” (Der-
rida 2006: 126, original emphasis), the border appears to be present itself during 
the encounter between border guard and border crosser, during the study of a 
map, or during the contemplation of the Israeli West Bank barrier. And yet, if a 
researcher joins or observes these situations, contemplates the wall, or studies 
mapmaking, she does not study the border itself, but its apparitions, its proxies, 
its phantom objects. Whatever the substance of the border, it is socially available 
and effective via its proxies. In turn, the expectation, imagination, and belief that 
there is more – that there is, in fact, something substantial, a valid system behind 
or beyond these appearances, contributes to the relative stability and validity of a 
given political border. The thought of a border indeed seems more powerful than 
its materiality. How is this real (and by no means ephemeral) power of the border 
constituted? What is the substance or fabric of the border, if not its measurement, 
ground; the guards, or the brick in the wall?  
                                                           
1 Only few authors have analyzed the processes and epistemological premises that go 
into the drawing and interpreting of a line. Two notable exceptions are first, the Swe-
dish geographer Gunnar Olsson (1991), who distinguished between three concepts of 
the line: the equal sign (=), the slash (/) and the dash (–) which he takes as representa-
tions of three different epistemologies, namely realism, dialectic, and signification (cf. 
Pickles 2004), and second, Angus Cameron (2011), who in his essay publication 
“Ground zero – the semiotics of the boundary line,” provided a comprehensive discus-
sion on the graphic figure of the boundary line. 
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Drawing on the first sociological definition of border by Georg Simmel, the sub-
stance of the border itself is not to be found in its materiality or location, but 
based on social relations and their interactions (Ger.: Wechselwirkungen)2. So-
cio-political relations as well as the collective psyche coagulate and objectify in 
the border. Using the example of the line of demarcation, Simmel illustrates “the 
incomparable firmness and clarity which the social processes of demarcation re-
ceive from being spatialized” (1997 [1908]: 144). He writes: 
 
“Every boundary is a psychological, more precisely, a sociological event; but through its 
investment in a line in space, the relationship of reciprocity attains a clarity and security in 
both its positive and negatives sides – indeed often a certain rigidity – that tends to be de-
nied the boundary so long as the meeting and separating of forces and rights has not yet 
been projected into a sensory formation, and thus as it were always remains in a status 
nascens.“ (Simmel 1997 [1908]: 144) 
 
As “psychological” (Ger.: seelische) or as Simmel emphasizes “sociological 
events,” borders result from interactions and imaginations. However, these social 
processes of demarcation remain events during which rights and forces compete 
and are negotiated, until they are “projected into a sensory formation”; until they 
are invested “in a line in space” or stabilized via materialization. The “relation-
ship of reciprocity” only turns into a sociological fact when it appears as border. 
Drawing on Simmel, Natalià Cantó Milà underlines that “the projection of de-
marcation onto space strengthens the border and perpetuates it” (Milà 2006: 
192). Here the emphasis lies on an aspect which has mostly been neglected in the 
reception of the Simmelian border definition: the coagulation, or hardening 
(Ger.: Gerinnung) of the social processes to a thing which itself becomes part of 
interactions. 
In the course of the spatial turn, Simmel’s border definition regained preva-
lence. His dictum that the border “is not a spatial fact with sociological effects, 
but a sociological fact that forms itself in space” (Simmel 1997 [1908]: 144) was 
often quoted to deessentialize and denaturalize the concept of the territorial bor-
der. This has corresponded to a general trend in border studies since the 1970s: 
borders are no longer described and analyzed in terms of geomorphological pat-
                                                           
2 A central concept throughout Simmel’s work is that of interaction. The German term 
“Wechselwirkungen” denotes reciprocity, reciprocal interrelations, reciprocal effects, 
mutual influence, without causal explanations. The English translation “interaction” 
does not satisfyingly transport these conceptual implications. 
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terns, but as social processes, practices, and imaginations. The central research 
interest in border studies has thus shifted from the Where? of borders to the 
How? of bordering (van Houtum/van Naerssen 2002; Newman 2006a, 2006b; 
Rumford 2006). 
As a result, border studies are no longer dominated by geographers, but have 
become an interdisciplinary research field, in which Simmel’s relational thinking 
has turned into an epistemological consensus. Furthermore, Simmel’s definition 
was considered empirically bidden. Lena Laube, for instance, sees that Simmel’s 
1908 definition “has never had greater validity, than under the conditions of 
globalization” (Laube 2013: 292). In the reception of the Simmelian border defi-
nition, what can be traced in different fields since the spatial turn is the deessen-
tializing impetus stressed by the relational character of phenomena. This has oc-
curred to an extent so that the concept of boundedness has been awkwardly 
avoided, as Jeff Malpas (2012) has criticized and countered. Just as the spatial 
turn has fostered a proliferation, if not diffusion, of what counts as spatial, rela-
tional thinking in border studies, it has diffused what constitutes a border (John-
son et al. 2011: 61). Likewise, globalization is quoted as the empirical condition 
to an epistemological premise, an argument which confuses epistemological per-
spective and empirical finding. But this allegation cannot duly be advanced to-
ward the Simmelian border conception. Even though Simmel did stress the so-
cially produced character of borders, his relational thinking also acknowledged 
the “physical force” and the “living energy” of material products. Simmel 
acknowledges the material, the built environment as part of the interactions. 
 
“once it has become a spatial and sensory object that we inscribe into nature independently 
of its sociological and practical sense, then this produces strong repercussions on the con-
sciousness of the relationship of the parties. Whereas this line only marks the diversity in 
the two relationships, […] it becomes a living energy that forces the former together and 
will not allow them to escape their unity and pushes between them both like a physical 
force that emits outward repulsions in all directions” (Simmel 1997 [1908]: 143). 
 
It is at this point that it becomes spooky, that the border reveals its spectrality. 
Not only because borders are based on social relations, which, as grounding rea-
sons are neither tangible nor visible but rely on objectified proxies. Even more, 
the objectified border, the proxies, come to life and are, as borders, endowed 
with a “physical force,” a “living energy,” and a certain amount of actorness or 
agency. Simmel, who gave particular attention to the small things from the han-
dle of a cup to the ruins of a castle, attested a living energy and social quality to 
them. As objects these things are inscribed into the environment and act inde-
pendently from the sociological and practical processes that brought them about. 
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In a modification of the Marxian wooden table as commodity that is more 
than wood, one could say the following about the objectified apparitions of polit-
ical borders: once a fence, the Rhine or the Mediterranean acts the part of a polit-
ical border (Ger.: tritt auf als) “it changes into a thing which transcends sensu-
ousness” (Marx 1976: 163). As a commodity, the table is no longer merely made 
out of wood, but it is product and perpetuator of the societal relations of produc-
tion. Borders, fences, gates, rivers and information systems are no longer merely 
made of barbed wire, bricks, water, and information, but are products and per-
petuators of the selection and prioritization of societal relations.  
These interrelations are constantly fixed – in the sense of being repaired, 
maintained, and iterated – by all of the border’s proxies. Similarly, the social re-
lations that are regulated and expressed via passports, databases, migrant vessels, 
fences, visa or asylum applications synthesize into the space of a legitimate bor-
der, which is valid qua itself. That which is socially produced comes into life as 
a border – as a thing. Not only does it structure the relations between individuals, 
but the products also relate among each other. 
 
Thus, the spectral character of a border does not stem from its liminality. It is ra-
ther the “living energy” and “physical force” of a border’s proxies which renders 
the political border an odd thing. Proxies are endowed with a quality that Marx 
(1976 [1867]: 128) termed “ghostly/phantom objectivity” (Ger.: gespenstische 
Gegenständlichkeit). The living relations and interaction that produced it – in 
Marx’s case the commodity; in the case of this study, the border – are dead. Its 
constituting forces and its reasons are atrophied and obliterated. What remains is 
the border, with the insistence to be maintained and its claim to be vital to socia-
tion (Ger.: Vergesellschaftung). In other words, what remains is the material 
presence of the border’s proxies, their objectivity, which claims to be vital on its 
own. This isn’t to say that its existence was independent from human production; 
however, it is stressed that its existence continues without the iteration of the 
process of production. The border continues being, remains there, physically 
bearing a lively energy. 
The spectral character of any border implies that border objects and their 
proxies are of a ghostly objectivity. Qua the border object, a quality of the rela-
tions between people and a mode of interaction turns into an imperative that 
drives their relations. Once objectified, the thing requires to be purchased, ob-
tained or protected; social interactions are redirected toward that purpose. Subse-
quently, the malleable character of societal relations disappears from view. This 
phenomenon that “a relation between people takes on the character of a thing and 
thus acquires a ‘phantom objectivity,’ an autonomy that seems so strictly rational 
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and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the rela-
tion between people,” has been described as reification by Georg Lukács (1976 
[1923]: 83). Just as the commodity has been interpreted as the ideological statue 
(Ger.: ideologisches Standbild) of the societal relations of production (Marchart 
2013: 84), the border can be interpreted as the ideological statue of the societal 
relations of inclusion and exclusion. 
The interrelations with the proxy turn into primary interaction. The border is 
protected and subverted; it is torn down, climbed and defended. The social rela-
tions that crystallize in and at the border are hardly straightforward. Relations are 
mediated by the manifold proxies that make up a given border. Ultimately, the 
spectral character of borders encompasses two aspects. First is the paradox in-
trinsic to reification, and second is the manifoldness of possible material mani-
festations and symbolic representations in apparitions. Reification is based on 
the paradox that “a relational social structure is objectified” (Ger.: verdinglicht), 
and that thereby “its processual character is quiesced and shut down” (Marchart 
2013: 84). This is traceable for the case of the territorial border that has been rei-
fied and indeed naturalized to the extent that its relational and processual charac-
ter is hidden from view. 
Methodologically, the paradox intrinsic to reification prompts the question 
whether it is more strategic to research process or product, machine or perfor-
mance, relations or object. The second aspect of the spectral character of a bor-
der lays in its manifold apparitions. Jacques Derrida has described this spectral 
contextual reference in interpretation of the Marxian analysis of commodity fet-
ishism in the following way: “One represents it [the specter] to oneself, but it is 
not present, itself, in flesh and blood” (Derrida 2006: 126). Proxies, that is, the 
representations (of the border) that one presents to oneself, are an expression of 
how a political border is “presumed, reconstructed, [and] fantasized” (ibid: 24). 
A border, therefore, does not exist. It is never “present, itself, in flesh and 
blood,” but finds expression in how we construct its proxies. The border thus ap-
pears in a variety of material and symbolic forms. It assumes concrete appear-
ance, it falls into place as proxy. In its etymological proximity to spectrum, 
‘spectral’ also refers to the arbitrariness of the form through which the societal 
processes of demarcation manifest themselves. This has also been expressed by 
Balibar’s characterization of borders as heterogeneous or vacillating, which al-
ways appear here and there in different forms. Here it is again clear that Balibar 
didn’t describe the new geographical locations or positions of borders, but rather 
new apparitions. These new apparitions, however, couldn’t emerge without the 
specification of a place. “Appearance requires an openness that allows emer-
gence, but appearance, as it is always the appearance of some thing, is always a 
Thinking and Researching Political Borders | 69 
 
taking place, which is to say that it is always the establishing of a certain there” 
(Malpas 2012: 237, original emphasis).  
The manifoldness in appearances in possible representations of the border 
demands that the selection of the object of investigation (the one object that is 
researched out of many) may be justified with regard to the objectives of a study. 
Calling on the spectral character of any border effectively means readjusting the 
researcher’s spotlight: the border is not socially produced, but its proxies are. In 
other words, if a border only appears as some thing, if it is only available and ex-
perienceable via its proxies, this has consequences for the research process. 
Proxies are the concrete and material manifestation of that which is imagined 
and believed to be the reason, the ground, the ought-to-be of the specter. It is the 
production and construction that is available to research. Hence we must ask, 
what status do the different proxies have in the research process? What weight 
should be attributed to selected border objects when researching the empirical 
example of the EU external border? And which research objects and research 
sites should be selected in the first place? The following sections address these 
methodological questions. I will argue that the Latourian distinction between in-
termediary and mediator allows for a research perspective that works through the 
paradox of reification. 
 
 
3.2 MEDIATED BORDERING AND THE 
TERRITORIAL BORDER AS INTERMEDIARY 
 
Realizing that the political border of interest is only available in the form of 
proxies, a researcher readjusts the spotlight shedding full light on a border’s 
proxy. What does she see? Well, a proxy; in the case of this study, it could be a 
gate, a wall, a situation, a practice, a database, an administrative line of demarca-
tion, a refugee camp. Yet, the central question at this point is less: What does one 
see? but rather: How does one look at it? How does one interpret the relation be-
tween a given proxy, for example the database of the Schengen Information Sys-
tem and the object of investigation – that is, the EU external border? Acknowl-
edging the spectral character of any border, a researcher cannot tackle the proxy 
as a representation or abstraction of societal demarcation, but might realize that 
what she is looking at is a construction site through which a social thing is medi-
ated. The proxy mediates a certain aspect and quality of the object of inquiry. 
What has been described as proxy so far, has been termed “mediator” in the 
works of Bruno Latour (cf. particularly Latour 1993: 79-82, 2005: 37-42, 106-
120). According to the French philosopher, mediators “transform, translate, dis-
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tort and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry” (Latour 
2005: 39). That which is carried, the social thing, the actor-network, or in the 
case of this study the border, is garnered by many mediators which each contrib-
ute their fabric and functioning to the apparition and social effectiveness of an 
EU external border. The mobilization, relation and interplay of many mediators 
allow the border to appear, and stabilize the demarcation iterated via the mani-
fold mediators. At the same time, each mediator has its own mode of being pro-
duced and being appropriated. The durability of social relations – and a border is 
a cardinal example for a relation being perceived as durable (robust, natural and 
lasting) – is yielded by material artifacts, technologies, maps or legal items 
which condense interactions and resolve conflicts among humans. In fact, 
“whenever we discover a stable social relation, it is the introduction of some 
non-humans that accounts for this relative durability” (Callon/Latour 1994: 359). 
These non-humans are the proxies, the items, the representations, sites or media-
tors available to research. Now, how to go about these proxies; how to turn them 
into research sites? 
 
When investigating political borders, the researcher deals with a phenomenon 
that is often perceived to be quasi natural or primordial. According to Latour 
these phenomena are thought of as intermediaries, that is, as things that are ‘out 
there,’ ready-made. Intermediaries do not appear to be socially produced, but ra-
ther does it seem as if they have, in fact, produced, shaped, and constituted socie-
ty. These intermediaries appear to be at the bottom of things. Moreover, certain 
phenomena are not only thought of as intermediaries, but indeed behave as such, 
as a “black box counting for one” (Latour 2005: 39). These intermediaries are 
extremely autonomous. They are not in the mix, but set the terms. These inter-
mediaries “transport meaning or force without transformation” (ibid); they de-
fine, without being defined. 
The modern territorial border can duly be regarded as an intermediary. It 
claims irreversibility for itself and the state it demarcates. Moreover, borders and 
territory seem only to be definable in mutual reference to one another. In modern 
politics, the French legal theorist Paul Alliès critically notes that “territory al-
ways seems linked to possible definitions of the state; it gives it a physical basis 
which seems to render it inevitable and eternal” (Allies 1980: 9). In fact, the ter-
ritorial border is the type of political border that is reified and naturalized to the 
extent that despite contemporary globalization theories and the proliferation of 
flows it is often perceived as the last landmark, and an almost cardinal point of 
orientation. Despite being engaged by discussion on globalization theories and 
spatially sensitive sciences as well as their traps and turns, and despite vehement 
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countering of substantialistic take on borders, the territorial border maintains an 
explanatory status. In fact, it seems that the territorial border even trips the spa-
tial turn and globalization theories. By providing data on cross-border move-
ment, for instance, territorial borders paradoxically function as an indicator and a 
place of measurement for the space of flows. Concepts of exclusion, fixity, and 
the topographical imagination of surface, which have been critically assessed in 
the works of the spatial turn, are reinserted into border studies through the type 
“territorial border” (Elden 2010a: 801; Painter 2010). 
Moreover, together with the spatial turn and its deessentializing and denatu-
ralizing impetus, there is a general unease among social scientists when taking 
the borders grounding or material presence into account. At times, researchers 
appear afraid of buying into a substantialistic take on borders. For instance, the 
Italian scholar Paolo Cuttitta, rejects the distinction between territorial and social 
borders, argued for by David Miller and Sohail Hashmi (Miller/Hashmi 2001) 
stating that their distinction was misleading, since it would suggest that territorial 
borders were not socially produced. However, what Cuttitta rejects is neither the 
concept of territorial border nor of social borders. He finds fault with the alleged-
ly misleading contrasting juxtaposition, as he apprehends a conclusion by analo-
gy between territory and an essentialist conception of borders. In his own works, 
however, Cuttitta finds that the strength of territoriality from which the border 
profited as a means to define and secure a socio-political entity, is now penetrat-
ing social, political and legal practices globally (Cuttitta 2006: 38, 2007). What 
strength does he have in mind, which does not stem from physical terrain or ma-
terial installation? And did this strength then change materiality?  
When dealing with an object of inquiry that behaves as intermediary, decon-
structing it as social product counters essentialism, however, it does not explain 
the strength, quality and effectiveness of a political border. This is why in the 
aforementioned example territory maintains its somewhat ghostly strength de-
spite being denounced as socially produced. Moreover, with emphasis on social 
construction borders are by implications evoked as volatile and up to change by 
(subversive) practices. 
The methodological consequence of this perspective is to study the border as 
practices. However, borders are neither produced nor reproduced ‘bottom-up’ on 
a daily basis; it is not border guards who produce the border through their patrol-
ling routines, nor is it border violations which shape its constitution. Also, politi-
cal borders are not as volatile as an emphasis on bordering practices might sug-
gest. In the case of this “rare exception,” Latour notes, in which a phenomenon 
behaves as intermediary, it “has to be accounted for by some extra work – usual-
ly by the mobilization of even more mediators” (Latour 2005: 40). This quota-
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tion elucidates why things that behave as intermediaries are so powerful, even to 
the effect of naturalization or sacralization: due to many, many mediators; no 
phantom strength or mystical force, but countless material mediators, each con-
tributing to the stability of a social relation while at the same time leaving its in-
dividual qualitative mark. As 
 
“most of the features of what we mean by social order – scale, asymmetry, durability, 
power, hierarchy, the distribution of roles [and also the international state system with its 
political borders] – are impossible even to define without recruiting socialized nonhumans. 
Yes, society is constructed, but not socially constructed.” (Latour 1999: 198, original em-
phasis) 
 
Therefore, neither the production of borders nor its reconfigurations should be 
analyzed from the perspective of social practices. For the case of borders, and 
other intermediaries that behave as such, it makes sense to actually start the 
analysis with the sites, proxies, items that mediate them, and explore how it does 
what it does, and how this doing came about. 
 
In sum, territorial mediation has been so successful for the case of the political 
border that the territorial border behaves as intermediary and provides an inter-
mediary imagination of the international system. Acknowledging the spectral 
character of a border does not imply that the political border in question was not 
real only because it is constructed via proxies. It rather implies that something as 
durable as a political border is mediated. In fact, it even has to be mediated in 
order to acquire durability. Nevertheless, albeit from the ethnographic perspec-
tive, things and apparitions can be effective as intermediaries, the researcher 
should neither consider his object of investigation readymade nor counter it as a 
fetish. He is rather asked to decipher the many mediators that support the inter-
mediary imagination. The spectral character of any border reminds the researcher 
that her object of inquiry is only available to her in terms of proxies. These prox-
ies can be observed to behave either as mediators or as intermediaries. However, 
when analyzing them, the researcher must take them as mediators. “At the level 
of observation, intermediaries are an integral part of the empirical phenomenon 
and must therefore be taken into consideration; as prefaces of the observer, how-
ever, they are theoretical artifacts which must be avoided as far as possible” 
(Schulz-Schaeffer 2008: 149).  
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3.3 RESEARCHING POLITICAL BORDERS: 
IN SITU OR IN ACTU? 
 
When researching any given political border the question thus is: How can a re-
searcher avoid getting trapped by an intermediary? How to get around the fact 
that one does take the observation for the border? Before laying out the notion of 
“mediated bordering” – which provided the title of this book – I shall illustrate 
further the difference between mediator and intermediary with reference to three 
works of site-specific art. All three projects engage with the question of what 
constitutes, expresses or produces art, while at the same time problematizing and 
irritating the relation between the ‘being art’ and the process of ‘producing art’; 
its being made, its being staged and its taking place. These works may bestow a 
sensibility to the challenge of analyzing mediation, but also to the analytic gaze 
that the focus on mediation opens up. The following examples are presented as 
snapshots and serve to play with perspectives, challenging the idea of art, the 
border appearing as something. 
 
3.3.1 Site Specificity 
 
In 1991, a thirty-year-old man got permission to collect species and plants in the 
rainforest of Venezuela. He spent three weeks in the Orinoco River basin outside 
Caracas. Once a week, a boat would reach him to pick up transparent boxes con-
taining the pieces of tropical nature, he had collected. 
This time it was not an anthropologist who dwelled in the tropics, but the art-
ist Mark Dion, who was working on his exhibition On Tropical Nature. Contrary 
to a scientist’s expectation, these boxes were not transferred to a laboratory, 
where the “various plants and insects as well as feathers, mushrooms, nests and 
stones” (Kwon 2002: 28) could have been microscopically studied. Instead they 
were taken to ‘Sala Mendoza,’ an art institution in Caracas. There, “[i]n the gal-
lery space of the Sala, the specimens […] were uncrated and displayed like 
works of art in themselves” (ibid). On Tropical Nature not only displayed these 
pieces of nature. The installation also included those artifacts and instruments 
that allowed Dion to collect, study and display tropical nature. Likewise, a pho-
tograph displaying Dion with a butterfly net in the middle of ‘nature’ turned the 
artist into an explorer as much as it defined the ‘being out there exploring’ as a 
performance of art.3 
                                                           
3  The photograph, taken by Bob Braine, has been reproduced in Dion (2003). 
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The issues raised by Dion’s art project On Tropical Nature not only concerns 
the nature of (tropical) nature, thus challenging concepts such as authenticity and 
originality. Dion also contributes to the debate on cultural interventions and rep-
resentations with regard to nature. Moreover, On Tropical Nature broaches the 
question of what constitutes a site, a prevalent issue in art since the late 1960s. 
Where is the place, the site of things? 
Where does one have to go in order to encounter, experience, or study tropi-
cal nature or, in the case of this study, the EU external border? Is it into the jun-
gle or into a museum (for the case of Dion); is it to Lampedusa, the Balkan route 
or the Frontex headquarters in Warsaw (for the case of the EU external border)? 
Applied to political borders, generally one could ask further: which piece, which 
segment of the Cold War does one look at when holding a piece of the Berlin 
Wall in one’s hands? A piece of a political border or a museal artifact? Does ra-
dar, does the SIS database or the barbed wire fence in Ceuta reveal the EU’s ex-
ternal border? What exactly are we looking for in the search for “tropical nature” 
or the “EU external border” respectively? Ultimately, Dion’s work touches upon 
ontological questions while, at the same time, pushing the need for a localizable 
origin and the grounding of essence. In On Tropical Nature he dissolved these 
demands praxeographically – as has been done in border studies when gauging 
the nature of the border. Does the praxeographic, deconstructivist approach ob-
scure or reveal the nature of nature. Does it obscure or reveal the nature of a giv-
en political border? 
 
Richard Serra’s Tilted Arc of 1981 (figure 2), by contrast, emphasizes notions of 
original and fixed location. Serra responded to the United States Arts-in-
Architecture program with a massive curved wall (of 3.65 meter height, 36.58 
meter width and 6,5 centimeter depth) built out of corten steel in the middle of 
the Federal Plaza in New York.  
By means of the Tilted Arc, Serra put emphasis on the uniqueness of a work 
and its particular relation to its location. As such, he argued that it was non-
transferable to another location. Reactions to the Tilted Arc, however, were 
mixed. The ones who worked in the adjoining offices facing the Federal Plaza 
found it inconvenient to walk around the massive wall at lunchtime or when 
rushing to the office in the morning. According to city officials, the arc attracted 
rats, garbage, and crime. Yet, attempts to have Tilted Arc removed were fiercely 
countered by Serra himself, as he considered his work of art in relation to its site, 
and not a random artifact independent of its environment. 
Thinking and Researching Political Borders | 75 
 
Figure 2: Richard Serra, “Tilted Arc,” Federal Place NY, (destroyed) 
Source: http://art-nerd.com/newyork/site-of-richard-serras-tilted-arch/ 
© VG Bild-Kunst, Bonn 2020 
 
“To remove is to destroy” was thus his answer to the different attempts to have 
his work shifted elsewhere. “As I pointed out,” Serra elaborated, 
 
“Tilted Arc was conceived from the start as a site-specific sculpture and was not meant to 
be ‘site-adjusted’ or […] ‘relocated.’ Site-specific works deal with the environmental 
components of given places. The scale, size and location of site-specific works are deter-
mined by the topography of the site, whether it be urban or landscape or architectural en-
closure. The works become part of the site and restructure both conceptually and percep-
tually the organization of the site.” (quoted in Kwon 2002: 12) 
 
In 1989, the Tilted Arc was deinstalled and destroyed. In 1989 the Iron Curtain 
also fell. In the case of political borders, deinstallation is more complicated. This 
isn’t to say that Serra’s Tilted Arc was no political issue. Still, when border posts 
were deinstalled as a consequence of the Schengen Agreement, this did not mean 
that the national borders between France and Germany, for instance, no longer 
existed. There seems to be a certain ‘rest.’ 
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Figure 3: Daniel Buren, “Within and Beyond the Frame,” 1973 
 Source: Souvenir photo, at: https://blogs.uoregon.edu/danielburen/posts/ 
 © VG Bild-Kunst, Bonn 2020 
 
A third impetus in site-specific art can be interpreted as a critical engagement 
with institutional frames of art practices and valuation. For example, with Within 
and Beyond the Frame of 1973, Daniel Buren literally crossed boundaries by 
hanging one half of his installation out of the museum’s window (figure 3). 
The museum was the conventional frame where art is supposed to be found, 
and which bestows a sense of art to the things it frames, maybe by means of a 
spotlight, a signpost, and the very fact that it is placed in an art institution. In a 
refined manner, Daniel Buren asks for the appropriate place of art, and puts the 
focus on irritating this meaning: are the rags, which are hanging ‘outside’ on the 
clothesline no longer art, as they left the frame of a museum? Is the attribution 
applied to things dependent on their location? For the purposes of this study: 
does it make a difference whether a migrant arrives at the airport, is found on a 
truck, or on a boat off the coast of Lampedusa? In Buren’s installation, a decod-
ing and recoding of conventions, a window of emancipation is opened by irrita-
tion. Applied again to political borders, our gaze is turned to the institutional set-
up – to the border as institution. 
That which might irritate in art not only irritates but confounds political bor-
ders. When representatives of a nation’s border move beyond their frame – that 
is, beyond the territorial borders of the nation deploying and mandating said bor-
ders, their presence irritates and requires a situational mandate. In application of 
the distinction between mediator and intermediary, these projects can be de-
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scribed as sites of interventions (where art is mediated), as opposed to the site of 
effects (where art behaves as intermediary, or rather where things behave as art). 
These engagements with site-specific art bring to the fore a methodological fi-
nesse that boils down to difference between researching borders in actu or in 
situ. 
 
3.3.2 In Situ or In Actu? 
 
When Stefan Kaufmann, Ulrich Bröckling and Eva Horn write in the introduc-
tion to their anthology on border violators (Ger.: Grenzverletzter) that borders 
“only exist in actu, as technical devices and social arrangements of inclusion and 
exclusion as well as of opening” (Kaufmann/Bröckling/Horn 2002: 7, original 
emphasis), their statement entails a similar tension as described above. Are bor-
ders constituted via performance or via machines? Where is the load in this so-
cio-technical hybrid of “technical devices and social arrangements” (ibid)? 
Should a given border be studied as process or product? While negating the ex-
istence of a border as such, the authors deploy a praxeological concept of bor-
ders, in which humans not only perform bordering, but also devices and ar-
rangements. They continue:  
 
“No matter how narrow or wide meshed the bordering forces set the filter between inside 
and outside, they always distinguish between lawful and unlawful crossings, between legal 
and illegal border crossers. [...] The border regime may change, what remains is the prin-
ciple of selection.” (Kaufmann/Bröckling/Horn 2002: 7) 
 
The border is identified by its filtering function and observed in the devices and 
arrangements that perform this function. It is this performance that is analyzed 
when gauging the existence of a border in actu. 
With a somewhat different impetus, although with a focus on bordering prac-
tices, too, Sabine Hess and Vassilis Tsianos propose to analyze borders in situ, 
“in the sense of a doing borders as a dynamic field of conflict and negotiation 
between different local, regional, national and transnational actors” (Hess/ 
Tsianos 2010: 248, original emphasis). Their idea is to study the border as it is 
taking place and more important so, as it is contested, crossed, and violated. 
They argue for an “inductive praxeographical method” which is able to reveal 
“the conflicting genesis and implementation of the border regime from the per-
spective of the many actors involved” (ibid: 256). In this perspective, a given 
border can only be analyzed in the local or rather situational contexts, where “an 
enormous gap between theory, ‘paper’ and practice is revealed” (ibid). 
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The tension between these two praxeographic approaches reflects the fact 
that a site of intervention (where the object of investigation is mediated) can be 
approached from very different points of departure. (1) First, the site can be ana-
lyzed in terms of tools and apparatuses. This would center attention on the ap-
propriation of the object of investigation and the translations and mediations in-
scribed into it. (2) Second, the object of investigation, the site, could be studied 
by a sort of mini-genealogy, which would investigate how it has been produced, 
as well as what kind of decisions, beliefs, consensus, rules and beliefs are built 
into it and have become part of the site (3) Third, a given site can be analyzed in 
terms of contestations and struggles. All three trajectories are part of a praxeo-
logical or rather praxeographic turn; they shed light on different aspects of con-
struction. 
The notion of “mediated bordering” is part of that turn and takes on board a 
specific methodology. Rather than focusing on the performance, on “doing bor-
der,” the impetus of “mediated bordering” centers attention on the generalizable 
principle that is stabilized by the iteration and institutionalization of ideas, prac-
tices, and obligations. Mediators – as the sites of these iterations and institution-
alizations – are studied to understand how stabilization is brought about and 
made possible. Moreover, they are examined in order to trace and understand the 
quality of the (larger) thing that is mediated. The distinction between site of ef-
fects and site of intervention helps to pinpoint this. The site of effects – in the 
case of this study: the external EU border – can be examined by assessing the 
sites of intervention: in this case, different sites where bordering is mediated and 
thus researchable. According to Knut Ebeling, this (site-specific) methodology 
reflects the premises that “each site gives away a different visibility or different 
sight and therefore a different theory of history” (Ebeling 2007: 321). As a 
methodological approach to border studies, this allows us to pay special attention 
to the performances, practices and struggles, the artifacts, things, and material in-
stallations as well as the frames, rules and institutions that become part of a bor-
der’s fabric. This kind of approach underlines the notion of site-specificity in the 
sense that selected research objects, practices, interactions, or sites do not merely 
‘represent,’ ‘manifest’ or ‘reflect’ the object of investigation (in this case an ex-
ternal EU border) but rather substantively bring it about. While the border re-














Since December 2, 2013, the European Border Surveillance System, EUROSUR, 
has been operational. This is to say that, since that day, most EU member states 
share “border related information” via a designated electronic network, the 
EUROSUR network. 
The immediate purpose of EUROSUR is the generation of a situational pic-
ture, the so-called European Situational Picture (ESP). For this purpose, infor-
mation is exchanged between EU member states and the Frontex agency. Apart 
from the information sent by participating member states, Frontex receives and 
processes information in agreement with third parties and uses surveillance in-
formation from different apparatuses such as radar, satellite, or drones. The visu-
alization of the information is executed by means of a geographic information 
system (GIS). The ESP is then circulated among EUROSUR participants. The 
integration of information in the ESP is thought to increase “situational aware-
ness” and the “reaction capability” along the external borders of the EU.1 
Yet, after more than five years of being operational, it is still unclear whose 
“reaction capability” it is meant to increase: will the hunter be able to fence off 
migrants earlier, in a spatiotemporal sense, before they can claim rights or asy-
lum in the EU? Or will the friend be fast enough to save migrants’ lives at sea? 
So far, EUROSUR’s intrinsic ambivalence has not been resolved in favor of 
one side. While its success is attributed to knowledge items such as trend or risk 
analysis anticipating “migratory pressure” and the course of migrants’ routes, 
                                                           
1  Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of Oc-
tober 22, 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), in: 
OJ L 295/11-26, November 6, 2013, [hereafter cited as EUROSUR Regulation (EU) 
No 1052/2013], Art. 1. 
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this respective knowledge is apparently not used for coordinating rescue opera-
tions: The documented number of migrants drowning in the Mediterranean Sea 
has increased fivefold since EUROSUR became operational, from 600 deaths at 
sea in 2013 to 3,538 in 2014; 3,771 in 2015; 5,096 in 2016; 3,139 in 2017 and 
2,277 in 2018. Estimates for 2019: 820 by July 31, 2019.2 
 
This part of the book will not, however, focus on the operational performance 
and consequences of the European Border Surveillance System. Rather, it will 
reconstruct the development phase of EUROSUR. This focus on the develop-
ment phase is based on the premise that certain aspects of EUROSUR can only 
be made sense of when reconstructing the negotiations, the work involved, and 
the resolution of controversies that preceded the system. The focus lays on the 
political objectives and normative will that went into the making of the system. 
During the process of establishing a network, however, many tools, talents and 
tactics are needed that might not be part of the final product, not even its mainte-
nance. In other words: the politics of the development process cannot necessarily 
be fully reconstructed from the final product. Temporary concessions sometimes 
become invisible once the system is up and running. Consequently, the following 
examination of EUROSUR’s formation deals with the period of its political, le-
gal and technical development as well as the respective test phases and negotia-
tions involved. 3  The development phase – from the commissioning of the 
EUROSUR Roadmap in February 2008 to when the EUROSUR Regulation took 
effect in December 2013 – will thus be the period of investigation. 
The development phase comprised two parallel processes: on the one hand, 
the politically and legally sustainable drafting of a generally acceptable regula-
                                                           
2  Numbers according to UNHCR statistics, at: http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/ 
regional.php (accessed July 31, 2019), and according to UNHCR news of January 24, 
2014, at: https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2014/7/53d0e2d26/unhcr-calls-urgent-
european-action-end-refugee-migrant-deaths-sea.html (accessed July 31, 2019). For a 
discussion on the availability of data concerning the deaths of migrants at sea as well 
as the different sources and methods of data collection, and the politics of these num-
bers, see section 8.1.3. 
3  Sometimes development and planning phases are even the subject of a monograph 
without yielding an actual result. For a famous example, see Latour’s analysis of the 
technological vision of a personal rapid transit system in Paris called Aramis (Latour 
2002 [1993]). 
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tion; and, on the other, the development of an IT application to make the 
EUROSUR network technically feasible.  
This process yielded two products: the EUROSUR Regulation of 22 October 
2013 and the electronic EUROSUR network – in other words, the IT application. 
Both products, the software and the regulation, are the products of a complex 
process of institutional negotiations between different officials of the European 
Commission (EC), the member states, Frontex and (not least) software engi-
neers. Both products have also ultimately stabilized a political compromise that 
had been reached during the development phase, and which is – in Latour’s 
(1986) fullest sense – inscribed into the system. By studying the development 
phase, I unpack this inscription process and inspect it for signs of controversies, 
crossroads, important incentives, decisive agreements and constant reservations. 
This second part of the book is structured in a way that underlines my inten-
tion to separately investigate the development of these two products while also 
relating their mutual intertwining alternately from the perspective of each respec-
tive result. Chapter 4 starts by inspecting “EUROSUR on the screen,” it traces 
the development of the IT application by outlining selected elements of 
EUROSUR’s graphical user interface and by exploring the way these technical 
fixtures emerged and gained acceptance during the development phase. Chapter 
5 explores the process of EUROSUR’s legal establishment, thereby illustrating 
to what extent EUROSUR by its Regulation accomplishes the next step in the 
EU’s Integrated Border Management (IBM). Finally, chapter 6 discusses the ef-
fect of the parallel development of software and regulation, outlining in how 
EUROSUR’s dual development not only facilitates the exchange of information, 





4 “EUROSUR on the Screen” 
 
When I first saw the EUROSUR on the screen, 
I finally realized what it was all about. 
BG Major Świąteka1 
 
 
Today, EUROSUR is perceived and identified through the cartographic image of 
the European situational picture (ESP). The ESP, which is generated by a geo-
graphic information system (GIS) and visualized as a map with border-related in-
formation, emblematically stands for the exchange of information between EU 
member states and the Frontex agency. This “EUROSUR on the screen” is the 
object that is shown when the EUROSUR project is presented in public. For in-
stance, when Erik Berglund, then Director of Capacity Building at Frontex, 
spoke about EUROSUR during a workshop at the European Parliament in 2012, 
he provided a screenshot of the map, commenting that this was what EUROSUR 
looked like.2 
                                                           
1 Border Guard Major Aleksandra Świąteka (Director of the International Relations Of-
fice, Polish Border Guard, Warsaw): “The Commission’s proposal for EUROSUR,” 
presentation during the conference “Keeping the EU’s External Borders Secure. Fron-
tex and the Use of New Technologies” at the Academy of European Law (ERA) in 
Trier on May 15 and 16, 2012 [hereafter cited as BG Major Świąteka: EUROSUR 
Presentation (May 16, 2012)]. The statement quoted is from a bilateral conversation 
following her presentation. 
2 Erik Berglund (Head of Capacity Building at Frontex): “European Border Surveil-
lance System (EUROSUR): Objectives and State of Play,” presentation during the 
workshop “An Emerging e-Fortress-Europe? Border Surveillance, Frontex and Migra-
tion Control” at the European Parliament in Brussels on June 26, 2012, at: 
http://www.gruene-europa.de/an-emerging-e-fortress-europe-7509.html (accessed 
June 26, 2012). 
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This statement particularly and only gains relevance when considering that, 
during the first four years of the development phase – and thus also during the 
first years of my research – there was neither a map nor an image connected to 
the EUROSUR system. It was a vision that was lacking visualization. “How will 
it look” was thus an incredibly pressing question, particularly since the different 
elements that were supposed to be integrated by EUROSUR are quite heteroge-
neous: the 2008 EUROSUR Roadmap3 mentions different authorities and exist-
ing surveillance systems, a vast amount of discontinuously generated infor-
mation, such as occurrence reports by member states, Frontex’s risk analysis, po-
lice and intelligence information from Europol, geodetic and meteorological da-
ta, daily news, close to real-time surveillance data sent by surveillance gadgetry 
such as radar or satellite, as well as information from the “pre-frontier area” pro-
vided, for instance, by Immigration Liaison Officers (ILO). In being able to 
“show” EUROSUR, Berglund allegedly demonstrated what the system amount-
ed to, and that it all fit into one picture. 
“How will it look?” was, however, more than a question of curiosity, which I 
as a researcher shared. The availability of a desktop IT application was also a 
critical element in the development phase, as the quotation heading this section 
illustrates. “When I first saw the EUROSUR on the screen, I finally realized 
what it was all about,” Border Guard Major Aleksandra Świąteka, Director of the 
International Cooperation Bureau of the Border Guard Headquarters in Warsaw, 
reported of the pilot phase. Ostensibly, the electronic map – the “EUROSUR on 
the screen” – is where ‘things’ come together. According to Świąteka, seeing the 
electronic map helps to understand and justify the practical efforts and institu-
tional restructuring that the European Commission has required of member state 
authorities in the development phase of the EUROSUR since 2008. It is on the 
screen where efforts come together. 
This chapter inspects the “EUROSUR on the screen” in order to explore the 
drawing together and the concentration of efforts that went into the EUROSUR. 
The site-inspection explores the communication format that is offered and re-
quired by the application’s graphical user interface (GUI). I start by describing 
the graphical features of the GUI, such as menu items and design. I then trace 
their development by looking into controversies and variations that preceded the 
technical implementation onscreen. Finally, the digital ‘objects’ and their devel-
                                                           
3  European Commission (2008): Examining the Creation of a European Border Surveil-
lance System (EUROSUR), COM(2008) 68 final (February 13, 2008), [hereafter cited 
as EUROSUR Roadmap, COM(2008) 68 final]. 
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opments are correlated to their textual fixation in the EUROSUR Regulation. 
The chapter thus looks into the question of how political compromises are trans-
lated and operationalized into IT classifications, which in turn amount to binding 
rules in a regulation. Furthermore, the particularities of the European situational 
picture (ESP) and the Common Pre-frontier Intelligence Picture (CPIP) which 
also (e)merge “on screen” are discussed. The chapter ends with a discussion on 
visualization as the most powerful form of meditation in the EUROSUR net-
work. The ESP lends the supranational EU border the necessary image and the 
necessary appreciation, thereby accomplishing a level of integration and Europe-
anization that hitherto and otherwise would have been impossible. 
 
 
4.1 EUROSUR’S GRAPHICAL USER INTERFACE: 
COMMUNICATION DEVICE, FORMAT, NETWORK 
 
Using the EUROSUR network means accessing a password-protected graphical 
user interface (GUI) on a personal computer. Once logged in, the user has access 
to an electronic map portraying the situation along the external borders of the EU 
in the form of a geo-tagged depiction of “border-related” information. The center 
of the GUI consists of a representation of the European continent in white on a 
light blue background. This acts as a kind of pinboard to which border-related in-
formation on a given geographical location can be added in the form of tags that 
include various expandable data fields. The interface has interactive features that 
allow the user to both read and input information.  
The electronic map of the EUROSUR network and its graphical user inter-
face were presented to me in the context of a “briefing”4 with the responsible 
project manager for the EUROSUR network at Frontex in May 2012. The pro-
ject manager has been in charge of the development, modeling and programming 
of the EUROSUR network and its graphical user interface since November 2009, 
  
                                                           
4  The “briefing” was offered to me instead of a participant observation in the Frontex 
Situational Center (FSC) that I initially asked for. This seemingly insignificant change 
of terms underlines how Frontex maintains the prerogative of interpretation. Neither 
the agency nor its services remain passive while under observation; rather, it is the 
agency who informs those “outside the border guard community” by means of a brief-
ing. My object of investigation thus turned itself into the subject of explanation. 
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Figure 4: EUROSUR on the screen 
Source: own photograph, taken in May 2012 
 
and he has been discussing and negotiating the system’s features with the partic-
ipating member states since March 2010. During our conversation5 he appeared 
to highly identify with the computer-generated network, which culminated in the 
sentence “I am the network.” To him, his being the network not only consists of 
his expertise in software engineering, but also his bringing together member 
states and convincing them to routinely share information. 
  
                                                           
5  Both the “briefing” with the project manager [hereafter cited as EUROSUR Project 
Manager at Frontex, personal interview (May 15, 2012)] and the follow-up telephone 
conversation [hereafter cited as EUROSUR Project Manager at Frontex, telephone in-
terview (June 26, 2012)] required authorization by the Head of the Research and De-
velopment Unit at Frontex. Further communication via email also required authoriza-
tion. Regarding several responses, concerning, for example, the usage of data and 
screenshots, authorization by the European Commission or the Head of Research and 
Development Unit at Frontex was required. Not all requests were granted. 
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“I have a long experience in international relations […]. And I know where the difficulties 
are. So instead of doing a big bang technical solution, because it is not technical, what I 
did when I arrived here – they asked me: ‘You should work in the EUROSUR network.’ 
And I say, ‘Okay, I know how to do it.’ I call the member states, and got them – three, 
four meetings – asking them: ‘What information do you manage today that you may be 
willing to share with others?’ And that is the starting point. And then I will give you the 
minimum technology to support that exchange, the minimum!”6 
 
This statement can be quite surprising in that the system developer, and thus the 
main figure in terms of technical feasibility and implementation, states that “it is 
not technical.” Moreover, despite political rhetoric’s emphasis of EUROSUR as 
a “technical framework”7 and the “system of systems,”8 and despite being char-
acterized as surveillance behemoth by critical commentators,9 EUROSUR is pre-
sented as minimalistic in terms of its technological setup. Hence, a new question 
arises: What kinds of difficulties are located beyond technicality? 
Judging by the objectives of EUROSUR – namely, increasing the interopera-
bility of existing surveillance systems, information exchange, and situational 
awareness among border agencies in the EU – and taking seriously that these are 
not technical issues, the focus falls on the willingness, acceptance and compli-
ance of EU member states to share information with each other and possibly 
with an institution at the supranational level of the EU. Subsequently, the legal 
discrepancies in terms of information policies turn out to be important. Regard-
ing already existing formats of information exchange and data sharing between 
law enforcement agencies in the EU, such as the Schengen Information System 
(SIS), European Dactyloscopy (EURODAC), and the Visa Information System 
(VIS), Leon Hempel and colleagues note that “interactions become even more 
complicated at the transnational level of the EU: the cultural, social, organiza-
                                                           
6 EUROSUR Project Manager at Frontex, personal interview (May 15, 2012). 
7 EUROSUR Roadmap, COM(2008) 68 final. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Initial reactions to the Commission’s envisioning of EUROSUR focused on the type 
and amount of surveillance technology that could be connected to the system. Particu-
larly the involvement of the arms industry and the number of FP7 projects mentioning 
EUROSUR as a possible “end user” initiated criticism. Often the amount of money 
spent in research and development has been taken as an indication of its being “big 
and bad.” In this context, the term ‘drones’ was deployed as a controversial stimulus 
and a platform of critique (cf. Kasparek 2008; Tsianos 2009, Monroy 2011). 
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tional and legal differences between the data exchanging law enforcement au-
thorities increase to a maximum of complexity” (Hempel/Carius/Ilten 2009: 5-6). 
In practical terms, this means that the exchange of information is hampered more 
by disharmony and a lack of trust between organizations (Balzacq/Hadfield 
2012; Aden 2014) than by the incompatibility of the technical systems used by 
administrations. Generally, the exchange of information between law enforce-
ment agencies – particularly the exchange of operational information – is a sensi-
tive issue. A NATO press officer mentioned to me that European member states 
routinely refrain from sharing information rather than the other way around. An-
ecdotally, he noted that even the brand of toilet paper provided in ministries was 
treated as classified information. The general secrecy and non-disclosure claimed 
by administrations can be deployed as a means to keep control over one’s own 
information and avoid being monitored from the outside. 
Hempel et al. see the reluctance of some member states to exchange infor-
mation as a “symbolic answer to the overall EU strategy of integrating national 
security policies at EU level, thereby consuming essential parts of national sov-
ereignty” (Hempel/Carius/Ilten 2009: 10). In fact, a centralized technical system 
could allow unwanted control and comparability both between member states 
and between the states and the European Commission. Effectively, information 
exchange means that internal procedures become visible and hence subject to 
evaluation, comparison and, ultimately, control. Maintaining authority over 
one’s own national information can be considered a strategic element against Eu-
ropeanization. Moreover, exchanging information also requires compliance to a 
reporting format that might differ from national routines and thus cause extra 
work. 
 
In order to eventually persuade member states to share information via the 
EUROSUR network, a bottom-up approach dominated the development phase 
during which all steps and propositions were carefully considered. This incre-
mentalism is alluded to in the passage quoted above: “I call the member states, 
and got them, three, four meetings, asking them […]. And this is the starting 
point.”10 It becomes clear that convincing member states to listen to the proposal 
is hard work already. Creating the conditions for a starting point required “three, 
four meetings”11 to mitigate skepticism and to make initial inquiries into the na-
tional status quo in terms of the availability of information and data. 
                                                           
10  EUROSUR Project Manager at Frontex, personal interview (May 15, 2012). 
11  Ibid. 
EUROSUR on the Screen | 91 
 
Thus, the starting point has been to create a general inventory of the kind of in-
formation national border authorities collect in their institutions. The tentative 
phrasing of “information […] that you may be willing to share with others”12 re-
quires for principle willingness. Political, administrative and legal details – such 
as who will be entitled to request information, who will receive it, how much 
administrative effort or even restructuring will be needed, and how the infor-
mation will be used – are set aside for the moment. By taking stock of the kind 
of information national authorities manage today, a list is made that assembles 
border-related information, which will then be further addressed. 
 
4.1.1 Europeanization by Design: Defining and Designing 
“Border-Related Incidents” 
 
As soon as a list is available, its content can be sorted, organized and catego-
rized. Thus, according to the preliminary schema of the pilot phase, border-
related incidents were to be grouped as either “illegal immigration,” “crime,” 
“crisis” or “other.” The responsible project manager at Frontex (P.M.) described 
the genesis of the classificatory schema as follows: 
 
P. M.: The first thing I created was a schema with four types of information and this 
schema is a tree that can be expanded or cut. 
 
S.E.: And what kind of information is that? 
 
P.M.: They [that is, the member states] say that they want to share information on illegal 
immigration, crime, crisis and other. […] I am using the information of the member states 
here. They say: “Crisis for us is: if there was a fire in the forest and we have to abandon 
the [border] crossing point, this is a crisis for us, or we are using a border guard helicopter 
to evacuate people from a boat. This is not illegal immigration and this is not crime, so 
crisis.” So this is the starting point: “What do you want to share?” And I facilitate that in a 
system which is extensible, stretchable. 
 
My interviewee describes a situation here in which representatives from member 
states have exemplified their operations and difficulties related to border polic-
ing, which they were asked to group and evaluate. At face value this can be un-
                                                           
12  EUROSUR Project Manager at Frontex, personal interview (May 15, 2012). 
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derstood as striving for a common heuristic (“this is crisis for us”13). Infor-
mation-sharing has two requirements: it requires a principle willingness and a 
format that is understood and accepted by all participants. “You need to have 
common definitions,” the Head of the Research and Development Unit at Fron-
tex stressed, “because otherwise it is going to be a big mess.” He explained: 
 
“If somebody is considering this coming under this heading and somebody else considers 
this as being under another heading, and then the whole structure gets completely lost. So 
you have to have these common definitions before you can start developing any system 
like this.”14 
 
To achieve these two requirements, a classificatory schema needs to resonate 
both with the local (that is, individual) conditions of different national border au-
thorities and with the global view of the European Commission. How things are 
named must thus be vague enough for all authorities to locate their issues while 
creating the impression of that they are represented correctly. They must also 
make sense in the context of a common task. The elements of such a classifica-
tion must bridge and translate between the local and the global level, between 
national concern and European outlook. The classificatory schema for sorting 
border-related information that the project manager proposed to the representa-
tives of the member states thus had to function as a “boundary object” 
(Star/Griesemer 1989) – that is, it had to be “both plastic enough to adapt to local 
needs […], yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites” (ibid: 
393).15 In the case of EUROSUR’s classificatory schema, the challenge was that 
it had to first create (rather than maintain) this common identity, which member 
states were reluctant. 
                                                           
13  EUROSUR Project Manager at Frontex, personal interview (May 15, 2012). 
14  Head of Research and Development at Frontex, telephone interview (October 28, 
2011). 
15  Susan Star and James Griesemer identify four types of boundary objects: repositories, 
ideal types, coincident boundaries, and standardized forms. The characterization of 
coincident boundaries almost reads like a description of EUROSUR’s functional rai-
son d’être. They are “common objects which have the same boundaries but different 
internal contents. They arise in the presence of different means of aggregating data 
and when work is distributed over a large-scale geographic area” (Star/Griesemer 
1989: 410-411). 
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Ultimately, the question of how to reach an agreement regarding adequate ti-
tles is centrally related to the communication of local events under a common 
European heading. Apart from streamlining understanding, it also concerns pri-
oritizing issues according to relevance for the shared responsibility of Schengen 
borders. This is because discussing the meaning of different types of border-
related information inevitably triggers a discussion on the critical point when a 
local phenomenon becomes an issue that should be considered a problem for the 
entire Schengen area. Thereby, claims and complaints by individual member 
states are put into comparison and hence into (a European) perspective. 
The search for common definitions prepares and, if successful, also supports 
the formalization of information exchange. However, there is more at stake than 
formalization. In their study on the creation of information infrastructures and 
the role of categories therein, Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Star stress that 
“[s]eemingly purely technical issues like how to name things […] in fact consti-
tute much of human interaction and much of what we come to know as natural” 
(Bowker/Star 2000: 326). In this sense, the EUROSUR on the screen and the 
menu bar of its graphical user interface provide a new way of looking at the bor-
der, while also proposing a mode of naturally recognizing the external border of 
the EU as emerging from events, issues and trends of concern. In order to reify 
and naturalize EUROSUR’s classificatory schema, its defined types of border-
related incidents are reformulated as: (a) technical – which in this case means as 
digital menu items, (b) iconographic – they are represented as icons, and (c) le-
gal – they are fleshed out in the regulation as a sub-layer of events and are par-
tially furnished with examples. Consequently, border-related incidents appear as 
menu items and graphical icons on the graphical user interface (GUI) and as sub-
layers of the events layer as in the software architecture of the GIS and in the 
legislation. In this way, the common definition of types of border-related infor-
mation is successively stabilized. 
 
Technical Framework: Border-Related Incidents as Menu Items 
When the test-application was shown to me in May 2012, the schema was al-
ready part of the menu bar. By transforming the schema of four types of infor-
mation into menu items, it became the first element in the infrastructure of the 
EUROSUR network. The schema was thus transformed from a loose question of 
“Under which heading would you communicate your event?” to an IT item that 
is materially available, selectable and clickable. Moreover, different types of 
border-related incidents were identified and proposed by the national coordina-
tion centers (NCCs) of member states participating in the test phase. 
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This resulted in a series of items in the menu bar and the so-called “incident 
catalogue,” an inventory of all incidents relevant for the common enforcement of 
the external EU borders.16 
 
Figure 5: Catalogue of “border-related” incidents” in the test application 
Source: own reconstruction, designed by Nils Ellebrecht 
 
                                                           
16 Up to today, the incident catalogue is subject to constant adjustment, and is not offi-
cially in the public domain. As these incidents sort out events relevant to border con-
trol, the process of defining them illustrates a European consensus about what is re-
garded border criminality, despite of the absence of a common EU immigration and 
asylum law. 
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During the pilot phase, participating member states could assess whether the 
schema was working in practice and how it could be amended and differentiated. 
As a result, two capabilities were tested in the pilot phase: fitting the classificato-
ry schema with the views, needs and interests of the participating member states, 
and the usability of the IT application. For participants, testing the application 
included getting used to a certain way of looking at the border and of perceiving 
information as border-relevant.  
This customization is supported by the interactive features of the platform 
that allows the user to both enter and retrieve information. The user can also fil-
ter the information by navigating the menu items to select certain types of inci-
dents. They will then receive a map on, for instance, cross-border crime. Similar-
ly, when a user intends to input information into the system, they are asked to se-
lect from the different types of border-related incidents and to classify the infor-
mation according to this agreed schema. In the meantime, both the application 
and the schema remained flexible; the system is “extensible, stretchable”17 and 
can also be reduced. This certainly evokes an atmosphere of “playing around” 
with the EUROSUR network in a non-binding way. Thus, rather than participat-
ing in new intergovernmental or communitarian obligations, the personnel at the 
NCCs became used to interacting in an electronic network. Rather than discuss-
ing common policy objectives or programs, member state representatives dis-
cussed menu items. 
 
Iconographic Framework: Border-Related Incidents as Icons 
All border-related incidents are rendered commensurable by way of icons. This 
has effects on both cartography and organization. Each type of incident has an 
assigned icon (cp. figure 6).18 The fact that the different icons have been de-
signed to imitate traffic signs19 – and hence appear mainly in red and yellow with 
a round or triangular shape – alludes to a self-image of border policing as the 
regulation of movement and traffic. The protection of borders has thus been 
transformed into the control of routes and entry points.  
                                                           
17 EUROSUR Project Manager at Frontex, personal interview (May 15, 2012). 
18 As an anecdote, it is interesting to mention that, when I was at the network office, the 
icon for a stolen car had just been developed after the Eastern authorities requested it 
be a border-related crime. In addition, the ability to delete messages was added during 
the pilot phase, when there was also a monthly update of the application. 
19 Head of Research and Development at Frontex, telephone interview (October 28, 
2011). 
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Figure 6: EUROSUR Icon Examples 
 Source: “EUROSUR: The Pilot,” presentation slide20 
 
The translation of the type of incident into an icon visually condenses the infor-
mation, thus reducing the material for the part of the electronic map in question. 
The icons are placed according to where the incident has occurred. If a series of 
events are reported in a single area, the red icon is surrounded by blue circles, 
which is meant to attract the operator’s attention. In addition, the current number 
of incidents at a particular spot is indicated in bold numbers on top of the inci-
dent icon. The operator can drag the cursor over the icon to display the individu-
al events and to select the respective incident report. In practical terms of infor-
mation exchange between border agencies in the EU, the icons bridge existing 
language gaps: While the EUROSUR network is set up in English, it is not the 
working language in most national offices. 
The common iconographic language may therefore be able to compensate for 
potential communication difficulties. Apart from these language barriers, icons 
are also able to bridge diverging interpretations of issues and even work when 
common definitions have not yet been fully achieved. They even out incongru-
ences and national divergences. They approximate understanding without con-
sensus by offering the flexibility to apply individual perspectives and fill a com-
mon icon with individual examples. They embody the quality of boundary ob-
jects. 
The semantic interoperability offered by icons suggests a common under-
standing, even when its content is still contested. The icons thus facilitate usabil-
ity, and they visually offer and anticipate a consensus even before it has been 
reached. Moreover, the symbolism of traffic signs suggests that there are set 
rules for movement in Europe. Finally, by way of accumulating events, the ne-
cessity to act seems obvious when looking at the map. 
 
                                                           
20  Gregorio Ameyugo Catalán (Frontex): “EUROSUR. The Pilot,” presentation during 
the European Day for Border Guards at the Frontex Headquarter on May 24, 2010 in 
Warsaw, Poland, at: http://www.ed4bg.eu/files/files/ Ameyugo_FRONTEX.pdf (ac-
cessed September 28, 2011), here slide 10. (Repository S. Ellebrecht) 
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Figure 7: Mapping border-related events 
 Source: own photograph, taken in May 2012, revised in color 
 
Legal Framework:  
Border-Related Incidents as “Sub-Layers” of the “Event Layer” 
The consensus on the kind of information to be shared and on how to sort it has 
been addressed in the EUROSUR legislative proposal of December 12, 201121 
and fixed in the EUROSUR Regulation of October 22, 2013.  
In the latter, the different types of information are circumscribed as “sub-
layers” of the “events layer.” Article 9 (3a-d) of the EUROSUR Regulation 
states:  
  
                                                           
21 European Commission (2011): Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council – Establishing the European Border Surveillance system 
(EUROSUR), COM(2011) 873 final (December 12, 2011) [hereafter cited as 
“EUROSUR draft regulation” or “EUROSUR legislative proposal” COM(2011) 873]. 
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“The events layer of the national situational picture shall consist of the following sub-
layers: 
(a) a sub-layer on unauthorised border crossings, including information available to 
the national coordination centre on incidents relating to a risk to the lives of mi-
grants; 
(b) a sub-layer on cross-border crime; 
(c) a sub-layer on crisis situations; 
(d) a sub-layer on other events, which contains information on unidentified and sus-
pect vehicles, vessels and other craft and persons present at, along or in the prox-
imity of, the external borders of the Member State concerned, as well as any oth-
er event which may have a significant impact on the control of the external bor-
ders.” 
 
At this point, it becomes clear that the regulation largely describes the software 
architecture of a geographic information system (GIS). It is, however, remarka-
ble that the regulation does not list the full number of border-related incidents to 
be communicated – that is, that is does not provide an incident catalogue. The 
technical option of selecting items from a menu translates in the regulation into 
an information request and hence as “the national situational picture shall con-
sist”22 of these types of information. At this point, playing around with a test ap-
plication becomes an obligation to communicate certain things in a certain way 
under defined headings. Thus, the inventory of border-related information has 
been transformed from a list into a classificatory schema of four types, a selec-
tion option in a menu bar, and finally a request for a particular kind of infor-
mation. 
Bowker and Star aptly emphasized that classifications “are powerful technol-
ogies. Embedded in working infrastructures they become relatively invisible 
without losing any of that power” (Bowker/Star 2000: 255). Indeed, the 
EUROSUR network offers a new working infrastructure, which in turn produces 
a new perspective on the task of border management. The process of establishing 
a working infrastructure for the exchange of information that is acquired and in-
tegrated into the relations between border authorities seems to weigh more than 
the content of the information itself. 
 
                                                           
22  EUROSUR Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013, Art. 9 (3a-d), emphasis added. 
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P.M.: I used to use this anecdote, this metaphor: this system is the train system, the station, 
the train, the trucks, but the cargo and the passengers is an issue for you, the users. So, I 
provide you with a secure train system; cargo and passengers are up to you. 
 
S.E.: It is a huge system. 
 
P.M.: In fact, it is small. Look at this; this will sound philosophical, but look, this network 
that I have created is using the minimum technology because I know that technology is not 
the issue. And the application may change, the security of the network may change, the 
network itself may change, it could be a dedicated network in the future; but what should 
be permanent is the community of people that are getting used to sharing information; that 
part should be permanent, and how they do it. We have a super solution now that may 
evolve and may change.23 
 
The border-related incidents (whether as menu items, icons or sub-layers) are of-
fered as a new convenient way of judging and sorting what is happening at the 
border. They are proposed as wagons of the “secure train system” to transport in-
formation. However, even though presented as intermediary, the classificatory 
schema of border-related incidents does not simply transport information. It me-
diates a new way of perceiving the external border of the EU. It is therefore 
worth stressing that the entire process successfully continued without defining 
“border-related.” The monopoly of interpretation lies in the act of visualizing in-
formation on the EUROSUR electronic map. What makes it onto the map be-
comes relevant for common border policies. 
 
4.1.2 Sorting, Reporting and Evaluating Information 
 
Having developed a classificatory schema to sort border-related information, 
member states were asked to report events using the different headings available 
on the GUI. Generally, occurrence reports are an essential part of police work; 
internally, they fulfill the function of documentation and accountability. Fur-
thermore, they can be used as pieces of information to be forwarded to other in-
stitutions. When information is forwarded among several institutions, as in the 
EUROSUR network, further agreements are required, concerning: 
  
                                                           
23  EUROSUR Project Manager at Frontex, personal interview (May 15, 2012). 
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• the format of the report, 
• the degree of automatization of sending information, 
• the selection of information based on one’s own preferences for or against 
sharing,  
• the selection of information based on its relevance to the common border. 
 
During the test phase, participating member states used the preliminary format of 
an incident report. The decisions regarding the degree of automatization and the 
selection of information to be forwarded in the network were left to the individu-
al member states, whose representatives could “play” with the system. It is im-
portant to stress that the incident report as displayed in the photograph in figure 8 
shows the version that was available in May 2012, which has most likely since 
been updated. It shows the format in the test phase that provided several features 
that are no longer part of the application description in the EUROSUR Regula-
tion. The value of presenting and discussing the format anyway lies in the fact 
that significant aspects that fostered the compliance of member states with the 
EUROSUR network can be demonstrated in this test version. It shows that dif-
ferent material development steps are not merely incomplete stages of the end 
product; they are seminal mediators that provide of the potential for further ac-
ceptance and development. Accordingly, they resemble those “fragments of the 
story” which Michel de Certeau recognized in the sailing ship painted on the sea, 
indicating “the maritime expedition that made it possible to represent the coast-
lines” (Certeau 2013 [1984]: 121). Although the sailing ships become invisible 
through the transformation of the depiction of coastlines into maps, they repre-
sent and call to mind the operations from which the map resulted. 
 
Incident Reports 
In the frame of the EUROSUR network, incident reports can be considered the 
basic format of information exchange between member states. Border-related in-
cidents are entered into the system by clicking on the pencil icon, which is called 
the “artifact editor.” In the language of EUROSUR users, the occurrence is then 
transformed into an “artifact.” A so-called “new artifact” consists of the follow-
ing nine details, which the artifact editor requests in an input mask: type, creator, 
owner, impact, state, layer, location, updated, and description. To enter an inci-
dent report, these boxes must be filled in. 
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Figure 8: Reporting incidents from the border 
 Source: own photograph, taken in May 2012, revised in color 
 
These reports on events can be published on the national situational pictures 
(NSP) of the reporting member state, meaning they remain with that member 
state, or they can be forwarded to selected partners and also appear on their 
maps. When published on the electronic map; incident reports are represented by 
different icons, as described above. If we click on an icon, a file card pops up in 
the shape of a speech bubble, displaying the information that has been filled in 
the boxes (see figure 8). Given the fact that the communication format of the in-
cident report structures both the reporting and the reception of the information on 
“border-related” events, it is worth discussing its different elements. 
In the “artifact editor,” the author selects a “type” of “border-related inci-
dent” from the menu. The classification of the incident also appears in text for-
mat in the first line of the file card as “type.” Figure 8 provides an example of an 
incident report for an “irregular entry.” The respective icon, placed on the top 
right side of the file card, repeats the type. This again underlines the importance 
of the iconographic translation of the classification: The graphical image, the 
“traffic sign,” supports the standardization of common definitions, as it translates 
particular events into icons of common concern. Moreover, the last box at the 
bottom of the speech bubble asks for a “description” to accompany the infor-
mation on the reported event.  
This means that the sorting is illustrated, and the classification is performed 
and customized. Moreover, other participants are able to see whether a respective 
heading has been chosen appropriately. These three boxes – type (selected from 
the menu bar), icon (which visualizes the incident accordingly) and description – 
support the customization of incidents to the classificatory schema through para-
phrasing. 
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The next five boxes negotiate the issues of ownership and authority over in-
formation and data. The first two boxes distinguish the “creator” from the “own-
er” of information. With regard to the information provided by member states, 
the owner of the information is identical with the creator of an incident report. 
However, the “owner” of information could also be a source or party who is not 
part of the EUROSUR network, but who provides information on agreement. In-
formation regarding vessel traffic, for instance, might be provided and owned by 
EMSA. In this case, the creator of the information in the EUROSUR network 
would, however, be Frontex. Likewise, Frontex might be the “creator of infor-
mation” during Joint Operations (JOs), while the “owner of the information” 
would be the host country. According to the terms of use, any participating na-
tional coordination center (NCC) – or in the language of EUROSUR, every users 
or node – could be the creator of information. Frontex is also a node, yet it lacks 
the mandate of an investigative authority. However, in the interactive setup of 
the IT application, the entry of information is not bound to the rights of that in-
formation or data. In the case of the EUROSUR network, it could thus happen 
that Frontex, although not allotted an investigative mandate, can create infor-
mation relevant to the operationalization of border policies. The standard in in-
formation security, according to which an institution which creates and stores in-
formation is the initial owner of that information,24 is thus made flexible. Moreo-
ver, the distinction between owner and creator might become increasingly sensi-
tive when it comes to operational information: will a Maltese border guard be al-
lowed to report something he sees in the Italian waters to Frontex and vice ver-
sa? Does reporting imply operational obligations? Who creates information dur-
ing a joint operation? And is reporting different from being responsible? 
The labeling of a participant as the “owner” of information demonstrates a 
signaling effect toward member states, in the sense that their sovereignty is doc-
umented by being named the owner of the information in the reporting system, 
but the legal framework of informational sovereignty is unsettled by the very dis-
tinction between the creator and the owner of information. As a node, Frontex 
can create information without having the rights to generate surveillance infor-
mation itself. The lack of sovereign competence is compensated for by referring 
to the “owner.” 
 
                                                           
24 Information Security Glossary, sub voce “Information Owner,” at: http://www.your 
window.to/information-security/gl_informationowner.htm (accessed August 7, 2019). 
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The next three boxes – “impact,” “state” and “layer” – further interfere with the 
setup of the ownership of information by relating the assessment of information 
to the way it should be treated and shared in the network. 
The “impact” refers to the assignment of an “indicative impact level,” which 
ranges from “high” to “medium” to “low.” During the test phase, only those in-
cident reports were requested to be sent to Frontex that had been assigned a me-
dium or high impact level, while low impact reports were kept at the NCCs. This 
offered them the possibility to use the system without exchanging all of the in-
formation all of the time. Additionally, the box “state” indicates whether the in-
formation in the incident report is to be kept “closed” (that is, with the NCC) or 
whether it is to be “shared” with other network participants. During the test 
phase only, it was possible for member states to decide what information they 
wanted to share with what other participants. 
The box “layer” sorts different kinds of information and offers the following 
options: “events layer,” “analysis layer” and “operational layer.” All three layers 
reveal and negotiate the tension between local issues and the assessment of their 
relevance for common European border policies. Considering member states’ 
strong reluctance to exchange information on national procedures and events, 
and thereby disclose it to a European view, the processes during the test phase 
were intended to demonstrate that local events are part of a bigger picture (mate-
rialized in the ESP) and that there was therefore a “responsibility to share.”25 
However, while filling in information, operators did not necessarily apply a Eu-
ropean perspective, but were also selective and influenced by national interests. 
For instance, local occurrences that have been dramatized and assigned a high 
impact level may suggest (that is, create evidence for) a desire for more funding. 
Conversely, controversial or low-standard operational practices could be hidden 
in the system by assigning them a low impact status (or simply by not reporting 
them at all). The following two sections will describe these temporary conces-
                                                           
25 Jargon among officials at the European Commission and Frontex responsible for the 
EUROSUR development phase (December 2012). The official jargon changed here 
from “need to know” and “need to share,” to “responsibility to share.” Effectively, 
these formulations take a step back from the principle of availability and its demand 
toward member states to provide information without further ado (cf. Bunyan 2006; 
Töpfer 2008). Moreover, the principle of availability refers to criminal law infor-
mation, which are not addressed in the EUROSUR GUI. Again, it shows that 
EUROSUR has not been developed along existing legal categories, but makes its own 
definition offer. 
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sions and compare this procedure with the final rule in the EUROSUR Regula-
tion. 
First, however, it should be mentioned that the details on space and time 
(“location” and “updated”) provided in the incident report allows us to deduce 
the possibilities and motives of the EUROSUR network in terms of a timely op-
erational response. Although information on the “location” indicated with longi-
tude and latitude coordinates can be relevant for operational decisions as well as 
for the retrospective transparency of events, it is useless when reported one day 
after the occurrence. Yet, the time tag does not ask for the time of occurrence, 
but rather refers to the information in the incident report, stating when it was last 
updated. This documents when the incident became an artifact in the system, or 
when the information was changed. The continual possibility to update e the in-
cident report lets the EUROSUR seem more like a documentation platform and 
archive than as an agency supporting prompt interventions. In fact, Martina Taz-
zioli, who in 2014 had the chance to conduct ethnographic work in the Italian 
NCC after EUROSUR became operational, found that “the average time of la-
tency between a migration event being added to a map and being displayed is of 
some hours and can reach two days” (Tazzioli/Walters 2016: 9). Apparently, this 
has not changed much since the pilot phase, when it was considered a success by 
Frontex and EC officials if “the stuff is inside the system within 24 hours.”26 
Compliance with and the actual usage of the system is thus critical for any eval-
uation of EUROSUR’s function as an agency supporting operational reactions. 
I will now return to those temporary concessions that fostered the compliance 
of member states during the pilot phase and initially allowed them to maintain 
control over their national information. 
 
Sharing Policies: 
Maintaining Control Over One’s National Information 
Since the EUROSUR Regulation of 22 October 2013, all incident reports created 
in the IT network are sent to Frontex. While some NNCs can automatically re-
trieve the information, most participants enter the information manually, alt-
hough the exchange of information is instituted and regulated via the EUROSUR 
system. For some, this high level of compliance may come as a surprise. 
A look at the test phase demonstrates the gradual process of convincing 
member states and getting them to share information and become less reluctant 
toward a European standard format of communication regarding operational in-
                                                           
26 Formulation used by an EC official in December 2012. 
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formation. When I interviewed the project manager responsible at Frontex during 
the test phase, he described the options for the exchange of information in the 
following way: 
 
S.E.: Does one have the opportunity to select the information that will go into the net-
work? 
 
P.M.: There is the option of selecting between automatically or manually. But first, when 
you inject information in the system, it is injected locally, because maybe your people 
want to see it and maybe you want to discuss this with other people in the NCC. And then 
someone has to publish it. And when you publish, the information will be distributed fol-
lowing the sharing policies that you have established. 
 
S.E.: And what could be the sharing policies? 
 
P.M.: Sharing policies are defined by each node [that is, NCC]. For instance, illegal immi-
gration will go to everybody, crime will go to France and Italy, crisis will go to every-
body, so this is the sharing policy.27 
 
The option to define individual information sharing policies was crucial to the 
acceptance of the system among member state authorities. Member states thus 
maintained authority over their national ‘border-related information’ in two 
ways: First, national authorities decided which information would be shared with 
whom – that is, the participants could exploit the system to their advantage and 
interests without having to comply with a central demand to provide information. 
A selective usage of the system was allowed; there were no strings attached, just 
strings of digital references were offered. Second, national border enforcement 
activities were not reported on the European level, which essentially would have 
suggested a central supervision of Schengen activities. When asked whether 
these different options were part of the design from the beginning, the Frontex 
official replied at length: 
 
“I planned it in this way, after discussion with the member states. I got their answers, and I 
quickly saw that they didn’t want to have a big brother. I saw also that if we establish a 
centralized system, the centralized system will be managing the information which will be 
                                                           
27 EUROSUR Project Manager at Frontex, personal interview (May 15, 2012). 
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the common denominator of everybody. And that common denominator will be very 
small, so ‘No thank you’ – we will not have a centralized system.”28 
 
The obstacles to sharing information are identified as conflicting interests and 
fear of supervision. Convincing member states to loosen their sovereign monop-
oly over national surveillance information and to routinely and actively share in-
formation required added value. For, if the common denominator is “very small” 
and members’ reluctance to report their own activities is great, the system will 
not take off. The Frontex official describes a kind of skepticism that is typical for 
law enforcement agencies with regard to the exchange of information: the belief, 
or rather concern, “that communications amalgamation breaks down both territo-
rial and formal organizational boundaries” (Ericson/Haggerty 1997: 393). Hence, 
the EUROSUR system was explicitly offered to member states as a service in 
which each participant could select the options that best benefitted their needs. 
 
“We have a distributed system with the possibility to create communities of interest. And 
if there is one of the nodes that cannot see some type of information – so what? This node 
will not see it. But the others – why not?! You may create a community! Imagine that 
we’re having 25 nodes, and there are five nodes that have customs’ information – because 
this picture of the NCC having all the information is not real – so imagine that there are 
five that have customs information, and they are able to share that information between 
them. We will be helping them! And that will be part of their border situation, and they 
will have a European situational picture of their region that will be richer than that of other 
nodes.”29 
 
Future additional reporting burdens were left to the member states to decide. The 
incentive to do so, however, was established with reference to the value of in-
formation itself: “If I am very active and if I am sharing a lot of information with 
the others I will have a very rich map, so if I am very active, I will have a rich 
map.”30 A glance at the EUROSUR electronic map shows why this circular ar-
gument could be convincing. Engaging in the exchange of information, and shar-
ing a great amount of information with many partners meant having more tags 
on one’s own situational picture. 
                                                           
28 EUROSUR Project Manager at Frontex, personal interview (May 15, 2012). 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
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Getting involved was visually rewarded with a “richer map” and the feeling 
of knowing what was going on at the common borders. Again, the option to de-
fine individual sharing policies was crucial to the acceptance of the system by 
member state authorities. Still, the idea of generating different national pictures 
of the situation at the external borders was not in the interest of the European 
Commission, and ultimately sharing policies disappeared with the publication of 
the final regulation. 
 
Impact Levels: The Traffic Lights of Border Control 
In addition to reporting occurrences in the form of an incident report, NCCs are 
requested to assign each incident an “indicative impact level, ranging from ‘low’ 
and ‘medium’ to ‘high.’” The purpose of this procedure is primarily to assess lo-
cal events with regard to their relevance for common Schengen border policies. 
What local occurrences weigh enough to impact Schengen responsibilities? Put 
differently: What local information is also relevant to others, and to what extent? 
In this case, “impact” is not further defined, as this could be construed as being 
overly demanding and perhaps even patronizing toward member states who may 
then no longer accept the system and could leave the test phase. 
During the test phase, the assignment of impact levels was monitored by 
Frontex. The agency ran a so-called “consistency check” on how member states 
apply the impact levels. However, this consistency check had the potential to go 
beyond this information submitted with the incident report and to additionally 
enable national claims to be put into perspective. “It is not just exchange of in-
formation,” noted a Frontex official, “it is also asking for information and asking 
the Italians: ‘Why do you think that this event is high impact when we see that it 
is only related to a single Moroccan?’”31 The impact level thus not only reports 
local urgency, but also allows for comparability. The application of impact levels 
can thus be considered a relatively strong insight into national affairs and border 
police work, and its acceptance by member states therefore surprising. 
As already mentioned, this acceptance emerged gradually. During the pilot 
phase, the value of these procedures could be tested without having to share all 
of the information all of the time with all of the nodes. In fact, those events as-
signed a low impact were intended to remain in the member states’ NCCs. Me-
dium and high impact incidents were sent to Frontex where the “consistency 
check” was applied. Assigning a low impact level to an incident thus meant 
keeping control over the distribution of an incident report. In this sense, the rule 
                                                           
31 EUROSUR Project Manager at Frontex, personal interview (May 15, 2012). 
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that incidents of low impact need not be shared with Frontex did not necessarily 
mean that the incidents were of minor importance to overall European border 
management, but rather allowed member states to be active in the system without 
being monitored by others. That the draft regulation proposed that “[a]ll [read: 
only] events assigned with a ‘medium’ to ‘high’ impact level shall be shared 
with the Agency”32 can be regarded as the top-down expectation of the European 
Commission to at least routinely share those incidents with Frontex that member 
states considered as having a moderate or significant impact on the situation at 
the common external borders. 
However, the final regulation no longer grants the selective exchange of in-
formation, but rather prescribes that every incident “shall be shared with the 
Agency.”33 This can be judged as a positive achievement of the European Com-
mission, which was able to convince the Council that all incident-reports go to 
Frontex. 
 
“The argument on the side of the Commission in this regard – and the member agreed – 
was: if a migratory route is altered and a new route is being tested, it is not risked [by fa-
cilitators, S.E.] to send 30, 40 or 100 persons which then are intercepted. Rather one sends 
three, five, ten persons and it is watched how permeable the border is; now, these incidents 
would be classified as low impact. But if one was already able to see these incidents, new 
routes could be detected much faster, instead of waiting until member states report these 
30, 40 or 100 persons. ”34 
 
Finally, the EUROSUR Regulation requires Frontex to “visualise the impact lev-
els attributed to the external borders in the European situational picture”35. For 
this purpose, Frontex aggregates the individual impact levels in the context of 
the agency’s risk analysis, referring both to the impact level assigned by member 
states and the frequency of incidents of a specific type along a defined “border 
section.” This visualization consists of the respective border section being col-
ored, so that different parts or dots along the external borders of the EU appear 
as green, yellow, or red stripes. 
  
                                                           
32 EUROSUR legislative proposal COM(2011) 873, Art. 9 (4). 
33 EUROSUR Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013, Art. 9 (4). 
34  EC official in Brussels, personal interview (December 2012). 
35  EUROSUR Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013, Art. 15 (3). 
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Figure 9: Frontex’s demonstration of border sections and impact levels 
Source: European Commission, press release of November 29, 201336 
 
This means that the distinguishing aspect of an incident is no longer the national 
border, but the color-coded impact level. Additionally, the color codes are not 
applied to national borders, but to designated border sections. The EUROSUR 
Regulation requires each member state to “divide its external land and sea bor-
ders into border sections, and […] notify them to the Agency”37.  
Border Guard Major Świąteka reasons that national borders would be too 
general a unit, as “it depends on what is happening on the other side of the bor-
der.”38 Furthermore, she considers the assignment of impact levels more of an 
exercise of semantic interoperability. During a presentation on EUROSUR, she 
stated: “It is not just to give names; we will be obliged to react accordingly. This 
is why EUROSUR is not just a system for the exchange of information but 
                                                           
36  European Commission (2013): EUROSUR: Protecting the Schengen external bor-
ders - protecting migrants' lives, MEMO/13/1070 (November 29, 2013), p. 3, at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/memo_13_10
70/MEMO_13_1070_EN.pdf (accessed August 15, 2019). 
37  EUROSUR Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013, Art. 14. 
38  BG Major Świąteka: EUROSUR Presentation (May 16, 2012). 
110 | Mediated Borders 
 
much, much more.”39 Even if the authority of border guards is still tied to territo-
rial borders, as depicted on the screen, their place of operation is denationalized 
and dynamic.  
Coloring puts the self-evaluations of the member states into a supranational 
perspective. This allows for comparisons, while also painting a new picture of 
the border: no longer are state borders drawn as lines on a map, now their insecu-
rities are identified, aggregated, and visualized as concerns rendered in color. 
While this new outlook affects the image of a common EU border, it is also re-
ferred to for the allocation of resources and personnel, as the EUROSUR Regula-
tion foresees “reaction corresponding to impact levels.”40 Thus, in the process of 
collecting, evaluating, aggregating, visualizing and coloring pieces of infor-
mation, they turn into occasions or even evidence for intervention. According to 
the “EUROSUR on the screen,” there is always something to do: perhaps more 
here (red), and less there (green). In this sense, the exchange of information fuses 
with the suggestion of operational urgency. 
 
Layers: System Architecture and Techno-Political Filter 
The division of the EUROSUR GIS into layers surpasses the conventional use of 
layers in a geographical information system. Generally, data on the distribution 
and characteristics of defined aspects are clustered into layers to be selected for 
display. This is also used in the context of EUROSUR when types of border-
related incidents appear as layers or sub-layers, as described above. The practical 
reason for layers in the GIS is that it creates the possibility to select and combine 
information, or to single out a single aspect for display. This is also possible with 
the EUROSUR application. An operator can thus select “cross-border crime” and 
receive a map that displays only this defined information.  
Additionally, it is interesting to note that the EUROSUR layers also imply 
different fields of responsibility. In addition to these thematic variables, which 
can be displayed layer by layer, the institutional structure of sharing and pro-
cessing information via the EUROSUR network is also organized in layers. The 
Head of Research and Development explained this during the test phase: 
 
“The way the EUROSUR network is built up is that we will have different layers, the op-
erational layer, and the analytical layer, which can be used by different people. For in-
stance, if you talk about analysis, you do not want operational people to have direct access 
                                                           
39  BG Major Świąteka: EUROSUR Presentation (May 16, 2012). 
40 EUROSUR Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013, Art. 16. 
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to that layer. I mean this is a layer which is used for analytical people to compile infor-
mation, to draw conclusions, basically, to do analyses. And this analysis will then appear 
in the network of EUROSUR. And if we’re talking about the operational information, 
which is real time or near real time, this is the event or incident layer, as we call it, and this 
is where people, this kind of operational people, can put on things that are actually hap-
pening at the extern al border right now. So we see it in these kinds of layers.”41 
 
The layers the official is describing here distinguish competences and thus oper-
ate as protected spaces in the system. Moreover, these layers do not cluster in-
formation in terms of content, but in terms of how it is obtained and processed 
and according to its weight in knowledge production. Louise Amoore received a 
similar statement from an interview with a border security software designer in 
2009. Her interviewee stated: “There is real time decision making, and then the 
offline team who run the analytics and work out the best set of rules” (Amoore 
2011: 25). This new distinction in competences has thus been built into the IT 
architecture of EUROSUR by way of “layers.” The draft regulation specifies the 
three layers with regard to the information they collect and in turn provide: 
 
(a) an events layer, containing information on incidents concerning irregular migration, 
cross-border crime and crisis situations; 
(b) an operational layer, containing information on the status and position of own assets, 
areas of operation and environmental information; 
(c) an analysis-layer, containing strategic information, analytical products, intelligence as 
well as imagery and geo-data.42 
 
The final regulation, however, merely lists the three layers that make up any sit-
uational picture in the EUROSUR: the events layer, the operational layer, and 
the analysis layer.43 The wording follows the formal logic of a GIS. When the 
regulation was passed, customizing the participants to fit the distribution of tasks 
and competences in the EUROSUR network was no longer debated, but taken 
for granted. It no longer needed to be specified, as it logically emerged from the 
system. It is an infrastructure that is taken for granted. 
                                                           
41 Head of Research and Development at Frontex, telephone interview (October 28, 
2011). 
42 EUROSUR legislative proposal, COM(2011) 873 final, Art. 8 (2). 
43 EUROSUR Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013, Art. 8 (2). 
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In sum, discussing the EUROSUR network initially meant developing an IT 
application and discussing the menu options of its graphical user interface (GUI). 
The development of EUROSUR focused on what this could look like and how it 
could be represented on a screen. Different national angles were tentatively sub-
sumed under menu items, domains of responsibility were translated into GIS 
layers, and organizational hierarchies were flattened into nodes in the system. 
Regarding the test application, discussions were geared toward (and reduced to) 
the GUI, the usability of which mediated the negotiations. To a certain extent, a 
question of sovereign competences (in this case, the authority of one’s own na-
tional information) was flanked by, reduced to or even smothered by the ques-
tion of software design. Ultimately, it can be assumed that it was most likely eas-
ier to get used to menu items for the purpose of testing an IT application than to 
agree on common priorities for border policies in Europe. Because interaction is 
mainly with the platform rather than member states engaging in discussions, the 
exchange of information ensues smoothly. Or, as Ruben Andersson commented 
pointedly: “If they started talking, it would never happen” (Andersson 2016: 
13).44  
In effect, the fact that officials did not want to make these development steps 
public because they said that they were “premature” highlights the frailty of the 
inter-organizational agreement at this time rather than the technical shortcom-
ings. What was critical about the pilot phase was not the readiness of the tech-
nology, but the compliance of the member states. 
 
 
4.2 THE EUROPEAN SITUATIONAL PICTURE 
 
The immediate purpose of the exchange of information in the EUROSUR net-
work is the generation of the European situational picture (ESP). Frontex pro-
vides the ESP to the national authorities active in national coordination centers 
(NCCs) in the format of the electronic map described above. During the pilot 
                                                           
44 From the quoted passages in Andersson’s essay; I assume that he had the same inter-
view partner as I did. Certain formulations are very similar to the statements I record-
ed. This demonstrates nicely that Frontex officials not only “brief” social scientists 
(cf. fn. 4 and 5), but are themselves briefed. Certain formulations seem to be deliber-
ately released to the public, as if their effect was expected. Dealing with the controlled 
disclosure of information limits ethnographic work in the (border) security domain 
more than dealing with difficulties acquiring access or finding interview partners. 
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phase, member states experienced the added value of sharing and accumulating 
their information by seeing it all assembled in the European situational picture. 
This visualization literary makes visible the added value of exchanging infor-
mation, which is in turn accessible as an object and thus exploitable by partici-
pants. This having been said, the EUROSUR electronic map is about Europe’s 
borders. Geographic features are secondary in the cartographic representation 
and can be changed by the individual user, that is, by each NCC. “The map is a 
holder of information,” explains the responsible project manager at Frontex, who 
argued: 
 
“We don’t need to have very precise maps because we just use them as a place holder for 
the information. Nevertheless, in the rack that I am installing, there is one server of maps. 
We are providing three maps, but if one of the users wants to put their own maps, they can 
do it.”45 
 
As the official said about the test phase of the network, the background map’s 
“open street layer,” which appears by default – presenting a white European con-
tinent in front of a light blue background (figure 4) – was never changed by 
member states. The reason was obvious to him: “Then the events are more visi-
ble.”46 In fact, the ESP is all about the visibility and tagging of events,47 rather 
than the definition of a territory. While in the territorial frame the drawing of a 
                                                           
45 EUROSUR Project Manager at Frontex, personal interview (May 15, 2012). – The 
“server of maps” offers three maps to choose from; apart from the one selected in the 
Frontex office, which in the system is called “open street layer,” two further options 
exist – termed “blue marble” and “land set” – both of which are based on satellite im-
ages. The user has the possibility to manually select further configurations. Apart from 
the background map, it is possible to define whether bio-physical conditions should be 
indicated: forests, for example, can be added and would appear in green imitating bio-
physical appearances according to their actual color (cf. Ehrensvärd 1987: 131). The 
blue color representing the Mediterranean Sea is most likely also taken from the real-
istic tradition of imitating perception, which has been customized to the extent that it 
is common to talk about blue borders. 
46 EUROSUR Project Manager at Frontex, personal interview (May 15, 2012). 
47 Martina Tazzioli also highlights the focus on events articulated on the map and de-
scribe this gaze as an “epistemology of the event” (Tazzioli 2018: 6). Joseph Pugliese 
argues that the “incident-as-event is the non-normative figure that ruptures the banal 
unfolding of normative seriality on the screen” (Pugliese 2014: 580). 
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single line allowed things and people to be organized, the accumulation of in-
formation, as in the ESP, lets single events that are suspicious to be identified or 
detected against the background of data. The ESP maps insecurities, hotspots of 
migratory pressure, and risks as they culminate into an accumulation of incidents 
marked as traffic signs or colored-in border sections. In fact, the ESP is not in-
tended to provide a cartographic representation in which territorial border lines 
compartmentalize, contour and identify political authority; it was meant to pro-
vide a “situational picture” that can be used by authorities to develop operational 
strategies. Yet, what are the peculiar characteristics of a situational picture? 
What does its map accomplish? What is the argument its map is trying to make? 
Situational pictures can quite generally be described as tools for making de-
cisions. They arrange information as objects of concern that represent the spatial 
distribution of, for instance, adversary troops in the battle field, a certain type of 
crime, HIV or aids, or consumer patterns on a neighborhood, country or global 
scale. This can be arranged above a table or in a GIS-generated map to create a 
dynamic depiction of an object or theme in a defined area. The purpose is to pro-
duce an overview, a panorama, with regard to the extent and distribution of a de-
fined issue of concern, so that personnel and resources can be deployed accord-
ingly. In the context of inter-organizational cooperation, situational pictures also 
provide a platform for collecting information from different actors. Situational 
pictures can also be used to anticipate future developments or to trace the evolu-
tion of a situation. They are a typical asset in control rooms of all kinds, where 
they may be wall-sized or available on different screens. In any case, contem-
plating the picture is expected to lead to an informed, evidence-based decision 
that is tailored to the situation being viewed from a distance. 
EUROSUR’s definition of a “situational picture” states that the picture must 
be represented and accessible via ICT as a “graphical interface.”48 Its content is 
defined as “near real time data and information received from different authori-
ties, sensors, platforms and other sources.”49 This surveillance data is visualized 
as a situational picture which is “shared across communication and information 
channels with other authorities in order to achieve situational awareness and 
support the reaction capability along the external borders and the pre-frontier ar-
ea.”50 What is missing is any mention of the issue being displayed in the ESP. 
                                                           
48 EUROSUR Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013, Art. 3(d). 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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The definition merely answers Wood’s and Fels’s call for a definition of the 
map’s performance and its argument by stating the purpose of EUROSUR’s sit-
uational picture as achieving “situational awareness” and supporting “the reac-
tion capability along the external borders and the pre-frontier area”51. The elec-
tronic map thus embodies a widely accepted rationale that there is a virtual caus-
al relation between the availability of information and the effectiveness of (bor-
der) policing. It assumes that authorities know (or rather see) what to do. And the 
argument? What argument does the ESP put forth and on the basis of what sup-
porting documentation? Judging from the Regulation’s defined aim of “situa-
tional awareness” and its respective definition as “the ability to monitor, detect, 
identify, track and understand illegal cross-border activities in order to find rea-
soned grounds for reaction measures on the basis of combining new information 
with existing knowledge, and to be better able to reduce loss of lives of migrants 
at, along or in the proximity of, the external borders,”52 the ESP is meant to ar-
gue (“find reasoned grounds”) for reaction measures. 
In effect, the non-representational map of the ESP argues that certain situa-
tions, such as a high-impact, red border section or an accumulation of incidents 
of a certain type require reaction measures. However, these reaction measures 
are not specified in the regulation; they are rather described as an ability that is 
made possible by the situational awareness achieved by the ESP. According to 
the regulation, “reaction capability” means “the ability to perform actions aimed 
at countering illegal cross-border activities at, along or in the proximity of, the 
external borders, including the means and timelines to react adequately”53. This 
definition does not provide a qualitative benchmark of reaction capability either 
in terms of a defined timeliness of the reaction or in terms of objectives. It also 
does not refer to any legal basis for interventions, or mention that this definition 
addresses law enforcement units, whose reaction capability is a concern. Rather, 
it stresses that the “ability to perform actions” and “the means and timeliness to 
react adequately” result from the quality of the ESP. What is unsettling here is 
the fact that the humanitarian intention “to be better able to reduce loss of lives 
of migrants” is included in the “situational awareness,” but is not mentioned as 
one of the results of this awareness. Saving lives is not part of its defined reac-
tion capability. 
                                                           
51  EUROSUR Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013, Art. 3(d). 
52 Ibid, Art. 3(b). 
53 Ibid, Art. 3(c). 
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Overall, the generation of the object of knowledge itself, the ESP, is under-
lined as the means and ends of the exchange of information in the EUROSUR 
network. The argument, or evidence, for taking reaction measures is visually 
presented on the electronic map of the ESP. However, it is visualized “on the ba-
sis of combining new information,”54 such as operational information or signals, 
and fused with “existing knowledge,”55 such as available data or databases. Ac-
cording to the Head of Research and Development at Frontex, the ability to elec-
tronically leave their national border and see (and compare) what is happening at 
other parts of the external borders not only supports solidarity among authorities 
– in the sense that, for instance, Polish authorities see that the Italians have much 
to do – it also allows them “to understand parallels.”56 He explains: 
 
“Normally, the member state, they should know what they are doing at their external bor-
ders […] in that sense it isn’t additional information, they know where the patrol units are, 
so in that sense it is nothing new. However, they can see that at the border between 
Ukraine and Slovakia that a new modus operandi is popping up there and, I don’t know, 
Chinese are appearing there at the border with false documents, so they might think: 
‘Okay if we see Chinese at our border we might want to check a little bit further and verify 
whether these documents are really the correct ones.’ And this tool to understand parallels 
is not available in Europe at the moment.”57 
 
However, matching data and conducting a risk analysis – factors alluded to in the 
definition of situational awareness – go beyond profiting from the experiences of 
other authorities and border guard colleagues. Moreover, they also go beyond the 
mere purpose of information exchange. These computerized analyses rather pro-
duce knowledge and generate scenarios. They project models of how and where 
the border will probably (or possibly) be subject to pressure in the future. In this 
attempt to understand parallels, the “emphasis is on what can be conducted 
‘across’ items of data, on and through their very relation” (Amoore 2011: 30). 
However, this relation is a data correlation, and it serves to detect anomalies in a 
set of data. As such, it operates in a self-referential manner. The (future) risks 
emerge according to how the filters have been defined. 
                                                           
54 EUROSUR Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013, Art. 3(b). 
55 Ibid. 
56 Head of Research and Development at Frontex, personal interview (May 27, 2011). 
57 Ibid. 
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Since the prognostic criteria and indices for data analyses are defined by the 
agency itself, the European situational picture is critically influenced by Fron-
tex’s services and risk analysis. In fact, a careful reading of the composition of 
the ESP as defined in Article 10 of the EUROSUR Regulation reveals that the 
ESP is, in fact, abounding with Frontex’s risk analysis and processed infor-
mation. Inti Schubert’s observation that the generation of situational pictures en-
ables authorities (here Europol) “to define the requirements for their intervention 
themselves” (Schubert 2008: 177) proves true in the case of the ESP. Although 
merely a coordinator, the Frontex agency is in the position to produce a dynami-
cally developing knowledge base that serves to justify and legitimize border con-
trol, surveillance and intervention measures. 
 
 
4.3 THE COMMON PRE-FRONTIER INTELLIGENCE 
PICTURE (CPIP) 
 
The common pre-frontier intelligence picture (CPIP) was planned as a “service 
to the EUROSUR.”58 Its service consists in the contribution of information to the 
European situational picture (ESP). Although the CPIP was launched separate 
from the EUROSUR IT application, its content is ultimately visualized together 
with the ESP: “technically, the ESP and the CPIP are one.”59 In practice, this 
means that the information collected for the CPIP appears together with the ESP 
on the same screen in the same map. Contrary to its technical fusion and visual 
indistinguishability, however, the regulation lists the CPIP as a separate situa-
tional picture that is different from the ESP and the national situational pic-
tures.60 Moreover, its information is described as being from the “pre-frontier” 
and as leading to an “intelligence picture.” We must therefore ask, if the differ-
ences do not appear onscreen, what kind of situational picture is this? What sort 
of information is this about? And where is the pre-frontier area? 
Research and development for a common pre-frontier intelligence picture 
(CPIP) was conducted by a German company called Electronic Systems GmbH 
(ESG) together with the University of the German Federal Army Munich as a 
subcontractor, with cooperation from the subcontractor EADS. Drawing up a 
                                                           
58 EUROSUR Project Manager at Frontex, personal interview (May 15, 2012). 
59 Formulation used by an EC official in December 2012. 
60 EUROSUR Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013, Art. 8. 
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CPIP concept was one of the sub-projects of a larger contract with ESG for the 
EUROSUR technical study.61 The task of the CPIP subproject consisted in pro-
posing a way to provide member states with a comprehensive information base, 
while at the same time leaving their authority over information untouched. The 
study’s final report, presented to the Commission in January 2010, provides in-
sight into the sources and the kind of “intelligence” considered usable for the 
CPIP.62 
In the report, the CPIP is intended to “provide the national coordination cen-
tres (NCCs) with effective, accurate and timely intelligence […] in a frequent, 
reliable, interoperable and cost-efficient manner,”63 In terms of the CPIP con-
cept, not only the quality of the data is intended to matter, but also the quality of 
the service of providing information in and of itself. In fact, this service served 
two purposes: a) member states were to receive information that would be “out 
of scope” for them to collect, access or produce themselves; b) in addition, they 
were to receive new information frequently, cost-free and via reliable and in-
teroperable channels. The advertisement directed at member states is clear: CPIP 
offers you more information, processed according to your interests, without extra 
cost or effort. The distinction between “items that are in scope of the CPIP and 
those that are out of scope,”64 which the report lists in tabular form, deservers a 
closer look. Out of scope for the CPIP is any information collected within the 
                                                           
61 In January 2009, the Commission contracted Electronic Systems GmbH (ESG) to do a 
“Technical study on developing concepts for border surveillance infrastructure, a se-
cure communication network and a pre-frontier intelligence picture within the frame-
work of the European Border Surveillance System” referred to as the EUROSUR 
technical study [hereafter cited as EUROSUR technical study]. The study is divided 
into three subprojects: namely, the management concept (subproject 1), the communi-
cation information system (CIS) (subproject 2), and the common pre-frontier intelli-
gence picture (CPIP) (subproject 3).  
62 The study is designated intellectual property of the Commission, which is why ap-
proval from the Commission is required for each citation. Inquiries made directly to 
the ESG are also referred back to the Commission. In a conversation on the phone 
with a representative of the ESG, my identity as a PhD student of sociology was ques-
tioned and I was asked if I were not rather from a “leftist newspaper.” All quotations 
cited in this work have been authorized by a spokesperson of the Commission during a 
personal conversion in 2016 with the concrete citations at hand. 
63 EUROSUR technical study, subproject 3, p. 11. 
64 EUROSUR technical study, subproject 3, p. 19, original emphasis. 
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sovereign territory of the member states or Schengen associated countries. For 
the purpose of the CPIP, no information or intelligence can be collected from 
within a national territory. Furthermore, information that is relevant for defense, 
personal data and law enforcement activities other than border control are out of 
scope for the CPIP.65 Essentially, this distinction keeps the supranational level of 
the EU out of member states’ bureaucracies. The proposed CPIP does not inter-
fere with national administrations, security procedures or other sovereign compe-
tences. Conversely, the report envisions the “geographical area beyond the terri-
tory/external border of EU Member States and Schengen associated countries 
[…] with main focus on neighbouring third countries” as being “in scope” of the 
CPIP, thus circumscribing this area as pre-frontier. The CPIP is also designed to 
include information on “border management in third countries” as well as infor-
mation that is processed, that is, analysed or matched, against other databases.66 
Furthermore, there is information submitted from many possible sources, like 
embassies, to official informants, like the immigration liaison officer (ILO), as 
well as types of information, like open-source intelligence (OSINT), imagery in-
telligence (IMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT). The CPIP sub-report of-
fers a compilation of information and information channels that it would be “nice 
to have.” 
Since most of these sources found their way into the draft regulation, Hayes 
and Vermeulen expressed the concern “that a potentially limitless amount of 
third parties – coupled with the lack of meaningful oversight on the sharing of 
data between these parties – implies that ‘function creep’ will be built into the 
EUROSUR system from the outset” (Hayes/Vermeulen 2012: 20). Despite seem-
ingly limitless ambitions and ideas for synergy, the actual CPIP service still was 
described as “a very rudimental collecting system”67 during the development 
phase. According to the EUROSUR project manager at Frontex, “the purpose of 
EUROSUR is to make this more, let’s say, routine, and assign someone respon-
sible, which is Frontex.”68 In the end, Frontex’s Risk Analysis Unit (RAU) was 
tasked with establishing and maintaining the CPIP. It can be assumed that the 
task of composing the CPIP was not taken lightly by the Risk Analysis Unit, as it 
had to adapt to the expectation of a 24/7 service and thus the notion of an early 
warning system, while risk analysis at Frontex had actually thus far been con-
                                                           
65  EUROSUR technical study, subproject 3, p. 19. 
66  Ibid. 
67  EUROSUR Project Manager at Frontex, personal interview (May 15, 2012). 
68  Ibid. 
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cerned with long term studies, annual or quarterly reports and the formulation of 
risk indicators, etc. 
Ultimately, the CPIP was not drafted as a separate informational layer or 
separate electronic map, like the national situational pictures, but as a draft of a 
sphere of supranational competences in border management that evolves qua in-
formational affiliations and access. As a result, national territories and informa-
tional sovereignty are explicitly out of scope, while everything else that may af-
fect the EU external border could be in scope of the CPIP. In order to concretize 
supranational interiority as a sovereign place for the postnational EU external 
border, the CPIP has been developed along the notion of the information exploi-
tation and coverage of the pre-frontier area. 
 
4.3.1 The Pre-Frontier: Risks, Surveillance and the Elsewhere 
 
When asked about the specific nature of the CPIP, a Frontex official stated that it 
was “just exchanging information which is not coming from the border but be-
fore the border.”69 In a similar vein, the EUROSUR Regulation defines the pre-
frontier area prima facie in geographical terms. Yet, it is also completely bound-
less as “the geographical area beyond the external borders,”70 In other words, the 
pre-frontier is non-EU, it is the rest of the world whenever it affects the external 
borders of the EU. With regard to the CPIP, “border–related” does not result 
from having a geographical proximity to the political and administrative borders 
of individual member states, but from being passed through an informational fil-
ter. The pre-frontier is an “amorphous domain” (Pugliese 2014: 578) character-
ized ex negativo as not interfering with national sovereignty. Likewise, the draft 
regulation proposed that pre-frontier may be defined as “the geographical area 
beyond the external border of Member States which is not covered by a national 
border surveillance system.”71 This statement illustrates the added value of CPIP 
for the member states, because it contributes information that cannot be generat-
ed with the authority and the border surveillance systems of the individual mem-
ber states. The added information can be interpreted as the critical incentive for 
the member states to participate in EUROSUR and to engage in exchanging in-
formation themselves. However, as we have seen with other incentives of the 
development phase, the incentive has become invisible in the final regulation 
                                                           
69 EUROSUR Project Manager at Frontex, personal interview (May 15, 2012). 
70 EUROSUR Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013, Art. 3 (g). 
71 EUROSUR legislative proposal, COM(2011) 873 final, Art. 3 (f), emphasis added. 
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proposal. The pre-frontier is thus blithely defined as “the geographical area be-
yond the external borders.”72 Instead of a geographical place (not even of the ex-
tra-territorial kind), it is rather a network of cooperation, sources and references. 
Furthermore, the notion of pre-frontier encompasses the notion of a dark 
field, of the unknown and of futurity. This dark field needs to be explored, illu-
minated, explained and put on the screen. In the indeterminability (and liminali-
ty) of the dark field, the assessment of risks and the sovereign mandate to restrict 
people’s liberties merge easily, because the potential deviances in the dark field 
seem to call for action (Denninger 2008: 94-95; Aradau/Lobo-Guerrero/van 
Munster 2008; Ellebrecht 2014b). When relating strategic measures to risks, this 
brings about the “paradoxical situation that action must be taken although there 
is ultimately no basis for the action” (Nassehi 1997: 169-171). Pugliese describes 
the empowering modeling of possible risks as the “multi-layered aspect of the 
‘pre’ – pre-frontier, pre-emptive risk, precautionary assessments and so on” 
(Pugliese 2014: 579). This intimate relation between pre-emption, virtual suspi-
cion and scanning data for risks is also illustrated in the description of CPIP in-
formation. 
 
S.E.: If you look at the different outlines and comments on the EUROSUR, then the CPIP 
seems to be the big thing. 
 
P.M.: Sabrina, I told you, that you only collect information if you are going to act. If you 
are not going to act, why are you collecting information? So, CPIP should be a source of 
information that allows you to be proactive and not reactive, so that you know what is 
coming to you. For instance, you know that there is a group of people which are gathering 
in Georgia and they are planning all of them to cross to Europe, and to all, in block, re-
quire asylum – that is information that would be coming from the pre-frontier area. […] 
Or you know that there is this ship which is known to have been involved in traffic of to-
bacco before, that is now leaving Odessa, and then the Rumanians and Bulgarians are to-
gether and say: “Okay let’s see where this guy is going this time.” This is CPIP. […] 
Look, one of the sources is OSINT, open source, so you have information of traffic of 
ships and traffic of merchants, which is very much accessible. But if you are able to ana-
lyze this information you may find anomalies, in the container traffic for instance. Anec-
dotally, there is a JRC, joint research center project, which is analyzing the moving of 8 
million containers and telling the member states: “We have identified this which seems to 
be doing something strange.” And the hit of the cases in which they were right is about 50 
                                                           
72 EUROSUR Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013, Art. 3 (g). 
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per cent. When they say this container is suspect, 50 per cent of the time there is some-
thing strange. This is CPIP.73 
 
The situational picture of the pre-frontier presents information “that allows you 
to be proactive,” but instead of working with legal evidence, it works with a vir-
tual suspicion. Policing based on collected knowledge and experience is not new 
(“let’s see where this guy is going this time”). What is new is that this 
knowledge comes from a database and has been evaluated through algorithms 
and is no longer tied to the experience of the border guard doing the assessment. 
In information-based border management, a suspicion no longer develops 
through a concrete operational situation on a border, but within the national co-
ordination centers and analytical institutes, in particular the Frontex Risk Analy-
sis Unit (RAU). The “seeing like a border” called for by Chris Rumford (see for 
instance Rumford/Geiger 2014) is also embraced and managed by Frontex, alt-
hough not cosmopolitan in outlook. The gaze on the border reality rather is 
“more technologically and statistically mediated and ‘datafied’” (Broeders/ 
Dijstelbloem 2016: 242). Judging by the premise of “if you are able to analyze 
the information” stated in the interview, the interest in and use for data and in-
formation is potentially unlimited. 
The EUROSUR Regulation allows for the electronic monitoring of the pre-
frontier area and therefore transfers the coordination of “the common application 
of surveillance tools”74 to Frontex. The agency is thus again awarded a strong 
power over knowledge because it can define, or rather select, the targets to be 
monitored and the kind of data to be collected and processed. The task of supply-
ing “national coordination centres and itself with surveillance information on the 
external borders and on the pre-frontier on a regular, reliable and cost-efficient 
basis”75 distinctly goes beyond the act of providing a service. Rather, because 
Frontex is a coordinator, it is also a management tool and an authority. 
Frontex can generate surveillance information through a variety of different 
information sources and surveillance apparatuses. First, the agency can monitor 
selected harbors in non-member states via satellite image.76 Through these satel-
lite images, Frontex can monitor the coastlines of non-member parties in order to 
determine potential landing sites for small boats that can be used for refugees 
                                                           
73  EUROSUR Project Manager at Frontex, personal interview (May 15, 2012). 
74  EUROSUR Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013, Art. 12. 
75  Ibid, Art. 12 (1), emphasis added. 
76  EUROSUR Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013, Art. 12 (2a), (3b). 
EUROSUR on the Screen | 123 
 
and migrants. Second, the agency can also evaluate shipping traffic infor-
mation.77 The evaluation of various tracking signals78 allows them to locate ves-
sels that are not sending signals and therefore cannot be identified. Because the 
monitoring and tracking of shipping traffic occurs via a comparison of signals 
that have already been received, all vessels that do not send signals are suspect-
ed. As a result, the line separating not-identified and potentially dangerously be-
come fluid (Mallia 2010: 34). In addition, the suspicious lack of signals of cer-
tain boats and the SOS calls of vessels in distress are also relevant pieces of in-
formation when creating an overall picture. When visualized and integrated into 
discussions, this information creates opportunities for border guards to intervene 
(Miltner 2006: 84-85). Third, additional selected maritime areas or parts of the 
pre-frontier area can be monitored.79 with “sensors mounted on any vehicle, ves-
sel or other craft.”80 Frontex decides which areas, harbors or vessels to monitor 
based on its own risk analysis. Although its declared aim is to provide member 
states with information, it also admits that the “agency may use on its own initia-
tive the surveillance tools referred to in paragraph 2 for collecting information 
which is relevant for the common pre-frontier intelligence picture,”81 Finally, the 
visualization of border-related incidents in the pre-frontier area, regardless of 
how this occurs, – whether as dots, satellite imagery or incident reports – nor-
malizes its somewhat extra-territorial mandate by suggesting a transformed to-
pography of operational borders. The legal borders of policing thus become more 
mobile as the CPIP becomes more routine. 
The self-reflexive reference to CPIP amplifies Frontex’s competences. As an 
official of the European Parliament in Brussels said while shaking his head dur-
ing the negotiations for the EUROSUR Regulation, “CPIP is Frontex,” Indeed, 
assigned with the task of establishing the CPIP and ESP, Frontex has become not 
only an institutional hub through which information concerning the pre-frontier 
area can be collected and made graphically understandable; it has also become a 
                                                           
77  EUROSUR Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013, Art. 12 (3a). 
78  Ships are to report their identity and position four times a day to Long Range Identifi-
cation and Tracking System (LRIT) data centers. The implementation of LRIT is 
mandatory for all ships with over 300 gross tonnage as of May 2006. Information 
from the Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) or the Automatic Identification  
System (AIS) can be used without a ship’s consent (Mallia 2010: 34-37). 
79  EUROSUR Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013: Art. 12 (2e). 
80  Ibid, Art. 12 (3c). 
81  Ibid, Art. 12 (5). 
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service provider that has and distributes statistical information about crossings of 
the EU’s outer borders. Thanks to EUROSUR, Frontex is no longer merely an 
agency acting as a neutral coordinator on behalf of a supranational state; it is ra-
ther a “centre of calculation” (cf. Latour 2003: 215-257) for its border.82 
At the same time, the CPIP is not an information layer or a separate electron-
ic map, like the national situational pictures, but a description of competences. 
CPIP is the supranational sphere of competences, agreements and access. Re-
garding the ESP, it lets risk analysis and operational recommendations be inte-
grated into the way national authorities see and interpret situations along the ex-
ternal border of the EU. To Frontex, the CPIP is an instrument for bridging the 
gap between management and mandate. 
 
 
4.4 EUROSUR ON THE SCREEN: 
THE DEPICTION OF AN EXTERNAL EU BORDER? 
 
As Gordon Fyfe and John Law point out, a “depiction is never just an illustra-
tion. It is the material representation, the apparently stabilized product of a pro-
cess of work” (Fyfe/Law 1988: 1). In this section, I began by unfolding the pro-
cess of work that was necessary for developing a network that facilitates the ex-
change of information and analysis between border authorities in the EU. I then 
outlined the visualization and integration of this data on the screen as a European 
situational picture (ESP) and a common pre-frontier intelligence picture (CPIP) 
respectively, and I discussed the premises and arguments of the electronic depic-
tion. Effectively, the EUROSUR IT network is as much a result of a process of 
work as it is an ongoing process of constant work on the ESP. I thus analyzed the 
EUROSUR on the screen as both a result and a process. 
In tracing the development of the network, it quickly became clear that the 
challenge presented by this process of work did not consist in the technical de-
tails of the GIS’s configuration, programming or software design, but rather in 
the acceptance of and compliance to the system by member state authorities. 
Still, the flexible and non-committal method used to test the IT application 
strongly contributed to convincing member states to consider the system in the 
                                                           
82  I used this characterization already in an earlier publication (Ellebrecht 2014b: 180). It 
has also been advanced by Dennis Broeders and Huub Dijstelbloem (2016: 243) in an 
essay publication. 
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first place and gradually led to an increase in trust and compliance among partic-
ipants. The communication format and the rules of information exchange be-
tween member state authorities were geared toward the usability of the graphic 
user interface. 
Indeed, an issue of sovereign competences was translated into an issue of 
software design and was solved as such. Correspondingly, different national an-
gles were arranged in the GUI under menu items, domains of competence were 
translated into GIS layers, and different political hierarchies were flattened to 
nodes in the system. Ultimately, it was probably easier to get used to menu items 
for the purpose of testing an IT application than to agree on common priorities 
for border policies in Europe. 
However, the EUROSUR on the screen did more than just allow the recon-
struction of the process of work that went into it. The electronic map of the ESP, 
the “EUROSUR on the screen,” not only provides an image to the added value 
of information exchange and not only demonstrates that all the extra work and 
the institutional reconfigurations are worth it, it also offers what Latour has 
called a “new visual language” (Latour 1986: 19) that allows the external border 
of the EU to be ‘seen’ as a supranational entity. 
Indeed, it is not border guards and Frontex officials who now have the new 
supranational border in mind and in plain view – a supranational EU external 
border is not a thing that border guards or foreign ministers all of a sudden see 
and thereof take for granted. It is not a new thing that can be seen from one mo-
ment to the next, from the moment of signing the Schengen Agreement or its Eu-
ropeanization in the Treaty of Amsterdam. It is rather the case that “the same old 
eyes and old minds” are now applied to the communicational format of the 
EUROSUR network, which allows them to naturally see the external border of 
the EU as a job description. The EUROSUR on the screen offers the “new fact 
sheets inside new institutions” (Latour 1986: 15), which allows the old heads to 
naturally see the common border. Incident reports and impact levels are distinct 
features of this new fact sheet. As boundary objects (Star/Griesemer 1989), they 
unite national issues at the border with ambitions of European border manage-
ment. Hence, the “EUROSUR on the screen” can duly be described as a “giant 
‘optical device’ that creates a new laboratory, a new type of vision and a new 
phenomenon to look at” (Latour 1986: 19). 
 
In many ways, the EUROSUR items differ from the cartographic depiction of 
political borders and the treaties on them in the modern frame. First and fore-
most, EUROSUR’s electronic map provides a situational picture and not a repre-
sentational map. The electronic map displaying the European situational picture 
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is the tangible result of both the exchange of information and institutional recon-
figurations in EU border policies. It is the epitome of the system and the focal 
point of the regulation. The regulation, in turn, defines how situational pictures 
are to be produced, namely “through the collection, evaluation, collation, analy-
sis, interpretation, generation, visualization and dissemination of information.” 
In fact, the European situational picture is based on a reversed relationship be-
tween the notion of border and the notion of selection: the drawing of a line as a 
benchmark to selection has given way to the drawing together of disaggregated 
sources and information which visually cumulate by their geo-code; homoge-
nous territory on the one side, constantly changing distribution and assessment of 
risks on the other. In this sense, Rocco Bellanova and Denis Duez aptly describe 
EUROSUR as a “continuous effort of mise-en-discourse” rather than “an adden-
dum or technical fix” (2016b: 40).  
This chapter has shown that EUROSUR brings about the laboratory, the vi-
sion, and ultimately the “new phenomenon to look at” (ibid). While the different 
NCCs and Frontex RAU are networked as the “new laboratory” producing 
knowledge and maps of border-related incidents, the ESP embodies the “new 
type of vision.” This vision assembles on the screen, where it benefits from “the 
appearance of a neutral and depoliticized form of calculation” (Amoore 2009: 
20), even though it integrates discontinuously generated data and the most di-
verse ways of obtaining information and suspicion. Ultimately, the ESP provides 
a view of the situation at the external borders and a vision of cooperation, joint 
tasks, and operational urgencies. The exchange of information thus produces a 




5 EUROSUR on Paper –  
in the Official Journal of the EU 
 
 
The EUROSUR on the screen mediates the “new phenomenon to look at” 
(Latour 1986: 19): the external border of the EU. Since this work deals with the 
emergence of an EU external border, the question now arises whether the tech-
nical tool described above has told the entire story of its evolution. Is the EU’s 
external border reified via the digital geo-coded mapping of border-related 
events and impact levels? Does EUROSUR, in fact, successfully produce an ex-
ternal border of the EU by providing a network and a situational picture? In other 
words: is this a story of technological determinism? 
If the ‘new’ materiality of the border was, in fact, digitally produced, how 
would this border acquire its legitimacy? Isn’t a border also a legal entity aside 
from being materially and cartographically represented; not only a product of 
practices but also of treaties? 
This chapter examines how this external EU border in-the-making turns into 
an official border with legal authority. It traces different attempts to acquire le-
gality for a supranational border which would provide law enforcement officers 
with the quality to act. While the external border materializes on the screen, its 
mandate and legitimacy assemble elsewhere. But where? And as what kind of 
product? How does the EUROSUR development phase play into this assembling 
of legality? To answer these questions, this chapter turns toward the second 
product of the EUROSUR development phase, namely the EUROSUR Regula-
tion, and thus to an item of secondary EU law. In terms of their status in the legal 
framework of the EU, regulations are “binding in their entirety and have direct 
effects in the Member States” (Voermans 2009: 412). In the words of the Head 
of the Research and Development Unit at Frontex, the EUROSUR Regulation is 
the tangible result of the “bigger Commission project,” which he distinguished in 
an interview from the “practical project” of the EUROSUR network. 
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“We have our own EUROSUR here, within Frontex, which is a very practical project, 
which focuses on the development of this network. This forms part of the bigger Commis-
sion project that has different steps, and that will lead to a further gradual build-up, inte-
gration of the EUROSUR idea in this bigger conceptual picture.”1 
 
This chapter is interested in the details, traits and traces of the “bigger conceptual 
picture,” and thus in the other half of the story. It discusses in how far the “prac-
tical project” of the IT network described in the previous section relates to the 
political process of streamlining border policies among EU member states. In do-
ing so, I intend to explore what precisely the kind of relation is that is behind the 
notion of the network-forming part of the “bigger conceptual picture.” 
While the previous chapter dealt with the generation of compliance, this 
chapter focusses on how the obligations concerning the exchange of information 
and the cooperation between member states and the Frontex agency became ac-
ceptable and binding. Officials of the European Commission know and underline 
that the acceptance is always very important, and that the mere saying that this is 
a binding rule is not enough. Yet, how did the “bigger Commission project”2 of 
EUROSUR gain acceptance among member states and in the European Parlia-
ment to the effect of legal codification. How can the relation between the binding 
rule of the EUROSUR Regulation, i.e. the legal thing, and the acceptance of the 
technical EUROSUR network, i.e. the technical thing, be described? 
Do politics thus have artifacts or legislations? With this question in mind, I 
want to follow the course of garnering legitimacy for common EU border poli-
cies, from the signing of the Schengen Agreement in June 1985 to the adoption 
of the EUROSUR Regulation in December 2013. Looking at different attempts 
of Europeanization in the field of immigration and border control policies since 
the Schengen Agreement, I intend to specify what the EUROSUR project does, 
assembles and mobilizes, all of which did not fall into place before. 
For this purpose, I trace the political and institutional development of the 
EUROSUR, firstly by examining its precedent initiatives between 1985 and 
2013, and secondly by paying particular attention to visions and catalysts of 
communitarian border policies in the EU. Generally, a move from “Europeaniza-
tion by objectives” to “Europeanization by service” can be observed. This devel-
opment can be traced on different plateaus, which I will explore in the following 
                                                           
1 Head of Research and Development at Frontex, telephone interview (October 28, 
2011). 
2 Ibid. 
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six sections. However, the heuristic division shall not suggest that the develop-
ment was directed toward EUROSUR from the beginning. Rather, different at-




5.1 SCHENGEN AS A POSTNATIONAL LABORATORY 
AND FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS (1985-1997) 
 
Unlike Latour’s (1986: 17) description of a process of inscription, in which “pa-
per always appears at the end,” the following development was initiated with the 
signing of a paper. On June 14, 1985, the representatives of the five signatory 
states, West Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, 
signed the “Agreement on the gradual abolition of checks at their common bor-
ders”: the Schengen Agreement.3 For the act of signing the agreement, they left 
the firm ground of their territorial nation-states and boarded the riverboat Prin-
cess Marie-Astrid. This took them to the middle of the river Moselle, and thus to 
a condominium, a location of joint sovereignty. The choice of location was con-
sciously a symbolic one.4 It was meant to signify the overcoming of the “old” na-
tionalisms in Europe and demonstrate the courage to base policies on joint con-
siderations rather than on national sovereignty. As elaborated above, the aim of 
reconciliation through economic integration had been set with the Treaty of 
Rome. However, even though market integration was considered a path to stabil-
                                                           
3 The agreement was signed by Robert Goebbels (Secretary of State for Foreign Af-
fairs) for Luxembourg, Catherine Lalumière (Secretary of State for European Affairs) 
for France, Waldemar Schreckenberger (Secretary of State at the Federal Chancellery) 
for West Germany, Paul de Keersmaeker (Secretary of State for European Affairs) for 
Belgium, and by Wim van Eekelen (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) for the 
Netherlands. 
4 According to the former Luxembourgish secretary of state Robert Goebbels, cosigner 
of the agreement, the symbolism was decisive for the choice of location. German ori-
ginal: “Wir haben das gemacht in Schengen, weil dies das Dreiländereck ist, dort, wo 
der Benelux, Deutschland und Frankreich zusammenstoßen, und auf einem Schiff in 
der Mosel, weil die Mosel ein Kondominium ist, das heißt deutsches und luxemburgi-
sches Hoheitsgebiet” (quoted in Herter 2010). The Luxembourgian town of Schengen, 
from which the ‘Princess Marie-Astrid’ departed, gave name to the agreement. 
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ity and peace among previous bellicose states in Europe, the concrete political 
consequences of doing away with sovereign control at national border appeared 
too risky to the political actors and the general public in EEC countries (Hobbing 
2006: 173; Zaiotti 2011: 4, 67-89). To a certain extent, the Schengen group thus 
acted as an avant-garde in putting a political will on paper that hadn’t garnered 
consensus among all EEC member states. 
What did this paper stipulate? Albeit a treaty on borders, it did not determine 
or redraw any borders by delimitating territory (see chapter 2.1). It constituted an 
area for the free movement for goods, capital, services and persons, which ren-
dered cooperation necessary (Vobruba 2012: 135; Nagy 2006: 105). Unlike terri-
torial border treaties, the Schengen Agreement did not resolve a conflict, nor or-
ganize a consensus. Neither did the Schengen Implementing Convention (SIC) 
of 1990. On the contrary, both papers fueled debates and requested further work 
and procedures. Signatory states agreed to “open discussions” on ways of coop-
eration and judicial assistance,5 “to examine any [related] difficulties,”6 to “en-
deavour” or “seek to harmonize” laws and regulations,7 to “endeavour to approx-
imate visa policies,”8 and to “seek means to combat crime jointly.”9 The prag-
matic and consented aim was formulated as the realization of an “equal level of 
control […] exercised at external borders.”10 
While the agreement enabled a common domestic market, the papers read as 
a recognition of the practical problems that the gradual abolition of “internal” 
borders could bring about, especially with regard to the mandate and organiza-
tion of law enforcement. As has been noted above, the Schengen Agreement and 
Convention did not bring about the notion of legal authority for an external EU 
border or common border policies.  
Unlike those contracts in modern politics that concealed national territorial 
borders, these two papers rather mark the beginning of displacements and mobi-
lizations of competences in security policies in the EU. With the monopoly over 
the legitimate means of movement (Torpey 1998) being delegated to an arena of, 
“cooperation,” “mutual recognition” and “shared responsibility,” – as the jargon 
puts it – common Schengen border policies were required to work toward acquir-
                                                           
5 Schengen Agreement, Art. 18. 
6 Ibid, Art. 18 (b). 
7 Ibid, Art. 13 and Art. 19. 
8 Ibid, Art. 7. 
9 Ibid, Art. 18 (c). 
10 Schengen Implementing Convention, Art. 6 (5). 
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ing acceptance and legitimacy among member states and practitioners. Even 
though the five signatory states individually went ahead in working toward Eu-
ropean market integration, this process was neither smooth nor easy. In fact, the 
implementation of the Schengen rules has been described as “tortuous,” with dif-
ficulties ranging from “problems with the SIS computer system” to “concerns 
with transparency and democratic accountability,” to public concerns or “panic 
[…] about immigration and drugs” (Duff 1997: 53). Commentators thus saw 
Schengen as either “pathfinder” (ibid: 52), “competitor” (Jeandesboz 2009: para. 
2), or “laboratory” (Monar 2001: 750-752) for cooperation in the areas of border 
and migration control. 
Of these characterizations, the laboratory metaphor has gained the most cur-
rency. This is particularly true among academic commentators, who have de-
ployed or quoted the metaphor to illustrate the agreement’s secretive prepara-
tions or to criticize the intergovernmental procedures as illegitimate in terms of 
EU integration. For instance, William Walters (2002: 561) notes that Schengen 
had been developed and implemented outside the framework of the EU. The fact 
that this criticism concerns the authorship of the agreement and not its legality 
deserves careful attention. The Schengen Agreement’s form – an international 
agreement – was not so critical to the acceptance of its rules, as was its for-
mation: in fact, the preparation of the Schengen Agreement was largely based on 
a German-French initiative carried out under strict secrecy by then Chancellor 
Helmuth Kohl and then President François Mitterrand. In Germany, “neither the 
parliament nor the responsible ministries nor the public had been informed prior 
to the agreement” (Siebold 2013: 43; Baumann 2006: 80-81). Waldemar 
Schreckenberger, chief of the German Federal Chancellery (Ger.: Bun-
deskanzleramt) at that time, recalled in an interview with Mechthild Baumann 
that Helmuth Kohl personally requested him to work out the Schengen Agree-
ment. “I succeeded ultimately to engage the responsible minister in intensive 
work. When I determined that a representative of the minister wasn’t prepared to 
cooperate, then he wouldn’t be invited anymore” (quoted in Baumann 2008: 22). 
By choosing the format of an intergovernmental agreement, which did not re-
quire ratification by national parliaments, Kohl and Mitterrand chose a procedure 
which was not made to generate acceptance or legitimacy, but rather aimed at 
getting things done. 
When the laboratory metaphor is evoked today, it stirs up this sense of ille-
gitimacy, secrecy and undemocratic decisions. However, unlike this impetus, the 
laboratory metaphor was first deployed by the political actors involved in order 
to actually counter the “sense of illegitimacy surrounding the Schengen initia-
tive” (Zaiotti 2011: 75). Zaiotti actually found that “[t]he laboratory metaphor 
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and the family of related concepts (‘testing,’ ‘experimenting,’ ‘trial,’ etc.) sur-
faced in internal and public documents and speeches about the Schengen regime 
soon after the initiative was launched in the mid-1980s” (ibid). The Commission, 
for its parts, considered Schengen as a “separate but parallel and very relevant 
exercise”;11 it was considered a “testing ground” and “test-bed”12 for the devel-
opments concerning free movement in the EU. The Commission did not consider 
the initiative as thwarting EU procedures and legislation. Instead, it actively tried 
to use it in order to accelerate EU wide integration in this regard. 
 
“The Commission participates in the work of the Schengen Group which it finds invalua-
ble in formulating its ideas in the wider Community context and which enables it to help 
ensure that Schengen is compatible with Community law and with the Community’s ob-
jectives: but in no way would the Commission wish to slow down progress where progress 
can be made.”13 
 
It remains controversial whether intergovernmental cooperation in juridical and 
police matters is to be considered an “aberration” (Ger.: Fehlentwicklung, Stabe-
now 1995) or an “engine” for common European policies. Clearly, the Schengen 
Agreement and the Convention did not conceal supranational border and migra-
tion policies or an external EU border. They are, in fact, agreements for opening 
up a laboratory for postnational law enforcement, and they describe the first 
modes of functioning and equipment to be used in this setup. 
 
  
                                                           
11  Abolition of controls of persons at intra-community borders, COM(88) 640 final, 
para. 12. 
12  Formulation used in: Written Question No. 413/89 by Mr. Ernest Glinne to the Com-
mission of the European Community. Assessment of the Schengen agreement,  
OJ C 90 (9 April 1990): 11; quoted in Zaiotti (2011: 75). 
13  Abolition of controls of persons at intra-community borders, COM(88) 640 final, 
para. 12. 
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5.2 IN SEARCH FOR NEW, SUPRANATIONAL HEADS 
(1997-2003) 
 
When the heads of states and governments updated the Treaty of the European 
Union on June 18, 1997 in Amsterdam, they formalized the incorporation of the 
Schengen rules into the legal framework of the EU. The EU brought suprana-
tional legitimacy to the intergovernmental Schengen arrangement. With its “ex-
tensive list of working arrangements” and the then working Schengen Infor-
mation System (SIS), Schengen increased the “operational capacity” of policies 
concerning police and judicial cooperation (Boer/Corrado 1999: 399). Monica 
den Boer and Laura Corrado see the Treaty of Amsterdam as a “momentum for a 
marriage of convenience between Schengen and the EU” (ibid), with the fiancés 
exchanging legitimacy for operational capacity. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam redirected the efforts of the Schengen group into 
ambitions for an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), a space institut-
ed by way of police and justice cooperation. The latter was translated into a pro-
gram for measures in Tampere, Finland in 1999. The Tampere Programme in-
tended to render border and migration policies more coherent and more effective. 
It did so by taking into account that post-Amsterdam, the political and institu-
tional setup would, in theory, facilitate communitarian policies. However, the 
forms of these common EU border and migration control policies and also the 
figures which could potentially operationalize them and enforce an external bor-
der were envisioned quite differently. 
 
5.2.1 The Idea of a ‘European Corps of Border Guards’  
or a ‘European Border Police’ 
 
When the European Commission proposed a regulation on the European Border 
and Coast Guard in December 2015, observers of EU Justice and Home Affairs 
might have groaningly commented that this had only been a question of time.14 
                                                           
14  European Commission (2015): Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 2007/2004, Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 and Council Decision 
2005/267/EC, COM(2015) 671 final (December 15, 2015). 
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In fact, what had been proposed and has been accepted in 201615 is not less than 
a supranational border police, which derives its mandate and strategy from su-
pranational considerations. A European border police is not a recent idea. In fact, 
it has been around since the Treaty of Amsterdam and thus, since the incorpora-
tion of the Schengen rules into the EU legal framework. As early as 2000, word 
was out about an EU-wide integrated border police. If it was, in fact, only a 
question of time until EU border guards would be accepted, one can raise the 
question of what happened in the interim. Why has it been consented to now, and 
what is different now from then? Is it a proposal that just had to be digested, one 
that needed 15 years to mature so that the heads of state could simply “rubber 
stamp” (Eriksson 2016) it four months after it had been tabled by the Commis-
sion? 
Against the background of the previous chapter, I argue that this develop-
ment has required more than time, diplomatic patience and the persistent repeti-
tion of communitarian benefits. On the basis of the analyses in chapter 4, I claim 
that the vision of the European border guard was lacking a visualized localiza-
tion for their mandate. The European situational picture generated in the 
EUROSUR framework embodies this visualization. In fact, a consideration of 
the first proposals around an EU border guard reveals similar ideas, concepts, 
and even semantics to those that now support the EUROSUR project. Yet, this 
early vision was still lacking the “optical consistency” (Latour 1986: 15) that 
EUROSUR later provided with its menu items, icons and reporting sheets. 
 
Let us turn back to the first mentions of an EU border police. In 2000, various 
media outlets reported that Italy and Germany foresaw an exchange of troops, 
aiming “to serve as a vanguard of an EU-wide integrated border police” (Migra-
tion News (N.N.) 2000). Kurt Schelter, minister for justice and European affairs 
for the federal state Brandenburg, was quoted in the British Telegraph proposing 
the “deployment up to 10,000 of Germany’s 40,000 Federal Border Guards in a 
joint EU border patrol. This was motivated by the fact that German frontiers with 
                                                           
15 Regulation (EU) No 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation 
(EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regula-
tion (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regu-
lation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC, in: OJ L 251/1 (Sep-
tember 16, 2016); [hereafter cited as Regulation on the European Border and Coast 
Guard Agency]. 
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Poland and the Czech Republic are removed under the Schengen system” (Ev-
ans-Pritchard/Helm 2000). However, the intention to deploy border guards 
‘elsewhere’ was not considered a mere geographical shift. The journalists Am-
brose Evan-Pritchard and Toby Helm point to the “political sensitivities” of “sta-
tioning German border guards on Polish soil” and reported that “Berlin [was] 
looking at the idea of a joint EU force in which every country would participate 
on equal terms” (ibid). From this perspective, the communitarian vision still im-
plicates the taming of the national. By contrast, the United Kingdom worked to-
ward taming European and Schengen ambitions for an integrated force, while 
agreeing on the need for more cooperation in tackling illegal migration (Zaiotti 
2011: 162-163). 
In 2000, the Commission nevertheless commented with reserve on the border 
guard exchange between Italy and Germany. It emphasized that “such exercises 
were a matter for individual member states,” that “there were no plans for a su-
pranational force, and that the Commission’s job was only to set common stand-
ards for dealing with asylum requests, refugees and illegal migrants” (quoted in 
Migration News (N.N.) 2000). Yet, the first official mention of the term “Euro-
pean Border Guard” can be traced back to the Commission’s “Communication 
on Illegal Immigration” of November 15, 2001. 16  Therein, the Commission 
stresses that “the setting up of a European Border Guard” was a “core element” 
of a border management strategy; it also mentioned that the idea had “received 
strong political support” and that “exploratory work” was underway.17 The ex-
ploratory work consisted of a) the first joint operations and b) conceptual explo-
rations: the Commission supported a feasibility study on the idea of a European 
Border Police. The laboratory was thus generating its first outputs. 
The “Feasibility Study for Setting-up of a European Border Police” was con-
ducted by Italy together with Germany, Belgium, France and Spain, with 80 per 
cent of the financial support coming from the Odysseus Programme. The feasi-
bility study was undertaken over a six-month period between November 2001 
and May 2002 and was presented during a ministerial conference in Rome on 30 
May 2002. It collected “input from a number of national experts, most of whom 
tended to defend their national methods and organisational structures” (Monar 
2006: 196). Jörg Monar assumes that this rather protective stance toward nation-
al competences and organizational structures led to the study’s proposition of a 
                                                           
16  Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
a common policy on illegal immigration, COM(2001) 672 final (November 15, 2001). 
17  Ibid, Section 4.4 (Border Management, p.17-18). 
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complex network of national border police forces. The form of organization was 
evoked as “polycentric and multipurpose system.” 18  The network model was 
evoked as “a series of ‘knots,’ each of them related to specific and sector re-
quirements/objectives.”19 The knots would specialize while the system remained 
flexible and elastic.20 
In fact, the study used similar terms as would be later used in the context of 
the EUROSUR network. There was talk of centers and knots, for instance, which 
correspond to NCCs, and nodes in the system in the context of EUROSUR. At 
that time, however, the study’s vision was not approved by member states. In the 
view of most national authorities involved, the proposal for a polycentric net-
work model “was lacking in clarity, providing a mosaic of proposed structures 
and individual measures rather than a grand design” (Monar 2006: 196). Monar 
comments that “some of the participating Member states were not fully satis-
fied;” and he goes on to quote a Brussels newspaper article dismissing the “en-
tire study, rather harshly, as ‘80 pages of waffle’” (quoted in ibid: 196-197). 
Apparently, the study’s network model was a strong vision that, however, 
was lacking its visual grip. Unlike BG Major Aleksandra Świąteka in 2012, au-
thorities in 2003 could not see – and therefore could not recognize – the benefit 
of it all. In more abstract terms, the 2003 proposal of a European Border Police 
was lacking the “‘optical consistency’ necessary for power on a large scale” 
(Latour 1986: 15). As the new object to be guarded, the external border was nei-
ther considered natural, nor taken for granted institutionally. In other words, it 
was not rendered immutable or – as we are accustomed to in our formulation of 
borders – not yet natural. The EU external border could therefore not be seen, as 
it was not made visible, which is to say, interobjective. 
In fact, the proposal of a European border police or border guard was ad-
vanced during a situation which, following Latour, can be described as an “ag-
nostic situation” (Latour 1986: 8). Security personnel still believed in the 
strength of the national framework for law enforcement. However, they did not 
deny the eventual existence or rather necessity of an EU external border. Just, it 
was not taken for granted by the former national heads. In their mind, there was 
no picture of an EU external border. The mandate that was proposed – the guard-
ing of a supranational border – was built on the projection, the enunciation of an 
                                                           
18  Feasibility Study for Setting-up of a European Border Police, Final Report, Rome 
(May 30, 2002), Section 13, p. 30. 
19  Ibid, Section 14, p. 30. 
20  Ibid, Section 19, p. 35-36. 
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“absent thing” (ibid). One the one hand, this was due to the spectral character of 
all borders. On the other hand, this was also due to fact that different heads of 
state and government and also the security personnel at the border had no “meet-
ing ground” (ibid) for recognizing an EU external border. Peter Hobbing’s de-
scription of the vested perspective on common border tasks illustrates the mis-
trust with regard to communitarian law enforcement at Schengen borders. 
 
“Discussions sprang up, inside the territory, as to whether ‘these foreigners on the border’ 
would do a good job in keeping the border tight, or create loopholes that allowed organ-
ised crime and illicit migration to penetrate all the way through the Union. Right on the 
border, discussions went in the opposite direction: ‘Why is it just us who bear all the re-
sponsibility and the financial burden?’” (Hobbing 2005: 1) 
 
Oblivious to the apparition of a supranational border, the European Council did 
not find consensus on the proposal of a European border police. The Presiden-
cy’s conclusion of the 2001 Laeken meeting abstained from using the term “Eu-
ropean Border Guard” or “European Border Police” at all; and the Council’s 
compromise has been described as “carefully worded” by commentators (Monar 
2006: 195; Leonard 2009: 376-377). Echoing the prudent tone of the Schengen 
Convention, the Council’s Laeken conclusion21 calls on the group members to 
work toward an Europeanization of border surveillance and control. 
Hence, ten years after the formulation of the SIC, and two years after the in-
tegration of the Schengen rules into the EU legal framework, border policies are 
still national in outlook. Communitarian control policies remain an objective to 
work toward. Actually, the Presidency’s requests to the Council and the Com-
mission is less a mandate than a vague declaration of intent, in which the Coun-
cil members want to principally establish the conditions of possibility for com-
mon services of control. Council and Commission are concordantly requested to 
“work out arrangements for cooperation between services responsible for exter-
nal border control and […] examine the conditions in which a mechanism or 
common services to control external borders could be created.”22 For the time 
being, the attempts were merely directed toward setting the course while examin-
                                                           
21  Presidency Conclusions on Justice and Home Affairs, Laeken Conclusion No 42, 17 
December 2001, SN 300/1/01. 
22  Ibid, para. 42. 
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ing the “conditions in which”23 the vision of a supranational border would be vis-
ible and politically thinkable as a supranational thing. 
 
5.2.2 The Auxiliary and Displacing Notion of Integrated 
Border Management (IBM) 
 
On 7 May 2002, the Commission responded to the Laeken conclusion.24 Its re-
sponse has been interpreted as an “effort to satisfy both the advocates and the 
sceptics” of a supranational border police (Monar 2006: 196). In its communica-
tion, the Commission placed emphasis on both “operational synergies” and on 
whatever “practical progress which could be achieved in various fields in the 
meantime” (ibid, emphasis added). Joint operations and border guard exchanges 
thus occurred while the legal codification of a supranational mandate was pend-
ing. Such a mandate would provide border guards with the power to sanction on 
behalf of the EU. Thus, while there was a lot of integrative work going on at the 
actual workplaces of border guards, there was no political agreement on the 
common legal framework which would place this cooperation under a suprana-
tional mandate.  
Effectively, the ambition for a supranational force entails going beyond the 
principle of mutual recognition of decisions at national borders, which was fore-
seen in the Schengen Agreement and Convention. Ambitions for a supranational 
force have to deal with the question of where this supranational authority would 
be based. It also raises questions of which authority would enforce whose laws 
and grant access to what kinds of rights; for instance, whether Greek nationals 
would accept a French border guard patrolling along their borders. Apart from 
that issue, the figure of a European border guard was required to formulate, ac-
cept and enforce common (im)migration and asylum rules (of which there are 
none even until today) and grant European rights. The notion of integrated bor-
der management (IBM), as introduced by the Commission’s Communication of 
May 7, 2002, mediated between practical cooperation, which suffered from its 
                                                           
23  Presidency Conclusions on Justice and Home Affairs, Laeken Conclusion No 42, 17 
December 2001, SN 300/1/01, para. 42. 
24  European Commission (2002): Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament, Towards Integrated Management of the External Bor-
ders of the Member States of the European Union, COM(2002) 233 final (May 7, 
2002). 
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test character, and the reluctance toward official harmonization (in a legal sense). 
By pragmatically focusing on the optimization of controlling and surveilling 
movement across borders, the auxiliary notion of integrated management some-
what depoliticized the communitarization of border policies.  
During the 1990s, the concept of integrated border management had been 
elaborated as a community concept (Hobbing 2005: 2). However, rather than the 
converging political impetus, a “pragmatic orientation” (Monar 2006) and a 
managerial tone of focusing on concrete tasks and measures took hold. The bor-
der was no longer evoked as a security shield or borderline but instead as a 
common task of security personnel. Border enforcement is thereby “detached 
from the territorial logic” (Jorry 2007: 14) and targeted toward certain groups of 
people and certain kinds of movements deemed relevant to border control – 
which in this case is translated into the control of movement. For this border 
work, neither geography, nor law stands as a unifier, but rather common chal-
lenges and common tasks. Integrated border management is thus an integrating 
task. 
 
5.2.3 The CIVIPOL Feasibility Study and the Notion 
of the Virtual (Maritime) Border 
 
With regard to the idea of a European border guards, the integrative vision of the 
Commission’s communication has been relativized by the Councils pragmatic 
orientation. What remains integrated, however, in a managerial sense of a com-
prehensive approach, are the measures to counter illegal migration – particularly 
by sea. It is against the backdrop of the sea, that it is possible to reverse the ques-
tion of localization of an EU external border and ask for the locus of common 
tasks, challenges, and risks. The CIVIPOL feasibility study, which had been 
commissioned to examine how the EU could strengthen “controls at maritime 
borders in order to combat illegal immigration,” is a central document in this re-
gard. 25 
In 2002, the Commission contracted CIVIPOL, a French think tank associat-
ed with the national Ministry of the Interior, to conduct the “Feasibility study on 
                                                           
25  CIVIPOL (2003): Feasibility study on the control of the European Union’s maritime 
borders. Final report transmitted to DG JAI on July 4, 2003. Available as Council 
Document 11490/1/03 (September 19, 2003); [hereafter cited as CIVIPOL study or 
CIVIPOL feasibility study], here: p. 4. 
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the control of the European Union’s maritime borders.” The study was complet-
ed swiftly in the first half of 2003 and then presented in Brussels on July 4, 2003. 
The document was of central importance, as it presented new drafts of the loca-
tion as well as the type of common external borders. Different commentators 
have identified the so called CIVIPOL feasibility study as an inflection point in 
the self-conception of EU border policies. For instance, Dimitris Papadopoulos, 
Niamh Stephenson and Vassilis Tsianos introduce the study as an example of the 
“virtualisation of borders, which consists of deterritorialising border controls and 
externalising camps” (Papadopoulos/Stephenson/Tsianos 2008: 176). Olivier 
Clochard and Bruno Dupeyron trace how the externalization of EU police activi-
ties to countries of departure became thinkable through the lens of the CIVIPOL 
feasibility study (Clochard/Dupeyron 2007: 27-29). Statewatch analyst Ben 
Hayes even considers the study “a law enforcement blueprint rather than any 
kind of objective or broad-based ‘feasibility study’” (Hayes 2003: para. 9). In 
fact, operational practices of border enforcement agencies as well as national 
legislations changed in reference to the CIVIPOL study and its concept of the 
“virtual maritime border,” 
The study (hereafter cited in the text) describes the special characteristics of 
maritime borders. According to the CIVIPOL study, maritime borders are prone 
to three types of “illegal immigration” which it classifies according to routes or 
possible entries into the EU. First, there are port-to-port routes with harbors as 
entry points where illegal immigrants enter as stowaways; second, there are focal 
routes, which are “geographically favourable” resulting in 70 to 80 per cent of il-
legal immigration occurring in this way: “The usual practice here is that a (dis-
posable) light boat, overloaded and having absolutely no safety equipment, 
makes a night crossing.”26 Third, CIVIPOL sees random routes which involve 
ships from 300 to 500 GRT and which are “chartered by transnational criminal 
organisations with investment capacities and local accomplices in the port of de-
parture.”27 The study states that, although only two to three per cent of illegal 
immigration occurs in this last manner, it attracted the greatest public attention 
as several hundred migrants were involved.28 In terms of legal instruments, the 
study sees that illegal immigrations are “subject to international law on two 
grounds”: They can either be “seen from the sea” or “from the land.”29 It has 
                                                           
26  CIVIPOL feasibility study, p. 9. 
27  Ibid, p. 10, emphasis added. 
28  Ibid. 
29  Ibid, p. 20. 
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been argued that seen from the sea, “the legal bases for combating illegal immi-
gration” are to be found in the December 10, 1982 Montego Bay Convention on 
the Law of the Sea. On this basis of flag state liability, the interception or con-
tainment of vessels with migrants on board could be justified in different mari-
time zones.30 In contrast, seen from the land, the rights of migrants were empha-
sized: 
 
“the right of asylum is the criterion which distinguishes a political refugee from an illegal 
immigrant as regards the right to enter and stay in a European country. All the Member 
States or Schengen States have ratified the Geneva Convention. They are required to apply 
it. An illegal immigrant will therefore, naturally, claim refugee status as long as possible 
one way or another.”31 
 
In short, at sea, the operational leeway for border enforcement was considered 
stronger in comparison to containment possibilities at land, where the obligation 
of states toward individuals weighs higher. In consequence, the study recom-
mends that physical border controls may be supported and reinforced by “an up-
stream ‘virtual border’ for the operational management of the three types of 
routes,”32 which means shifting controls to ports or countries of origin and depar-
ture. With this shift in competences being generally more available via sea op-
erations, the notion of a virtual border and the notion of the maritime border 
merged. Operating on the ambiguous notion of a virtual border, the CIVIPOL 
study advocates that border controls be relocated to possible migrant departure 
and transit points (such as coasts and harbors). Hayes criticizes that “[t]he under-
lying principle is that the EU’s ‘sea border’ extends to any country with which it 
shares an ocean, basically giving it the right to police the entire sea” (Hayes 
2003: para. 10). The concept of the virtual maritime border was taken up by the 
European Council in its “Programme of measures to combat illegal immigration 
across the maritime borders of the Member States of the European Union”: 
                                                           
30 CIVIPOL feasibility study, p. 37. 
31 Ibid, p. 20. 
32 Ibid, p.53. 
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“The programme adopts the concept of the virtual maritime border in order to reinforce 
the legal borders of Member States by means of joint operations and specific measures in 
the places where illegal migratory flows originate or transit.”33  
 
The legal borders of policing seem to easily blur at sea. Subsequently, the Coun-
cil’s interpretation allows for operational flexibility along “the virtual maritime 
border”: it argued that the passage of migrant vessels was not innocent, and there 
such passage could be intercepted both in territorial waters and contiguous 
zones; furthermore, if the vessel was not flying a flag, it could legally be inter-
cepted on the high seas; lastly, joint patrols with countries of departure were 
considered an option if consent was given. Commentators gave the impression 
that the management of maritime borders invited a rewriting of the law of the sea 
(Hayes 2003: para. 23-28). 
In fact, the CIVIPOL study documents an uninhibited will to reinterpret the 
possibility of enforcement practices at sea. The relocalizing of the job site of 
border guards, the institutional widening of competences and the use of external 
relations are semantically fettled in the sentence “virtual maritime border.” The 
concept of the virtual maritime border thus rendered plausible a flexibilization of 
border control. Linking the concept of the virtual border to the idea of a maritime 
border made it possible to open up the idea of precise territorial borders in their 
spatial dimension and use them to entice geographical ambiguity. In the process, 
the reference intrinsic to border enforcement is no longer external to geograph-
ical administrative markers. The semiotic proximity of the sea and virtuality 
(Schroer 2006: 258-264) certainly contributed to detaching the range of Europe-
an border control measures from 24 nautical miles of the contiguous zone; it also 
diffused its spatial reference (Ellebrecht 2014b: 177). In the argument that fol-
lows, the concept of the virtual border will appear again in connection with the 
notion of one that is intelligence-led. It is with this concept that the jurisdiction 
of law enforcement and border authorities increases with regard to geographical 
reference and access to information.  
                                                           
33 European Council (2003): Programme of measures to combat illegal immigration 
across the maritime border of the Member States of the European Union, EC 15445/03 
(November 28, 2003). 
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5.3 COORDINATED COOPERATION ALONG THE 
VIRTUAL BORDER (2003-2008) 
 
5.3.1 The Creation of Frontex: From Europeanization 
by Objectives to Management by Service 
 
The CIVIPOL study further served as a basis for proposing the establishment of 
the “European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union” which has been 
abbreviated as Frontex (from the French phrase frontières extérieures). The 
Commission proposed its creation to the Council in November 2003. A year later 
the agency was established by the so called Frontex Regulation of October 26, 
2004.34 It took another year until the agency opened its headquarters in Warsaw 
on October 3, 2005. The stringent necessity to cooperate stemming from the 
Schengen Agreement and Convention was thus delegated for coordination to a 
community agency of the regulatory type.35  
The creation of an agency was interpreted as “an ex post authorization of ex-
isting initiatives, and a streamlining of existing structures,” with the regulation 
providing “little more than a window dressing exercise, giving a ‘legal basis’ to 
the ad hoc development of a whole host of operational bodies and measures that 
are already in place” (Hayes 2003: para. 2, original emphasis). Operational co-
operation and the exchange of information which hitherto “all depended on the 
willingness of some member states to maybe share some information”36 now de-
pended on the knack the agency would show. 
From the beginning the delegation of coordination to an agency was carefully 
framed as “support,” “facilitation,” and “service” to the member states, rather 
than any form of central, supranational border authority. In fact, since the estab-
lishment of Frontex “careful attention was paid to constantly refer to ‘external 
                                                           
34  European Council (2004): Establishing a European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the Europe-
an Union, Council Regulation EC/2007/2004, October 26, 2004, in: OJ L 349 (No-
vember 25, 2004) [hereafter cited as Frontex Regulation EC 2007/2004]. 
35 Sarah Leonard (2009: 373-374) aptly describes Frontex as a regulatory agency, which 
is set out in its own legal basis, whereas executive agencies are allotted more narrowly 
defined tasks. 
36  Head of Research and Development at Frontex, personal interview (May 27, 2011). 
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borders of the Member States’ in order to stress as clearly as possible that the 
competence over the area of ‘borders’ remains at the heart of sovereignty of the 
State” (Carrera 2008: 9).37 
The agency has been introduced as coordinator and iterates its role. However, 
tasked with risk analysis,38 the role of the coordinator translates into the “compe-
tence to carry out ‘coordinating intelligence-driven operations’ based on risk 
analysis and threat assessments” (Carrera 2008: 2). While border control re-
mained in the responsibility of member states, the management of risks and 
threats gained plausibility as a community task. Risk analysis, however, could be 
provided as a service to the member states, which allows the agency to suggest, 
if not recommend, technical and operational measures. Thus comments Andrew 
Neal that Frontex “sits alongside the (perhaps deliberately) less controversial 
discourse of regulation, best practice, training, coordination and management. 
[…] for the most part Frontex speaks ‘risk’ as a series of quiet, professional, 
technical practices” (Neal 2009: 351). 
The Frontex Regulation has since been amended by the Council Decision of 
2005/267/EC which established a secure web-based Information and Coordina-
tion Network for Member States’ Migration Management Services, and two 
pieces of legislation: the Regulation on Rapid Border InterventionTeams, the re-
vised mandate of September 2011. Both are no longer in force. The agency’s 
personnel, budget, competences, and tasks have increased steadily. Since Octo-
ber 6, 2016, the abbreviated name Frontex has turned into a stand-in of sorts: 
Frontex now stands for the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) Agen-
cy.39 This nominal transition to independence corresponds to an increase in au-
tonomous competences: the coordinator pools means of violence (resources in 
the form of personnel and tools), and means of the power to decide (information 
and data). Furthermore in 2018, the Commission “proposed to strengthen the re-
                                                           
37 However, already in 2006, Peter Hobbing expects that “with a growing need for oper-
ational assistance, [the agency] will develop into a body not too different from the Eu-
ropean Border Guard originally intended” (Hobbing 2006: 184). The creation and also 
institutional development of Frontex has been analyzed and commented widely (cf. 
Carrera 2008; Fischer-Lescano/Lohr/Tohidipur 2009; Leonard 2009; Papastavridis 
2010; Neal 2009; Kasparek 2010; Mungianu 2013; Perkowski 2018). For prompt 
analyses see the online blog EU LAW Analysis by Steve Peers at: http://eulaw 
analysis.blogspot.com. 
38 Frontex Regulation EC 2007/2004, recital 6, Art. 2 (c), and Art. 4. 
39  Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard Agency of September 16, 2016. 
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cently created EBCG (2016) by providing the EBCG Agency […] with its own 
operational tool, a standing corps of 10,000 EU border guards with executive 
powers that would be operational from 2020.”40 
 
From the beginning, Frontex was not to be dependent on information that mem-
ber states were eventually willing to share, nor did the Hague principle of availa-
bility of information relate to the agency’s task in any way. Rather, the idea was 
to set up a coherent information base, one which would be supranational in out-
look while also identifying the common tasks and threats of all EU member 
states. Overall, through the creation of an agency, the management of border pol-
icies in Europe has increasingly been achieved by various services, rather than 
by objectives. Therein the agency both fulfills the roll of a coordinator while at 
the same time providing the grounds – decision support, trend and risk analysis, 
background information, statistics, equipment – for both member states’ and 
community operations along the external borders. In addition, “support to return 
operations” also counts as a service to the member states.  
In fact, Frontex services gained more weight in the process of integration and 
harmonization than they did in the attempt for legal harmonization – pursued, for 
instance, by the Schengen Borders Code (SBC).41 The Schengen Borders Code 
presented a renewed attempt to impose standardized external border controls and 
to apply common rules to the practices and procedures. Yet, the SBC states how 
border guards should fulfill their mandate: that is, according to which standards 
and procedures border policing should occur. Conversely, one of the major tasks 
of Frontex consists in providing evidence for the need of supranational activities, 
and thus evidence for the need of those operations which they are meant to coor-
dinate. Frontex is thus tasked with rendering plausible the supranational mandate 
                                                           
40   European Commission (2018): Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard, COM(2018) 631 (Septem-
ber, 12, 2018). The quotation is taken from the “Legislative Train Schedule” a website 
by the European Parliament, at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme 
-towards-a-new-policy-on-migration/file-european-border-and-coast-guard (accessed 
October 19, 2019). For an analysis of these developments see Carrera/den Hertog 
(2016) and Campesi (2018). 
41 European Parliament & European Council (2008): Establishing a Community Code on 
the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders 
Code), EC/562/2006, March 15, 2006, in: OJ L 105 (April 13, 2006), [hereafter cited 
as Schengen Borders Code (2008)]. 
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to the member states. The agency does this by conducting feasibility studies, by 
providing risk analysis (the criteria of which are defined by the agency itself), 
and through its services. The art of coordination exercised by Frontex consists in 
advising, giving recommendations and facilitating those tasks that are controver-
sial in national parliaments. The mandate and the sovereign competences rest 
with the individual member state. In official terms, the agency does not interfere 
with the sovereignty of member states; in terms of service provision, competenc-
es are mediated. 
 
5.3.2 From a “Maritime” to an “Intelligence-Led” Virtual Border 
 
Two of the early tasks of Frontex consisted in the composition of two feasibility 
studies: first, the MEDSEA feasibility study on Mediterranean Coastal Patrols 
Network presented on July 14, 2006, and second, the BORTEC study on the 
technical feasibility of establishing a surveillance system (European Surveillance 
System) presented on January 12, 2007. 
The BORTEC study has been of particular legitimizing relevance to the 
EUROSUR project. In the Commission’s Communication “Reinforcing the 
management of the European Union’s Southern Maritime Borders,”42 the study 
was already referred to as evidence even though it was not yet presented official-
ly to the Commission. To date, the BORTEC study remains unpublished; how-
ever, a summary is available in a working document entitled “Integrated mari-
time policy for the EU, Working Document III on Maritime Surveillance Sys-
tems” published by the European Commission and prepared by the Joint Re-
search Centre in Ispra, Italy.43  
From these documents it can be gleaned that the BORTEC study “made a 
thorough analysis of existing maritime surveillance systems and operators in 
Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Slovenia, Malta, Greece and Cyprus,”44 The sum-
mary gives two tables for each of the eight countries. The first table displays the 
authorities involved in maritime surveillance and their responsibilities. The sec-
                                                           
42 European Commission (2006): Reinforcing the management of the European Union's 
Southern Maritime Borders, COM(2006) 733 final (November 30, 2006). 
43  European Commission/Joint Research Center Ispra (2008): Integrated maritime policy 
for the EU, Working Document III on Maritime Surveillance Systems (June 14, 
2008), at: https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/sites/maritimeaffairs/files/docs/body/m
aritime-surveillance_en.pdf (accessed August 13, 2019). 
44  Ibid, p. 23. 
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ond gives an overview of the technological systems in place. National plans to 
integrate existing surveillance systems were documented. While the data collec-
tion process took two months, the study was completed within six. Whereas the 
Commission’s summary only gives the impression of a general inventory, the in-
formation in the BORTEC study must have been more precise in nature; the 
summary explicitly excluded information: 1) on the components of the systems, 
2) on how the systems operate, 3) on the geographical range of surveillance cov-
erage, 4) on the exact numbers and types of patrol boats, aircrafts and vehicles. 
Moreover, it can be assumed that policy recommendations were given, as repeat-
ed reference is made to their suggestions. As a supporting reference, the 
BORTEC study is an important document in reference to which the necessity to 
streamline border surveillance and control measures is supported. 
The managerial premises that cooperation leads to more effective border sur-
veillance and control and would thus be more cost-efficient – an assumption that 
has gained the status of self-evident by the time of the EUROSUR draft regula-
tion – was introduced by the BORTEC study. The BORTEC study served as an 
exploration into the structural and political possibility of a European border sur-
veillance and control system. In the beginning this European structure was 
thought to be based on: a) common border patrols and b) an information-based 
network, and its operational area stretched along the maritime border. 
 
Since 2006, a reinterpretation – and extension, respectively – of the notion of a 
“virtual border” as introduced by the CIVIPOL feasibility study from maritime 
to intelligence-led is observable. In that year, the Commission published differ-
ent Communications and strategy papers on priorities in the “fight against illegal 
immigration,” which emphasize the potential benefit of “intelligent solutions” 
and “technological mechanisms,”45 Contrary to earlier approaches, the emphasis 
on integrated border management is less on European (policy) integration, but 
rather on an “integrated technological approach – e-borders,”46 which might in-
tegrate its participant in passing. 
In its Communication on policy priorities in the “fight against illegal immi-
gration of third-country nationals” of July 19, 2006, the Commission introduces 
the concept of intelligence-led border management described as “a process of 
                                                           
45  European Commission (2006): Policy priorities in the fight against illegal immigration 
of third-country nationals, COM(2006) 402 final (July 19, 2006). 
46  Ibid, para. 23. 
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gathering and analyzing data for threat analysis and risk assessment, with a view 
to establishing certain risk criteria.”47 
Often e-borders are identified in the computerized handling of information 
which has been advanced as part of the Schengen Process since its beginning, 
most notable in the databases which have been created to support coordinated ef-
forts, namely the Schengen Information System (SIS), the VISA Information 
System (VIS) and the European Dactyloscopy (EURODAC). These databases 
are mostly related to the border’s filter function. When the Commission now 
states that intelligence-led border management “would allow border control au-
thorities to filter out passengers who fall under one of these categories, in order 
to carry out additional checks,”48 this bestows yet another quality to the genera-
tion of suspicion for law enforcement agencies. 
The concept of the virtual border takes in the notion of an intelligence-driven 
approach to border management. This is exemplified in an article in “Focus,” the 
in-house magazine of the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Eu-
rope (ASD), in which Ilkka Laitinen, then Director of Frontex, explicitly referred 
to the operating value (Ger.: Betriebswert) of the concept of the virtual border. 
 
“In the 21st century border management must be intelligence-driven. This is a prerequisite 
of all actions taken regarding borders. Effective border management does not exist without 
sophisticated systems of data collection and analysis followed by its timely dissemination 
to officers making decisions on the ground, such as the eligibility for crossing of a person 
or cargo. Illegal entries represent a small percentage of the overall flow across a border. 
Nevertheless, in real numbers it is a massive flow. That’s why the concept of a ‘virtual 
border’ is so important; because the management of a border starts even while gathering 
intelligence or issuing a visa in a third country. The physical border is, so to say, the ‘last 
borderline.’”49  
 
Different aspects are alluded to in this quotation: a detachment from territorial 
logic, a different time-space relation to the notion of border management, an in-
creasing reliance on data, and the lack of a distinction between information and 
intelligence. As stated elsewhere (cf. Ellebrecht 2014a), the concept of the virtu-
al border can be considered the guiding image (Ger.: Leitbild) to the Europeani-
                                                           
47  European Commission (2006): Policy priorities in the fight against illegal immigration 
of third-country nationals, COM(2006) 402 final (July 19, 2006). 
48  Ibid. 
49  Laitinen, Ilkka (2008): “Shaping European Security,” in: Focus 2/2008, p.8. 
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zation of border control. Its ability to take in the notion of the maritime border as 
operational area and its operational strategy as being intelligence-led merged in 
the notion of the virtual border and could be recalled flexibly but in an all-
encompassing manner. The virtual border set aside the need to be localized and 
instead called for specific forms of information (surveillance information, name-
ly), to support its control. 
This is the discursive environment when the Commission presented first ide-
as on a European Border Surveillance System, abbreviated as EUROSUR. In its 
Communication to the Council “Reinforcing the management of the European 
Union’s Southern Maritime Borders” of November 30, 2006, EUROSUR is 
sketched against the backdrop of the virtual border: its operational area is the 
maritime border and its operational means are intelligence-led. The first para-
graph on EUROSUR reads as the intent to optimize existing surveillance activi-
ties and surveillance technologies. 
 
“EUROSUR could in a first stage focus on synergies created by linking the existing na-
tional surveillance systems currently in use at the southern maritime external borders. In a 
second stage, however, it should gradually replace national surveillance systems at land 
and maritime borders, providing a cost-efficient solution, including for example, a combi-
nation of radar and satellite surveillance at European level, taking into account on-going 
developments realized in the framework of GMES (Global Monitoring for Environment 
and Security). EUROSUR will benefit from experience at national and European level 
with similar surveillance systems, possible synergies with existing European surveillance 
systems for other purposes should also be explored.”50 
 
According to the Commission, EUROSUR could first take stock of existing na-
tional surveillance systems, link them in a first step and replace them in a second 
step through itself, which is a European Border Surveillance System. The opti-
mizing jargon of “synergies” and “cost-efficiency” presented integrated border 




                                                           
50  European Commission (2006): Reinforcing the management of the European Union's 
Southern Maritime Borders, COM(2006) 733 final (November 30, 2006), Section 2.2 
(A European surveillance system, para. 24). 
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5.4 FROM THE EUROSUR ROADMAP TO ITS DRAFT 
REGULATION (2008-2011): NATIONAL INFRA- 
STRUCTURES, SUPRANATIONAL INCENTIVES 
 
While Monar saw that pragmatism was understood in operational terms in 2003, 
pragmatism post 2006 was regarded in terms of ‘technological solutions.’ The 
Commission’s Border Package from February 13, 2008 can be identified as the 
official turning point in this regard. The so-called Border Package consisted of 
three communications. The first communication sketched “A comprehensive vi-
sion for an integrated European border management system for the 21st century” 
and called for the creation of an entry/exit registration system.51 In the second, 
the Commission presented the results of a first evaluation of the Frontex agency, 
which served as the basis for its proposals to strengthen Frontex’s responsibili-
ties and resources.52 The third included plans for a European border surveillance 
system, later referred to as EUROSUR Roadmap.53 During the respective press 
conference, Franco Frattini, then Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs, 
described the Border Package as a proposal, a vision for the future development 
of border control; however, concrete measures or implementations could only be 
expected after a period of five to ten years (Kasparek 2008). Generally, the 
Commission drew a rather satisfactory balance of the developments thus far and 
considered the “ambitious agenda set by the Commission and the Council in 
2002 […] completed.”54 The Schengen Borders Code of 2006 was referred to as 
a consolidation of the legislative framework. Cooperation was seen as institu-
tionalized and fostered by the Frontex agency, which in the Commission’s view 
had added an “operational dimension” to the European model for integrated bor-
                                                           
51  European Commission (2008): Preparing the next Steps in Border Management for 
the European Union, COM(2008) 69 final (February 13, 2008). 
52  European Commission (2008): Report on the Evaluation and Future Development of 
the Frontex Agency, COM(2008) 67 final (February 13, 2008). 
53  European Commission (2008): Examining the Creation of a European Border Surveil-
lance System (EUROSUR), COM(2008) 68 final (February 13, 2008), [hereafter cited 
as EUROSUR Roadmap, COM(2008) 68 final]. 
54  European Commission (2008): Preparing the next Steps in Border Management for 
the European Union, COM(2008) 69 final (February 13, 2008), Section 1.1 (Policy 
context). 
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der management.55 Finally, in the spirit of “the best way to show solidarity is 
money,”56 the Commission stated that the “concepts of burden-sharing and soli-
darity have been given real meaning by the European Border Fund (EBF) which, 
for the first time, allocates substantial financial resources to these policy areas.”57 
While practical effectiveness had been promoted for the purpose of integrat-
ing border policies, the next round in this narration of progress revolved around 
technological solutions, technical mechanisms and smart borders. In order to 
strike a balance between securing its citizens on the one hand, and granting free-
dom of movement on the other, the Commission put emphasis on “using the 
most advanced technology to reach the highest level of security.”58 Technologi-
cal solutions were considered the most apt tools with which to strike that balance 
that had occupied the Schengen Process from the very beginning. “All new tech-
nologies, such as biometrics, unmanned aerial vehicles or entry-exit systems are 
expensive,” admitted the former Director of Frontex Ilkka Laitinen, “but they 
will allow Europe to remain open and be ready for a fast response to constantly 
changing threats” (Laitinen 2008: 8). 
With technological borders, there would supposedly be no trade-off between 
freedom and security, between an open and a secure Europe. Two initiatives 
were put forward under this “technological imperative” (Chapman 2004): the 
EUROSUR Roadmap and an outline for smart borders in the form of an en-
try/exit registration system. Both initiatives bet on technical solutions; in fact, 
they were themselves presented as “technical frameworks” or “technical mecha-
nisms,” This new tone led to criticism; Peter Hobbing, for instance, noted: 
 
“All that seemed of doubtful value before, such as fully automated border checks, com-
prehensive systems of entry-exit control, air passenger surveillance and electronic travel 
                                                           
55  European Commission (2008): Preparing the next Steps in Border Management for 
the European Union, COM(2008) 69 final (February 13, 2008), Section 1.1 (Policy 
context). 
56  EUROSUR Project Manager at Frontex, personal interview (May 15, 2012). 
57  European Commission (2008): Preparing the next Steps in Border Management for 
the European Union, COM(2008) 69 final (February 13, 2008), Section 1.1 (Policy 
context). 
58  European Commission (2008): Press release. A comprehensive Vision for an Integrat-
ed European Border Management System for the 21st Century, IP/08/215 (February 
13, 2008). 
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authorisation, high-tech border installations including virtual fences, has all of a sudden 
become part of the EU’s vision for the 21st century.” (Hobbing 2010: 68) 
 
The Border Package was about more than simply promoting the development 
and use of new technologies for surveillance and control. It set into motion the 
rhetoric of the conflation of surveillance instruments and means for policy inte-
gration: the integration of (different) surveillance systems was thus framed in 
terms of establishing common border policies. 
 
5.4.1 The EUROSUR Roadmap 
 
When EUROSUR was commissioned as part of the 2008 Border Package, the 
Commission set the defined aim of having a regulation ready and accepted with-
in the current financial framework, which ran until 2013. Despite various re-
search and development projects for smart and e-technologies, the targeted polit-
ical result of the EUROSUR Roadmap was to establish an EC regulation. It is 
important to keep this in mind – particularly because, in this case, the making of 
the law proved to be overdetermined by the development of different technical 
elements used in the EUROSUR framework. This had the particular effect that 
neither the European Parliament nor the national parliaments were able to fulfill 
their function of control, because they were only involved at a time when the 
points had already been fixed. 
Although conveyed as a vision, the communication for “[e]xamining the cre-
ation of a European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)” functioned not 
only as a Roadmap, but also as a mandate for the political, technical, informa-
tional and legal reconfigurations of border management at both national and Eu-
ropean levels. It underscored the necessity of taking advantage of synergy be-
tween surveillance technologies and the sharing of information among border au-
thorities in Europe. The Roadmap’s stated objective was “to examine the param-
eters within which a European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) […] 
could be developed.”59 Although these parameters entailed both political, organi-
zational, legal and technical dimensions, the technical aspect of system interop-
erability was also rhetorically prioritized. The European Border Surveillance 
System itself was meant to be “a common technical framework” that was built to 
 
                                                           
59  EUROSUR Roadmap, COM(2008) 68 final, Section 1 (Introduction). 
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“support Member States’ authorities to act efficiently at local level, command at national 
level, coordinate at European level and cooperate with third countries in order to detect, 
identify, track and intercept persons attempting to enter the EU illegally outside border 
crossing points.”60 
 
If one looks at the levels where EUROSUR sought to improve border protection 
– reaction capability at the local level, allocation of resources and personnel at 
the national and European planning levels, and facilitation of inter-organizational 
information sharing and cooperation with third countries – the envisioned politi-
cal and geographical reach of EUROSUR is remarkable. The all-encompassing 
notion of integrated management, which tackles a task (here border surveillance 
and control) from a holistic perspective, was projected onto the technological 
possibility of integrating surveillance systems. Furthermore, EUROSUR was 
thought of as a tool for border guards, analysts and policy makers. The “common 
technical framework” was to provide those authorities responsible for border 
control in the Member States “with more timely and reliable information,” so 
that they are able to reduce the “number of illegal migrations who manage to en-
ter the EU undetected,” “contribute to the prevention of cross-border crime” as 
well as “enhance search and rescue capacity.”61 
 
This technical framework was thus envisioned as a universal problem-solver, or 
as it was termed in official rhetoric: a multi-purpose system. The ambivalence of 
the declared objectives – namely, to save migrants’ lives at sea and to counter 
unauthorized migration – evaded the technological promises of a multi-purpose 
system. In addition, the integrative technical framework, which was seemingly 
not inconsistent with this idea, was supposed to be “set up without affecting the 
respective areas of jurisdiction of Member States nor replace any existing sys-
tems.”62 Where the system of systems was attractive and convincing, the idea of 
a European Border Guard stirred up reluctance regarding the subject of conver-
gence. At this point, it is again important to underline that the technical frame-
work that would later take shape in the EUROSUR network (see chapter 4) had 
not yet been specified in 2008. The EUROSUR Roadmap was delineated as 
eight steps in three phases. 
                                                           
60  EUROSUR Roadmap, COM(2008) 68 final, Section 3 (General concept). 
61  Ibid, Section 2.2 (Objectives). 
62 Ibid, COM(2008) 68 final, Section 3 (General concept). 
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The first phase dealt with national infrastructures, the second phase ad-
dressed surveillance tools, and the third phase foresaw the setup of an integrated 
network. What appears to be a chronological sequence is actually a successive 
Europeanization. While the first three steps addressed those areas where neither 
the Commission nor Frontex have decision-making or regulatory competencies, 
the second and third phase (steps 4 to 8) foresaw elements where responsibility 
was increasingly allotted to Frontex.  
From the launching of the EUROSUR Roadmap in 2008 to the legislative 
proposal in 2011, it was almost exclusively up to the political will of member 
states whether EUROSUR would take off or not. The establishment of national 
coordination centers (indicated as step 1) as well as the acceptance and usage of 
the EUROSUR network (indicated as step 2) set the course for the success of 
EUROSUR. However, framed as preparatory or infrastructural, this decisive de-
velopment phase was seldom recognized as such. 
 
5.4.2 The First Phase:  
National Infrastructures – a Means or an End? 
 
When examining the practicalities of the first phase projected in the Roadmap, 
an organizational reconfiguration of border management among European na-
tional authorities comes to the fore. The first three steps subsumed under “infra-
structure” entail the building of national coordination centers (NCCs) (step 1), 
the development of the EUROSUR network (step 2), and the coordination of re-
lations with third countries (step 3). In a (perhaps deliberately) ambiguous man-
ner, the notion of infrastructure captured both an institutional and a technological 
aspect. First, it referred to the institutional reconfigurations within member states 
that came with the establishment of a single central office to coordinate border 
surveillance. The second notion of infrastructure involved the technical connec-
tion between computers and apparatuses and may have thus referred to both the 
infrastructure of surveillance technology and the ICT network. Effectively, the 
planned infrastructure was both technical and institutional. Furthermore, step 3 
expanded the meaning of infrastructure to entail “relations with third countries.” 
Political and electronic connections were thus also subsumed as infrastructure. 
The first step of setting up the NCCs had the declared aim of “providing the 
essential border surveillance infrastructure at national level.” 63  Subsequently, 
                                                           
63  EUROSUR Roadmap, COM(2008) 68 final, Section 4.1.1. 
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step 1 fanned out into a recommendation for surveillance systems – that is, 
equipment (“one single national border surveillance system”) – and for the or-
ganizational level of national border surveillance and control (“one single na-
tional coordination centre”).64 The establishment of the physical office of the 
NCC was thus a different action than the upgrade of a national surveillance sys-
tem that could be managed from that office. In any case, the Commission en-
couraged member states to “make full use of the financial support available un-
der the External Borders Fund (EBF) for the above two actions.”65 
Shortly after launching the EUROSUR Roadmap, the Commission sent out a 
questionnaire to member states to collect information “on existing and planned 
national border surveillance infrastructure, communication and information ex-
change systems and on the use of surveillance tools such as satellites,”66 It is 
likely that it also took stock of states’ willingness to upgrade existing national 
surveillance infrastructures. The collected information served as initial input for 
the development of what is called the “EUROSUR guidelines,” Following the in-
terim report, these guidelines were thought to clarify “responsibilities and duties 
for national coordination centres”67. The Commission was thereby not allowed to 
dictate a technical standard, nor influence the internal business of member states. 
That the Commission was working at the limits of its authority in the first 
phase can be seen when considering how the budgetary impact of EUROSUR 
was calculated. In estimating the costs of EUROSUR, only the amount used for 
the NCC, that is, “for the technical equipment inside, personnel and building 
maintenance costs, computers,”68 was taken into account. Any expenditure for 
surveillance systems was excluded from the cost calculation for EUROSUR. 
In keeping with this budgetary distinction, the Commission did not expect 
the establishment of NCCs to be overly expensive. It was estimated that it could 
amount to a maximum of several hundred thousand euros. However, when in-
cluding the expenditure that indirectly went to the EUROSUR for “national bor-
der surveillance systems” vaguely specified in the official jargon as “all the 
equipment and such,” 50 per cent of the external border fund of 1.8 billion euros 
                                                           
64  EUROSUR Roadmap, COM(2008) 68 final, Section 4.1 (Recommendations, p. 6-7). 
65  Ibid, Section 4.1 (Recommendations, p. 7), emphasis added. 
66  European Commission (2009): Report on Progress made in developing the European 
Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), SEC(2009) 1265 final (September 24, 
2009), Section 2.1.1.2 (Measures taken during the reporting period, p. 4). 
67  Ibid. 
68  EC official in Brussels, personal interview (December 2012). 
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went toward border surveillance. The Commission’s reason for keeping these 
two items separate, why the surveillance apparatus should not be counted in the 
costs for EUROSUR, although EUROSUR is (as its name indicates) a surveil-
lance system, can be explained by its limited authority: “We excluded national 
border surveillance because we do not regulate this.”69 
In this first phase, however, both surveillance gadgetry as well as office sup-
plies for the establishment of NCCs were merged under the heading of infra-
structure. The official budgetary balance abstractly noted that the establishment 
of the NCCs was to be co-financed 75 per cent with funds from the External 
Borders Fund, while the remaining 25 per cent were to be provided by the re-
spective member states. Despite lengthy procedures of applying for and receiv-
ing funds, the Commission, by its own account, was satisfied with the use of the 
EBF. The infrastructure, in its reference to surveillance technologies and the 
physical office of the NCC, was also tied to the competences assembled in a 
NCC. Again, neither Frontex nor the Commission had the authority to regulate 
the competences that member states’ authorities would transfer to or locate at the 
NCC. The Commission, however, sketched different ways to run a NCC. These 
so called “policy options” implied both different technological functionalities 
and a different degree of competence for the NCC. These competencies can be 
mainly distinguished by the degree of centralization instituted by the office 
(from bureaucratic information gathering to coordination, command and con-
trol), and with regard to the kind of information processed and available at the 
respective NCC (from unclassified to top secret). 
 
The EUROSUR Roadmap and its accompanying impact assessments70 detailed 
four policy options running up to 2013. Policy option 1, termed the “status quo 
option,” recalled the 2004 Hague Programme and the related communication 
from the Commission from May 2005 entitled “Ten priorities for the next five 
                                                           
69  EC official in Brussels, personal interview (December 2012). 
70  - European Commission (2008): Examining the Creation of a European Border Sur-
veillance System (EUROSUR): Impact Assessment, SEC(2008) 151 (February 13, 
2008), [hereafter cited as Impact Assessment of the EUROSUR Roadmap, SEC(2008) 
151]; 
- European Commission (2008): Examining the creation of a European border surveil-
lance system (EUROSUR): Summary of the Impact Assessment, SEC(2008) 152 
(February 13, 2008), [hereafter cited as Summary of the Roadmap’s Impact Assess-
ment, SEC(2008) 152]. 
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years.” However, the timeline of these priorities already suggests that “the status 
quo option” was not an option. 
The other three policy options were staggered according to the reach of sys-
tem integration. While policy option 2 focused on “upgrading and streamlining 
existing surveillance systems and mechanisms at Member State level,” policy 
option 3 entails “developing common tools and applications at European level,” 
Finally, policy option 4 “builds upon the actions proposed in the two previous 
options and combines them in a coherent framework”71. However, when consid-
ering the Impact Assessments accompanying the 2011 EUROSUR draft regula-
tion,72 it quickly becomes clear that the policy options include more than the 
reach of system integration: it is about the NCC’s own resources and competenc-
es, which are linked to the type and amount of data to be assembled and handled 
by the office. This is also shown in a figure from the EUROSUR Impact As-
sessment (figure 10), in which the status quo option is no longer shown. 
  
                                                           
71 Summary of the Roadmap’s Impact Assessment, SEC(2008) 152, (Comparison of the 
Policy Options). For an analysis of the EUROSUR Roadmap and its relation to the 
development of Frontex see Jeandesboz (2008). 
72  The EUROSUR legislative proposal has been accompanied by three Impact Assess-
ments of together 114 pages, including 8 ANNEXES with cost estimates, list of expert 
groups, etc. 
 - European Commission (2011): Impact Assessment accompanying the Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European 
Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), SEC(2011) 1536 final (December 12, 
2011), (40 pages), [hereafter cited as EUROSUR Impact Assessment, SEC(2011) 
1536 final]; 
 - European Commission (2011): Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment ac-
companying the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council establishing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), 
SEC(2011) 1537 final (December 12, 2011), (9 pages), [hereafter cited as Executive 
Summary to the EUROSUR Impact Assessment SEC(2011) 1537 final]; 
 - European Commission (2011): Impact Assessment accompanying the Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European 
Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), SEC(2011) 1538 final (December 12, 
2011), (65 pages), [hereafter cited as Compilation of Annexes to the EUROSUR Im-
pact Assessment, SEC(2011) 1538]. 
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Figure 10: Policy options, EUROSUR development (official illustration) 
 Source: EUROSUR Impact Assessment SEC(2011) 1536 final, p. 23 
 
Furthermore, the selection of information from a certain area is displayed along 
with the competences as a circle, which suggests that these matters were logical-
ly related and strive for completion. It is also suggested that the option is not an 
either-or situation but a continuum, a possible successive upgrade and expansion 
– if nothing else, the achievement of a level of common technical frameworks as 
technical completion. 
 
“There were different approaches. For the context of EUROSUR, merely land and mari-
time surveillance had been determined to be included. It was also an option to include 
border checks, which several member states opted for; or thirdly, to further include air 
border surveillance. This would result in a full command and control center, and this will 
be expensive, and there are a few member states which also did that.”73 
 
Thus, the more competences national authorities decided to transfer to the NCC, 
the more expensive the NCC would be. However, it is not the competence of 
command and control that costs, but the technologies needed to assemble all the 
                                                           
73 EC official in Brussels, personal interview (December 2012). 
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necessary surveillance and information at the center. In August 2011, member 
states’ decisions concerning these policy options stood as summarized in table 1. 
 
Table 1: Policy options as applied by 18 member states in 2011 
Policy 
Option 
NCC competences Countries 
1 NCC coordinates (at least) the surveil-




2 NCC has command and control compe-







3 NCC has command and control compe-





Source: EUROSUR Impact Assessment SEC(2011) 1536 final, p. 23 
 
Technical equipment and the power to command and control are what related the 
ordinary task of setting up business offices to the political and technical compe-
tencies based and collected at these centers. Policy options were not only condi-
tioned by technology; merging the two was already a political decision in itself. 
In this case, technology became a substitute for policy. The option of partially 
funding national surveillance systems for the NCC via the EBF served as an in-
centive to choose policies that might reduce the exclusive competence of mem-
ber states in the information and operational environment of borders in favor of a 
computerized network or of integrated systems for monitoring and surveillance. 
Various other sensitive political decisions also needed to be made in order to 
establish a NCC. What authorities were to be present at the center? What compe-
tences needed to be assigned to the NCCs? What data needed to be shared and to 
what level of secrecy? Was the handling of personal data supposed to be sup-
ported in the EUROSUR network? Should the data be transferred manually or 
automatically to the system? Should the NCC be a national command and con-
trol center and thus run 24/7? All these options had to be decided by national au-
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thorities when establishing their NCC. The listing of policy options, however, 
suggested that member states could simply opt for either one, and it distracts 
from the fact that all these tensions and decisions between national authorities 
must be already solved, avoided or overthrown in order to establish an NCC.  
Table 2 illustrates some of these decisions and alludes to the differences in 
tone toward the EU among the member states. 74 The table also illustrates what 
was easily forgotten later on: That the establishment and setup of an NCC is an 
entirely different procedure from its connection to the EUROSUR network (see 
the second and third column in table 2). The neat schedule provided by Frontex 
in its 2015 report on the functioning of EUROSUR stands in sharp contrast to the 
more than 50 pages concerning policy options in the Commission’s Impact As-
sessments of 2011.75 Furthermore, the Frontex report again conflates technical 
and political infrastructure. Bureaucratically speaking, EUROSUR provided fi-
nancial support for the technical NCC infrastructure. Developed as a technical 
framework, political decisions fell short and were cloaked as “infrastructure” in 
the first step of the EUROSUR Roadmap. The question of whether there should 
be a national surveillance system was overwritten by the question of what kind 
of technology. Moreover, the table shows that being connected to the 
EUROSUR network cannot be equated with establishing an NCC. 
                                                           
74  The table has been compiled in December 2016 and, for most parts, quotes member 
states answers to questionnaires by the European Commission; the boxes are thus 
filled in quite heterogeneously. The information in the third column indicating the 
NCC’s connection to the EUROSUR network has been taken from the 2015 Frontex 
Report “The functioning of EUROSUR,” at http://statewatch.org/news/ 2016/mar/eu-
frontex-report-on-eurosur-functioning-12-2015.pdf (accessed December 5, 2016). All 
other information have been taken from the Compilation of Annexes to the 
EUROSUR Impact Assessment, SEC(2011) 1538: Annex 4.2 (Overview of coordina-
tion of the NCCs with other national authorities and third countries, p. 27-29), Annex 
4.3a (Classification level of information shared in NCCs, p. 30), Annex 4.4 (Costs of 
setting up, upgrading and maintaining NCCs and FSC (2007-2010), p. 33), Annex 4.5 
(Annual staff in NCCs and FSC (2007-2010), p. 34).  
75  EUROSUR Impact Assessment, SEC(2011) 1536 final, p. 19-39; Executive Summary 
to the EUROSUR Impact Assessment SEC(2011) 1537 final, p. 4-5; Compilation of 
Annexes to the EUROSUR Impact Assessment, SEC(2011) 1538, p. 25-52. 
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Sources: see fotenote 74, p. 160  
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However, in later documentation, it is only the connection to the EUROSUR 
network that is documented and communicated as the decisive element. As such, 
the political reconfigurations at the national level are rendered invisible. Institu-
tionally, however, the inconspicuous establishment of NCCs is justified with ref-
erence to the role and responsibility of Frontex. The agency is in charge of only 
the development of the network, and as such only reports from the connected 
NCCs to the EUROSUR network. As a result, the establishment of the NCCs is 
not documented as being part of the political setup of EUROSUR, even though 
NCCs are extolled as the “backbone” of the system.76 In this process, it was ob-
viously possible to transform something taboo into something attractive. While 
conducting my interviews, I was told different anecdotes about “fights” among 
law enforcement authorities in several member states concerning the establish-
ment of the NCCs. Accordingly, the more advanced the application of the 
EUROSUR network became, the more diffuse the initial skepticism became. In 
the end, authorities even “started fighting for the NCC”77 for the assumed rea-
sons of status and recognition. 
When a member state decides to establish an NCC, it is then equipped with a 
server that connects it to the EUROSUR network. The commissioning of the 
server is staged as a symbolic act, for which the responsible Frontex official spe-
cially arrives. It thus seems no coincidence that the “big computer rack” hosting 
different servers for the EUROSUR application played a recurring role in many 
different conversations with Frontex officials, be it when joking that EUROSUR 
could not be delivered “in your pocket,” or by showing a photograph of two men 
in work clothes carrying a computer rack. At this point in time, the EUROSUR 
test application was already on the server. The EUROSUR project manager at 
Frontex even talked about the computer rack and network as a gift to member 
states: “My biggest satisfaction is hearing the member states say: ‘thank you 
very much for what you are doing,’ because I am providing them with something 
for free, and something that is useful.”78 As a gift, the material artifact stood for 
the possibility to connect to the EUROSUR network, to exchange as well as re-
ceive information. However, the gift also brought on a backlash, quite in the 
                                                           
76  Cf. for instance, the description on the Frontex website “The backbone of Eurosur is a 
network of national coordination centers (NCCs),” at: http://frontex.europa.eu/ 
intelligence/eurosur/ (accessed February 4, 2017), as well as EUROSUR draft regula-
tion: p. 2 and 29. 
77  EUROSUR Project Manager at Frontex, personal interview (May 15, 2012). 
78  Ibid. 
EUROSUR on Paper | 167 
 
Maussian (2016 [1925]) sense, because it concomitantly represented an expecta-
tion to actually connect to the EUROSUR network, to use it and feed it with in-
formation. In this way, the network instituted a relationship of mutual obligation 
that would ultimately be more beneficial for the donor. Moreover, a further spin 
was given to this gift-induced dependency: Frontex not only provided the net-
work as a gift; it also remained part of the equation by using the network itself, 
as the following interview excerpt demonstrates. 
 
Head of R&D (Frontex): Basically Frontex is also part of the EUROSUR network, also a 
kind of NCC although not national, but we are at the same level. It is very flat. We are not 
in charge, it is flat, a flat platform. And we are also only one of the participants in that ex-
change schema. But we have taken it upon us to develop the EUROSUR network, which 
means basically the technical installations that are needed to be present in the NCCs for 
making the exchange of incident-related information possible. This is developed here. 
 
S.E.: What kind of technical equipment is that? 
 
Head of R&D (Frontex): It is basically a big computer rack that is duplicated in each of 
the member states to make this exchange from a technical point of view possible; […] 
there is no database, it is just exchange of the information.79 
 
The role of Frontex and the impact of the EUROSUR are played down here by 
the rhetorical analogies between technological elements and political structures. 
Frontex routinely stresses its coordinating role in the context of the EUROSUR 
project (“We are not in charge”), which also suggests that the hierarchies within 
EUROSUR are flat (“it is flat”), and epitomizing “it” as the communication plat-
form itself (“it is flat, a flat platform”). The flat platform embodies and presents 
as plausible Frontex’s claim of being “on the same level.” Furthermore, the 
“technical installations” are reduced to the big computer network, while the pro-
cess of defining menu items and border-related incidents, which is the guts of the 
installation (see chapters 4.1. and 4.2), is excluded. 
In sum, in the first three years of the EUROSUR development phase, the in-
stitutional reconfiguration in member states toward establishing NCCs, as well 
as the potential of the electronic EUROSUR network, were systematically trivi-
alized and played down: the technology at stake in the European surveillance 
system was portrayed as “just a big computer rack” (and not as an integration of 
                                                           
79  Head of Research and Development at Frontex, personal interview (May 27, 2011). 
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national surveillance systems), “just a network” (and not as a proposal for a 
mandatory European communicational format), “just the equipment for an of-
fice” (the NCC) (and not as surveillance technology or as the acquisition and 
centralization of competences), “just exchange of information,” (and not as a da-
tabase or an increase in power). Moreover, only after the institutional changes 
were set in motion was EUROSUR’s legislative proposal issued. After the infra-
structure was laid, the EP and national parliaments became involved, and while 
the paper’s formulations were still being discussed, the political and institutional 
reconfigurations were already being taken for granted. Establishing an NCC os-
tensibly meant connecting to a computerized network for information exchange. 
The network was an incentive to access a new arena of information and intelli-
gence that was – and this is where we find the optical device – supranational in 
outlook. Effectively, the arena of European competences took shape as a tech-
nical innovation in the field of border surveillance and not as an encroachment 
on exclusive national competences. 
 
5.4.3 The Second Phase: Surveillance Tools – Incentive, 
Subterfuge or Qualitative Change of Border Management? 
 
Effectively, the Roadmap’s second phase can be described as an arena of supra-
national services, incentives and devices. As such, its relation to the first phase is 
not chronological but rather structural and political. While the first three steps 
addressed member states’ competences, the second phase sketched how 
EUROSUR could generate surveillance information and thus produce an “added 
value” for member states – namely, that of surveillance information generated at 
the supranational level. The second phase concentrated on surveillance tools, 
both in terms of research and development (step 4) and their common application 
(step 5), as well as the common pre-frontier intelligence picture (CPIP) (step 6). 
The Commission explicitly invited research and development projects on border 
surveillance within the framework of the Seventh Framework Programme for 
Research and Technological Development (FP7) with a view to EUROSUR as a 
potential “end-user.” The Commission Staff Working Paper of January 28, 2011 
mentioned nine border surveillance projects it recommended taking “into ac-
count when developing EUROSUR”80. Generally, the Roadmap’s recommenda-
                                                           
80  European Commission (2011): Determining the technical and operational framework 
of the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) and the actions to be taken 
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tions revealed the extensive understanding of surveillance that underpinned the 
EUROSUR project and its sole focus on maritime surveillance.  
 
“The 7th Framework Program for research and development (security and space themes) 
should be used to improve the performance and use of surveillance tools, to increase the 
area covered, the number of suspicious activities detected as well as to improve the identi-
fication of potentially suspicious targets and the access to high resolution observation sat-
ellite data.”81 
 
Simply put, this framework states that this technology’s capability must be im-
proved (development, engineering), and the number of end users increased 
(market). Moreover, the power, reach and effectiveness of surveillance should 
also be increased by expanding “the area covered,” raising “the number of suspi-
cious activities detected,” and by improving “the identification of potentially 
suspicious targets,” This surveillance gaze is deep and wide and should be fur-
ther improved in resolution. Surveillance expands the idea of what it may be able 
to reveal and thereby achieve in our imagination. It is fostered both by a prolifer-
ation of its tools as well as its ends. In this vein, EUROSUR has also been por-
trayed as a surveillance behemoth that, with its drones, radar surveillance and so 
forth, is advancing the militarization of borders (cf. Lemberg-Pedersen 2013: 
152-153; Monroy 2011). 
However, it is virtually impossible to document the concrete and measurable 
influence of FP7 projects in border surveillance on EUROSUR. Nevertheless, a 
significant, indirect influence can be assumed when listing different FP7 projects 
in which the EUROSUR is the “end-user” along with their defined objectives 
and the volume of funding they received. Taking this approach, Hayes and Ver-
meulen conclude that, by 2012, the EU had provided more than 170 million Eu-
ros in funding to 16 projects that promised direct or indirect synergy with the 
EUROSUR system (Hayes/Vermeulen 2012: 60-64). These included the devel-
opment and testing of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and satellites for use in 
civil-security applications.  
Similarly, Martin Lemberg-Pedersen presented EUROSUR as an “example 
of outsourced research and development in border control systems, which in-
                                                           
for its establishment, SEC(2011) 145 final (January 28, .2011), Section 5.4 (Research 
and development to improve the performance of surveillance tools). 
81  EUROSUR Roadmap, COM(2008) 68 final, Section 4.2 (Recommendation, p. 8-9), 
emphasis added. 
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volve a substantial amount of sub-contracting” (Lemberg-Pedersen 2013: 156-
157). Based on his own calculations and the remodeling of contracts and grants 
per project, he regards EUROSUR as subsidizing the arms industry, and argued 
that the influence of private security companies on the governance of borders has 
been “more pervasive […] than mediatized political discourses categorizing im-
migration as a security threat” (ibid: 157). 
 
There are essentially two issues at stake. First, there is the question of to what 
extent the diverse new surveillance technologies that were proposed to serve 
EUROSUR are changing operational practices and value orientation, and thus 
the quality of border work. There have been initial general enquires into the 
question of how these new technologies of surveillance and production of suspi-
cion are impacting enforcement practices (see for instance den Boer 2011). 
However, as the period of investigation does not include when EUROSUR be-
came operational, an evaluation of the effects of surveillance technologies on 
border policing goes beyond the reach of the material of this study. 
The second issue is that private military companies were able to influence the 
definition of political problems, because private military contractors “can no 
longer content themselves with being mere technical experts. They become secu-
rity experts shaping understanding of and decisions about security” (Leander 
2005: 612). Because of competition in the security technologies market and for 
funding, technologies not only have to be good, they also have the following 
paradoxical effect: 
 
“The competition for market shares pushes PMCs to become lobbyists, security advisers 
and public-opinion-makers. […] They create a demand for the services they offer by mak-
ing clients [in this case policy makers and legislators] aware of the many threats they need 
protections against.” (Leander 2005: 612) 
 
In the market for security technologies, supply and demand is distorted by the 
factor “risk” which, however, is calculated, assessed and provided as needs as-
sessment by the suppliers themselves. This can result in lock-in effects that make 
it rather difficult to reverse the technological upgrading of borders.  
For the case of EUROSUR, sources also suggest that the supply-side of secu-
rity companies and security research projects intended to define the setup and 
thus the abilities of the system. According to one Frontex source, the agency 
concluded from tests that satellite surveillance was not contributing to improving 
maritime response, and that the main reason was the time of latency. Satellite 
imagery was considered virtually useless for operational purposes in which mov-
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ing targets were to be detected between waves. An official of the European 
Commission also admitted that companies were preferable that do not develop 
their own technology, as “they don’t want to sell you something all the time.” 
According to another Brussel’s official, the development and use of drones in 
EUROSUR projects had only been incorporated into the EUROSUR draft regu-
lation on request from the Directorate-General Enterprise and Industry (DG-
ENTR). However, the Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG 
Home) wanted to keep a low profile and did not want to attract public outrage for 
having mentioned drones, which in any case were not decisive for the success of 
EUROSUR. Effectively, Anna Leander’s words resonate in so far as the tech-
nical experts not only generate their own demand, but lobbyists and advisers to 
policy makers do so as well to an extent where political decision-makers have to 
make a conscious effort to decide against technological solutions. 
 
In the end, the question to be asked is what technologies were and are behind the 
notion of advanced solutions in the case of EUROSUR. Presented as a “system 
of systems,” the dominant reception of EUROSUR has primarily revolved 
around surveillance technology, particularly around drones and satellite surveil-
lance. However, the most important technology of the EUROSUR framework is 
the ICT application of the EUROSUR network. From the beginning, EUROSUR 
has ‘played’ with an extensive understanding of surveillance that includes moni-
toring technologies, data processing and the assembling and integration of much 
information.  
The promise of creating better awareness and a more timely response enables 
us to subsume variable notions of surveillance into a central idea, thus diverting 
criticism of big bad systems, while achieving almost clinical silence and seclu-
sion in order to build trust in and compliance with an IT system for the exchange 
of operational information. In either case, the entire legal text of the EUROSUR 
Regulation was predetermined by technical semantics and functionalities. In this 
vein, the Commission described the draft regulation as “the result of summariz-
ing 1500 pages of technical specifications in 21 articles” (quoted in Bellano-
va/Duez 2016: 28). 
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5.5 “THIS IS A BEAUTIFUL SITUATION HERE” – 
EUROSUR’S DRAFTING PROCEDURES AND  
THE PILOT PHASE (2011-2012) 
 
When the draft regulation was launched by the Commission on December 12, 
2011, the European Parliament and the Council began negotiating their respec-
tive positions in preparation of the trialogue between the European Council, Eu-
ropean Parliament and European Commission. Between December 2011 and De-
cember 2012, they staked out their positions parallel to the so-called “big pilot,” 
the testphase of the EUROSUR network. This parallel adjustment of a piece of 
legislation and a piece of technology has been considered “a beautiful situation”: 
 
“There is some beautiful situation here; we are developing a system which is in a test 
phase, and at the same time, there is a legislative proposal in parallel. The legislative pro-
posal is taking the ideas from this system, and we may propose changes to the legislative 
proposal based on the use of the EUROSUR, of this system. So I think this is a beautiful 
situation here. Now, we have here an application, this application which is very much in 
line with the legislative proposal.”82 
 
Considering the time line, the result of this suitable regulation is not surprising. 
Because “the legislative proposal is taking the ideas from this system,” the appli-
cation consequently seems to be “in line with the legislative proposal.” In fact, as 
the previous chapter has illustrated, what much of the regulation describes is 
software architecture. However, this statement also implies that legislation is the 
authority by which to set standards and with which to be in line. The “beautiful 
situation” of developing both an IT application and legislation in parallel was 
thus, in fact, regarded as a rather comfortable and gainful one for the success of 
the EUROSUR project. 
When voting on the EUROSUR Regulation, member states were expected to 
be less under the impression that they were voting on a binding EU law, and 
more that they were reconfirming what they had already developed and what 
they were already using in daily practice. Their acceptance thus appears in a 
somewhat depoliticized light: it is a user’s acceptance of technology, and not a 
member state’s willingness to further integrate and accept Europeanization to the 
effect of legal codification. An official from the Commission and hence a figure 
                                                           
82 EUROSUR Project Manager at Frontex, personal interview (May 15, 2012). 
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representing the legislative body similarly noted in December 2012, the system 
and the legislation were consciously developed in parallel “in order to trial and 
error, in order to test things. That way we were able to integrate feedback from 
the technical development of the EUROSUR network into the legislation, and we 
are still able to do so.”83 To a certain extent, this echoes the laboratory metaphor 
deployed in the early days of the Schengen process. When applied to technology, 
the metaphor seems even more plausible.  
Technology requires test phases “in order to trial and error, in order to test 
things.” In the case of legislation, however, the officials at DG Home by their 
own accounts know that “if you go too far and want to define too much, things 
are not accepted.” In the case of EUROSUR, however, the Commission has said 
that it witnessed a common spirit, in the sense that it honorably mentioned that 
the member states had committed themselves to EUROSUR and that all of them 
put effort into the project. The Commission stated that it was important that 
member states maintained a sense of ownership and responsibility. However, 
ownership and responsibility were thought of almost exclusively with reference 
to the development and setup of the EUROSUR network. In terms of legislation, 
the influence of member states was minimized, particularly meaning the question 
of subsidiarity – that is, the question of whether the EU was in charge in this 
matter – was only directed at national parliaments after the NCCs had been es-
tablished, the EBF had been used and the network application was up and run-
ning, as the following section describes. 
 
5.5.1 National Parliaments and the Principle of Subsidiarity 
 
After the European Commission proposed the EUROSUR legislation in Decem-
ber 2011, member states were called upon to clarify the issue of subsidiarity – 
that is, to determine in their own national parliaments whether the EU had com-
petency in this area.84 In the case of the proposed EUROSUR Regulation, only 
the Swedish parliament, the Riksdag, had concerns regarding the competency of 
the EU. In a reasoned opinion, it stated that “it is not sufficiently clear that the 
goals of the proposed measures cannot be achieved at national level. Nor is it 
clear that the goals of the proposed measures can better be achieved if undertak-
                                                           
83  EC official in Brussels, personal interview (December 2012). 
84  Cf. Article 5 (3) of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) and the Protocol on the 
Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality. 
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en at EU level.”85 The Swedish Riksdag was thereby the only institution to offi-
cially call into question the widely accepted premises of a causal relation be-
tween the quality of border surveillance and control and the quantity of shared 
information and data. The basic idea of EUROSUR that situational awareness 
would better be achieved at the level of the EU was thus not shared by the Swe-
dish Riksdag. 
At the time of the legislative proposal, the Commission, by contrast, argued 
that EUROSUR was in line with the principle of subsidiarity, as it “follows a de-
centralized approach, with the national coordination centres for border surveil-
lance forming the backbone of the EUROSUR cooperation.”86 The Commission 
supported its argument by weighing the amount of information and data against 
the quality of analyzing it. While “in quantitative terms most information would 
be managed in the national coordination centres, without Frontex being able to 
see this information,”87 the EU level was fostered in qualitative terms of situa-
tional awareness. In fact, sharing and interlinking systems and information in the 
supranational format of EUROSUR was thought to bring “true added value to 
border surveillance.”88 The Commission argued that 
 
“[b]etter information sharing will help to identify targets such as boats used for irregular 
migration and cross-border crime more accurately and therefore allow a more targeted 
timely and cost-efficient use of available equipment for interception. This is an objective 
which cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States alone and which can be better 
achieved at Union level.”89 
 
5.5.2 Drafting Procedures in the European Parliament and 
the European Council 
 
Before the trialogue between the European Council, European Parliament and 
European Commission could be opened in December 2012, the Council and Par-
                                                           
85  Swedish Riksdag (2011): Reasoned Opinion of the Riksdag, Statement 2011/12: 
JuU29 Appendix 4. 
86  EUROSUR Impact Assessment, SEC(2011) 1536 final, Section 3.5 (Subsidiarity, 
p. 11). 
87  Ibid. 
88  Ibid. 
89  Ibid. 
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liament first needed to negotiate their individual positions. The rapporteur in the 
European Parliament was Jan Mulder from the Liberal Party, with Ska Keller 
from the EP Greens functioned as shadow rapporteur. When the EUROSUR 
Regulation was proposed, the Council was under the Polish presidency. Then, 
during the first six months of the drafting procedure, amendments were formu-
lated under Danish presidency, while the final draft issued by the Council in De-
cember 2012 was submitted under Cypriot presidency.  
In both the European Parliament and the European Council, the most contro-
versial issue was to what extent “the saving of migrants’ lives” should be part of 
the EUROSUR provisions. From the “first documents coming out of the Danish 
Council Presidency and the European Parliament before the summer of 2012,” 
Jorrit Rijpma and Mathias Vermeulen conclude that “both institutions wanted to 
ensure that EUROSUR would improve the capacity of FRONTEX and the Mem-
ber States to save lives of migrants” (2015: 464, emphasis added). However, the 
issue of saving migrants at sea was not difficult and controversial in terms of ca-
pacity; it was not debated whether migrants could better be rescued with larger 
or smaller vessels, or whether they were spotted at sea easier by binoculars or 
satellite- or thermo-cameras. The question was rather whether a humanitarian ob-
jective was meant to be part of the surveillance system at all. The European Par-
liament intended, if nothing else, to attach a humanitarian end to the proposed 
improvement of capacities and it proposed the following wording for recital 2 of 
the EUROSUR Regulation: 
 
“The practice of travelling in small and unseaworthy vessels has dramatically increased 
the number of migrants drowning at the southern maritime external borders. EUROSUR 
should considerably improve the operational and technical ability of the Agency and 
Member States to detect and track these small vessels, leading in the mid-term to a con-
siderable reduction of the loss of migrants and refugees at sea.” (quoted in Rijp-
ma/Vermeulen 2015: 464, emphasis added) 
 
The final regulation, however, provides a formulation that relativizes the respon-
sibility toward persons and vessels at sea. The ability to detect vessels is still 
formulated as an objective, but the aim of tracking is no longer mentioned in the 
introductory recital, whereby any impression of potentially witnessing distress at 
sea is avoided. The final official commitment is indirect at best and plainly eva-
sive at worst: “to detect such small vessels and to improve the reaction capability 
of the Member States, thereby contributing to reducing the loss of lives of mi-
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grants.”90 As information alone can already be declared as a contribution to sav-
ing lives at sea, an actual effort to rescue persons at sea is not part of the com-
mitment fostered by EUROSUR. Reaction capabilities thus rather serve the 
hunter who is hoping not to be required as a friend. 
The compromise text put forth by the Danish Presidency proposed that the 
information that would go into the European situational picture (ESP) and the 
Common Pre-frontier Intelligence Picture (CPIP) would “reflect information that 
would be relevant for the protection of lives of migrants” (Rijpma/Vermeulen 
2015: 464). A consequence of this amendment would have been that distress 
calls would be visualized on the electronic map of the ESP. Moreover, the Dan-
ish presidency even went one step further and proposed to link operational obli-
gations to the availability of information on migrants endangered at sea by pro-
posing to broaden the definition of “reaction capability” in Article 3(b) to also 
imply “protecting lives of migrants at the external borders.”91 In the Council, 
however, “the compromise text was not well received, in particular by the south-
ern Member States, who feared that the EUROSUR Regulation would only in-
crease their responsibilities for intercepted migrants and asylum seekers, rather 
than alleviate the burden” (ibid). These proposals were thus withdrawn from the 
new draft which the Cypriot Presidency tabled at the first trialogue meeting with 
the EP rapporteur in December 2012.  
The Commission, for its part, felt that the negotiations with the European 
Parliament and Council had run smoothly and easily, and an EC official assumed 
that this would not have been the case without the pilot project. For this reason, 
it is worth looking again at how the EUROSUR network was accepted by the us-
ers during the test phase of the so-called “big pilot.” 
 
5.5.3 How Did the System Take Off? 
 
According to aggregated data on the activities in EUROSUR in 2012 provided to 
me by Frontex, there was a constant increase in information entered in the 
EUROSUR network in 2012. In total, Frontex created 4,484 “artifacts,” while 
the Member States entered 3,062 pieces of information. According to the infor-
mation at hand, the system started to really pick up after July 2012. While there 
                                                           
90  EUROSUR Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013, Recital 2, emphasis added. 
91  European Council (2012): Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council establishing the European Border Surveillance System EUROSUR – Note 
to working party on frontiers/mixed committee, EC 11437/12 (June 20, 2012). 
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were 1,342 entries registered under the name of Frontex in July 2012, member 
states’ artifacts amounted to only 273. Within six months, that is, by January 
2013, the entry of artifacts increased threefold for Frontex and more than ten 
times for member states. Of the total number of 7,584 artifacts created, 32 were 
maps, 1,757 were documents and the majority of 5,757 were incidents.92 
Although the sample period is too short to draw conclusions, it can be noted 
that Frontex was more active in the system than the other nodes. The second 
basic trend that can be seen in the charts is that incident reports were used the 
most. However, considering the usage by (new) participants, an observer to the 
big pilot phase stated that caution should be used when reading the figures, 
stressing that these did not allow for reliable statements to be made just yet. The 
observer told me: 
 
“In the current situation, member states enter a lot of data when they are first connected, 
but then it levels out pretty quickly because Frontex is not yet always able to provide 
feedback. They all faithfully do their part in the beginning, then they don’t get anything 
back […]. But that’s hopefully over now – that the member states had to enter in some-
thing for EUROSUR and for another Frontex system that was built at the same time, 
meaning they had to enter the same information for Frontex two times and were wonder-
ing why they had to do that twice and what Frontex was doing on the other end […] but 
that is being fixed now.”93 
 
The observer mentions the well-known risks that frequently emerge when new 
technologies are introduced in organizations. On the one hand, there is a reluc-
tance to accept extra or double work. On the other hand, a neglect of, or even a 
disregard for, new technologies can quickly set in when nothing is offered in re-
turn – for example, if the surplus value is not available or evident. 
As to the practical acceptance of EUROSUR, which was critical for its de-
velopment, the following occurred. Political acceptance, which had long been 
secondary to issues of usability, became more important, because the draft regu-
lation that was presented more or less parallel to the “big pilot” already proposed 
a political compromise. This made it unlikely that the system would be generally 
rejected at that point: not only had a mandatory use of the system been proposed, 
                                                           
92  Data on EUROSUR activity from July 2012to January 2013, provided by Frontex via 
Email on February 1, 2013 (Repository S. Ellebrecht). 
93  Own conversation protocol, December 2012; the quotation has been authorized in 
2016. 
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the member states, as users of the system, were now involved in negotiating the 
means of communication while the medium was being set up. Losing their status 
as users would have meant losing their ability to help shape the draft regulation. 
Beyond the development phase, when looking at the report about the func-
tioning of EUROSUR that was tabled by Frontex in December 2015, it can be 
concluded that double work was resolved, while the general trend of usage con-
tinued: “the incidents reported into JORA (Joint operations reporting applica-
tion) are being fed by Frontex into the Eurosur network application.”94 Frontex 
remained the most active node in the system with “64,355 events uploaded in the 
application” between November 2011 and November 2015.  
In total “the Eurosur network application has recorded a total of 117,721 
events, while 9,125 documents were stored in its repository. In terms of events 
most reported in the Eurosur network application, these are firstly related to ‘ir-
regular migration’ (over 90,000), followed by ‘related cross-border crime’ (over 




5.6 EUROSUR AS AN ITEM OF LAW: THE FINAL 
REGULATION OF 22 OCTOBER 2013 
 
When EUROSUR was commissioned as part of the 2008 Border Package, it was 
foreseen to be completed in a regulation within the ongoing financial framework 
running from 2007 to 2013. The procedure toward the EUROSUR Regulation 
                                                           
94  Frontex Report to the European Parliament and the Council on Art 22 (2) of the Regu-
lation EU 1052/2013, The functioning of EUROSUR, (December 1, 2015), [hereafter 
cited as Frontex Report on the functioning of EUROSUR (2015)], p.10. The report 
states: “From the beginning of the Eurosur network implementation, emphasis was put 
on the integration between the existing JORA incident reporting and the Eurosur net-
work application. Frontex ensured early that there is no duplication of incident report-
ing during Frontex coordinated Joint Operations, which contributed significantly to 
the compilation of a reliable and coherent European Situational Picture” (p. 12). 
Against the background of unauthorized sources, this assessment seems to profit 
strongly from its ex-post perspective. For a recent comparison of the activities in 
EUROSUR and JORA, see Martina Tazzioli’s (2018) astute analysis. 
95 Frontex Report on the functioning of EUROSUR (2015), p.18. 
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was quick and neat. The publication of the Roadmap in February 2008 was fol-
lowed by a period during which political and technical feasibility studies were 
carried out. By 2012, the EU had provided funding worth over 170 million euros 
to 16 research and development projects that promised synergies with the 
EUROSUR system (Hayes/Vermeulen 2012: 60-64). In addition, the develop-
ment of the IT application for the EUROSUR network began in November 2009. 
Structures and definitions that provided themselves in the network’s test phases 
were included in the legislative proposal tabled by the Commission on December 
12, 2011.  
At this point in time, the member states were requested to clarify the issue of 
subsidiarity, that is, to determine in their own national parliaments whether the 
EU had competency in this area. After the Council of the European Union and 
the European Parliament had determined their positions on the proposed legisla-
tion, the trialogue between Council, Parliament, and Commission was inaugurat-
ed under the Cypriot presidency. The ultimate aim was to adopt the regulation by 
October 2013. And so it happened. The ordinary legislative procedure ended 
with the Council of the European Union adopting the regulation on October 22, 
2013 without discussion.96 Two weeks earlier, the European Parliament had ap-
proved the EUROSUR Regulation, by 479 votes to 101, with 20 abstentions.97 
As a consequence, the exchange of information and interagency cooperation has 
been carried out on the legal basis of the EUROSUR Regulation since December 
2, 2013. 
What does this item of law do? In simple terms, it renders interactions oblig-
atory, which were previously subject to change or dismissal. These interactions 
concern the exchange of information and operational coordination between bor-
der agencies in Europe. The EUROSUR Regulation provided Frontex and mem-
ber states with a binding “communicational format” aimed at underpinning bor-
der surveillance and control practices, data collection and analysis, as well as op-
                                                           
96  Council of the European Union, Council adopts regulation establishing the 
EUROSUR system, 15031/13, press release, October 22, 2013, at: https://www.consili 
um.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/139099.pdf (accessed August 
26, 2019). 
97  European Parliament News, EU border surveillance: MEPPs approve Eurosur operat-
ing rules, press release, October 10, 2013, at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/ 
news-room/20131007IPR211624/html/EU-border-surveillance-MEPs-approve-
Eurosur-operating-rules (accessed October 12, 2013). 
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erational cooperation and planning. For this purpose, the EUROSUR Regulation 
has rendered the following components compulsory: 
 
“(a) national coordination centres; 
(b) national situational pictures; 
(c) a communication network; 
(d) a European situational picture; 
(e) a common pre-frontier intelligence picture; 
(f) a common application of surveillance tools”98 
 
These elements are results of the EUROSUR development process and yet here-
tofore did not exist. By means of the EUROSUR Regulation these elements are 
not only accepted, but are rendered official, legitimate, and mandatory. Basical-
ly, the EUROSUR Regulation obliges member states to have a national coordi-
nation centre and to contribute information to the European situational picture 
(ESP) by operating the EUROSUR network from this bureau. To a certain ex-
tent, the regulation encompasses a software architecture and fixes the definitions 
on menu items, reporting formats, layers, informational sources and modes of 
visualization as agreed upon during the development phase. The regulation co-
vers the composition of situational pictures, the necessary communication rou-
tines to stipulate the network, as well as the structure and the sources of the final 
ESP, which, to a degree, brings us back again to the beginning of this chapter – 
to the EUROSUR network and its devising actors. However, due to the provi-
sion, the technical framework has turned into a legal framework for the exchange 
of information and operational coordination. By means of the regulation, 
EUROSUR is no longer merely a tool or network but also a set of obligations. 
 
While the previous chapter has shed light on the packing of a black box, namely 
that of the EUROSUR network, the item of law, the regulation, cannot be un-
packed as it is no black box which would substitute, accelerate or delegate any-
thing (Latour 2014: 272-273). In fact, Latour considers an item of law a very dif-
ferent object from a technological artifact. While, for instance, a speed bump (the 
example is Latour’s 1994: 38-40) replaces the police patrol, that is, speed control 
is delegated to a material artifact, a corresponding item of law – be it on speed 
limits or the official rules for installing speed bumps – neither controls nor dele-
gates. It rather states that the kind of mobilization and mediation inscribed in the 
                                                           
98  EUROSUR Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013, Art. 4 (1). 
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speed bump is lawful. An item of law does not replace or coagulate an interac-
tion, nor is anything accelerated, delegated or innovated by a legal text. Unlike 
technical mediation, an item of law does not stabilize an interaction but renders 
the stabilized set of interactions official and binding. It turns them into an obliga-
tion and lends an atmosphere of legal authority to the arrangement, very much in 
the Weberian sense of an impersonal and rational order. 
How does it accomplish this? Rather than making a detour, law bases itself 
on a constant invocation of other, precedent legal documents: decisions and sig-
natures of this and that date in such and such place. “The legal document ‘cools 
down’ the hot process of production: it is the extensity that emerges from the in-
tensive ordeal, which is composed entirely of associations” (McGee 2014: 146). 
Correspondingly, a legal document is not a black box, it cannot be unpacked as it 
requires itself to be spread around, to be distributed and to be associated and 
cross-referenced to other procedures and texts. At this point, when the object is 
propagated by the treaty, associations are not only objectified, but justified – in 
the case of borders often to the extent of naturalization and fetishization. As an 
item of law, EUROSUR can be spread, visited, researched, consulted and re-









What exactly is referred to, when the acronym EUROSUR is deployed by policy 
makers and those involved in “the progressive establishment of a European 
model of integrated border management”1? What kind of object is EUROSUR? 
Does EUROSUR refer to the situational picture, and thus to a GIS-generated 
map, which border guards and analysts see on their screen when wanting to in-
quire about the latest from the border? Does EUROSUR, as an umbrella term, 
refer to the technical upgrade and integration of border surveillance of EU mem-
ber states, as expressed in the phrase ‘system of systems’? Is EUROSUR the 
electronic network installed between national coordination centers (NCCs)? 
Does it, as such, refer to a setup designed for the purpose of inter-organizational 
communication and information exchange? Is it a concretization of the ‘flanking 
measures’ to the Schengen Agreement and its Convention? Is it, thus, another in-
ter-governmental arena; or can it rather be characterized a communitarian hetero-
topia (Foucault 1986 [1967]), indicating common concerns while at the same 
time displaying the crisis of precisely that common entity? 
In a sense, EUROSUR is all of the above. However, in more pragmatic terms 
it has been portrayed as “just a network, nothing else.”2 And in fact, developing 
this network, all the other reconfigurations have been mediated. EUROSUR is 
thus not an object, but a trigger. It is the mediator for several reconfigurations in 
EU border management. 
Part II of this book started off with the intention to trace, analyze and discuss 
the contribution of the European Border Surveillance System, EUROSUR, to the 
emergence of a supranational EU border. The exploration has focused upon the 
                                                           
1  Executive Summary to the EUROSUR Impact Assessment SEC(2011) 1537 final, 
p. 2. 
2  Head of Research and Development at Frontex, personal interview (May 27, 2011). 
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development phase of EUROSUR running from February 2008 to December 
2013. During a period of just under six years, two results – or, in fact, products – 
were yielded: first, the IT application of the EUROSUR network and second, the 
EUROSUR Regulation. Both products revolve around the exchange of border-
related information between EU member states and Frontex for the purpose of 
generating a common European situation picture (ESP) visualized in an electron-
ic map. The EUROSUR development phase has been explored for those inscrip-
tions that made it into software and regulation, such as for instance, menu items 
of the GUI that are at the same time mentioned in the regulation as obligatory el-
ement of the situational pictures. 
Generally, the analysis referred both to the making of a cartographic depic-
tion and of a legal text as mediators of the external EU border. Their interplay: 
the IT application provides the classifications to sort and valuate border-related 
information and offers a standardized communication format for the exchange of 
information. The regulation turns this standard into an official procedure, and al-
lots the respective competences. 
 
EUROSUR not only facilitates the exchange of information nor does it merely 
produce an electronic map; the processes instituted by EUROSUR rather con-
tributes significantly to the formation, acceptance and validity of an external EU 
border while. The development process of these two products proposed, tested 
and eventually stabilized the material basis for a new taken for granted idea of an 
external EU border: While the IT application and its GIS produce chains of ref-
erences which are supposed to increase and guarantee situational awareness, the 
regulation describes this accumulation of information as chains of obligations. 
These chains of references and chains of obligations have been set up anew 
with their interrelation mediating the supranational border mandate; (new) chains 
of reference have been established with regard to “situational awareness,” and 
the provision of a “situational picture,” A new truth about what concerns the 
border is onscreen and guiding the allocation of personnel, resources and the le-
gitimization for interventions. In turn, the regulation fixes the maintenance of 
these references as an obligation. As the ‘result’ of these reconfigurations and 
new fact sheets, new chains of references and new obligations of reporting and 
assessing the border become tangible to and exploitable by participants. This pic-
ture of the external EU border appears plausible, and finds adoption. Chains of 
obligations and chains of references thus work together and establish a very 
powerful system whose output changes the assumed geographical and informa-
tional limits of border policing. 
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As both software and regulation are set up for the purpose of generating a 
European situational picture, their parallel development has provided for the pos-
sibility of a dual claim: the ESP produces a both truth claim and a legitimacy 
claim. In this case, politics thus have artifacts and legislations, their power, how-
ever, “does not lie in themselves. It lies in their associations; it is the product of 
the way they are put together and distributed” (Joerges 1999: 5). Subsequently, 
EUROSUR – as process, trigger, object and system – constructs that which is le-
gitimately taken to be the border and the need for protection, together with the 
authority to regulate movement. From the previous two chapters, EUROSUR’s 
mediation can be summarized by the following five aspects: 
 
•  Europeanization. Since cooperation and information exchange have been 
cautiously valued and rejected by member states from the very beginnings 
of the Schengen Process, the development of EUROSUR has produced a 
degree of integration that did not previously exist and that even seemed 
heretofore unrealistic. A “detour” – through the development of a commu-
nication platform for the exchange of information – mediated member 
states’ willingness to accept obligations concerning the reporting and opera-
tionalization of border surveillance and control. 
• Composition of a new visual language. The most powerful mediation is 
achieved by way of visualization of the information exchanged in 
EUROSUR in the European situational picture (ESP). The electronic map of 
the ESP, the “EUROSUR on the screen,” not only provides an image to the 
added value of information exchange, it also offers what Latour has called a 
“new visual language” (Latour 1986: 19), that allows the external border of 
the EU to be naturally ‘seen’ as a supranational entity. Just as at the turn 
from medieval to the modern age when “maps depicted political authority as 
homogeneously territorial and linearly bounded even before political prac-
tices and institutions were operationalized as such” (Branch 2011: 2, em-
phasis added), the mapping practices instituted by EUROSUR have been 
analyzed with regard to the crafting of the supranational authority they 
evoke. The IT network not only facilitates the exchange of information, but 
also mediates the integration of border policing in Europe by translating lo-
cal occurrences into “border-related incidents.” It composes a novel and 
binding association of informants, isolates or rather black-boxes the discon-
tinuous generation of data, and delegates the outline of an external EU bor-
der and its supranational mandate to the visualization of information on a 
screen. In this way, all kinds of information – risk analyses, geodetic data, 
daily news, police information and (live) monitoring data – are combined 
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and visualized as ‘one’ on the screen. EUROSUR does not mediate the for-
mation of an external EU border by demarcating a cartographic space, but 
by visualizing and geo-referencing risk analyses, incident reports and the at-
tribution of impact levels. 
•  Appropriation/Assembling of supranational competences. The European 
situational picture not only depicts the occurrences along the external bor-
ders of the EU. It rather outlines and projects the area of supranational con-
cern along a tailored body of processed surveillance data. Thereby, 
EUROSUR triggers that the ideas about the appropriate and legitimate 
forms of European political authority differ them the territorial logic. The 
supranational notion of the virtual border is perpetuated by surveillance in-
formation that is analyzed along self-determined prognostic criteria, and 
which acquires the status of “situational awareness” once visualized in the 
European situational picture. Gathering, aggregating, and evaluating data is 
the basis for risk analysis and thus the distribution of resources and person-
nel along a frontier, but also for individual checks and other measure carried 
out by border service staff. The appropriation of EU competences is not 
mediated via territory, but via information and data management. Surveil-
lance is the supranational realm of competences, providing risk assessments 
as a service and the better (the supranational) overview. 
•  Increase in competences for Frontex. In this context, the Frontex agency is 
given an enormous power to define and set the agenda. Since the prognostic 
criteria and indices for data analysis are defined by Frontex itself, the Euro-
pean situational picture is critically influenced by the agency’s services and 
risk analysis. By developing the technical network, by providing pre-
frontier information and risk analysis, by visualizing the surveillance infor-
mation in the ESP, and by administering the common application of surveil-
lance, Frontex has acquired the position to produce a dynamically develop-
ing knowledge base that serves to justify and legitimize border control, sur-
veillance and intervention measures. At the same time, its institutional com-
petences merely appear in disguise with reference to the function of a ‘coor-
dinating’ agency or a ‘service’ to the member states. 
•  Infrastructural take on immigration and asylum policies. Mediated through 
the production of a situational picture, the emerging EU border locates its 
enforcement areas by tracing vessels. As a result, the operational area is 
rendered dynamic. The border of policing is not so much limited by refer-
ence to geography, but rather mobilized by reference to ever-changing mi-
gratory routes and moving vessels. As a result, routes, vehicles and infra-
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structures both of mobility and surveillance are emerging as the relevant 
means of power. 
 
This chapter has highlighted EUROSUR’s quality as an optical device that pro-
vides the “new visual language” (Latour 1986: 19) to naturally see the external 
EU border. The European situational pictures changes the self-conception of 
border enforcement. The latter is centrally mediated by information management 
and the notion of suspicion and less by territory and the notion of inside-outside. 
Furthermore, it is sorting out the bona fide from the mala fide movement. This 
kind of external EU border tackles the “crimmigrant” (Aas 2011) and their 
means of transport. 
It should be stressed that, to date, no European asylum legislation or migra-
tion law exists. In the visualization of the situational picture, however, “unau-
thorized border crossing” first appears as a risk and then takes on the status of 
“border criminality” in the incident report. EUROSUR thus sketches a unified 
view of violations of immigration rules, although common immigration laws are 
absent. While the legal border of policing finds mobilization and mandating via 
EUROSUR, the legal borders of rights remain scattered. Technically the attempt 
is being continued to integrate the motives of hunter and friend by rendering 
their work interoperable in the EUROSUR system. Stefan Kaufmann considers 
this active ambivalence – the power to flexibly change from an authoritarian 
mode of governing to a humanitarian mode – characteristic of the contemporary 
border regime. The following chapters explore how the migrant vessel by its ver-





The Refugee Boat –  
Vehicle, Moving Target,  




Part III: The Refugee Boat – Vehicle, Moving 




In the context of the southern external borders of the EU, migrant vessels stand, 
on the one hand, for the risks of border crossing by sea, and on the other, for the 
challenges of border control. Examining EUROSUR’s legitimizing narrative, the 
previous chapter demonstrated that the reference to small boats both works to 
claim necessity to save migrants’ lives at sea and to justify the need for better 
surveillance. Those dinghies, fishing boats or freighters represent, in a nutshell, 
risks and challenges from the standpoint of border crossing and from that of bor-
der surveillance and control. In order to decipher and explain the possibility of 
this oscillating reference to the vessels commonly used for migration by sea, this 
part of the book focuses on the vehicle itself. 
For the following three chapters, I take up William Walters’ impetus to ex-
amine “the missing vehicles” in the context of migration and border control, tak-
ing seriously “the symbolic work that vehicles do – both incidental and calculat-
ed” (Walters 2011: 6) as well as the materiality of the boat as a socio-political 
and judicial entity. Modifying Latour’s “Where are the missing masses?,” Wal-
ters claims that the vehicles used for migration, have by their “behavior or nature 
[…] a comparable role” (Latour 1992: 225) to that of humans for the realization 
and reception of (unauthorized) migration. If true, the socio-technical arrange-
ments aligned to the phenomenon of unauthorized maritime migration could be 
traced back to its vehicular facilitator. For the purpose of operationalizing Wal-
ters’ claim, the following chapters examine the vehicle used for migration by sea 
as a site in its own right. 
The intention of the site-specific analysis is not to portray the history of a 
site, in this case of the refugee boat or migrant vessel, but rather to construct the 
emergence of a supranational EU border from the perspective of the small boat. 
The analysis thereby goes beyond emphasizing the impact of migrant vessels on 
EU border policies. It aims to understand and highlight the difference the boat 
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makes. Walters’ claim to focus on the vehicles of migration corresponds to the 
methodological premises of this study. It allows tracing the role of the vehicle 
pertaining to networks of commercialized migration as well as to the technical 
functioning and legal justification of border surveillance and control. 
Chapter 7 starts with an analysis of the vehicular characteristics of boats and 
ships and their differences. It then explores their very first appropriation in the 
context of unauthorized and clandestine migration in the context of the Indochina 
Refugee Crisis.  
Chapter 8 examines the appropriation of the vessel in the context of seaborne 
migration to Europe across the Mediterranean Sea, with the reception of the im-
age of the small, overcrowded and unseaworthy vessel given a discursive analy-
sis. Finally, chapter 9 investigates the role the vessel plays in distinguishing the 
migrants’ legal status. The analysis focuses on those arguments that rely on the 
vehicle as vessel: as stateless, as in distress, as a suspicious one “that is doing 
something strange,”1 and that is thus a target of surveillance. This allows the test-
ing of the hypothesis that a prioritization of the vehicle in legal reasoning (while 
at the same time bypassing or postponing any need to address the human cargo) 
facilitates operational practices that otherwise would have been difficult, if not 
impossible, to justify. To conclude, these trajectories are analyzed with regard to 
the boats’ role in the emergence of a supranational external EU border. 
 
                                                           
1  EUROSUR Project Manager at Frontex, personal interview (May 15, 2012)]. 
 
 
7 Site Inspection: On Boats and Ships, their 
Appropriation for Flight and Migration 
 
 
7.1 WHAT CHARACTERIZES BOATS AND SHIPS 
AS VEHICLES? 
 
Described as “a small buoyant structure for travel on water”1 a boat can essen-
tially be characterized by its ability to traverse bodies of water. To float on water 
is a boat’s property and condition. Yet, “travel on water” points, in fact, to more 
than the mere floating; first, it points to a directional movement, and second, to 
transportation. For, it is not the boat that travels; cargo or passengers travel by 
water, while the boat moves and carries across water. With its agency consisting 
in its ability to float and to transport cargo, the navigable boat thus allows for 
taking the liquid route. Facilitating mobility and transportation is an essential 
characteristic of any technology of movement; vehicles generally enable in-
creased independence from a fixed place. Yet, what distinguishes boats and ships 
from other technologies of movement and transportation is the medium they are 
devoted to: the sea. 
The sea – as the medium to be crossed and by which the boat is carried – 
places its own stamp on the journey and requires the vehicle to be fabricated in a 
certain way. While the sea, together with Archimedes’ principle,2 governs the 
                                                           
1 Merriam Webster, sub voce “boat,” at: https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/ 
boat (accessed March 29, 2019). 
2 Archimedes’ principle indicates that a body floats if its weight is equal to the weight 
of the liquid (water) it displaces with its volume. The force that drives the vessel down 
into the water (weight) equals the force that drives it up (buoyancy which is propor-
tional to the displaced volume). The form of the bow plays a significant role, as it de-
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watercraft’s fabric and basic design, its functional use determines its size and fa-
cilities. Fishing vessels, canoes, yachts, dinghies are small, light and easily ma-
neuverable vessels used for pleasure boating or fishing; they are suited for inland 
and coastal waters. The unwieldy container ships, tanker ships or cruise ships are 
deployed on international seagoing voyages; their enormous volumes are 
matched by (equally) massive bows. Overall, the relation between size, shape 
and utilization arranges itself around the capacity to float. 
From the late 15th century onwards, this capacity made the modern venture 
of navigation possible. Maritime vessels were used to explore the globe, to en-
hance trade, to expand spheres of influence and to displace, exploit or exchange 
whatever found ashore. Considered iniquity or even blasphemy in ancient and 
pre-modern times, seafaring later took on a promising connotation (Makropoulos 
1998: 56-57). The sea itself was no longer regarded from a distance as an arbi-
trary force, adverse to (spatial) orientation and characterized by unpredictability 
and “anomy” – that is, without legal force or binding effect (ibid: 56). In the 
course of the modern times, the sea could rather be experienced by sailing across 
it. Taking inspiration from the practice of seafaring adventures, the sea was seen 
as a challenge, as an element to be braved and mastered by means of navigation. 
Nautical metaphors thus changed fundamentally in meaning (Blumenberg 1997). 
Seafaring became the epitome of human curiosity and of a justified pursuit of 
happiness (Makropoulos 1998: 57). To this date, the ship stands for the extension 
of “the faculty and scope of human cognition and action” (Makropoulos 1997: 
11). 
It is noteworthy that the notion of ‘ship’ is not infused by acceleration in 
overcoming distances unlike other vehicles such as the airplane or car (Siegfried 
2005; Geisthövel 2005). Seafaring rather symbolizes, first and foremost, the 
practical possibility of freedom.3 It is not velocity that distinguishes boats and 
ships from other vehicles, but the possibility and (technical) suitability of an oth-
erwise impossible endeavor: the crossing of the sea. In addition to being a tech-
nology of movement, boat and ships are enablers and facilitators, the latter in the 
most literal sense of the word. Similarly, Rebekka Ladewig (2005: 64) sees the 
common characteristics of all ships – maritime ships, airship, spaceships – in the 
                                                           
termines how much water is displaced, e.g. in the case of bulbous bows. This will also 
determine how much additional cargo weight can be transported by the vessel. 
3 In fact, while aviation symbolizes a rather intellectual freedom, navigation has been 
regarded as the practical venture through which freedom could be achieved 
(Makropoulos 1998: 56). 
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fact “that they enable humans by their concessive, enveloping and protective 
character, to move through elementary (natural) spaces and open them up as 
spaces of action and play.” In a sense, the proverbial ocean of opportunity can 
only be accessed by means of boats and ships. Lastly, boats, ships and vessels 
stand for the passage, middle passage, the transit, the route itself (Certeau 2013 
[1984]: 121; Gilroy 2000). They transmit, transport and transgress; they not only 
facilitate but initiate. 
In thinking about boats and ships there is always an encounter with the 
changing nature of the sea, its unpredictability, its perils and promises. Imagina-
tions on the nature of the sea concomitantly evoke the phenomenology of seafar-
ing, of being on board a vessel, which, in turn, underpin any imagining of boats 
and ships. Michel Foucault (1986 [1967]: 27) depicts a boat as “a floating piece 
of space, a place without a place, that exists by itself, that is closed in on itself 
and at the same time is given over to the infinity of the sea […],” It is in this con-
text, that Foucault characterizes the ship as the “heterotopia par excellence,” as 
“greatest reserve of the imagination” (ibid). While in Ladewig’s portrayal the re-
lation between water and craft emphasizes access to opportunities and the protec-
tive character of the vessel, Foucault depicts it as a “piece of space” without ex-
ternal reference and completely at mercy of the ubiquitous sea. While the ship 
promises to cross the sea, to bring about an unknown, yet promising future, the 
sea advises caution. The ship promises, the sea admonishes. 
 
7.1.1 The Medium of the Sea 
 
Any maritime crossing fundamentally depends on the medium of the sea and its 
(weather) condition. In fact, while the vessel crosses the ocean, the water carries 
the craft. Even if the progress in navigational technologies – from compass to 
GPS, from wooden sailing ships to post Panamax ships – masks the intimacy be-
tween water and craft, the place element (Ger.: Ortselement) nevertheless re-
quires alignment. The sea is a functional necessity and an essential threat to any 
vessel. 
Following Simmel’s way of describing and analyzing space, the sea can be 
described as a purely sensual formation, which does not form itself in space.4 It 
is surface or turmoil. Applying Deleuze’s and Guattari’s (2013: 479) portrayal of 
the qualities of the sea, seafaring can be envisioned as an encounter with affects. 
                                                           
4 While the border famously is defined as “sociological fact, that forms itself in space” 
Simmel (1997 [1908]: 144). 
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Accordingly, seafaring can be described as an experience of space rather than an 
overcoming of it. According to the French philosophers “the sea is the smooth 
space par excellence” (ibid). As opposite to striated space, smooth space is main-
ly characterized by its incommensurability with measures and defined properties. 
 
“Whereas in the striated forms organize a matter, in the smooth materials signal forces and 
serve as symptoms for them. It is an intensive rather than extensive space, one of distanc-
es, not of measures and properties. […] Perception in it is based on symptoms and evalua-
tions rather than measures and properties. That is why smooth space is occupied by inten-
sities, wind and noise, forces, and sonorous and tactile qualities, as in the desert, steppe, or 
ice.” (Deleuze/Guattari 2013: 479) 
 
It follows that the sea cannot be bound. Moreover, as aesthetic impression and 
lived experience, the ocean is undifferentiated; it does not show any landmarks 
to which the eyes can hold onto. With the sea being a smooth space, the seagoing 
vessel becomes itself a (land)mark, point of reference and sign of life. While the 
sea swallows and blurs, the vessel, its direction, route and cargo indicate the rela-
tions at stake. 
 
7.1.2 On Boats, Ships and their Differences 
 
According to a basic definition provided by the Columbia Electronic Encyclope-
dia, a boat is a “small, open nautical vessel propelled by sail, oar, pole, paddle, 
or motor.” It follows that the “use of the term boat for larger vessels, although 
common, is somewhat improper, but the line between boats and ships is not easy 
to draw.”5 With regard to their utilization, however, boats are neither intended 
nor suitable for the open sea, which is both reflected by and due to their small 
bow. This relative unseaworthiness blends into legal definitions of both the term 
“boat” and “ship.” 
The dominant negative classification for “ship” is that “on the one side, (mo-
tor)boats, floating docks, pontoons, and seaplanes […] are not considered ships” 
neither are “boats or any yachts which are propelled by sails or oars” (Rah 2009: 
59). 
In her comparative examination of the meaning of the term “ship” in Ger-
man, British, US-American, French and Greek legal texts, Heidi Engert-Schüler 
                                                           
5 Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, sub voce “boat,” at: http://www.infoplease.com/ 
encyclopedia/history/boat.html (accessed March 29, 2019). 
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(1979: 59) extracts the overall definition that a ship “is an item of a not minus-
cule size [Ger.: Gegenstand von nicht unbedeutender Größe], which is suitable 
and dedicated for the sea” [Ger.: zur Schifffahrt geeignet und bestimmt]. The tau-
tological definition – a ship is a vehicle capable of navigation – links the charac-
teristics of a ship to its technical suitability (Ger.: Eignung) for the high sea. Yet, 
Engert-Schüler already conducts her analysis under the premise that the term 
ship refers to a sea-going vessel on international voyage (ibid: 26-29). 
A ship is imagined against the background of the high seas which it crosses. 
Boats, in contrast, are used in lakes, coastal and internal waters. In our imagina-
tion, boats move in a placid, recreational scene; they are goods and chattels, the 
economical basis of local fishermen or sports equipment, linked to adventures. 
One of the few conceivable images of a small boat on the high seas is that of a 
life boat. A boat does not cross an ocean, nor does it push a frontier. It stays local 
as it generally returns to its place of departure. Ships, in contrast, are used to 
change location. Likewise, Engert-Schüler stresses that the prime characteristic 
of seafaring is not transportation but the change of location (1979: 58). The in-
tention of seafaring, however, the crossing-over, the change of location may as 
well be pursued on a boat. This is to say that the suitability to travel the open sea 
(Ger.: Eignung) does not by implication comply with its dedicated purpose 
(Ger.: Widmung; Nutzung). A boat may be found on the open sea, too; yet, does 
it ipso facto turn into a ship? And what difference would it make?  
In fact, international law attaches a variety of legal consequences to the fac-
tual finding that an “item is a ship” (Engert-Schüler 1979: 25). The rights and 
obligations defined in international maritime law apply to ships and not to boats, 
such as for example the right to innocent passage (Rah 2009: 15). However, 
technical qualifications do not suffice for the legal recognition of a watercraft to 
be a ship. Cargo has its bearing on the classification of vessels, too: the 1974 In-
ternational Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) defines a vessel 
that “carries more than twelve passengers” as a “passenger ship”6 – regardless of 
size, as Patricia Mallia (2010: 35) points out. 
 
According to the rights and obligations under the Law of the Sea,7 a watercraft is 
only treated as a ship when flying a flag. The flag indicates the nationality of 
                                                           
6 SOLAS, Chapter I, Regulation 2(f). 
7 The 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) is the most comprehen-
sive interstate agreement on the rules and obligations concerning international seafar-
ing. 91 countries have signed the LOSC; in 2013 the European Union also signed it. 
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ships (Gavouneli 2006: 206-209; Rah 2009: 17-18). By flying a flag, a ship indi-
cates that it is registered with the respective state. However, ships cannot be reg-
istered with just any state and thus fly its flag. Art. 91 (1) of the Law of the Sea 
Convention (LOSC) stipulates that “[t]here must be a genuine link between the 
State and the ship.” When a ship bears a flag, it thus indicates a consented legal 
relationship: the flag bearing said state holds both legal authority over that vessel 
and its cargo as well as responsibility for it. By flying a flag, a vessel displays its 
jurisdictional reference, that is, the laws that apply on board as well as those of 
the state which then is obliged “to effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control 
in matters administrative, technical and social, ranging from the construction, 
equipment and seaworthiness of ships to the manning, labor conditions and the 
training of crews on board.”8 A vessel is thus considered a ship when identifia-
ble, that is, localizable with regard to its legal position in international relations. 
What is relevant in this context is the question whether for the factual finding 
“item is a ship” flag state regulations should be recognized or not. In this regard, 
Sicco Rah deduces from the LOSC that “vessels that are not legally entitled to 
flying a flag […] may not be regarded as ships.” (Rah 2009: 16) In contrast, 
Engert-Schüler argues that the reference to flag state is not appropriate, as not 
every item that wears a flag turns into a ship (Engert-Schüler 1979: 25). By 
means of her comparative analysis of legal texts, she proves that the suitability 
for the high seas and not the registration with or reference to a flag state is the 
most significant feature of a ship in legal understanding (ibid: 25-26, 59). Re-
viewing the understanding of the term ship in both the texts of the LOSC, in dif-
ferent multilateral international agreements, as well as in German maritime law, 
Inken von Gadow-Stephani minimizes the definition even further: she argues 
that one should act on the assumption of a ship “if an item serves the locomotion 
on water” (2006: 19-26, here: 26). She accordingly defines “ship” as an item 
“that can move by floating” (Ger.: der sich schwimmend fortbewegen kann) 
(ibid: 23). This definition does not distinguish between boats and ships. Gadow-
Stephani places emphasis on the mere ability of the floating movement on water 
– and not to the suitability for the high seas. Thus, she does not see the prerequi-
site for the applicability of rights in a technical qualification, but a physical abil-
ity and moving presence on water. 
Ultimately, ships are not considered independent legal entities. This holds 
true despite diverse (metaphorical) conceptions of a ship as legal territory, and 
contrary to common references to the rights of a ship (Rah 2009: 15). Ships are 
                                                           
8  LOSC Art. 94. 
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no subject of international law. As vehicles they are rather “merely movable ob-
jects [Ger.: lediglich bewegliche Sachen] in the ownership and possession of 
states or international organizations” (Gadow-Stephani 2006: 19). It follows that 
the rights of a ship are rights which states grant each other (Rah 2009: 21). 
By implication this also means that the recognition of a vessel as ship brings 
state politics to the table. When, in turn, the vessels used for maritime migration 
are regularly depicted as boats, this might also serve to circumvent international 
politics. This aspect will be elaborated further below. 
When addressing the characteristics of boats and ships as technologies of mobili-
ty, its technical specifications and requirements can be distinguished from the le-
gal terminology of the term ship as well as from the metaphorical reference to 
boats and ships. In all three contexts, boats and ships are treated unequally alt-
hough a clear definition of their distinguishing features is lacking. The only re-
curring distinction between boats and ships is their size as the technical condition 
of seaworthiness. Other technical classifications blend into legal references, and 
vice versa. Together they serve as a basis for claiming or rejecting obligations 
and competences toward the vehicle and its passengers. As this study is interest-
ed in the reference to boats and ships in the context of EU border surveillance 
and control practices, it is not important to distinguish between boats and ships 
by definition; nor will I maintain a defined separation between boats and ships. 
This section rather reveals that the description of a vehicle is simultaneously a 
negotiation of competences and obligations toward its (in)animate goods. 
 
 
7.2 APPROPRIATION OF BOATS AND SHIPS FOR 
FLIGHT AND UNAUTHORIZED MIGRATION 
 
As vehicles, boats and ships generally assist in traversing maritime distances. If, 
however, the purpose of the change of location is flight or clandestine migration, 
this later appropriation impacts upon the condition of the itinerary, its organiza-
tion, its departure and arrival, the fate of the human cargo and on the vehicle it-
self. Seaborne escape and migration is hardly “travel by water.” 
Correspondingly, the suitability of the vessel is not only directed to seafaring 
alone. The purpose of flight or clandestine migration has its own bearings on the 
suitability of the vessel. Boats and ships that are appropriated for the purpose of 
flight or clandestine migration are compromised by a dual, yet ambivalent, 
sometimes conflicting suitability (Ger.: Eignung): for the purpose of clandestine 
seaborne migration small boats are, for instance, more suitable than ships, as it is 
more difficult to detect boats amid the waves. In terms of seaworthiness, howev-
200 | Mediated Bordering 
 
er, small boats are not suited for the open sea. Furthermore, the condition and 
thus seaworthiness of a vessel is thwarted by the profitability of commercialized 
migration.  
The following section illustrates and examines the implications of dual suita-
bility. Under the premises that the vessel appropriated for flight and clandestine 
migration incorporates this dual suitability, a site-inspection, which focuses on 
the practicalities and experiences of flight and migration by boat, gains strategic 
relevance. Starting with the earliest appropriation of boats and ships in the con-
text of the Indochina Refugee Crisis, I intend to explore the characteristic differ-
ence the boat makes as a means of movement in the context of unauthorized mi-
gration. 
 
7.2.1 Boats and Ships as Appropriated during the 
Indochina Refugee Crises 
 
Since the systematic use of vessels for the purposes of escape during the Indo-
china refugee crisis, the “refugee boat” can be considered a particular type of 
vessel: a vessel classified by its (human) cargo. The boat, in turn, gives name to 
the passengers it transports: the boat-people. Moreover, the vehicle leaves its 
mark on the person: even after disembarking “an encounter with travel follows 
you around. Long after your journey is finished you remain a boat person” (Wal-
ters 2011: 5).  
The term “boat-people” was coined during the Indochina Refugee Crisis fol-
lowing the Vietnam War. The communist takeover of the three Indochinese 
countries Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos in 1975 forced approximately three mil-
lion people to seek refuge in neighboring Southeast Asian countries over the next 
two decades.9 According to UNHCR’s statistics, about one fourth of these refu-
gees, which amounts to 796,310 persons, were Vietnamese refugees who es-
caped by boat.10 
                                                           
9 Various studies on the Indochina Refugee Crises attempt to quantify and classify the 
number of refugee during that period Robinson (1998: 2), Davies (2008: 85), Thomp-
son (2010); Wain (1981: 42). However, all note that these numbers can only be mini-
mum estimates, as thousands are believed to have perished en route and in the hands 
of pirates. 
10 UNHCR (2000): The State of the World’s Refugees: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Ac-
tion, Chapter 4 (Flight from Indochina: 79-105, here p. 98 and 102) at: 
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When forces of the communist North marched into Saigon in April 1975, 
American forces attempted to evacuate Vietnamese people by airlifting them 
from the rooftop of the American embassy. Between April 21 and 29, 1975, 
35,000 Vietnamese were to be flown out (Vo 2006: 65). The Pentagon “posi-
tioned more than two dozen aircraft carriers, destroyers, and merchant marine 
vessels off the Vietnamese coast” (Robinson 1998: 18). When on April 30, Sai-
gon was taken by the communists, airlifts became impossible, and escapees used 
“supply and patrol boats, landing craft, fishing boats, trawlers, tugs, ferries, and 
anything that could float” (Vo 2006: 70) to flee Saigon. The then US President 
Gerald Ford ordered the ships of the U.S. Seventh Fleet to drop anchor outside 
Vietnamese territorial waters and take escapees on board (ibid: 3). The exodus 
was an emergency evacuation, with scarce logistical resources and no time left. 
Reports of the sea being crowded with “overloaded fishing boats and other 
small craft” (Thompson 2010: 28), of Vietnamese fishers setting their boats on 
fire to force the US Navy to take them on board illustrate the precipitous exodus 
that the Vietnamese reportedly called “the running” (ibid: 27). The staggering 
number of 60,000 refugees over several days is tangibly illustrated in depictions 
of the US Navy having to hoist people aboard using cargo nets instead of lad-
ders, which proved infeasible given the scores of people trying to climb them. 
Moreover, the limit of persons to be taken aboard US ships was raised several 
times (Vo 2006: 70).  
Considering the haste in fleeing Saigon aboard “anything that could float” 
(Vo 2006: 70), the appropriation of boats and ships in this context occurs within 
the framework of an emergency situation: for the appropriation of boats and 
ships this meant that the characteristic of “floating” was enough. In this situation, 
boats were not a means of first or last choice, but rather the last resort. The fact 
that during evacuation no attention was paid to ensure the escape of high-risk 
persons, that is, “Vietnamese who work for any element of the US mission” 
(Robinson 1998: 17), illustrates not only the time pressure and urgency of the 
evacuation but also its indiscriminate operationalization. There was no triaging 
or classification; there were contingents of Vietnamese to be fitted on ships. 
Those taken on board US ships were taken to the US military base in Guam, 
where arrangements had been made to process 50,000 Vietnamese. Most of them 
were relocated to the US. 
                                                           
http://www.unhcr.org/4a4c754a9.html (accessed August 27, 2019), [hereafter cited as 
UNHCR Report (2000): Flight from Indochina]. 
202 | Mediated Bordering 
 
Overall, in that situation, the sea was the last open route, and floating vehi-
cles the only suitable option to take said route. However, those sea-lifted Viet-
namese refugees were never described by the term boat-people, neither by the 
American forces nor by UNHCR. The Vietnamese were referred to as refugees, 
evacuees, or simply as the Vietnamese people. The appropriation of boats and 
ships in this context was spontaneous and functional rather than strategic. Even 
though fishing boats and other watercraft had been used to escape, and even 
though this image of fleeing Saigon by sea determined the image of the evacua-
tion, this scenario did not elicit the term “boat-people.” The peculiar hybrid of 
the “boat-people” is not the product of an emergency situation and does thus not 
carry its notion of urgency and final run. 
 
7.2.2 “Boat-People”: An Evasive Term 
 
However, following the ad-hoc mass evacuation, the mode of escaping by boat 
continued. While UNHCR registered 378 boat escapees landing on neighboring 
shores in 1975, their number increased to 5,247 in 1976, and rose further to 
15,690 over the next few years (Wain 1981: 42). 
In retrospect UNHCR described its “initial reaction” as “to treat these 
movements as the aftermath of war rather than as the beginning of a new refugee 
crisis.”11 Yet, the increasing number of individuals fleeing Vietnam by sea ren-
dered a clarification of their refugee status and the subsequent processing neces-
sary; especially so, since neighboring Southeast Asian states were increasingly 
reluctant toward allowing Vietnamese refugees to land on their shores. Already 
in 1975, UNHCR mentioned difficulties in “ensuring that Indochinese people 
seeking asylum by boat would be rescued at sea or provided with asylum upon 
arrival in Southeast Asian states” (quoted in Davies 2008: 89). 
Despite these concerns, UNHCR did not grant prima facie refugee status12 to 
the people leaving Vietnam. Even more irritating was that “there was no mention 
                                                           
11  UNHCR Report (2000): Flight from Indochina, p. 81. 
12 “Prima facie refugees is a term used to identify a large number of people fleeing 
events in which they may not have actively participated, but fear the consequences for 
themselves and those around them if they do not flee, it also takes into account those 
that have been personally threatened or persecuted. In contrast to individual refugee 
status granted under the 1951 Convention, prima facie refugee status is used in situa-
tions where individual screening is not possible, though this does not preclude eventu-
al individual screening for refugee status.” (Davies 2008: 20). 
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of refugees at all in the earliest communications between UNHCR and Southeast 
Asian states in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam war” (Davies 2008: 90). 
In 1975 and 1976, the Indochinese were regarded and referred to as displaced 
persons by UNHCR and Southeast Asian officials alike (ibid: 91; Robinson 
1998: 20-25). 
The year following, the term boat-people came to be used in negotiations be-
tween Southeast Asian government officials and UNHCR. The first official doc-
uments referring to Vietnamese refugees as “boat-people” were UNHCR’s 
Weekly Notes in 1977 in which the organization summarized “the increasing de-
nial by Southeast Asian states to ‘boat-people’ arrivals unless the UNHCR guar-
anteed that the asylum seekers’ asylum would be temporary only” (quoted in 
Davies 2008: 93, fn. 38). In October 1977, Thailand, the Philippines and Indone-
sia requested during different meetings of the United Nations General Assembly 
to treat the problem of the so-called boat-people as a global one. Arguing that al-
lowing boat-people to land might attract an even greater influx, Southeast Asian 
governments justified their rejection of Vietnamese refugees (ibid: 93). 
The term boat-people thus was either inadvertently or purposefully used in a 
period during which both UNHCR and the receiving neighboring countries 
avoided calling or classifying the Vietnamese as refugees. UNHCR’s continuous 
efforts to have Southeast Asian governments sign international refugee law, 
namely the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, limited the pressure 
UNHCR could possibly put on those countries’ governments with regard to tak-
ing on the increasing number of Indochinese attempting to arrive by boat. Con-
sidering this, it seems plausible that UNHCR therefore refrained from granting 
prima facie refugee status and from using the term “refugees.” The United 
States, in contrast, pushed toward calling the people fleeing Vietnam, Cambodia 
or Laos, refugees. In response to UNHCR’s evasive rhetoric, the US representa-
tive Haugh was considered to rather “dropped […] large hints about what he 
found missing from the discussion” (Robinson 1998: 22). 
 
“The refugee […] fled from his homeland as an individual who had been deprived of his 
human rights and it was noteworthy that the High Commissioner directed his program of 
international protection and material assistance to the refugee as an individual and that 
each project was geared to the rehabilitation of the refugee and the restoration of his faith 
and hope in humanity.” (quoted in Robinson 1998: 22) 
 
However, Davies (2008: 94) points out that commentators also interpreted the 
US’s prompt recognition of a prima facie refugee status as a justification for 
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waging war against communism in the region. The many refugees were taken as 
proof of an inhumane and authoritarian communist regime. 
In this atmosphere of terminological vagueness, typical of negotiations, the 
term boat-people might have been “inadvertently coined,” as Martin Tsamenyi 
(1983: 348) argues. As it were, the term became utilized as it put, in a descriptive 
fashion, a visual image into language. Moreover, the term summed up the practi-
cal common denominator of those Indochinese who fled by boat as their classifi-
catory characteristic and attribute: they came by boat; or rather, they were in a 
boat and needed to land somewhere. As UNHCR and Southeast Asian govern-
ment officials came to use the term “boat-people” to avoid using the obliging 
term “refugee,” the periphrasis boat-people also echoes this hesitation and indi-
cates a latent doubt of the refugee status of persons on board a certain type of 
vessel. At first glance, this might appear to merely suspend the refugee debate; 
yet, it restructured the international response toward the emerging Indochinese 
refugee crisis and its protagonists: the boat-people. In fact, the concrete setting of 
‘a group of people in a boat at sea’ opened up new arguments and provided time 
and space for negotiations. 
Meanwhile, Thailand, Malaysia and Indochina increasingly turned away 
boats from their shores; this pushback put pressure on the international commu-
nity to address the issue as a global one. At the same time, boat-people ended 
their state of uncertainty at sea by provoking a distress situation. Barry Wain re-
ports in his monograph The Refused that it was a “common but dangerous prac-
tice to hole their boats so they would be allowed to land” (Wain 1981: 65). Yet, 
the reluctance of Southeast Asian states to admit Indochinese boat-people not 
only occurred in avoidance of legal obligation and in keeping local hostility to-
ward the Indochinese at bay. It was also an expression of a growing skepticism 
that the new government in South Vietnam was not only actively “exporting ref-
ugees” (Thompson 2010: 162) but was also profiting from it. And, in fact, an 
unofficial “pay-as-you-go policy” (Robinson 1998: 41) perpetuated the exodus 
of ever more Vietnamese, most of them ethnic Chinese who were “invited” to 
leave and charged for this option. Underlining their doubt in the genuine refugee 
status of the boat-people, Southeast Asian officials thus started to refer to them 
as “illegal migrants.” 
When in 1978 “several of the boats arriving on the shores of countries in 
Southeast Asia were not small wooden fishing craft but steel-hulled freighters 
chartered by regional smuggling syndicates and carrying over 2,000 people at a 
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time”13 the increasing irritation led to forceful refusals. Southeast Asian coun-
tries argued that a prerequisite for a temporary asylum of refugees on their shores 
was the guaranteed permanent resettlement in other countries of the international 
community. Temporary asylum was thus traded against permanent resettlement. 
The two situations involving the freighters Southern Cross and Hai Hong, which 
I will address in the section following, catalyzed this kind of international policy 
arrangement, which became known under the phrase “an open door for an open 
shore.” 
 
7.2.3 The Southern Cross and the Hai Hong Incidents 
 
The voyages of the coastal freighters Southern Cross and Hai Hong came to be 
remembered as “the first organized refugee movement involving a non-
Vietnamese vessel” (Wain 1981: 18)14. The incident of the Hai Hong was tangi-
ble evidence that the transport of refugees had turned into an organized and prof-
itable business. And still, this did not clarify but rather intensify the international 
debate over the refugee status of the persons on board. 
The refugee pick-up of the Southern Cross was arranged by the Vietnamese 
businessman Tay Kheng Hong. Tay used his business and government contacts 
and convinced the managing director of Seng Bee Shipping, Chong Chai Kok, 
and the Finnish sea captain, Sven Olof Ahlqvist, who possessed a Singaporean 
employment pass, to use the 850-ton Honduras-registered freighter for the com-
mercial transport of Vietnamese passengers. When the Southern Cross left Sin-
gapore on August 24, 1978, it was empty and supposedly going “to collect a car-
go of salt” in Bangkok (Wain 1981: 18). Instead, the freighter docked in Ho Chi 
Minh City, formerly Saigon, and picked up 1,250 people who had paid the Viet-
namese authorities six to eight pieces of gold (ibid: 21), which roughly amounts 
to 1,500 Euros today. The involvement of local authorities at the very least is 
demonstrated in the below description of the logistic arrangements for embarka-
tion: 
 
                                                           
13 UNHCR Report (2000): Flight from Indochina p. 82. 
14 The description of the two voyages mainly follows Barry Wain’s detailed examina-
tion. The earliest account of the two incidents dates from 1979 and is provided by 
Bruce Grant’s (1979) investigation The Boat People. Larry Clinton Thompson’s 
(2010) account offers further insights of the US perspectives on both the freighters’ 
incidents as well as on the Indochinese Exodus in general. 
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“[T]he Southern Cross had received red-carpet treatment when it went to collect its cargo. 
A Vietnamese government pilot launch came alongside; the pilot boarded the Southern 
Cross and guided it up the twisting Saigon River to a berth in Ho Chi Minh City. The ship 
was supplied with fresh water and vegetables, guarded by troops patrolling the wharf and 
guided by the same pilot to the collection point in the following day. The pilot and three 
armed soldiers spent the night on board. In Ho Chi Minh City, Tay had been taken to a 
restaurant for a meal with civilian officials. On its departure the Southern Cross was al-
lowed to fly the red-and-yellow Vietnamese flag, had the benefit of the pilot’s services un-
til it was two hours in the open sea and was not challenged by Vietnamese security pa-
trols.” (Wain 1981: 21) 
 
The refugee-freighter was escorted by government officials out to the open sea. 
Once it reached international waters, the Captain radioed that his freighter had 
rescued 1,220 Vietnamese “in international waters from four large fishing junks” 
(Wain 1981: 18-19) and wished to put them ashore immediately in Malaysia. 
The Malaysian government refused permission for the vessel to land and escort-
ed it out of its territorial waters again. Singapore, too, refused to accept the ves-
sel. The crew of syndicates, which had already left the freighter when the distress 
call had been sent, rejoined the ship together with a load of additional water, 
food and fuel sent by the shipping company as the vessel was stranded at sea. 
Almost one month after its departure, on September 21, 1978, the Southern 
Cross had drifted into Indonesian waters, where Ahlqvist “beached deliberately 
on Pengibu Island” (ibid: 19). Even though Indonesian authorities suspected that 
the captain of the ship might attempt to solve the dilemma over the refugees by 
purposely grounding the vessel in order to capitalize from the situation with re-
gard to insurance; however, “a trade in refugees never occurred to them – or to 
anyone else” (ibid). Doubt was cast on the patterns of navigation, rather than on 
the status and the circumstances of the passengers. This changed with the second 
set of deceptive maneuvers the same group of syndicates launched with the Hai 
Hong. 
Tay again organized a freighter through his contacts at Seng Bee Shipping, 
employed the Indonesian Sunsun Serigar as new captain and registered the “ag-
ing coastal freighter” (Wain 1981: 16) with Panama for a month. It had been ar-
ranged that 1,200 refugee passengers would be picked up by the Hai Hong. This 
time, there was no red-carpet treatment; Vietnamese officials instead expected 
the Hai Hong to take an additional 1,300 passengers aboard. They enforced their 
demand by threatening to arrest the crew and its captain and by blocking the 
ship’s exits. On October 24, 1978, the heavily overcrowded Hai Hong left the 
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port of Saigon with approximately 2,500 passengers on board, the vast majority 
being ethnic Chinese. 
With engine trouble and a typhoon endangering the voyage, the captain cor-
rected his northward course and directed the Hai Hong toward Indonesian archi-
pelagos. When on November 2, 1978, the captain of the Hai Hong radioed to the 
Eastern South Asia regional office of UNHCR in Malaysia, he briefly reported 
“that he was in Indonesian waters with more than 2,000 refugees on board” 
(Wain 1981: 23; Thompson 2010: 150). Later the same day, the captain sent an-
other radio message to the UNHCR office in Kuala Lumpur in which he provid-
ed more details: 
 
“He said the Hai Hong was Panamanian-registered, Singapore-owned. […] [I]t had been 
en route from Singapore to Hong Kong when, on October 23, it had developed engine 
trouble near Lincoln Island in the Paracels. The following day it had been boarded by 
more than 2,000 refugees from between 10 and 15 smaller boats.” (Wain 1981: 23) 
 
The reported chronology, however, attracted suspicion. Why would a captain 
wait an entire week to inform UNHCR after having picked up such a large num-
ber of refugees, and why would he first change his course? Furthermore, most 
practical doubts emerged as it seems implausible that “2,000 Vietnamese [had] 
managed to gather at one place in the middle of an ocean, 225 miles from the 
coast of Vietnam, as Typhoon Rita stirred the seas and sent much larger vessels 
scurrying for shelter” (Wain 1981: 23). This and further inconsistencies lead to 
official investigations. Both the Australian and Southeast Asian governments as 
well as UNHCR were deeply disturbed by the level of commercialized and orga-
nized refugee trade for which the voyage of the Hai Hong provided evidence. In 
his short statement of November 3, Rajagopalam Sampatkumar, Regional Repre-
sentative of UNHCR, expressed concerns about an illicit market of people traf-
ficking from southern Vietnam which would jeopardize UNHCR’s assistance for 
“genuine refugees.” Amongst policy makers in Canberra it was even concluded 
“that the Hai Hong venture must fail and that its failure must stand as deterrent 
to any similar enterprises in the future” (ibid: 27). 
On November 6, the Hai Hong was driven from Indonesian waters. When on 
November 9, the freighter dropped anchor again, it did so twelve miles off the 
Malaysian Port Klang. At that time, it was flying the Malaysian flag.15 While 
                                                           
15 During the investigation, it turned out that the Hai Hong was formerly “registered in 
the Malaysian port of Penang” (Wain 1981: 29) under its original name, Golden Hill. 
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Sampatkumar made efforts to board the Hai Hong and assess the situation of the 
people on board, the government in Kuala Lumpur ordered the ship out of Ma-
laysian waters. It was made clear that “if the ship proved obstinate the govern-
ment would take all steps necessary to force it beyond territorial waters” (Wain 
1981: 32). 
Meanwhile pictures and documentaries of the Hai Hong – of more than 2,000 
thirsty and devastated people, cramped on a scrap-metal vessel in the middle of 
the ocean – began to spread in Western media. Shock and sympathy might have 
triggered the relatively quick commitment to “take” the boat-people from the Hai 
Hong and resettle them as refugees. Word was again passed to UNHCR. Sam-
patkumar, who, in fact, was increasingly worried about UNHCR’s poor access to 
the freighter and the poor health of some of the Hai Hong passengers, seemed to 
reverse his opinion overnight. UNHCR officially declared that it considered the 
passengers of the Hai Hong as refugees (Wain 1981: 32-33). It was added from 
UNHCR headquarters that “in the future, unless there are clear indications to the 
contrary, boat cases from VietNam be considered prima facie of concern to 
UNHCR.”16 With 657 Hai Hong passengers resettled in Germany, 604 in Cana-
da, 897 in the United States, 222 in France, 52 in Switzerland, nine in New Zea-
land and eight in Australia, the new category of the humanitarian refugee was 
created. 
 
The shift in perspective is remarkable: the humanitarian eye was not geared to-
ward refugees from war or an authoritarian regime, but toward people on a boat. 
While official political discourse in the region evaded and protracted the decision 
on the refugee status, Western policy makers rather discussed the situation 
aboard the Hai Hong, the dangers of the seaborne escape, the bad condition or 
unseaworthiness of refugee vessels. The boat was referred to as a mirror of the 
misery of the Vietnamese people. Their immediate neediness consisted in being 
aboard an overcrowded and unseaworthy vessel. The urgency to do something 
was manifest in the bad condition of the vessel. 
With the voyage of the Hai Hong ending successfully for the Vietnamese 
refugee, two more ships followed: the Tung An with 2,300 Vietnamese on board, 
and the Huey Fong with more than 3,000 passengers on board. And again, the 
situation on board was protracted until coastal states received assurance that the 
refugees would be resettled elsewhere after disembarkation (Thompson 2010: 
151). Yet, these were almost the final larger ships from Vietnam. “Thereafter, 
                                                           
16 Quoted in UNHCR Report (2000): Flight from Indochina, p. 83. 
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refugees turned to flight in smaller craft and at a much greater risk, hoping to 
sneak ashore in one or another Southeast Asian country” (ibid). Robinson as-
sumes that the “organizers learned that big ships drew too much attention and 
began to abandon them for smaller vessels” (Robinson 1998: 32). Similarly, 
Grant notes that the “attraction of the freighters was that they were safer, mini-
mizing the dangers of piracy and death at sea. The use of cargo ships gave the 
whole exodus a higher profile, and led to a more thorough investigation of the 
system that brought paying refugees out of southern Vietnam” (Grant 1979: 
116). Likewise, Singapore’s Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, commented in 1979 
that the “latest exodus of ‘boat-people’ and ‘ship-people’ [was] the result of acts 
of cold calculation, measured in gold” (quoted in Thompson 2010: 162). And in 
fact, the profitability of trafficking refugees is more evident in the cases of 
cramped freighters. 
During the late 1970s the image of rickety and cramped vessels became an 
emblem for grief and suffering in the Western media, which ultimately catalyzed 
the establishment of the humanitarian refugee and justified resettlement quotas. 
Escape by boat was taken as proof of neediness and refugee status. Yet, among 
Southeast Asian countries, it is precisely the neediness of Vietnamese boat-
people which was contested. Until today, and also transferred to the European 
context, both trajectories meet in the expression boat-people and the image of the 
overcrowded and unseaworthy refugee boat. 
 
 
7.3 WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES THE BOAT MAKE? 
 
With unauthorized migrants and refugees on board, boats and ships can thus be 
distinguished with regard to the level of international politics they can trigger. 
Boats not only “sneak ashore” (Thompson 2010: 151) and thus signify the possi-
bility of an unauthorized, unsighted entry, they also escape open international 
diplomacy if not conflict. 
Ships and freighters not only attract more attention due to the mere number 
of passengers they can carry. They also involve, by means of their technical and 
legal references, legal obligations, business ties, and the question of state juris-
diction over the vessel and its cargo. Yet, does it in fact make a difference, 
whether refugees are on a boat or ship? 
Lee Kuan Yew’s statement cited above in fact implies at least a symbolic dif-
ference between “boat-people” and “ship-people.” A freighter is a bold hint to 
the commercialized structure of facilitated maritime migration, and the genuine 
status of the refugee is ever more questioned on a ship than on a boat. In these 
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cases, the state of the vessel as unseaworthy – and in this case unseaworthiness 
can be due to the fact that the vessel is simply too small for the high seas or due 
to its poor condition, being rusty, rickety, made of scrap metal – becomes a 
proxy for the neediness of the passengers on board. The vessel signifies urgency, 
while the recognition of an eventual refugee status is protracted. 
Size and seaworthiness, the two main distinguishing features between boats 
and ships, are thus turned on their heads by the appropriation of vessels in the 
context of flight and migration: while the size of the ship (it cannot be small) and 
the seaworthiness qualify a vessel for international voyages, a small or unsea-
worthy boat is what qualifies its passengers for international protection. 
What can be observed for the case of the refugee boat is a dual, yet ambiva-
lent, sometimes conflicting suitability (Ger.: Eignung) which not only responds 




8 Seaborne Migration: Europe’s Boat 




In the context of maritime migration to Europe, vessels also play a role as vehic-
ular facilitators. The following exploration of the appropriation of boats and 
ships in the context of unauthorized Mediterranean crossings will illustrate that 
the vessel is a focal point in many ways. Boats and ships are not only central to 
the practical endeavor of maritime migration to Europe; they are also a crucial 
asset for the organization of this specific journey which provides for a particular 
access to the legal and administrative territories of the EU. 
If the program of a watercraft can be phrased as “to carry across water,” mi-
gration disturbs this aim. The program “get people into Europe by sea” requires a 
certain type of vessel. Tracing this program means asking for the vessels’ rela-
tion to the phenomenon of unauthorized migration to Europe. This in turn means 
portraying the vessels’ share in the illicit market of smuggling migrants, describ-
ing its strategies to remain undetected, exploring the circumstances on board as 
well as the vessels relation to the migrants’ death toll in the Mediterranean Sea. 
The following three sections focus on the ambivalent features that both stem 
from and are reflected by the condition, appropriation and image of the migrant 
vessel as “refugee boat,” “ghost ship” or “cargo freighter.” In order to decipher 
and understand how politics approaches these different ambivalent features, the 
following sections outline the rumors, the factual findings, the indicators and im-
ages concerning boats, ships, and their migrant passengers, as well as the sym-
bolic work they do. Moreover, they examine how far the condition and image of 
the vessel blends into the status ascribed to maritime migrants heading for Eu-
rope. If Mathias Bös (1997: 135) is right stating that “categorizations of migra-
tions are determined rather by political processes than by migrants’ characteris-
tics,” the question is: what are the political processes leading to the category of 
boat migration and boat refugees? 
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8.1 BOATS AND BORDER ENFORCEMENT 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 
 
As a mode of migration and circulation between countries bordering the Mediter-
ranean Sea, maritime crossings have been quite regular. The mode of crossing 
the Mediterranean by boat preceded the efforts of European countries to regulate 
the phenomenon. This is to say that the appropriation of boats for migration has 
been one of the Mediterranean’s “historical uses” (Pugh 2000: 31) and did not 
emerge as a subversive strategy or illegal practice, but as a regional practicality. 
What emerged, however, was the commercialization of unauthorized Mediterra-
nean crossings, along with border control and surveillance practices. This section 
is about the boat mediating the two. 
 
8.1.1 Boats for Migration: From “Historical Uses” to 
First Schengen Targets 
 
In the 1960s, irregular migration was a rather tolerated practice in the Strait of 
Gibraltar. The distance of only 14 kilometers between Tarifa and Tangier could 
be crossed using small fishing vessels. The only hindrances were either strong 
currents or ship traffic (Carling 2007b: 22). Another historic route was the trip 
by boat from Tunisia or Libya to Italy. With fishermen commuting between Tu-
nisia and Sicily to sell fish on their mutual local markets, and many Sicilian-
Tunisian marriages and thus family visits, going back and forth by boat across 
the Sicilian Channel used to be a rather common practice.1 Moreover, would-be 
migrants only needed a valid passport to travel to Italy, as the Tunis-Palermo and 
Tunis-Trapani ferries traveled back and forth in the Strait of Sicily (Ben-
Yehoyada 2011: 19). For both countries, Italy and Spain, irregular migration and 
the informal economy were closely related; the corresponding networks aligned 
both labor and transportation. This is well illustrated by the case of the Tunisia-
Sicily connection: 
 
“Other Tunisians found both work and a ride to Italy on Sicilian trawlers that anchored in 
Tunisian ports. Sicilian captains in search of cheap fuel or undisturbed fishing in Tunisian 
waters often hired Tunisian crewmen to mediate the exchanges. The Sicilian fishing fleet 
                                                           
1 Gloria Cipolla, Cooperazione Internazionale Sud Sud (CISS), personal interview in 
her office at the CISS in Palermo, Sicily (March 25, 2011). 
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played a dual role for would-be migrants: Its easily approached sailors got the Tunisians 
aboard the trawlers, and then its vessels carried them across the channel. In the business of 
clandestine migration, transporters and passengers were somewhat interchangeable. Many 
of the Sicilian fleet’s Tunisian crewmen were originally passengers, who later arranged for 
the passage of friends and relatives, who still later became coworkers on the trawlers.” 
(Ben-Yehoyada 2011: 19) 
 
With informal transportation networks up and running between Mediterranean 
countries, trips “did not require much secrecy, if any” (Ben-Yehoyada 2011: 19). 
This changed, however when the Schengen acquis stipulated stricter control of 
the exterior borders. By joining the Schengen group in the early 1990s, Italy and 
Spain committed themselves to aligning their migration, visa and border control 
policies with the Schengen acquis.2 Until their borders were waived, both coun-
tries introduced major legal reforms.3 
                                                           
2  On November 27, 1990, Italy signed the Schengen Agreement. Spain and Portugal 
followed on June 25, 1991 while Greece joined on November 6, 1992. However, bor-
der controls between these countries and other Schengen members only got waived 
when checks had been tightened at the then external border of the Schengen area. For 
Spain and Portugal, this was March 26, 1995; for Italy October 26, 1997; for Greece 
March 26, 2000. 
3  Spain: The very first law to regulate immigration policies in Spain was passed by the 
government in July 1985. Presented as an urgent bill, the ‘Law about the rights and 
freedoms of foreigners in Spain’ (Ley Orgánica 7/1985 sobre derechos y libertades de 
los extranjeros en España, known as the Ley de Extranjería [Foreigners’ Law]) was 
hardly debated in Parliament and passed “by virtual unanimity” (Moreno Fuentes 
2000: 10). The urgency was declared with reference to joining the Schengen states by 
January 1986. The new law foresaw restrictive immigration policies and a strong fo-
cus on border control. “The new Law also defined the presence in Spanish soil with-
out the necessary authorisation, as an offence punished with expulsion from the terri-
tory” (Moreno Fuentes 2000: 10-11). The resolution proposal of April 1991 initiated a 
series of decisions and directives: regularization of irregular foreign workers (1991, 
1996, and 2000), employer sanctions, the introduction of a quota for foreign workers 
in 1993. In 1991, visa requirements were introduced for Latin American and Moroc-
can nationals. Due to these restrictions on labor immigration, asylum claims were used 
to work in Spain, as asylum petitioners still had the right and possibility to work while 
their claim was reviewed (Cornelius 1994: 351). This, again, led to the 1994 reform of 
Spain’s asylum law. The previous regulation, which was considered generous and left 
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In anticipatory adjustment, the “Europeanisation” (Moreno Fuentes 2000: 2) of 
immigration policies shaped Spain’s national policies at a point in time when the 
issue of immigration had not even reached the national agenda (Cornelius 1994; 
Moreno Fuentes 2000; Kreienbrink 2004). Kreienbrink shows that in the 1980s, 
Spain’s immigration and border policies were hardly defined, and even in the 
1990s, Spain’s economic focus on the tourist economy thwarted strict mobility 
regulations (2004: 73-86, 91). For Italy, too, Kitty Calavita (1994: 320) found a 
“relative absence of public debate on this issue [immigration],” as immigrant 
black labor formed a substantial part of the Italian economy, and in many places 
was considered complementary to the local workforce (ibid: 311). During the 
1980s, both countries had transformed from countries of emigration to countries 
of immigration (Bade 2000; Boswell 2005: 2-3). However, the emergence of na-
tional immigration policies was fostered by the new task of securing maritime 
borders as Schengen borders. 
Overall, and significantly, the institutional incentive to codetermine EU poli-
cy in this emerging policy field, namely border surveillance and control, preced-
ed the experience of migration as an actual problem. Moreno Fuentes according-
ly comments on the case of Spain: 
 
“In the absence of a nationally specific stand on immigration the ‘Europeanisation’ of this 
area of policies represented not only the participation of Spanish officials in the commit-
tees created to coordinate and define a common European immigration policy, but also the 
somehow thoughtless acceptance of European policy objectives within the legislation im-
plemented at the national level. The result was a very restrictive policy that did not corre-
spond to the early stages of the migratory processes that were affecting Spain.” (Moreno 
Fuentes 2000: 2) 
                                                           
it at the state’s discretion to grant asylum for humanitarian reasons, was abolished and 
asylum was restricted to the political refugee of the Geneva Convention (Kreienbrink 
2004: 189-235). Italy: In 1990, the Italian government passed the Martelli Law 
(named after the then justice minister Claudio Martelli), Italy’s first immigration legis-
lation, which enacted visa requirements for North African nationals and was commu-
nicated as strict and discouraging of immigration. However, commentators also con-
sidered it a hidden regularization program (Calavita 1994: 318). The Italian debate 
was generally more concerned with undocumented migration, rather than with asylum 
(Turner et al. 2006: 88-92). Southern European countries turned both into countries of 
immigration and into gatekeepers of the EU – not only in terms of geography but also 
in terms of policies. 
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Effectively, Spain and Italy were the last countries in Western Europe to intro-
duce visa requirements for North African nationals and only did so in compli-
ance with the Schengen Acquis: Spain in May 1991 and Italy in 1990. The sig-
nificance of introducing visa requirement for Northern African nationals to the 
emerging external EU border must not be underestimated. By introducing these 
visa requirements, Northern Mediterranean states decided to be European coun-
tries and to pronounce Schengen membership while putting less emphasis on 
their hitherto regional economic ties. However, legalizations in Spain and am-
nesties in Italy indicate that a clean break was neither possible in terms of en-
forcement, nor was it politically or economically desirable. 
 
One Means of Transport, Multiple Itineraries 
Since the early 1990s, the Schengen-induced increased border control measures 
have been discussed as contributing factors to the changing patterns of (mari-
time) migration. In fact, intensified sea patrols and tightly enforced borders sel-
dom dissolve migratory intentions but rather lead to displacement effects (Haas 
2006, 2008), a diversion of routes, as well as the emergence of transit migration 
(Simon 2006; Mehdi Lahlou 2006). Several commentators argued that the new 
visa requirements together with the enforcement of Schengen borders not only 
resulted in more queuing for visas, but fueled “a rapidly expanding economy of 
illegal migration services” (Carling 2007b: 11).4  
Furthermore, boat migration was diverted to the Canary Islands to the effect 
that in “2003 and 2004 unauthorized arrivals by boat along the Spanish coasts 
were split almost equally between the Canary Islands and the Spanish mainland” 
(Carling 2007b: 14). Moreover, boats increasingly departed to the Canary Islands 
from West African countries, particularly Mauritania (approx. 800 km) and Sen-
egal (approx. 1,400 km). When in 2006, boat migration to the EU reached its 
first peak with a total of 72,035 arrivals, the majority of migrants landed on the 
Canary Islands, which according to Lutterbeck amounted to 33,126 persons (Lut-
terbeck 2010: 130). The Atlantic route toward the Canary Islands was said, how-
ever, to cause an unequally higher migrant mortality. Already in 2009, members 
                                                           
4  Alison Mountz and Ronja Kempin describe the mutual interrelation between border 
enforcement and human smuggling as “geographically relational” (Mountz/Kempin 
2014: 86). They even push the argument to the extent of stating that “enforcement 
measures and human smuggling industries tend to escalate in symbiotic fashion: as 
one intensifies, so too does the other” (ibid: 85). 
216 | Mediated Bordering 
 
of the Red Cross mentioned to me during a personal interview that for every per-
son that arrives, 1.5 have died at sea. 
At the same time, the composition of migrant nationalities on board the ves-
sels diversified at the beginning of the new millennium; which among other as-
pects, also implies that the business spread. This latter effect was more pro-
nounced than any increase in the total number of migrants. In 2003, the Moroc-
can Ministry of Interior reported that for the first time, the number of sub-
Saharan clandestine migrants had outnumbered the number of national clandes-
tine migrants, the difference being 12,400 to 23,851 (quoted in Mghari 2005: 
201). In 2008, Hein de Haas noted with regards to EU bound migration from 
North African countries, that “(r)ather than an increase per se, the major change 
has been that, after 2000, sub-Saharan Africans started to join illegal Mediterra-
nean crossings and have now overtaken North Africans as the largest category of 
irregular boat migrants” (Haas 2008: 13-14, emphasis original). This trend con-
tinued to 2012 (Bruycker/Di Bartolomeo/Fargues 2013: 6). Ten years later, in 
2018, sea arrivals’ most common countries of origin are Mali, Afghanistan, Irak 
and Syria.5 These dynamic aspects need to be remembered when quoting aggre-
gated numbers on maritime migration to Europe. 
 
8.1.2 From Counting Boats to Classifying Migrants as 
“Arrivals by Sea” to Counting “Illegal Border Crossings” 
 
In the years that followed Spain’s newly received Schengen membership, the 
number of boats intercepted at sea increased more than a hundredfold. While in 
1991, four so called pateras were reportedly intercepted in Spanish coastal wa-
ters, 1,020 were reported in 2002 (Kreienbrink 2004: 210). More boats also 
meant more immigrants. In that same period, detentions increased from 477 to 
16,670 (ibid). However, the increasing numbers of pateras and immigrants not 
only documented the increase of migratory flux but also resulted from increasing 
ambitions of the Guardia Civil del Mar, which had just been founded in 1991 
(Kreienbrink 2004: 210) to detect and seize vessels and passengers. Moreover, 
this was spurred by a continued increase in border surveillance and more sophis-
ticated technology in the Integrated System of External Vigilance (SIVE, in the 
                                                           
5  UNHCR (2018): Desperate Journeys. Refugees and migrants arriving in Europe and at 
Europeʼs borders. January-December 2018, at: https://www.unhcr.org/desperate 
journeys/ (accessed October10, 2019). 
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Spanish: Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia Exterior)6. Hence, the numbers collat-
ed in table 3 are not only a description of the phenomenon of migration, but also 
of the activities of border surveillance and control. This demonstrates well the 
argument that I made above with regard to the epistemological challenge of 
thinking about (political) borders: political borders are not generated by way of 
practices of subversion; it is rather that subversion is itself defined by way of 
bordering and by those classifications that mediate bordering. 
With regional migration being part of the informal economy, boat migration 
turned out to be the most visible part that could be tackled (cf. Genova 2013). 
 
Kreienbrink, who documents one of the earliest reports of data on unauthorized 
maritime immigration to Spain, captioned his table “seized ‘pateras’ and persons 
apprehended thereof” (Kreienbrink 2004: 210). Here, the new move in border 
enforcement finds expression: pateras are seized and their passengers appre-
hended. Even though the possibility of boat-migrants with a valid visa is not ex-
cluded in this formulation, the discursive link between arriving in pateras and 
being apprehended is revealed. Of course, this link has not been set by Kreien-
brink. The author’s table merely documents the emerging lens of sorting out EU-
bound migration. In a very practical sense of stopping and interdicting the con-
tinuation of a directional movement, the seizure of pateras has turned into the 
performance of border control. Implementing the Schengen acquis meant stop-
ping pateras. In the context of freedom of movement within Schengen, pateras 
became the reference point for problematizing access to the Schengen area.  
Theories of globalization and conceptions of postnational political forms trip 
up on the modern territorial border. Likewise, any national administrative logic 
of quantifying migration crumbles vis-à-vis data collection on seaborne migra-
tion. Acknowledging eventual biases emerging from territorial, that is, adminis-
trative references, different authors also include apprehensions in North African 
countries, such as Morocco or Libya (cf. for instance Fekete 2003).At the same 
time, classifications are unclear: what to count in order to document border con-
trol activities and what kind of migration actually violates the border? Boats, mi-
grants, Moroccans on a tourist visa, persons per boat? The numbers in table 3 
document early tentative classifications of Spain’s Europeanized border en-
forcement. 
 
                                                           
6  The effects of the SIVE have been discussed by Carling (2007b) and Kaufmann 
(2008). 
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1991 4 477 112 
1992 15 616 41 
1993 33 1925 58 
1994 34 352 10 
1995 130 1800 14 
1996 339 1.573 5 
1997 399 887 2 
1998 557 2.995 5 
1999 475 3.569 8 
2000 807 15195 19 
2001 1060 18517 17 
2002 1020 16670 16 
2003 942 19.176 20 
2004 740 15.675 21 
* in Spanish waters, by Spanish border guards 
** apprehensions, persons detained off the vessel 
*** persons detained/vessels intercepted 
Sources: Numbers quoted in Kreienbrink 2004: 201; Lutterbeck 2006: 63;  
Mehdi Lahlou 2006: 117 
 
Returning to the quantifying representation of the phenomenon, in 2006, Lutter-
beck, too, quotes the number of “[i]nterceptions of vessels and undocumented 
immigrants in Spanish waters,” providing the number of detained persons to cap-
ture the number unauthorized migrants (Lutterbeck 2006: 63). Carling argues 
that the “only way of quantifying the unauthorised migration flow is to refer to 
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apprehensions along these borders” counting “the number of interceptions of un-
authorised migrants along the Spanish coasts” (Carling 2007b: 20). His method-
ology is accepted and applied widely.7 In a sense, both Lutterbeck and Carling 
construct the border along Spanish enforcement activities. While Lutterbeck 
quoted both the number of boats and the number of immigrants intercepted in 
Spanish waters, Carling skips the numbers of vessels, but provides the number of 
interceptions along the Spanish coast, thereby quantifying persons which had 
been picked up at sea and detained on Spanish territory. Successively, reporting 
the number of boats is replaced by a reference to the location of interception. 
Only speculation can be advanced about why Kreienbrink did not mention 
any territorial restriction to the sample, and why Carling and most of his succes-
sors, skip the number of boats. However, I dare to speculate: The lack of a geo-
graphical reference in Kreienbrink’s account might result from considering this 
information as superfluous, as it was taken for granted that sea patrolling only 
occurred in territorial waters, be it due to legal compliance or limited enforce-
ment capacities, or in reflection of the practices of boat migration.8 The lack of 
geographical information may also be explained by the focus of discursive atten-
tion: it was not the legality and scope of border security that was up for debate, 
but the fulfillment of Schengen obligations, which were symbolically communi-
cated and performed by the stopping of boats. Despite the legal vagueness of 
whether border surveillance and control practices amount to enforcement juris-
diction, the data on ‘boats’ and ‘persons detained’ are used to sketch the propor-
tion of the issue at stake. At the same time, the issue at stake found localization 
“at sea,” and “on boats.” 
This hypothesis is further supported by the lack in substantial knowledge 
which could be generated from the number of boats within the frame of Europe 
bound maritime migration. The number of unauthorized migrants could not be 
extrapolated from the number of boats, especially because boats were known to 
commute. With migrants being forced to swim the rest of the way, boats were 
reused for transport purposes. 
                                                           
7  Michael Jandl (2004) also proposed a methodology to estimate “illegal migration” in 
Europe; however, his approach is not as widely applied as Carling’s methodology. 
8  The Spanish Guardia Civil generally operated close to the Spanish coast. This tactic 
was reportedly deployed in order to avoid that facilitators threw their passengers over 
board once detected (Kreienbrink (2004: 210). This alludes to quite a different opera-
tional philosophy than the one in place post-SIVE or during Frontex Joint Operations, 
when the ideal of intervention ‘already at the shores of third countries’ is pursued. 
220 | Mediated Bordering 
 
In fact, in a strict methodological sense, a trend analysis cannot be derived 
from the data presented, as it is based on triangulation and thus on different la-
bels and methods of quantification. Often triangulation is aptly used to cross-
check data and gain the most plausible numerical information. In this case, the 
triangulation of data, sources and their utilization also reveals the insecurity con-
cerning the new labels of border enforcement and migrant illegality. Deciphering 
the classifications used in the collated table 3 reveals how the sorting machine in 
the Mediterranean was successively programed.  
Consequently, the issue at stake – Europeanization of border management 
and Schengen compliance – was projected onto the migrant vessel, and connect-
ed boat migration and the image of “black young men jam-packed in a fishing 
vessel” to border violation and illegality. This had consequences for the way 
boats were treated by authorities - in fact, boats seem to be far more than means 
of transportation, which could be counted to determine the volume of traffic. 
During her field work in Libya, Sicily, Lampedusa and Malta, legal anthropolo-
gist Silja Klepp (2011) came across numerous traces of boats as flexible re-
sources. Klepp remembers the following anecdote from an official at the Lampe-
dusa boat cemetery: 
 
“In 2003 and 2004 there were always repeated requests from Libya and Lampedusa for 
stolen boats, which were then brought back to Libya by the Italian navy. As soon as they 
realized that that the boats arrived back on Lampedusa fully laden with migrants, they be-
gan working to destroy the boats immediately. Ever since, he [the official]’s been con-
vinced that the Libyan government was hidden behind the organization of maritime migra-
tion. In 2005 the delegation of the Libyan army came to Lampedusa to look after their 
boats. The Libyans had always repeatedly asked for their boats, but he always kept them 
away from the ship’s graveyard because he didn’t want to give the boats back.” (Klepp 
2011: 224-225) 
 
The migrant vessels are as much a resource for strategic businesses as for sym-
bolic politics: in order to prevent Libyan authorities from engaging in the smug-
gling business, the boat cemetery official – in a preventive manner – keeps the 
vessels hidden. Meanwhile, the request by the Libyan government for ‘its own 
boats’ can duly be interpreted as diplomatic provocation. This corresponds with 
the idea of a boat cemetery, and with the public destruction and burning of boats 
which, during the 1990s, had been decreed by the Berlusconi administration sev-
eral times and appeared to commentators as the “equivalent to destroying an en-
emy’s logistic assets” (Pugh 2004: 57). Finally in 2015, these vessels acquired 
the status of a strategic military target. In May 2015, the EU’s foreign policy 
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chief, Federica Mogherini, asked the United Nations to “authorise military action 
to destroy boats used to smuggle people from Africa to Europe” (Melvin 2015). 
A military mission, dubbed EU NAVFOR Med (European Union Naval Force - 
Mediterranean), has been planned “to intercept and board what are deemed to be 
‘hostile’ vessels, preferably before they have left Libyan waters” (The Economist 
(N.N.) 2015b). Further description of the plans mentioned the confiscation and 
destruction of boats, possible in harbors or on land “by helicopter gunships or 
even special forces” (ibid). The Economist also reported that NATO offered to 
help if requested; there is, by contrast, little mentioning of the proceedings with 
regard to the migrants on board. 
 
The small boats, the pateras, function as initial evidence in a process of prob-
lematization (Foucault). Moreover, just like the sailing ship disappeared again 
off the map once the new world was founded (Certeau 2013 [1984]: 121); count-
ing boats disappeared again once the Mediterranean had been transformed into 
Europe’s imagined southern maritime border. Furthermore, attention is not only 
geared to irregular migration itself, but peculiarly toward this particular mode of 
travel: by sea. In fact, this is the very attribute which gives name to migrants’ 
quantifications: arrivals by sea. With this label detached from any legal or terri-
torial reference, arriving on board these vessels, refugees and migrants land on 
EU shores as if they came out of nowhere. The labeling is most non-committal 
and almost without reference. The only localizing reference made: by sea, dis-
penses any political vector.  
Today, information on the boats or freighters on which migrants travel is no 
longer provided numerically, but rather in terms of the vessel’s condition. The 
political implications of these conditions – overcrowded, small and unseaworthy 
– will be dealt with in the next section (8.2). For the moment, it is important to 
emphasize that despite the iterated description of the kind of migration – “they 
arrive by boat” – migration dynamics have changed significantly throughout the 
past 30 years. 
 
The Frontex agency has increasingly developed its Risk Analysis Unit (RAU), 
which is tasked with producing reports on the situation along the external bor-
ders. Since 2010, Frontex publishes Annual Risk Analysis (ARA). Frontex pro-
vides quickly accessible and neatly visualized data on its website, to the effect 
that there is hardly any news on migration to Europe which is not flanked by da-
ta of the agency or its visualizations. Frontex counts the number of illegal border 
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crossings and distinguishes them by routes.9. While the Schengen regulations 
brought a new logic of classification to the Mediterranean space, Frontex anal-
yses have formalized the knowledge on Europe-bound migration through the 
lens of its illegalization. Likewise, Frontex’s classification of distinguishing be-
tween different routes supports Bös’s hypothesis that rather than migrants’ char-
acteristics, it is political processes which determine how we count. 
 
8.1.3 Deaths at Sea: Quantifying the Migrants’ Death Toll 
 
This also holds true for the counting of migrant fatalities in the Mediterranean. 
As unauthorized migration occurs clandestinely, fatalities en route are hardly 
quantifiable. Both boats and bodies might be involved in unsighted accidents. In 
2009 UNHCR’s answer to a frequently asked question states that the “exact 
death toll will probably never be known as some of the flimsy vessels used by 
boat-people just disappear without trace.”10 
In 2019, however, the UNHCR provides comprehensive data on what is now 
called “the Mediterranean Situation,” including the number of land arrivals, sea 
arrivals, and dead and missing, as well as data on the most common nationalities 
of Mediterranean sea and land arrivals.11 This is not self-evident, but the result of 
increased public and political pressure with regard to the availability of data on 
the situation of refugees and migrations crossing the Mediterranean following (a) 
the 2013 Lampedusa incident referred to in the introduction, (b) the increase in 
Mediterranean crossings during the refugee crisis following the war in Syria in 
2014 and 2015, and (c) the Mare Nostrum operation, which triggered a discus-
sion on the legality and effectiveness of border enforcement and rescue opera-
tions, thereby generating a demand for data to prove or refute the various claims. 
In February 2017, when I submitted the manuscript of this book as a PhD thesis, 
the only comprehensive data available on migratory movements across the Medi-
terranean was provided by the Frontex: the agency identified migration routes, 
provided numbers and maps and explained where the migratory pressure was the 
                                                           
9  Cp. Frontex, Website: Migratory Routes Map, at: http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-
routes/migratory-routes-map/ (accessed October 19, 2019). 
10  UNHCR (2009): Irregular Migration by Sea: Frequently Asked Questions, May 28, 
2009, at: https://www.unhcr.org/subsites/euasylum/4a1e48f66/irregular-migration-sea 
-frequently-asked-questions.html (accessed 14.10.2019). 
11 The information is constantly updated and available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/ 
situations/mediterranean. 
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strongest, and which route was currently used the most. The number of dead and 
missing was not provided. This section describes the state of official non-
knowledge at that time. 
 
In practical terms of producing data, estimates of the number of deaths at sea 
have been based on different sources: “on survivors’ accounts of the number of 
passengers” (Carling 2007a: 330), on distress calls to UNHCR or coastal authori-
ties, on projections based on bodies found ashore, or lately, also on estimates of 
border guards who have been deployed during Frontex Joint operations  
(cf. Meyer 2015).12 In essence, “[f]atalities are counted as the sum of bodies dis-
covered and persons registered as missing” (Carling 2007a: 331). In terms of 
generation and processing of data, the number of persons registered as missing is 
frequently added to the number of fatalities in order to compensate for those 
deaths which remain unsighted and unregistered. Generally, numbers of mari-
time migrant fatalities can be regarded minimum estimates. 
Apart from the practical problem of quantifying incidents which occur out of 
sight, quantifications often carry an administrative bias, as only bodies found on 
European shores are included. Liz Fekete commented in 2003 that “the ‘nautical 
graveyards’ are increasingly in African territorial waters ensuring that the prob-
lem is hidden even further from the European gaze” (Fekete 2003: 3). Similarly, 
Henk van Houtum criticized that the deaths, which is to say the names of indi-
viduals and causes of death, are “made absent, unrepresented, and invisible” (van 
Houtum 2010: 968). Out of sight is hence not only out of mind, but also out of 
official statistics, and thus political concern. 
 
The fact that the numbers of deaths which occur during maritime migration to 
Europe are not officially counted had been criticized by activists, researchers and 
the European Parliament (EP). The most explicit critique has been formulated in 
a 2007 report titled “The human costs of border control,” by Thomas Spijker-
                                                           
12 When the German government provided data on the number of victims along the Eu-
ropean external borders for the first time in 2012, it was emphasized that this data was 
not to be considered part of official statistics. The numbers would be based on infor-
mation provided by federal police officers who had been deployed to support the work 
of Frontex. According to this information, 180 refugees had died during an attempt to 
enter the EU in an unauthorized manner. It was also highlighted that 3,300 persons 
had been rescued during Frontex operations during the same time period (Meyer 
2015). 
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boer, written on request of the EP. His study assesses “the relationship between 
irregular immigration, increased border control, and the number of casualties at 
Europe’s maritime borders” (Spijkerboer 2007: 127). While different scientists 
have identified border control as contributing merely indirectly to the number of 
fatalities,13 Spijkerboer comes to conclude that the rising number of migrant fa-
talities is “a result of increased border control” (ibid). Duly acknowledging that 
there is no consistent evidence base from which to derive such claims, Spijker-
boer rather points to the paradox of the situation, namely that border control 
practices are thought of as both a counter measure and a cause of migrants’ 
death. He argues that a reliable data base would not only allow for validity 
checks against political claims, but would also allow open discussions on the le-
gality of (supranational) border control. 
 
“Getting more and more precise data would enable us to discuss the validity of the propo-
sition often made by European governments, holding that border deaths can be combated 
by combating irregular migration. As matters stand now, it seems more likely that the re-
verse is true: border deaths increase as a consequence of intensified border control. This 
effect of increased border control has bearings on its legality which have yet to be as-
sessed.” (Spijkerboer 2007: 139)  
 
Despite the declared political relevance of data on this topic to border policy in 
Europe, the paucity of any official count of migrants’ deaths had not been over-
come in 2015. In 2014 Spijkerboer and Last wrote a report for the IOM; they 
noted that “[a]gencies that deal directly with migrants attempting to cross the 
southern EU border without authorization, such as the national coast guards and 
Frontex, do not include data on deaths in their annual reports or statistics” 
(Last/Spijkerboer 2014: 96). Considering the fact that Frontex hosts an entire 
Risk Analysis Unit, which collects and processes various border related data 
from member states and international agencies such as EUROPOL and European 
Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), this official non-knowledge is hardly intelli-
gible. The explanation might be found in the political weight of the numbers. To 
officially register cases means to officially accept liability. Governments would 
                                                           
13  Carling approaches this question with a quantitative research design and concludes 
that “it is difficult to claim that the control measures are directly responsible for the 
increasing number of fatalities. Apparently, the growth in the number of deaths results 
from an increased number of migration attempts, combined with a constant or slightly 
falling risk of dying on the way” (Carling 2007a: 340). 
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have to relate to those numbers. Even though causal responsibility of EU border 
enforcement practices with regard to fatalities cannot be verified, this does not 
relinquish EU governments from doing something about the death toll. 
 
“The obligation of a State to take appropriate steps to safeguard lives is not conditioned on 
a causal relationship between the State’s actions and someone’s death. Rather, the obliga-
tion is triggered by the State’s knowledge that a particular life is at risk and that same 
State’s ability to do something about it.” (Spijkerboer 2007: 138, emphasis added) 
 
The relation between knowledge on a particular risky pattern and the ability to 
mitigate the risk is also illustrated in the example of road fatalities. In that case, 
the prevention of movement by repression is reported to be successful, that is, an 
increase in control pressure is claimed to reduce the number of road fatalities. 
This is the impetus of European states’ argument that fighting migration means 
fighting related deaths: an intensification of border control would thus reduce the 
migrants’ death toll. A government is not responsible if someone died while 
crossing the road, yet, if the street had been known to be busy, a traffic light or 
zebra crossing could have been installed to prevent such a death. Applied to bor-
der control, the question is whether increased surveillance increases the risk of 
trips going wrong or in the bolstering of their safety. Again, it is the decision be-
tween hunter and friend which suggests an answer in this case.  
Kiza considers the increase in the number of fatalities a possible Achilles’ 
heel “of the EU strategy of a criminalization and securitization of migration” 
(Kiza 2008: 213), as the escalation, more than the actual number, would impeach 
the effectiveness and legality of border policies in the Mediterranean. 
 
The available data on refugees and migrants who died on their way to Europe 
has been collected by activists or NGOs in an attempt to document and denounce 
states’ border control practices. NGOs document and count the number of deaths 
they attribute to EU border policies and practices. Even though these have turned 
into “the primary sources of data on border related deaths in the Mediterranean” 
(Last/Spijkerboer 2014: 96), their statistics are far from functioning as a monitor-
ing mechanism. Recent accounts of the death toll by the Migration Policy Center 
(Bruycker/Di Bartolomeo/Fargues 2013) and IOM (Brian/Laczko 2014b) thus 
criticize the fact that governments do not monitor the impact of their practices 
themselves. 
The international non-governmental organization UNITED for Intercultural 
Action (UNITED) has started listing the deaths of refugees and migrants, which 
it considers related to European states’ immigration and border control policies 
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and practices.14 The UNITED list of deaths compiles the dates migrants were 
found, the number of fatalities, the causes of death, countries of origin and the 
sources which reported on the incident. UNITED thereby provides a starting 
point for long-term research on the matter.15 The list not only includes deaths 
that occurred at the border but also those that can be attributed to the migratory 
journey: death in the Sahara or in transit countries, death or suicide in detention 
centers, death as a stowaway, as victims of racist attacks in Europe, or homeless. 
While the list functions as a reminder and as a monitoring instrument, these cas-
es are included to illustrate the range of effects attributed to EU border policies, 
even if the fatality did not occur at or along the geographic border. Last and 
Spijkerboer have filtered the UNITED list of deaths for those cases which have 
directly occurred “during the attempt to cross a southern EU external border” 
(Last/Spijkerboer 2014: 92). They counted 14,600 out of the 17,306 cases 
UNITED listed between 1993 and November 2012. 
The second alternative source is the blog of “Fortress Europe,” initiated by 
Gabriel del Grande, an Italian journalist and writer. Between 1988 until October 
2014, the blog listed 21,439 deaths.16 Working with this data, the Migration Poli-
cy Center (MPC) has produced two reports, narrowing down the numbers to 
those cases that relate to maritime crossings (Bruycker/Di Bartolomeo/Fargues 
2013; Fargues/Bonfanti 2014). Their methodology resulted in counting “15,016 
dead and missing persons […] from January 1998 till September 30, 2014” 
(Fargues/Bonfanti 2014: 5).17 Already in 2008, Ernesto Kiza argues that the mass 
                                                           
14  On June 20, 2015, the International Refugee Day, UNITED published an updated list 
of deaths, and states that between 1993 and 2015 “at least 22,000 refugee deaths can 
be attributed to the ‘Fatal Policies of Fortress Europe,’” at: http://unitedagainstrefugee 
deaths.eu/about-the-campaign/about-the-united-list-of-deaths/ (accessed August 25, 
2015). 
15  The documentation of UNITED has been used by Carling (2007a) and Kiza (2008), 
who examined the relation between border enforcement and migrant fatalities. 
16  Gabriel del Grande, Blog “Fortress Europe” at: http://fortresseurope.blogspot.de/ (ac-
cessed February 1, 2017). In October 2019, the Italian site of the blog, which provides 
translations to 20 languages, lists reports to February 2016. 
17  Comparing the list on the Fortress Europe blog to the UNITED list of death, Last and 
Spijkerboer found a more extensive coverage of the Egyptian (Sinai)-Israeli border 
and the Sahara in the Fortress Europe blog and a more comprehensive coverage of 
Greece and Spain in the UNITED list of death (Last/Spijkerboer 2014: 92), which 
stresses again that quantifying the death toll always remains partial. 
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victimization in the Mediterranean shows an “ever clearer escalation dynamics” 
(Kiza 2008: 213). This trend has continued to aggravate until today. In 2013 
Bruycker and colleagues found that 
 
“the maritime route to Europe is amongst the most dangerous in the world. Moreover, the 
last section [the boat passage, S.E.], at the gate of the EU, is the most lethal, and mortality 
during the journey has increased considerably in the last decade (Bruycker/Di Bar-
tolomeo/Fargues 2013: 4). 
 
Likewise, IOM concludes that in 2014, the Mediterranean has been “the deadli-
est sea in the world for migrants” (Brian/Laczko 2014a: 20), with deaths related 
to the crossing making for 75 per cent of all migrants’ death in that year. 
 
8.1.4 What Contributes to the Trip Being Increasingly Lethal? 
 
Available data suggests that the number of fatalities rises and falls in roughly the 
same way as the number of arrivals by sea. This rather general description up-
dates Carling’s 2007 finding to June 2015.   
Yet, what does the relation between arrivals and fatalities tell us? Does it 
suggest a mere proportional relationship in the sense that the number of fatalities 
depends on the number of persons who migrate by sea? Is the risk of dying at sea 
normally distributed? In order to assess this question, we can first look at wheth-
er the risk of dying at sea has changed over time – that is, whether certain peri-
ods of time were more lethal than others despite the general trend. Carling 
(2007a: 331-336) proposes calculating a migrant mortality rate (MMR), which 
shows the relation between dead and missing and departures. Following Carling, 
departures are estimated as the number of dead and missing plus the number of 
arrivals (ibid: 332). 
There are several restrictions with regard to the reliability of the data and 
thus also problems with regard to the validity of an MMR. Both the number of 
arrivals as well as the number of dead and missing persons might be under-
recorded. This could also vary in degree at different points in time. For instance, 
during the 1990s, undocumented migration to Spain was estimated to be almost 
50 per cent of the general migratory influx (Carling 2007a). However, and in 
strong contrast, in 2011, Frontex officials estimated that 98 per cent were detect-
ed before arriving at European shores. Consequently, only two per cent of arri-
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vals were undocumented.18 As discussed above, the number of dead and missing 
can only be taken as a minimum estimate. Both factors, however, change the 
MMR. If detections work well and most arrivals are counted, but the number of 
deaths at sea is not reported accurately, the statistical risk of dying at sea de-
creases. Likewise, if the quality of data on deaths at sea remains the same, while 
arrivals succeed undetected, the calculated risk is higher than empirical observa-
tions lead us to believe. In any case, the question of what contributes to the trip 
being increasingly lethal cannot be found using the MMR. 
An evaluation of the contributing factors suffers from both the classical out-
of-sight-out-of-mind problem related to issues at sea, and the secrecy of border 
enforcement’s operational information. Overall, six different explanations have 
been proposed as contributing factors to the increasing victimization of migrants 
in the Mediterranean: first, the condition of the vessels; second, the the smug-
gling business; third, EU border enforcement measures and policies; fourth, the 
involvement of authorities; fifth, self-endangerment, and sixth, diffusion of re-
sponsibility. 
However, when considered more closely, these explanations interfere with 
each other in an odd way and reveal the possible political interpretations which 
are implicitly there. The vessel, for instance, has been identified as a serious risk 
both in policy research, such as by UNODC, and in academic research as well as 
in investigative journalism. The causes of fatal accidents have been attributed to 
the poor state of many vessels, or to the fact that these kinds of small fishing 
boats or inflatable dinghies are not made for sea voyages. Ernesto Kiza, for in-
stance, researched the victimization of migrants en route for the case of the 
southern EU borders between 1999 and 2004. Kiza demonstrates that “the vehi-
cle most used in the context of undocumented migration from South to North is 
[…] simultaneously the most problematic and dangerous” (Kiza 2008: 237). 
Based on data from UNITED, Kiza’s study documents an increase in the use of 
boats for clandestine seaborne migration (ibid: 213-323, 241). In comparison to 
other means of transport (he further accounts the categories walking, swimming, 
container, lorry, and others), between 80 and 96 per cent of cases in the sample 
period used boats (ibid: 238). According to Kiza, three problems are related to 
the utilization of boats in this context. First, the carrying capacity of the vessel is 
usually exceeded; second, the poor condition of the vessel itself (leakages, en-
gine failure); and third, a lack of qualified operators on board the vessels (ibid: 
                                                           
18  Head of Sea Border Sector at Frontex and colleague, personal interview (May 27, 
2011). 
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239). These deficiencies are, however, either attributed to economic reasoning, 
that is, commercialized migration facilitation, or to border enforcement 
measures. Italy provides an instructive example in the latter case. There, “ultra-
modern speedboats (zodiacs) of the ‘scafisti’ [smugglers]” have been replaced by 
hardly seaworthy fishing vessels (ibid: 337-338). Likewise, in Spain, it could be 
observed that the deployment of seaworthy pateras which were hitherto used for 
regional fishing and had been appropriated for migration purposes, have been re-
placed by pateras which were ‘adjusted’ by deteriorating the vessels state to the 
business of transporting migrants clandestinely (ibid: 338). It has been suggested 
that the condition of the vessel was adjusted to and provoked by border enforce-
ment measures and the narrow admission requirement of ‘being almost in dis-
tress.’ Moreover, tight border controls increased the number of deaths as the 
maritime journeys were forced to take more dangerous detours. In addition, 
tougher border controls increased the costs of being transported. Different forms 
of self-endangerment have been advanced with regard to the increasing death toll 
in the Mediterranean. Different officials mentioned to me that migrants would 
deliberately provoke a distress situation in order to force border guards to take 
them on board. Other forms of self-endangerment include panic aboard the ves-
sels, or throwing navigational equipment aboard when being spotted by a heli-
copter or aircraft. Technical problems to send a rescue call were also mentioned. 
Yet again, this contradicts the observations of journalist Wolfgang Bauer 
during his attempt to across the Mediterranean in a boat among Syrian refugees. 
According to Bauer, the transportation business has developed into an economi-
cally competitive market, and bad service might result in passengers denouncing 
smugglers or middlemen to authorities. Furthermore, with the money for the trip 
being left with middlemen, trips are often only paid after the successful comple-
tion of the journey. Smugglers thus have an interest in organizing a safe trip. For 
every person making the journey attracts five new clients.19 
 
Ultimately, the diffusion and, at times, avoidance of responsibility for rescue at 
sea, which Silja Klepp already observed in 2007 in her ethnography on the mari-
time boundary in the Mediterranean, remains difficult to pinpoint. At the same 
time, public discourse has become used to blaming fatalities to the unseaworthi-
ness of boats, the greed or cruelty of smugglers, and an argument that has been 
foregrounded since 2015: the pull-factor of rescue measures. Overall, access to 
the operational field has proven difficult for researchers. This is precisely why it 
                                                           
19  Journalist Bauer, telephone interview (June 2014). 
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is so difficult to verify or denounce the claim that better surveillance and a better 
exchange of information would contribute to saving lives at sea. If there is hardly 
any reliable, official data, and if, at the same time, democratic and public control 
is limited by reference to the operational nature of border enforcement, this 
means that the relation between border policies and enforcement measures and 
the loss of lives at sea cannot be officially assessed. However, the fact that Fron-
tex stated that 98 per cent of boats were detected raises questions of why an in-
creasing number of people die while at the same time more boats are being spot-
ted. Finally, with regard to the justification of EUROSUR, it is remarkable that 
among all the reasons discussed in media and academia, the alleged lack of sur-
veillance and of interagency cooperation and good communication has not been 
mentioned as a factor contributing to the increasing death toll. 
 
8.1.5 The Passage: … at Sea … on Board, 
and Under Cover of Darkness 
 
In the context of flight and migration by sea, the small boat not only stands for a 
means of transport, but also for the condition of being transported. Testimonies 
of this “modern Odyssey”20 are, however, rare. For example, even though legal 
anthropologist Silja Klepp conversed with different migrants, she only cites two 
testimonies of the actual experience of being on board a migrant vessel, and 
those are rather evasive. A woman with whom she met several times in Hal Far 
on Malta assures “she had been asleep for the entire time of the journey of four 
night and four days” (Klepp 2011: 219). Another migrant Klepp spoke with 
didn’t want to talk too long about the sea journey and gave a staccato memory of 
the passage: 
 
“We spent three days and three nights on the water. For two days and nights we met no 
one at sea, but then a Tunisian fishing boat supplied us with a few bottles of water and 
bread. During all of the crossing we prayed to Allah. Especially the darkness of the night 
made us afraid. Then we saw other fishing boats. We thought we were on the way to Italy, 
and drove on in the same direction. We had a compass with us. But then we found our-
selves in the port of La Valletta, and the police and an ambulance were waiting for us.” 
(quoted in Klepp 2011: 219) 
 
                                                           
20  Journalist Bauer, telephone interview (June 2014). 
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The anthropologist reflects that it became successively clear to her, “that to all 
who cross the Mediterranean this way, it means a traumatic experience of which 
no one easily speaks” (Klepp 2011: 219). By contrast, Ruben Andersson’s re-
search in Senegal revealed that testimony is not only an individual’s story, but 
also a sellable thing, a product of specific expectations, namely “stories of deaths 
and suffering at sea” (Andersson 2010: 40). Not to mention these are also prod-
ucts in increasing demand, “[j]ournalists, police, academics, aid workers and re-
search students […] have combed the terrain for interviews with migrants and 
repatriates” (ibid). There is enough reason and opportunity to only tell one’s sto-
ry for money: “For a small sum, I’ll give you three or four guys,” was the ‘spe-
cial offer’ made to the anthropologist, “10,000 cfa (15€) is enough, since you are 
a research student” (ibid). Journalists had reportedly paid tenfold. 
 
Trauma-related speechlessness on the one hand, commodified and exoticized 
suffering on the other – and in-between: the passage, without witness. 
The passage seems to be a dark field in every sense of the word. In fact, 
darkness is as much a prerequisite to a successful, that is, undetected embarka-
tion, as it is the disquieting condition of several hours of the journey. While em-
barkation can only be unreeled under cover of darkness, darkness aboard a vessel 
merges up and down, vanishes orientation, and renders the horizon invisible. 
Under cover of darkness equally means to be at its mercy. The sea carries this 
ambivalence between functional necessity and essential threat, too. The water 
covers the tracks of routes, but also causes deaths at sea to vanish. It carries the 
boat, but might as well swallow the vehicle along with its passengers.21 Recon-
                                                           
21  This sensation is powerfully worked out in Nam Le’s short story “The Boat,” Nam Le 
describes the atmosphere of darkness at sea as a “black syrup” (Le 2008: 233) and a 
“viscid space without reference or light or sound” (Le 2008: 233) and follows the ex-
periences of a girl, called Mai on board a foundering vessel in the South China Sea. I 
consider it necessary to provide an impression of the probable condition on board a 
refugee-vessel, and this condition and even the imagination of these conditions blend 
into the political handling of the phenomenon. For it is a lived experience and not 
merely an attested trauma. In order to evoke a possible atmosphere, I shall ‘import’ 
fiction: “Finally the storm arrived in force. The remaining light drained out of the 
hold. Wind screamed through the cracks. She felt the panicked limbs, people clawing 
for direction, sudden slaps of ice-cold water, the banging and shapeless shouts from 
the deck above. The whole world reeled. Everywhere the stink of vomit. Her stomach 
forced up, squashed through her throat. So this was what it was like, she thought, the 
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sidering Habib Buhari’s statement against this background, it becomes apparent 
that the only emotion mentioned refers to the darkness of the night. Water and 
bread, prayer and compass are tools for the passage. There is no mention of hun-
ger or thirst, uncertainty, panic or hope. The profound experience of being exis-
tentially at mercy of the dark sea underpins his halting account of the passage. In 
reports to the European spectator, these sensations are translated into soundbites: 
“When I was on board the vessel, I thought I was dead,” stated a migrant in a 
documentary of ‘their journey’ on German television – and at this point I would 
not need a reference as it is a ubiquitous and random quote. The passage which 
“depending on the places of embarkation and destination […] can last anywhere 
between 2 hours and 30 days” (UNODC 2011: 30) remains hidden from view. 
 
ZEIT-journalist Wolfgang Bauer was the first journalist to actually cover the 
seaborne passage. He provided insights into the organization of crossings from 
Egypt. Together with the photographer Stanislav Krupar, Bauer clandestinely 
joined a group of Syrian refugees trying to get from Egypt to Italy by boat across 
the sea (Bauer 2014). The documentary starts with an interesting decision: based 
on rumors about the different conditions of vessels deployed for the trip, the 
journalists decided not to start from Libya or Tunisia, but from Egypt. From 
Libya or Tunisia “the distance to Italy is shorter, but the boats are extremely di-
lapidated. The Egyptian smugglers have to travel a larger distance, but therefore 
deploy better ships” (ibid: 14). On first account, the crossing seemed to be the 
                                                           
moment before death. She closed her eyes, swallowed compulsively; tried to close out 
the crawling blackness, the howl of the wind. She tried to recall her father’s stories – 
storms at sea, waves ten, fifteen, meters high! – but they rang shallow against what 
she’d just seen: those dense roaring slabs of water, sky churning overhead like a pud-
dle being mucked with a stick. She was crammed in by a boatload of human bodies, 
thinking of her father and becoming overwhelmed, slowly, with loneliness. As much 
loneliness as fear. Concentrate, she told herself, And she did – forcing herself to con-
centrate, if not – if she was unable to – on the thought of her family, then on the con-
tact of flesh pressed against her on every side, the human warmth, felling every square 
inch of skin against her body and through it the shared consciousness of – what? 
Death? Fear? Surrender? She stayed in that human cocoon, heaving and rolling, con-
centrating, until it was over” (Le 2008: 231-232). The blanket atmosphere of the ele-
ments, of water and wind, and of an omnivorous darkness, the narrowness, the smell, 
the bodily surrender, these descriptions cut through the soundbites sought after by 
media coverage. 
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most disturbing part of the journey. In his report, Bauer quickly relativizes this 
concern: “We thought that the sea is the greatest danger on our journey. Yet the 
greatest danger lurked: on land” (ibid). The journalist then provided a fascinating 
insight into the business of commercialized migration facilitation and its differ-
ent legs: different means of transport, different hideouts, different profiteers, 
kidnapping, protection racket and the permanent uncertainty about when the ves-
sel will be ready. 
The refugees are in an awkward manner both clients and commodities on 
which ‘local migration lords’ base their businesses. The crossing itself, however, 
did not succeed. Their boat was detected in Egyptian territorial waters, all pas-
sengers were detained and the journalists had to reveal their identity and were 
deported to Turkey. 
In a telephone conversion, Bauer described the moment his group was able to 
“change the medium from land, with all its diffuse uncertainties, to the sea into a 
boat” as a “great moment.” Most of the fellow passengers had a blissful smile on 
their face when finally being on board. At last, the journey was no longer a pre-
tense of concealment or “a game of hide-and-seek.” All the diffuse feelings, the 
uncertainty, was washed-up since “the boat is very concrete.” This was particu-
larly so, since while waiting and hiding, being in vulnerable diffuse fear, it had 
always been unclear whether there will be a boat at all, that is, whether the final 
leap will be possible and dared at last. “So in the beginning,” states Bauer, 
 
“there is less fear. When you’re first on the boat, you have first and foremost a feeling of 
relief. Being on the boat is like being on the rail, an apparent automatism, no more hiding. 
It’s a kind of congratulatory moment. That changes, of course, depending on the progress 
of this modern Odyssey.”22 
 
Yet again, the European spectators’ knowledge about the precise nature of this 
course remains dark. Whatever occurs during passage, when turning up on Eu-
rope’s public horizon, it is in the form of an overcrowded boat. Individual testi-
monies, the passengers themselves remain mute and visually aggregated to a 
boatload of people, to the visual image of the cramped and unseaworthy small 
boat. All that which is not known is compensated by the taken-for-granted, ex-
planatory image of the migrant vessel, to which I will now turn. 
 
 
                                                           
22  Journalist Bauer, telephone interview (June 2014). 
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8.2 “WHEN YOU SEE THE BOAT, 
THE BOAT TELLS THE STORY” 
 
The statement heading this section was given toward the end of an interview 
conversion with two Frontex officials from the Sea Borders Sector in the agen-
cy’s headquarter in Warsaw. The scheduled time for the interview ran out, and 
the PR officer entered the room as to guide me to the next interview she had 
scheduled for me. “Do you see your job adequately represented in the media 
coverage,” was the final question my interview-guideline prompted; and despite 
the shortage of time, it provoked a twenty minute answer. The two Frontex offi-
cials answered in an engaged manner, stating that the mandate of Frontex was 
poorly understood. They felt that the media coverage was wrongly focused. Re-
ports would focus on humanitarian issues while it was criminal networks that 
border management was dealing with. Underlining the fact that migrants were 
victims and that the facilitators were the targets of border control and surveil-
lance activities, the officers provided printouts of photographs of drugs detected 
on board a small vessel and of crowded boats. They mentioned different stories 
of migrants who, during debriefing, described their situations as vulnerable. Ac-
cording to the Frontex officials, the majority of migrants have no idea about 
what they got themselves into. Thus, they would end up in a situation at mercy 
of facilitators, who, in a low risk/high profit business, took advantage of mi-
grants’ aspirations. One of the officers stated that the amount of money which 
was generated through these illegal networks was shocking to him, and that con-
sidering Frontex’s limited budget and capacities, he always felt one step be-
hind.23 While the officers of the Sea Border Sector presented their images of the 
issue at stake as corrective to one-sided media coverage, the PR officer joined in 
providing demonstrative evidence, stating that migrants were taken in by facilita-
tors. Referring to the photographic material on Frontex’s website, she concluded: 
 
“If you look at the photos, some of which are on our website, you can see the boats that 
people come on. […] I mean this is, when you see the boat, the boat tells the story. And 
sometimes the boats are supposed to have hundreds of people. I mean, it’s self-
explanatory.”24 
                                                           
23  Head of Sea Border Sector at Frontex and colleague, personal interview (May 27, 
2011). 
24  Press officer at Frontex, conversation aside from the interview with the officials from 
the Sea Border Sector at Frontex (May 27, 2011). 
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According to the Frontex officials, the boats clearly indicate the carelessness of 
the facilitators, the profitability of the smuggling business, as well as migrants’ 
cluelessness. In a similarly obvious way, the boat represents the misery of the 
migrants on board. “The boat tells the story.” Yet, what story is this exactly? 
And how does it become involved in politics? 
In the EU media, the condition of the migrants’ vessel as unseaworthy, small, 
overcrowded, wooden or rusty is referred to as an almost explanatory variable. In 
fact, the standard reference to the condition of the boat is not infrequently the 
explanatory punchline to any news about seaborne migration. Maegan Hendow, 
for instance, writes that the passage turns “a dangerous trek for the old and over-
capacity boats used for the journey” (2013: 193). In her article on “Tunisian Mi-
grant Journeys,” she underlines the lack in safety of the maritime trip to which 
the condition of the vessels – “overcrowded and often dilapidated” (ibid) – con-
tributes to a large extent. The amount of agency attributed to the vessel is note-
worthy. It is the vessel whose capacity is exceeded, and to whom the trip is dan-
gerous. At the same time, the safety of many trips is, in fact, compromised by the 
condition of the vessel and the number of people on board. Yet, this image not 
only describes a condition, it is explanation and rubric. 
Apart from the factual deficiencies of migratory vessels – which I am explic-
itly not denying – images of crowded and unseaworthy vessels have become an 
archetypal image, an icon, almost used as taken-for granted explanation rather 
than individual testimony. Pictures and photographs are used as interchangeable 
images. This section deciphers within the taken-for-granted suggestion quoted 
from the Frontex officials. It takes apart the obvious idea about the scrupulous 
smuggler, the unseaworthy and crowded boats, and the migrant at mercy – at 
mercy of the smuggler, the boat and the sea. In order to do so, I will take issue 
with its three recurring attributes – overcrowded, small and unseaworthy – and 
ask for their problematization and appropriation in politics. Concomitantly, the 
following explorations decipher the “vehicle-body entanglements” (Walters 
2011: 6), which the strangely undividable hybrids of the refugee boat and the 
boat-people represent: A crowd of people bound to, put into, dependent on and 
visually integrated with their means of transport. Analyzing this depiction of 
transport, the image of the crammed, unseaworthy, and small vessel, can reveal 
how the politics of pity and risk (Aradau 2004) underpin the emergence of an EU 
border mandate. 
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8.2.1 Overcrowded – “The Boat is Full” 
 
If something is full, matters are beyond enough; a limit is met, almost exceeded. 
Crammed vessels indicate the scarcity of space, to the extent that more (for the 
case of vessels additional passengers or cargo) means shipwreck and an end to 
all. The almost over-capacity vessel is both a visual and verbal metaphor. Along 
with the expression “Das Boot ist voll” (“The boat is full”) comes an impetus of 
scarcity of space, resources and capacities, which has prominently, yet contro-
versially characterized the asylum debate in Switzerland since the Second World 
War and reappears then and again in the German public debate on migration and 
asylum policies. Even though this allusion appears askew and inadequate vis-à-
vis jam-packed migrant vessels in the Mediterranean, a careful consideration re-
veals overlaps and their absurdities. 
What turned into a metaphor of political rhetoric, Das Boot ist voll, is the ti-
tle of a book by the Swiss journalist and writer Alfred Häsler (2008 [1967]) in 
which he critically engaged with Swiss refugee policy during the Second World 
War.25 In Switzerland, the reception of particularly Jewish refugees was a con-
troversial issue during war-time, with the metaphor of the lifeboat igniting public 
controversies. Eduard von Steiger, a member of Swiss government, introduced 
the expression during a talk in Zürich, where he metaphorically compared Swit-
zerland to a lifeboat: 
 
“Who has to commandeer a strong, already occupied lifeboat with limited capacity and 
limited inventory while a thousand victims of a shipwreck scream for rescue, it seems hard 
to measure when he can’t take them all.” (quoted in Häsler 2008 [1967]: 170) 
 
The emphasis Steiger stressed was that of an ethically bitter, but necessary deci-
sion; as the lifeboat has limited capacities, reception must be limited too.26 
Even though the metaphor was controversially discussed in Swiss parlia-
ment, it hit the mark of the Swiss self-image as caring, humanitarian, yet reason-
able and neutral (Häsler 2008 [1967]: 160-185).27 After the war, the emphasis of 
                                                           
25  The English edition appeared in 1969 titled “The lifeboat is full”. 
26  An approximate 20,000 political refugees, most of them Jews, had been refused entry 
into Switzerland or had been taken back beyond the border, another 14,500 entry per-
mits had been refused. At the same time protection was granted to an approximate 
60,000 civilians (de Weck 2008 in Häsler 2008 [1967]: XVIII-XVIII). 
27  Cf. Kreis (2006) for a discussion. 
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the lifeboat metaphor was shifted toward the humanitarian aspect. “Switzerland 
imagined and presented itself as a humanitarian haven that had given protection 
to those who had needed it” (Falk 2010: 85). This impetus was particularly con-
veyed by a poster made by the Swiss painter Victor Surbek.28 The 128x271 cm 
poster presents Switzerland as an open lifeboat, the Swiss flag is set on the right 
side of the vessel behind four strong, rowing, helmeted Swiss soldiers. 
The sea is depicted as rough and dark. On the left side, three rescued persons, 
two adults and one child, sit wrapped in blankets. In the middle of the vessel, an-
other rescued, bare-chested person is lying on the lap of someone else, mimeti-
cally representing the Pietà (the Christian allegory of pity). Even though there is 
not much room left in the lifeboat, a strong man stretches out his hand to some-
one drowning. The poster “was used for an exhibit that was displayed in several 
Swiss cities just after the war. The aim of the poster was to collect money for the 
war-damaged countries of Europe” (ibid). The self-portrayal was condensed in 
the verbal and visual metaphor of the lifeboat, and this allowed for both the per-
formance of a humanitarian image and the justification of its limits. The lifeboat 
is the materialized necessity to triage the needy. 
In his 1967 book, Häsler took issue with the Swiss self-portrayal of a human-
itarian neighbor to Nazi Germany and criticized the self-righteous justification of 
legitimate rejection. Against the background of the Indochina refugee crisis in 
1979, Häsler challenged Swiss asylum policies again. He published an article in 
Die Weltwoche entitled “Unser Boot ist nicht voll” (Engl.: Our boat is not full), 
in which he urged for the Swiss government to accept more refugees (Kreis 
2006: 342). The Swiss self-portrayal as lifeboat with limited capacities was ren-
dered absurd, in view of these images of crammed refugee boats in the middle of 
the sea. When faced with these boats, the legitimacy to worry about one’s own 
vessel, which rather resembled a container ship than a lifeboat, was rendered 
problematic. The question of whose capacities are actually exhausted has been 
picked up by several caricatures since then. Yet, in addition to the impetus of 
comparison, which had been fostered by these cartoons and images, the new 
agency of the refugees, who themselves attempt to save their lives by taking 
boats, became apparent. As refugees and migrants themselves took boats to save 
their lives, the depiction of the lifeboat was fundamentally jarred. Even though 
the image of the (nearly) over-capacity lifeboat was challenged, the metaphor 
remained an established part of the Swiss asylum debate (Kreis 2006). 
                                                           
28  Francesca Falk (2010, 2011) has analyzed Surbek’s poster convincingly; and I follow 
her analysis here. Surbek’s poster is reproduced in her publications. 
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In the early 1990s, the metaphor was also used in Germany. Initially, it was 
only deployed in the right-wing political discourse, such as on the election poster 
of the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD). However, in August and 
September 1991, leading German newspapers such as Der Spiegel and Frankfur-
ter Allgemeine Zeitung introduced the metaphor into mainstream discourse 
(Pagenstecher 2008a).  
Yet again, even though the metaphor prevailed, the image of the refugee re-
lated to it changed fundamentally. This was triggered and reflected by the Benet-
ton Poster by Oliviero Toscani which recalled the 1991 Vlora incident. Even 
though the metaphor of the overcapacity boat prevailed, the visual image funda-
mentally confounded its very own metaphor, giving it just another spin. 
 
Catachresis I: Masses on Vessels – The 1991 Vlora Incident 
When the cargo ship Vlora landed in the Albanian port of Durrës to unload sugar 
from Cuba on August 7, 1991, approximately 10,000 Albanians took over the 
ship and forced the captain, Halim Milaqi, to take them to Italy. It was reported 
that tens thousands of Albanians were waiting at the port of Durrës “in the hope 
of going on board ships that would take them to Italy”29. “My father called me,” 
an Albanian pizza baker is later quoted in Der Spiegel, “he told me that 50,000 
people besieged the port of Durres” (N.N. 1991: 122). The next day, the Vlora 
approached the coast of Puglia and forced its way into the port of Bari with an 
estimated 10,000 Albanian nationals on board.30 After being allowed to disem-
bark for humanitarian reasons, the passengers were led to La Vittoria Sports Sta-
dium and detained there. When the Italian authorities organized immediate repat-
riations, clashes broke out between the Italian police and the Vlora passengers. 
While being detained, the Albanians used iron bars and pieces of the stadium’s 
building material to fight the police. Water and food supplies were dropped into 
the sports arena from a helicopter. The situation was dramatic, Der Spiegel re-
ported “a Dantesque inferno” (ibid). The masses of Durrës who, rather than wait-
ing for a Swiss life boat, hijacked a random cargo freighter to make their way, 
were finally repatriated by an “armada of ferries, troopships and aircrafts” (ibid). 
The harsh and prompt deportation of the majority of the Vlora’s passengers by 
                                                           
29  Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) Report on the Exodus of 
Albanian Nationals (1992: para. 23). The PACE Report is only available in excerpts 
at: http://migrantsatsea.org/tag/vlora/ (accessed February 1, 2017). 
30  Ibid, para. 25. 
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the Italian government was interpreted as a signal to the Schengen group (Pagen-
stecher 2008b: 609) that Italy was about to join. 
The takeover of the Vlora in Durrës was captured in a photograph by the Al-
banian Telegraphic Agency (Pagenstecher 2008b: 610), which became known 
for recalling the disembarkation at Bari on August, 8, 1991. It was used under 
this heading in the context of a controversial commercial campaign, which print-
ed “realistic” photographs, for instance, of blood-soaked clothes, victims of war, 
or HIV carriers. 31 “Regardless of the controversy discussed in press agencies, 
press councils and feuilletons regarding whether one should advertise using mis-
ery and death for fashion, the image of migration was listed as one of the most 
dreadful images of the decade” (ibid: 609). This was in spite that fact that the art-
ist who desigend the “Vlora-poster,” Oliviero Toscani, might have used the pho-
tograph in a sarcastic, provocative and ambivalent manner (Scorzin 2010: 103-
104) by pointing to the absurdity of whose boat was full. The image became em-
blematic for Europe’s redefined view on refugees and migration. 
The depiction differs fundamentally from the image of the refugee that un-
derpinned the Geneva Convention and the Cold War period. It was no longer 
families or heroic political refugees which were on the move and needed protec-
tion (Salomon 1991). Flight and migration was rather identified with undifferen-
tiated, yet insurrectionary masses.32 Chimni’s essay is classic in describing the 
shift in perception with regard to the figure of the refugee post the Cold War. He 
shows that the “image of a ‘normal’ refugee – white, male, anti-communist” led 
to a justified rejection with regard to the ‘masses from the global South’ who 
were “here for no good reason, […] abused hospitality, and […] [whose] number 
were too large” (Chimni 1998: 357). This “myth of difference” was centrally 
based on the notion of masses. The notion of masses blurred any difference be-
tween migration and flight, as well as individual biographical and legal issues. 
While individuals are attested to a capacity to act and speak, as well as an indi-
vidual biography and a reason to migrate, “masses are portrayed as elemental” 
                                                           
31  For a visual impression of the 1992 campaign of United Colors of Benetton by 
Oliviero Toscani see the poster collection at the Museum für Gestaltung Zürich, at: 
https://www.eguide.ch/de/objekt/united-colors-of-benetton/ (accessed December 20, 
2019). 
32  For the transformation of the construction of the figure of the refugee since the Gene-
va Convention, see Salomon (1991). Katharina Inhetveen aptly describes the dominant 
self-conception in Europe: “one isn’t a refugee, one was a refugee” (Inhetveen 2010: 
150). 
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(Johnson 2011: 1029). 33  They therefore appear overwhelming, as existential 
threats to the receiving countries. 
Moreover, public imagination of the refugee and migrants as masses goes in 
line with alienation, distancing, and a form of othering. The gaze at masses has a 
distancing effect. In this sense, Susanne Luedemann commented that one who 
“writes on masses cannot be and does not want to be part of it” (Luedemann 
2012: 105). The notion of masses is based on a gaze from a distance, as viewed 
from the land or even from above. With regard to masses on vessels, it includes 
the possibility of observing the shipwreck from a distance, wondering why they 
even embarked under these conditions with an almost scientific curiosity (Blu-
menberg 1997). It is this curious-yet-distant gaze that allows one to evaluate and 
assess: the refugee status, the intention of migration, the reasons to move, the 
trustworthiness of the refugee, the organization of the journey. The relation be-
tween the observer and the masses has been described as a “relation of distanced 
criticism, even condemnation” (Luedemann 2012: 105). The crowd that empow-
ers itself disputes the idea of the individual who is fleeing for reasons of political 
prosecution, that is, the refugee of the 1951 Geneva Convention.34 Thereby, the 
image of the masses allows for justifying the necessity to limit admission. In the 
sense, the image ‘masses on vessels’ triggered EU bordering, even though their 
boat was indeed, much more overcapacity than their ships of state. 
Just as Surbek’s poster provides both justification and a portrayal of humani-
tarian and restrictive asylum policies, the image of the Vlora illustrates a similar 
ambivalence: the grief of the many is obvious, but the reference to their sheer 
                                                           
33  In fact, Johnson argues that this link to the elemental and the savage has only been 
unpacked as regards (non-white) refugees from the South: “It is in the commentary on 
refugees in Africa and Asia that references begin to refer to ‘floods,’ ‘flows,’ and 
‘hordes’ of refugees. Rather than individuals, refugees began to represent masses of 
people moving across borders – not fleeing persecution, as outlined in the Convention, 
but fleeing violence and war, intimidating in their numbers” (Johnson 2011: 1023). 
34  The Geneva Convention defined that refugee status may be granted to a person who as 
a “result of events occurring before January 1, 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable 
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; 
or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual 
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to re-
turn to it.” United Nations (1951) Convention on the Status of Refugees, Art.1 A (2). 
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numbers limits admission capacities. Thus, it might not be by chance that jour-
nalist Michael Schwelien (2004) used the photograph as book cover to his 2004 
monograph, “Das Boot ist voll. Europa zwischen Nächstenliebe und Selbst-
schutz” (Engl.: The boat is full. Europe between humanitarianism and self-
protection). Whose vessel – Europe’s ship of state or the migrants’ boat? Yet, 
there is one further catachresis in the context of Europe bound flight and migra-
tion: migrants and refugees appear as a mixed flow in overcrowded fishing ves-
sels – no longer as an event, but as established phenomenon. In this context, the 
active insurgent masses are transformed into an immobile crowd. Aboard small 
fishing vessels, boatloads of African migrants travel toward Europe. 
 
Catachresis II: Europe’s Other 
aboard Overcrowded Pateras, Cayucos, or Rubber Dinghies 
Careful consideration reveals that it is merely the image of masses which is 
maintained, rather than an actual comparability in numbers. As we have seen 
above, in the 1990s, pateras boats from Morocco to Spain were reported to carry 
between ten and 30 passengers. During the first decade of the new millennium 
the number of passengers per vessel ranged between approximately 150 and 400. 
According to Fargues and Bonfanti (2014: 2), between 1998 and 2013 there was 
an annual average of 44,000 migrants who arrived on boats. Yet, the depiction as 
masses was and still is present, and supports and reproduces the myth of invasion 
(Haas 2008). 
Migrants appear “tightly packed” in overcrowded vessels and as a result, 
there is a visual depiction of masses which is maintained, and which suggest that 
there are “too many of them.” The “visual type” (Walters 2014: 7) of the over-
crowded vessel suggests that there are too many migrants on board, both for the 
vessel to be seaworthy as well as for European receiving states. Furthermore, the 
image of the boatload of people makes it difficult to distinguish them visually as 
individuals. Integrated with and stuffed into the vessel, they present one image 
and also one case to Europe’s public imagination. 
When they become visible on Europe’s public horizon, their boat is not al-
most full, but already overloaded. This fundamentally differs from the lifeboat 
scenario. While rescue and humanitarian assistance follows criteria of need, the 
crowd necessitates sorting them out. The notion of being overcrowded thus pro-
vides the basis for the myth of difference (Chimni 1998) and also provides the 
justification for screening, sorting, and debriefing migrants. Moreover, when 
characterized as “armada of the poor and desperate” (ZDF 2014), boat passen-
gers are both victim and threat in one and the same boat. Therefore, the oscillat-
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ing reference to migrants and refugees is possible because they appear as undif-
ferentiated boatloads. 
In addition, the image of a “collective body of migrants appearing on western 
shores offers up a spectacle of clandestinity,” whereby those considered illegal 
appear as irrational savages, incomprehensible to such a point that they can be 
studied (Andersson 2010: 43). The depiction of a cramped vessel in the middle 
of the sea stirs up fear and incomprehension. As emphatic emotion (“What if I 
was in their place?”), there is the fear that an overcrowded boat might capsize. 
The fear emerges vis-à-vis an existential threat. Yet, rather than a fellow feeling, 
this empathy is based on pity and commiseration. From the perspective of the 
EU-based spectator, incomprehension (rather than catharsis) dominates the gaze 
on the image. “No wonder, they don’t reach if they travel under these conditions. 
How reckless, and yet, how desperate must they have been?” could be the inner 
monologue of the European spectator. Apart from the questioning of identity and 
legality which serves to somewhat “localize” the person, there is a general de-
valuation of the entire endeavor of maritime migration. The view of the over-
crowded vessel from land recalls sensibilities similar to the antic and premodern 
perspective, which valued seafaring as outrageous and blasphemous (Makropou-
los 1998: 56-57). Meanwhile, orderly and safe maritime endeavors on registered, 
seaworthy, and technically advanced ships stand for the justified pursuit of hap-
piness and the exploration beyond one’s own horizon. These different gazes, the 
antic and premodern valuation of seafaring and the modern version of enlight-
enment, are both present when seaborne migration is assessed by onlookers, who 
the evaluate the endeavor using the boat as an indicator. 
Migratory ambitions on overcrowded and small fishing boats are at odds not 
only with politics, but also with reason and physical possibilities. Hence, that 
which ought not be moving, raises questions of legality and rationality. Empathy, 
a profound lack of understanding, and fear can equally and simultaneously be 
evoked by this image. Suspicion and unease dominate the seaward gaze. 
Finally, the attribution “cramped vessel” is also used as an image that entices 
urgency. As such it is appropriated by migrants and facilitators. The journalist 
Wolfgang Bauer reported on three-level vessels, on which migrants hid below 
deck until they were close to a European state’s coast. Only then, Bauer told, did 
migrants request to stand on deck, thus performing the image of the overcrowded 
vessel. The visual image of a cramped vessel turns into a warning signal and an 
SOS. The self-explanatory character which Frontex attested to the vessel – if you 
see the boat the boat tells the story – is taken up to craft an image of urgency and 
victimization. Thereby the vessel transforms into a kind of passport substitute, 
with ‘overcrowded’ providing for the just documentation to be identified as 
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worth of access and assistance. Assuming that European spectators take the boat 
as an explanation, the organization of the trip will consider the following ques-
tion: ‘If the boat is detected, what story needs to be evoked’? 
 
8.2.2 Small, Open Fishing Vessels 
 
The site inspection at the beginning of this chapter examined the difference be-
tween boats and ships with regard to technical and legal classifications. The size 
of a vessel has been worked out as the recurring distinction between boats and 
ships, with the size of a vessel determining the technical condition of seaworthi-
ness. While ships are built to go on international sea voyages, boats are rather 
made for coastal waters and thus remain imagined in the local or regional. Fur-
thermore, the Hai Hong incident presented in chapter 7 has illustrated that ships 
repurposed for commercialized migrate can trigger diplomatic conflicts between 
governments and UNHCR, while boats can be dealt with as a regional phenome-
non. Hence, in the context of the Hai Hong incident, a symbolic difference be-
tween “boat-people” and “ship-people” could be observed. This is also true with 
regards to the political attention paid to their arrival: while boats may remain in 
the realm of the unknown or wanted ignorance, ships cannot be denied. At first 
glance, small boats appear as the medium of choice to clandestine migration. The 
general framing of small boats is revealed in the following UNODC assessment: 
 
“Beyond their easy availability, fishing vessels are less likely to raise suspicion given that 
there is a legitimate reason for this type of vessel to be out at sea. Finally, fishing vessels 
often do not require registration domestically or internationally, and are not required to 
have satellite or other tracking systems on board, meaning that smugglers can use them 
with very little risk of being connected to them. Where vessels are unseaworthy and not 
intended for reuse, there is no risk to the smuggler in assigning an unskilled person, possi-
bly even a migrant, to captain and navigate the boats. Fishing vessels used to transport mi-
grants generally end up at the bottom of the sea and were never intended for use in more 
than one journey.”35 
 
Additionally, small boats are a technical challenge to border surveillance, be-
cause they are difficult to detect amid the waves. In cases where the vessel’s en-
                                                           
35  UNODC (2011): Smuggling of Migrants by Sea, p. 29 at: http://www.unodc.org/ 
documents/human-trafficking/Migrant-Smuggling/Issue-Papers/Issue_Paper_-_Smug 
gling_of_Migrants_by_Sea.pdf (accessed August 27, 2019). 
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gine is above water, radar does not always detect it.36 Small boats are thus imag-
ined as being able to sneak ashore. The image of the small boat supports a notion 
of clandestinity. In turn, this condition seems to be an essential requirement to 
avoid detection. The same holds true for the different registration requirements 
and the technical equipment required for larger vessels, such as the Long Range 
Identification and Tracking System. It seems probable that dockyards exist 
where these transponders are dismantled.37 In these cases, the attribution “small” 
does not mean “boat,” rather it is ships which are technically invisibilized and 
thereby disassociated from politics. 
The kind of adventure undertaken with a vessel strongly depends on its size: 
the sailboat stands for expedition, the small boat for the local earning a living. 
The image of the small fishing vessel with African migrants thus made it appear 
like a regional phenomenon. The fishing vessel is supposed to stay in local Afri-
can territorial waters and be used for earning a living. However, the vessels used 
for maritime EU bound migration seem to be ships in the technical and adminis-
trative sense of the word, and it was only through the SOLAS description that 
one speaks of a ship starting at 12 passengers (cf. chap.7.1). The attribute 
“small” can be interpreted as a political perspective, which classifies the kind of 
migration undertaken with these vessels as irrational. Just as these kinds of boats 
are not meant for international voyages, their passengers are meant to remain 
“local” and “at home.” 
 
The 2007 Marine I Incident 
Strangely enough, the documentation of the 2007 Marine I voyage starts with its 
distress call. Little to nothing seems to be known about the organization of the 
vessel or the business behind its voyage. It was merely reported that the Marine I 
was an Italian built prawn trawler (Brothers 2007a). Even accounts on the ves-
sel’s point of departure are inconsistent. International newspapers assumed that 
the vessel “set off from the troubled West African nation of Guinea or from Ivo-
ry Coast in early December, and was probably destined for the Canaries” (ibid). 
In later accounts, Conakry, Guinea is cited as the port of embarkation 
(Wouters/Den Heijer 2010: 2; Kumin 2014: 306). There is no mention of flag 
state affiliation or the owner of the vessel. Kees Wouters and Maarten Den Hei-
jer merely note that it was “not clear under which flag the ship was sailing, nor 
who the owner was” (Wouters/Den Heijer 2010: 2). Only the Spanish journalist, 
                                                           
36  Head of Research and Development at Frontex, personal interview (May 27, 2011). 
37  Journalist Bauer, telephone interview (June 2014). 
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Nicolás Castellano, assumed in an interview with legal theorist Sonja Buckel that 
the crew, who apparently left the vessel prior to the distress call, had been Rus-
sian (Buckel 2013: 247). She reports that the flag flown by the Marine I upon the 
arrival of Spanish authorities hangs framed in the Regional Coordination Center 
for the Canary Islands as a reminder of the incident (ibid: 243).38 Whether the 
flag is Italian or from Ivory Coast cannot be determined from her photograph.  
 
The distress call which subjected the Marine I and it passengers to interstate 
agreements was sent on January 30, 2007. Engine failure was stated as its reason 
for calling distress. The Marine I was on the high seas and was allegedly trans-
porting 369 migrants of African and Asian origin (Brothers 2007b). As the re-
sponsible search and rescue (SAR) authority, the Senegalese responded that it 
did not have the adequate equipment to assist such a large vessel in distress. 
Mauritania also refused responsibility as it had not signed the SAR Convention.39 
Several days after the distress call, on February 4, 2007, the Spanish maritime 
rescue tug Luz de Mar reached the Marine I and “provided immediate relief by 
handing out supplies of water and food” (Wouters/Den Heijer 2010: 2). Howev-
er, another eight days were needed before the vessel was brought back to port. 
For six days, the Spanish government negotiated with the Senegalese and 
Mauritanian authorities. On the 10th of February, an agreement between Spain 
and Mauritania was reached: The Mauritanian authorities agreed that – for hu-
manitarian reasons – the Luz de Mar would tow the Marine I into the port of 
Nouadhibou. In exchange, Spain guaranteed that none of the Marine I passengers 
were to remain in Mauritania. For that purpose, Spain was requested to provide 
airplanes on which the migrants could be repatriated. Only when the airplanes 
reached Nouadhibou would the cargo ship be allowed to enter the port. Moreo-
ver, the Marine I was only allowed to dock for four hours, during which time the 
migrants had to be triaged into three groups and transported off accordingly. The 
first group was created for persons “of African origin,” which were to be repatri-
                                                           
38  The Marine I incident has been documented and analyzed in detail by Sonja Buckel 
(2013: 243-289) and by Wouters and Den Heijer (2010). Further accounts have been 
provided by Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen (2011: 129-130) and Judith Kumin (2014: 
306-307). I mainly follow Buckel’s account in the below elaborations. 
39  Amnesty International (2008): Mauritiania: Nobody wants to have anything to do with 
us, Arrests and collective expulsions of migrants denied entry into Europe, July 1, 
2008, at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr38/001/2008/en/ (accessed Au-
gust 29, 2019). 
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ated to Guinea-Conakry. The second group was reserved for those Asian mi-
grants who agreed to return voluntarily. Finally, the third category was supposed 
to include the unmovable rest: those persons who would not accept return, and 
thus be transferred to Spain for repatriation (Buckel 2013: 245-246). 
The dominant reasoning underpinning this categorization was repatriation 
and its logistical requirements. In doing so, the agreement clearly ignored the 
possibility that persons in need of international protection could be among the 
passengers on board the Marine I. The principle of non-refoulement didn’t apply 
as the grounds for its application (presence of those in need of international pro-
tection) was not considered in the first place. The firm claim that all passengers 
were illegal immigrants was paired with the demonstrative rejection of any room 
for interpreting their political status. The willingness of the Spanish government 
to pay 650,000 Euros to Mauritania, rewarding the cooperation in the case of the 
Marine I, further highlights the atmosphere that must have determined the nego-
tiations – the endeavor of the Marine I could under no circumstances be success-
ful. The same attitude could be traced among Southeast Asian states in the case 
of the Hai Hong incident. Similar to the procedures in 1978, the first negotiations 
concerned the opening of a port to the migrants’ vessel. 
 
As provided for in the agreement of February 10, 2007 between the government 
of Spain and its Mauritanian counterpart, the passengers of the Marine I disem-
barked in Nouadhibou on February 12. The Spanish journalist Nicolás Castella-
no, who witnessed the arrival of the Marine I, reported in an interview that the 
situation on board was disastrous. The migrants were lying down, packed like 
sardines, the vessel was full of rats and the passengers were in a fragile state of 
health (quoted in Buckel 2013: 246-247). Yet, after a first medical treatment, two 
groups of 35 persons each were immediately flown out. The remaining 299 pas-
sengers of the Marine I were kept in a hangar for screening purposes. Only two 
days after disembarkation the great majority of them, 276 persons, had signed 
‘voluntary repatriation agreements’ which repatriated them to either India or Pa-
kistan. “During the interviewing and registration by IOM, these passengers had 
declared that the reason for their departure was fear of ostensible persecution as a 
result of the conflict in Kashmir” (Wouters/Den Heijer 2010: 3). Nevertheless, 
passengers were never asked whether they were in need of international protec-
tion. Authorities involved assumed “that these people were illegals” (Buckel 
2013: 247). By April 23, 2007 most Marine I passengers had been repatriated. 
The remaining 23 migrants who refused voluntary repatriation were kept in a 
fish processing plant in Nouadhibou port for another three months until July 23, 
2007. During these months, they were guarded by Spanish security forces. Dur-
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ing the entire five months, a total of 1,330 Spanish police officers had been de-
ployed in Mauritania to monitor the impromptu detention facilitation. Detained 
in the fish processing plant in the port of Nouadhibou, Mauritania, the 23 immo-
bilized migrants were kept in a “limbo juridico,” a legal grey zone. They were de 
facto under Spanish jurisdiction, but withheld from any rights provided in the 
Spanish legal system or in international human rights. This was also clarified by 
the UN Committee Against Torture decision of November 21, 2008.40 
On July 23, 2007, the detention of the 23 migrants in the Mauritanian fishing 
plant ended. The logistics that organized the confinement of the 23 migrants 
suggests that these passengers, under no circumstances, were allowed access to 
the Spanish legal system. Thirteen persons had been flown out to Pakistan on a 
Spanish plane. The remaining ten were flown to Gran Canary. From there a 
group of four was flown to Portugal where they received work and residence 
permits (Buckel 2013: 257). The other six persons were taken to the Spanish en-
clave Melilla. Two of them received asylum while the other four remained in 
Melilla for another three years (their asylum application had been refused). 
Nonetheless, the Spanish administrations were reluctant to expel them due to 
humanitarian concerns but also issued the three persons no papers. Finally, in 
June 2010, the last two passengers of the Marine I were hospitalized in a Barce-
lona based psychiatry ward that specialized in traumatic refugee experiences 
(ibid: 257-258). 
The case of Marine I has been described by journalist Nicolás Castellano as 
“the greatest scandal of border control in terms of human rights” (quoted in 
Buckel 2013: 286). And in fact, the case of the Marine I reveals a de facto exten-
sion of Spanish jurisdiction in the form of control over the ship’s passengers. At 
the same time, there was also a suspension of law and a refusal of access not on-
ly to Spanish territory, but also to the legal system upon which the Spanish po-
licemen based their authority to restrict the liberties of the migrants. The legal 
borders of policing where thus extended not only to Mauritania but also attached 
to the duration of ‘processing’ the passengers. Meanwhile, the legal borders of 
rights were out of reach for the migrants and thus seemingly removed. The ten-
sion between the legal border of policing and the legal border of rights was uni-
laterally resolved in favor of Spanish authorities. This can be described as a clas-
sic strategy of offshoring: increase in competences (profit) as well as evasion of 
                                                           
40  J.H.A. v. Spain, CAT/C/41/D/323/2007, UN Committee Against Torture (CAT), 21 
November 2008. 
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legal restrictions or obligations. Literature primarily described this as extraterri-
torial (border) control measures. 
The question, however, is how the proceedings could be possible. And this is 
where the vessel comes in again. The Marine I had sent a distress call, and as the 
vessel was in distress, Spanish authorities got involved in a rescue operation. The 
Committee against Torture noted that the Spanish state “maintained control over 
all persons on board the Marine I from the time the vessel was rescued and 
throughout the identification and repatriation process that took place at Nouadhi-
bou”41 Despite the exercise of jurisdiction, rights were not made available to the 
detained former passengers of the Marine I. According to Amnesty International, 
the conditions of detention were “grueling.” The human rights organization re-
ported “that the Spanish authorities exercised significant psychological pressure 
on the 23 individuals requesting asylum in Nouadhibou […] in order to break 
their physical and moral resistance.”42 When criticized for the inadequate deten-
tion, the Spanish government replied to Amnesty International that 
 
“although it had no jurisdiction in the matter, [the intervention] occurred with the sole aim 
of fulfilling its humanitarian duty to come to the rescue of the boat [Marine I] and to save 
the passengers and crew. This is why one cannot call its conduct into question or demand 
it assumes responsibilities and takes actions that are outside its jurisdiction.”43  
 
The distress situation of the Marine I was declared the justificatory basis for 
Spanish intervention. The humanitarian obligation turned into a substitute for 
sovereignty. At the same time, further responsibility was rejected. Hence, the 
case of the Marine I also points to a blurring of interception and rescue opera-
tions. While interception operations can at any moment and in any location turn 
into rescue operations, the jurisdiction over vessel and passengers does not cease 
with the termination of the distress situation. Rather, the rescue operation mobi-
lizes the legal borders of policing by uncoupling them from the place and time of 
distress. Yet, this is only possible when the law of the sea is decoupled from in-
                                                           
41  J.H.A. v. Spain, CAT/C/41/D/323/2007, UN Committee Against Torture (CAT), 21 
November 2008 (emphasis added). 
42  Amnesty International (2008): Mauritiania: Nobody wants to have anything to do with 
us, Arrests and collective expulsions of migrants denied entry into Europe, July 1, 
2008, at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr38/001/2008/en/ (accessed Au-
gust 29, 2019), p.31. 
43  Ibid, p. 30. 
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ternational refugee law (Buckel 2013: 273), thereby allowing for a fragmented 
reading of legal obligations and legal competences. 
 
The negotiations over a vessel pending in international waters remind us of the 
Hai Hong bargaining in 1978. At that time, western countries agreed to resettle 
the boat-people to which Southeast Asian countries opened their shores. Tempo-
rary access to territory was traded for access to asylum and permanent resettle-
ment. Yet, the negotiations over the Marine I and its passengers go beyond the 
diplomatic bargaining which could be traced in the Hai Hong case. In the case of 
the Hai Hong, western countries appeared as a third party, as an international 
community. The idea of burden sharing underpinned Southeast Asian govern-
ments’ pressure on western governments and their stubbornness toward 
UNHCR. Even if the migrants on board the Marine I represented global ine-
qualities, the call for burden sharing couldn’t be redirected. Both cases demon-
strate that being on board a vessel, migrants’ access to rights is protracted and 
subject to negotiation. 
Looking back at the role UNHCR took during the Hai Hong incident, opinion 
seemed to changed overnight and all Indochinese refugees on board the Hai 
Hong were declared prima facie refugees. The organization’s stance in the case 
of the Marine I was quite different. The organization did not get involved in any 
negotiations with potential receiving states, nor did it comment on the refugee 
status of passengers. Apart from an UNHCR letter to the Spanish government of 
April 20, 2007, where UNHCR attested that among the 23 remaining passengers 
of the Marine I there was none in need of international protection, the organiza-
tion was hardly involved in the procedures. After UNHRC attributed all passen-
gers with prima facie status in the case of Hai Hong, the organization might have 
evaded any similar signal that would allow for linking the vessel to a prima facie 
refugee status. In fact, in 2011, a UNHCR official stated in an interview with 
Buckel that the Spanish government wanted to “evade the impression that one 
only needs to hop into a boat to arrive in Spain” (quoted in Buckel 2013: 257). 
The vessel which came to indicate the need of international protection after the 
Hai Hong incident was not to be provided again with recognition of legal status. 
 
News about larger vessels and freighters either stir up indignation with regards to 
the circumstances and conditions on board, or outrage over nonexistent captains 
and the cowardice and cruelty of facilitators (cf. the below section). Meanwhile, 
the sensation stirred up by small boats rather relates to incomprehension, pity, 
and the angst of being close to death. The small boat is the image of bare life 
when evoked in the sense of the raft of the medusa; the image of the sacrilegious 
attempt to overcome nature; and the image of one’s own determination when 
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evoked in an archaic sense. Consequently, the image of the small boat allows for 
an oscillation between two dispositions: blaming migrants for the most irrational 
of journeys and depoliticizing the savage refugee. 
 
8.2.3 Unseaworthy – a Technical Description? 
 
Toy boats, nutshells, one-way-ships,44 the tenor is pretty much clear: this vehicle 
is not made for overcoming any space. This kind of boat shouldn’t be used to 
cross the sea in the first place. When examining the characteristics of boats and 
ships as vehicles in chapter 7, I’ve shown that boats weren’t considered suitable 
for the high seas or international voyages, but remained locally bound in concep-
tion and dedicated purpose (Ger.: Widmung). The appropriation of these vessels 
for Europe bound migration thus counters the image of “ought-to-be-traffic.” 
The attribute of “unseaworthy” points beyond the technical description; it also 
hints at moral and political implications. 
The condition of the vessel allows for the classification of seaborne migra-
tion as a humanitarian issue. Lutterbeck, for instance, states that “irregular mi-
gration across the Mediterranean has also become a serious humanitarian issue, 
as the would-be immigrants often travel in unseaworthy and overloaded vessels 
and accidents are frequent” (Lutterbeck 2010: 127). If the vessel is in bad shape, 
the condition of being transported is grueling. However, worse conditions in-
crease the chances of being rescued. Thus, the condition of the vessel is pro-
voked by an atrocious and inhuman double bind: the vessels ought to be strong 
enough to carry a certain amount of people, yet, if the vessel should succeed, its 
condition can only be marginally acceptable, that is, barely strong enough to 
make the whole journey. In fact, even during the Italian operation Mare Nos-
trum, the condition of the vessels used along the central Mediterranean route 
worsened. Before the operation was launched, Italy’s Defense Minister Mario 
Mauro reportedly stated that: 
 
“the ships would be escorted to the nearest safe port, in compliance with international law. 
If there aren’t any migrants in need of medical assistance […] and if the ship is able to 
sail, it will be taken to the safest and nearest port, not necessarily Italian.” (quoted in AN-
SAmed (N.N.) 2013) 
 
                                                           
44  All three expressions have been used by Frontex officials during interviews conducted 
for this study, as well as in German and international press releases. 
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Even though a careful reading of this statement reveals that access to Europe re-
quires a life-threatening state of either vessel or passengers, the poor condition of 
the intercepted vessels was interpreted as an indication of the unscrupulous and 
rough business conducted by facilitators. The image of the unscrupulous smug-
gler was pushed further in January 2015 with the incidents of the freighters Blue 
Sky M and Ezadeen, which were carrying more than 1,300 Syrian refugees. After 
these two freighters were stopped in the Mediterranean, new labels began to sur-
face. The ships were described as “crew-less freighters,” “spectral vessels,” and 
the “new tactic” of smugglers was attested a “new dimension of cruelty” (cf. 
Spalinger 2015; Frances D’emilio 2015). The smuggling business was described 
as scrupulous, cynical, and inhuman. Across the international press, it was re-
ported that the use of cargo ships was a new trend whereby the abandoning of the 
vessels was the new tactic of smugglers. For the first time since the enforcement 
of Schengen borders in the Mediterranean, media attention was solely geared 
toward the freighters and the organization of their journeys. 
On December 30, 2014 the Moldovan-flagged cargo freighter Blue Sky M 
drew attention as “a passenger sent a distress call […] when the ship was off 
Greece. Greek authorities scrambled a navy frigate and helicopter, but the cap-
tain said the vessel wasn’t in distress and didn’t require assistance” (Associated 
Press (N.N.) 2014). In Italian waters the ship was boarded by coast guards offi-
cials who were lowered from a helicopter. A female passenger had reportedly 
called the Italian Coast Guard, stating that freighter was alone and needed help. 
After the coast guards found the Blue Sky M on automatic pilot, the “spectral 
vessel” tagline began to spread. The assessment of the Italian coast guard com-
mander Filippo Marini particularly helped paint a dramatic picture and pointed to 
the vessel itself as a new threat. According to Marini, “despite strong winds and 
high waves, Coast Guard officers were lowered onto the ship’s bridge and man-
aged to regain of the steering about a half-hour before it was due to strike the 
coast” (Frances D’emilio 2015). The language appeared rather militarized with 
Marini comparing the vessel to a bomb: “Certainly it’s very dangerous because a 
ship with no one on the command bridge is like a bomb that will strike up 
against the reefs” (ibid). The state of the “abandoned vessel” was described as 
ready for the scrap heap. By January 2, 2015 news of the Ezadeen spread as an-
other episode of this “new tactic,” Marini’s bomb metaphor had already trans-
formed into a piece of information: it was recalled that the Blue Sky M was set on 
a “collision course for a stretch of Italy’s southern coast” (Povoledo/Cowell 
2015). The narrative was mimicked for the Sierra Leone-flagged Ezadeen: 
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“For the second time in three days, the Italian authorities found themselves racing on Fri-
day to rescue hundreds of migrants from an aging freighter that traffickers had pointed to-
ward Italy and then abandoned, leaving the ship to plow through wintry seas at top speed 
with no one at the helm, heading straight for the coastline.” (Povoledo/Cowell 2015) 
 
The information provided was contradictory – rescuers were reportedly “able to 
board the ship only after it ran out of fuel and stopped” (ibid). By the afternoon it 
had apparently been towed to a dock by an Icelandic ship operating in the Fron-
tex mission Triton (Spalinger 2015). Despite several inconsistencies, the episode 
was taken as “further confirmation that traffickers had hit on a new tactic to ex-
tract ever greater profits from human misery while eluding apprehension” (Povo-
ledo/Cowell 2015). Even though the image of an unseaworthy vessel would usu-
ally provoke at least some humanitarian considerations, the characterization of 
the vessel as “abandoned” and “spectral” channelled all public interest toward 
the vessel and the business of commercialized migration facilitation. No distinc-
tion was made between captain, crew and smugglers. Moreover, information on 
the vessel and its registration, often difficult to get, was available in this case. 
The Moldovan-flagged Blue Sky M belonged to the Romanian based company 
Fairway Navigation Ltd, and the Sierra Leone-flagged Ezadeen was owned by 
the Syrian businessman Youssef Mohamad Lebbadi, whose shipping company is 
based in the port city of Tarus (Jakob/Gottschlich/Braun 2015). The fact that the 
Ezadeen was employed as a cattle ship was used to further underline the victimi-
zation of refugees by facilitators. The profit margins of a facilitator are estimated 
to be one million dollars per steel-hulled vessel, with passengers being charged 
up to 6,000 dollars each (Povoledo/Cowell 2015). Facilitators are described as 
cowardly and cruel.  
By framing the Blue Sky M and the Ezadeen as “ghost ships” and “spectral 
vessels,” Frontex sets a particular moral valuation of the incidents. And even 
though it won’t be possible to know whether Frontex has chosen this precise nar-
rative deliberately or unwittingly, the characterization of ghost ship recalls the 
S.S. Jeddah affaire of August 1880. For this incident, the label of the ghost ship 
and the valuation of the captain being coward and cruel, were first coined.45 
                                                           
45  During the night of August 7 and 8, 1880, the S.S. Jeddah, a British streamer with 778 
men, 147 women, 67 children, and 600 tonnes of cargo (sugar and timber) was dam-
aged to the point where water started flowing into the engine room. This caused a se-
rious distress situation. The Captain Lucas Clark abandoned the ship with his first of-
ficer on a life boat, which was picked up by another steamer and brought to Aden.  
Seaborne Migration | 253 
 
Cowardly and cruel – such is the moral assessment that is meant to be evoked by 
the tale of the spectral vessel – a narrative which in its application to the incident 
of the Blue Sky M and the Ezadeen diffuses rescue responsibilities and the refu-
gee question at Europe’s borders and one-sidedly blames facilitators and seafar-
ers. 
However, in April 2015, investigations of the German news magazine Pano-
rama found that the Blue Sky M had been navigated by seafarers who “used their 
professional skills to save the passengers from war” (Buchen 2015). A passenger 
is quoted as noting that the captain had carefully navigated the ship along the 
coast. Moreover, the journalists’ investigations exposed that the Blue Sky M was 
“seaworthy without any reservation [Ger.: ohne Einschränkungen seetauglich]” 
(ibid). The Italian prosecutor in Lecce confirmed this valuation. 
When confronted with the Panorama investigations, the Frontex press officer 
argued that Frontex information at that time was not as good as the magazine’s 
information. This did, however, not lead to public corrections by the European 
agency. This situation also demonstrates that Frontex, with poor information, 
apparently assumed that the ship was unseaworthy and ready for the scrap heap. 
The focus on freighters and their allegedly poor state was set by Frontex and has 
been echoed by the international press. In fact, the unseaworthy vessel and the 
criminal networks fall in the operational field of the agency, while asylum poli-
cies or humanitarian issues don’t fall in the auspices of border enforcement, not 
even in its coordination efforts. By channeling the discourse toward spectral ves-
                                                           
Meanwhile the abandoned passengers on board the Jeddah ceaselessly bailed water 
out of the ship, pumping four days and nights. They set new sails and with the right 
wind, the Jeddah drifted toward the coast where the British steamer S.S. Antenor spot-
ted it and towed it to Aden. Two days later, on August 10, 1880, Captain Clark tele-
graphed Singapore that the Jeddah sunk with 953 pilgrims on board and that all pas-
sengers had perished. One day later, on August 11, 1880 a second telegram was sent 
by the Captain of the Antenor which had towed the Jeddah into the harbor of Aden. 
This one reported that all lives had been saved. The fact that Captain Clark had aban-
doned his ship in distress was publicly condemned. Commentators revealed sheer in-
dignation and called Clark’s behavior of the lowest modes of action and especially of 
cowardice. “The maritime court in Alden judged Clark guilty. He had failed to apply 
the simplest judgment on that day and had showed a ‘shameful lack of courage’ as 
well as ‘massive misconduct.’ The owner of the harbor added that the captain commit-
ted the greatest inhumanity” (summarized from and quoted in Kreitling 2015, also cf. 
Moore/F. R. G 2000).  
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sels, Frontex contoured its target and mandate, and thus positioned itself in the 
fight against criminal facilitation networks. Meanwhile, nothing was reported 
about the whereabouts of the passengers. With the exception of the alleged cap-
tain, no individual testimony was covered in media reports. Passengers’ reasons 
for fleeing were not even speculated upon. Although the Syrian passengers most 
probably have all been granted refugee status, it was not in the interest of Fron-
tex to have this message disseminated. Scandalizing the cruelty of smugglers and 
the condition of the vessel as unseaworthy, Frontex set the agenda and diverted 
possible signals of group refugee status. Furthermore, as Frontex had just 
launched the joint operation Triton, which replaced the Italian rescue operation 
Mare Nostrum, a general discussion about the legality and proportionality of EU 
border enforcement measures and rescue obligations was adamantly avoided. 
The Panorama journalists concluded that Frontex would surely be content 
with its power to define the incident. The incident of the Blue Sky M shows 
“how far Europe’s border protectors go in the propaganda fueled fight against il-
legal migration. Obviously, they want to pass the responsibility for the death of 
many refugees onto the smugglers” (Buchen 2015). 
This episode further demonstrates that “unseaworthy” is not a mere technical 
description, but implies discussions of ownership, responsibility and sometimes 
even suggests a moral valuation. 
 
 
8.3 WHAT STORY DOES THE BOAT TELL? 
 
“If you see the boat, the boat tells the story” – this explanatory and evaluative 
shortcut condenses around the boat, what cannot be understood nor classified as 
one: the complex circumstances, the different motives of migration and the vary-
ing itineraries. While UNHCR’s description of “mixed flow” warns not to treat 
all passengers equally only because they arrived by equal means, the suggestive 
explanation that the condition and image of the vessel is supposed to provide re-
duces all rhetorical differentiation to a subtly evaluative assessment. The diverse 
itineraries get reduced to their cramped presence at sea. 
While section 8.1 focused on the metric dealings with boats, their passengers 
and deaths at sea, section 8.2 examined the visual and verbal metaphor of the 
small, overcrowded and unseaworthy refugee boat. It could be shown that num-
bers hardly contribute to the public or political valuation of the situation in the 
Mediterranean. Migratory endeavors as well as asylum requests are rather as-
sessed and “explained” with reference to the condition of the vehicular facilita-
tor. Overcrowded, unseaworthy, small – all three adjectives are attributed to 
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those vessels repurposed in the context of European-bound flight and migration. 
Even though the analysis in section 8.2 meant to challenge the supposedly self-
explanatory image of the overcrowded depilated migrant vessels, I am not deny-
ing the poor state of most of these vehicles. Rather, I wish to illustrate that there 
is an oscillating reference behind the supposedly self-explanatory image. As a 
result, different “stories” are evoked parallel to one another, allowing for the os-
cillating reference to refugee boats, migrant vessels and their passengers, which 
in the process translates the unsuitability of the vessel into different evaluations 
of the migratory endeavor itself. 
Again, what story does the boat tell? – An intimate, anti-modern relation? A 
tale of limited capacities, of subversion, of humanitarian urgency or of profit-
oriented appropriation? 
All three attributes: small, overcrowded and unseaworthy, share the impetus 
that this maritime journey is not meant to occur. An overcrowded or small boat, 
and explicitly unseaworthy vessel, is not made for international voyages nor for 
any directional movement on water. These vessels are not built for the amount of 
people they carry and they are not meant for being used to travel to Europe. Size 
and seaworthiness – the two main distinguishable features between boats and 
ships – are turned on their head in the context of flight and migration. 
The vessel’s suitability no longer embodies the nature of the sea, but re-
sponds to the nature of international refugee policies as well as the nature of a 
surveillance apparatus and EU border enforcement measures. A vessel’s flexible 
suitability integrates and reflects the ambiguities and contradictions of European 
border policies. The unseaworthiness of the vessel is the substitute “passport” to 
passengers’ admission into Europe and their subsequent access to rights. 
The tale of limited capacities evoked by referring to the “overcrowded” has 
two facets: it entails the narrative of urgency and humanitarian need while at the 
same time questioning the admission capacities of receiving states. The reference 
to sheer numbers and masses de-individualizes migrants and refugees to boat-
loads of people of which there are “just too many.” The portrayal of an undiffer-
entiated mass thus allows for distancing and evaluation. Both the profitability of 
the smuggling business and the victimization of smuggled migrants is evoked by 
the mere reference to the condition of the boat as crowded and unseaworthy. 
While the victimization removes political agency, the condition of the vessel car-
ries the implication of reckless endeavor, of a “you should have stayed where 
you came from” accompanied by a shake of the head. 
The reference to small fishing vessels suggests an intimate relation between 
the vehicle and its passengers to the regional or “local” appropriation. Fishing 
vessels are supposed to stay local and earn their owners a living. They intimately 
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relate to the area where they are from, exactly like the refugees, who are evoked 
with a constitutive connection to their homeland (Inhetveen 2010: 157). Small 
boats are decisively not part of international politics, and thus cannot count on 
the rights and obligations state grant each other.  
Arriving by boat, migrants’ itineraries and their complicated organizations 
are effectively reduced to the sea passage. Their itineraries are aggregated to ar-
rivals by sea. The conditions under which one is being transported obscures the 
reasons for migration and can be used as purifying, to attribute pity or to argue 
for repatriation. The different images of vessels and their attributes are entangled 
in politics through the stirring up of emotions such as fear and pity, or by entic-
ing suspicion and calculations of risk. These emotions and the explanations they 
suggest don’t only seem plausible to the general public; they merge in an unstat-
ed way and leave one irritated, uncertain, and unsettled when faced with the 
standard image of the migrant vessel as an open boat stuffed with young black 
people, mostly men. Empathy, a profound lack of understanding, and fear can 




9 Seaborne Bordering: 
Legal Negotiations on Boats and 




The previous section examined the powerful image of the refugee boat by de-
scribing the extent to which the vessel’s recurring attributes of being small, 
overcrowded and unseaworthy go beyond a mere technical assessment of a ves-
sel’s suitability to move on water. I have illustrated that the image together with 
the vessel’s attributes call forth assumptions and fantasies about the condition 
and origin of its passengers and their political status, as well as the organization 
of the journey, thus opening up the possibility to valuate and classify the status 
and ambitions of migrants and refugees arriving in Europe. This chapter focuses 
on legal reasoning advanced in EU border policies toward migrants and refugees 
encountered at sea. 
When in 2000 (and explicitly in 2004) Michael Pugh considered it justified 
to apply the term boat-people to the context of maritime migration to the EU, he 
did so in order “to distinguish their status in law and political discourse” (Pugh 
2004: 51). Yet, what distinguishes the status of boat-people from that of other 
migrants and refugees? Pugh’s formulation suggests that it is, in fact, the vehicle 
that makes the difference. However, others observe a blurring (Inhetveen 2010: 
155) or nullifying (Budz 2009) effect of the vehicle on the legal status of its pas-
sengers. This section explores the vessel’s share in the legal argumentations of 
EU border enforcement measures. 
 
Against the background of the seemingly self-explanatory image of the refugee 
boat, it felt almost naive to ask a Frontex official working with the Sea Border 
Sector about how he could know at sea whether a vessel was used for unauthor-
ized migration. Yet, there was no mention of the crowd of people crammed on 
deck or the condition of the vessel. “They do not fly a flag” was the taken-for-
granted answer that the official provided. In further interviews and when analyz-
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ing legal documents related to sea voyages, I affirmed that the relevant legal 
ground for intercepting vessels with migrants and asylum seekers on board is the 
vessel’s “absence of nationality” (Papastavridis 2009: 159). Would a flag then 
prevent a migrants’ boat from being intercepted or pushed-back? Legally speak-
ing: maybe. Empirically deducing: rather not. 
And still, could the vessel provide the legal ground for border police inter-
vention, while the target and concern of border guards sits inside the vehicle? 
What does this legalistic separation – a distinction between legal reasoning in 
rem, that is, concerning the vessel itself, and legal reasoning in personas, that is, 
concerning the crew and passengers of a vessel – allow for? Which legal status is 
attached to the means of transport – the boat? Which legal status is, in turn, at-
tached to its passengers? Furthermore, how does the legal reasoning in rem inter-
fere with the in personas reasoning? 
For the purpose of working out the vessel’s share in legal reasoning, the 
analysis concentrates on those arguments which rely on the vehicle itself, justify-
ing the interception of “stateless vessels,” of “vessels in distress,” and of “suspi-
cious vessels.” This allows for testing the hypothesis of whether a prioritization 
of the vehicle in legal reasoning allows for operational practices which otherwise 
would have been difficult if not impossible to justify. Focusing on the boat, is 
not to say that persons are no longer considered a part of the relation. Rather, I 
intend to understand how the reference of having been on board “such a boat” ef-
fects migrants’ classification and administration in Europe. 
In order to explore how the liquid sea and the movable environment of the 
boat can determine the legal status of migrants – who then are even called sea-
borne or boat migrants – the relation between territorial border enforcement and 
the different maritime spaces needs to be assessed. Section 9.1 discusses the ex-
tent to which maritime spaces converge with, or diverge from, the notion of terri-
torial borders. As maritime interceptions are a common state practice in the Med-
iterranean, section 9.2 examines its legality as a border enforcement practice at 
sea. The section also goes into the three most virulent characterizations of the 
vessel that legitimize interception: the stateless vessel, the vessel in distress and 
the suspicious vessel. Section 9.3 summarizes the preceding three chapters on 
the refugee boat as vehicle, moving target, and integrating figure of EU border-
ing. The final section analyses the share of the refugee boat to the crafting of an 
external EU border. 
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9.1 MARITIME SPACES AND TERRITORIAL 
BORDER ENFORCEMENT 
 
Political geographer Victor Prescott identified two characteristic differences be-
tween maritime borders and land borders: first, maritime borders are rarely de-
marcated; second, they are more permeable than land borders (Prescott 1987: 
25). It follows that in practical terms, border enforcement along maritime borders 
is more challenging than along land borders. 
In terms of national jurisdiction and thus the range of state authority, border 
enforcement can occur at a port or within the territorial waters of a coastal state, 
the breadth of which is restricted to twelve nautical miles by Art. 3 of the 1982 
LOS Convention. However, Art. 33 (1) LOSC compensates for the practical dif-
ficulties of maritime border enforcement by allowing for certain control practices 
to be expanded up to 24 nautical miles. 
 
“In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, described as the contiguous zone, the coastal 
State may exercise the control necessary to: 
(a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regula-
tions within its territory or territorial sea; 
(b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or 
territorial sea.” 
 
Border surveillance and control can be enacted inside the territorial waters1 and 
in the contiguous zone. The competences of a state extend to 24 nautical miles 
off the baseline of its coast.2 Meanwhile, the legal border of individual’s rights is 
not explicitly expanded; as the obligations of a coastal state only fully apply in 
its territorial waters. Thus, the purpose of the contiguous zone explicitly consists 
in providing for the possibility of effective border control along blue borders 
(Rah 2009: 61). For the maritime space of the contiguous zone this means that 
state powers are extended to it, while at the same time the contiguous zone is no 
longer state territory. 
                                                           
1 According to Art. 3 of the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC), the breadth of the ter-
ritorial sea, to which the sovereignty of a coastal state extends, can be extended to 
twelve nautical miles. 
2 LOSC, Art. 33 (2). 
260 | Mediated Bordering 
 
However, as in the exercise of state power on land, these control measures 
must equally consider the principle of proportionality and non-discrimination; 
they also have to satisfy humanitarian obligations and the principle of non-
refoulement. Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Tillmann Löhr and Timo Tohidipur ad-
vance the territorial argument in a non-geographical interpretation: they argue 
that border control measures “have a functional territorial reference point since 
they are linked to the enforcement of state jurisdiction,” regardless of where they 
are carried out. It follows that border enforcement measures continue to be 
linked to a territorial frame, even in extraterritorial areas. “The factually substan-
tiated territorial reference significantly relativises exterritoriality and means that 
sovereign measures linked to border control activities fall within the ECHR’s 
scope” (Fischer-Lescano/Lohr/Tohidipur 2009: 277). According to Fischer-
Lescano and colleagues, extending the legal border of policing without simulta-
neously extending the legal border of rights externalizes responsibilities while 
provoking a “lack of efficient access to legal protection” (ibid: 295) on the side 
of refugees encountered at sea. 
 
Effectively, border zones and designated danger zones are areas where the com-
petences of policing are exceptional. The exceptional competences allotted to 
border guards or border police for the geographic location of the political border 
and limited to it, have been stressed by Kaufmann et al. (2002), Kaufmann 
(2006: 42), and Mau (2010: 59). No reasonable suspicion is required for inter-
vention and identification checks by the police. Enforcing the border, the liber-
ties of persons can be limited. Access to rights can be rejected to those not carry-
ing the right documents. Borders are thus “border zones of limited rights” (Basa-
ran 2011: 7). The tension between the legal borders of rights and the legal bor-
ders of policing characterizes border zones (ibid: 6-8), because it entails a lawful 
way of limiting the liberties of citizens and foreign nationals. The relation be-
tween the legal border of policing and the legal border of rights is generally 
asymmetrical in areas dedicated to sorting people and granting access, that is, 
border zones. 
On land, this asymmetry between policing and rights is restricted to a certain 
geographical area – the geographical location of the borderline and 30 kilometers 
of hot pursuit. At sea, however, this asymmetry is, in principle, limited to the le-
gal construct of the contiguous zone.  
Yet, the contiguous zone not only extends the legal borders of policing geo-
graphically, it even strengthens them by extending competences while tying 
rights and obligations to the territorial waters and to land. This one-sidedness of 
this maritime zone can be used to the advantage of the coastal state in its control 
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and enforcement capabilities. This radical split is at the bottom of so called 
pushback and interception operations. Before discussing the reasonings that sus-
tain so called interception or pushback operations, I shall go into a brief excursus 
on the maritime zone of the high seas and its notion of the freedom of the sea. 
 
The first to claim that the sea was a free space was the Dutch philosopher Hugo 
Grotius (1583-1645). In Mare Liberum, Grotius argued that the sea was interna-
tional rather than merely at the disposal of the capable sea powers. He claimed 
that “no part of the sea can be considered as the territory of any people whatso-
ever” (Grotius 2001 [1609]: 34) but as a common property which “all men might 
use […] without the prejudice to anyone else” (ibid: 2). According to Grotius, all 
nations should be able to undertake and profit from ocean-going trade and at the 
same time grant mutual non-interference. The assumption that directional 
movement occurs for the purpose of trade and commerce underpinned Grotius’s 
claim. The emphasis on movement and on the principle of non-interference with 
innocent passages at sea is key to what Grotius understood as the freedom of the 
sea. In other words, no authority should control access to the sea. The claim was 
revolutionary for the early 17th century. Mare Liberum not only undermined the 
Pope’s world order, it also opposed the British maritime mastery.3 It thus pro-
voked several responses. 
In 1635, the British polymath John Selden (1584-1654) published Mare 
Clausum, which divided the sea into exclusive spheres of interest and power. In 
1703, Cornelis van Bynkershoek mediated the two positions arguing that posses-
sion of the sea was principally possible, but that a state’s dominion and posses-
sion over the sea ended “where missiles […] exploded” (quoted in Prescott 1987: 
16). In the early 18th century, the range of a cannon shot was roughly three miles 
long. Bynkershoek’s cannon shot rule has been referred to as argumentative ba-
sis for the legal construct of the territorial waters. However, the mediation it of-
fered was too variable (ibid: 16-17), and states continuously tried to expand their 
spheres of influence and possession at sea. Even though different empirical ex-
amples can demonstrate states’ eagerness to appropriate the sea, the international 
customary law of the freedom of the sea is frequently brought against these am-
bitions. The stipulation twelve nautical miles in the Law of the Sea Convention 
of 1982 is a refining of territorial waters and thus state authority and jurisdiction, 
states dominion and possession is restricted geographically. Until this date, the 
                                                           
3  The Catholic Church promptly indicated Mare Liberum as it undermined the papal 
world order (Raya). 
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freedom of the sea is enshrined in Art. 87 of the LOS Convention. It declares 
that the high seas are “open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked.” It pro-
vides among other things for the freedom of navigation.4 
 
The freedom of the sea opposes the taking of possession, the territorialization, 
and the striating of the sea by stressing that the sea is “the spatial extension re-
source, principally useful as a domain for movement” (McDougal/Burke 1962: 
vii). Grotius claim that “the seas are by their very nature a domination-free 
sphere of trade routes [Ger.: herrschaftsfreie Handelsstraßen], which cannot be 
subjected to state appropriation” (Gadow-Stephani 2006: 39) implies that there is 
no supreme authority, no monopoly ruling over the legitimate means of move-
ment at sea.  
The notion of a space of movement free from dominion, and the principle of 
territorial sovereignty grounded on some sort of measured spatial extension 
stress different premises. While in the latter case, rules apply “within” a certain 
area, the former is concerned with movement itself. And while in the latter, 
movement as such can be interdicted, the former may merely define the “traffic 
rules.” When movement across maritime borders is surveilled and controlled, 
these two principles – the freedom of the sea and territorial order – confront each 
other. Meanwhile, boats and ships navigate between them, integrating and chal-
lenging both principles. 
 
Overall, it is important to keep in mind that the contiguous zone already com-
pensates for the practical difficulties of maritime border surveillance and control. 
In strictu sensu of the 1982 United Nations LOS Convention, which the EU 
joined in August 2013, border enforcement measures can only legitimately occur 
within the territorial waters of a coastal state and its contiguous zone. In fact, the 
contiguous zone is a maritime construct granted in order to address the practical 
difficulties of maritime border enforcement. With the contiguous zone providing 
                                                           
4  Ships enjoy freedom of navigation, even in territorial waters of a third coastal state, 
provided their passage is innocent and that there is a genuine link between the vessel 
and a flag state. Apart from providing for the freedom of navigation, Art. 87 (1) of the 
LOS Convention lists: “(b) freedom of overflight; (c) freedom to lay submarine cables 
and pipelines, subject to Part VI; (d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other 
installations permitted under international law, subject to Part VI; (e) freedom of fish-
ing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2; (f) freedom of scientific research, 
subject to Parts VI and XIII.” 
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already exceptional competences beyond the territorial border-line, anything be-
yond 24 miles has nothing to do with border enforcement measures. 
And still, despite the right to innocent passage and the principle geographical 
limitation of border enforcement measures to the contiguous zone, the LOS 
Convention encompasses no provisions from which refugee boats or migrants’ 
vessels could profit. It is instead composed of rights and obligations which states 
grant each other (Rah 2009: 21). Moreover, considering the history of the Free-
dom of the Sea and the Freedom of Navigation, these ideas and norms have been 
formulated without any bearing on (small) vessels or on the case of flight and 
migration as a purpose of seafaring. To a certain extent the discussions around 
the legality of maritime interceptions connects with these loopholes. 
 
 
9.2 LEGITIMIZING MARITIME INTERCEPTION AS A 
BORDER ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE 
 
Ever since operational border enforcement along Schengen borders has been co-
ordinated by the Frontex agency, maritime border enforcement practices of Eu-
ropean Mediterranean states have changed. Under the premise of “proactive” and 
“integrated border management,” border enforcement measures have also been 
implemented beyond the contiguous zone, and thus occur where border enforce-
ment is not supposed to occur. On the high sea, or in foreign waters, border en-
forcement measures encompass interceptions or pushback of migrants’ vessels in 
designated “operational areas.” Monitoring, control and recovery efforts are 
geared toward the small, crowded and barely seaworthy boats as condensed mo-
ment of suspicion, unease and insecurity. In fact, the interception “of boats carry-
ing irregular migrants is the primary tool by means of which States attempt to 
stem the number of arrivals at their shores and thus fulfill their main policy aim” 
(Mallia 2010: 18) in the area of immigration control.  
Yet, it is debatable whether maritime interception is to be considered a legit-
imate border enforcement practice. Both the available official description of “in-
terception” as well as practitioners’ early assessments of practices that were sub-
sumed under this term, reveal a disconnect between a common state practice at 
sea and the legal provisions in place. This section examines how these gaps are 
being closed by reference to the three most virulent characterizations of the ves-
sel that legitimize interception: the vessel’s statelessness, its being in distress and 
its being suspicious. 
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It should be noted that there is no official definition of interception as a policing 
practice or border enforcement measure. There rather is a description of a modus 
operandi. 
In June 2000, UNHCR’s Executive Committee described past and current 
state practices and thereof derived a provisional definition of interception. The 
“definition” should not be read as affirmation by UNHCR of the respective con-
trol practices. The Executive Committee found that interception encompasses 
“all measures applied by a State, outside its national territory, in order to prevent 
interrupt or stop the movement of persons without the required documentation 
crossing international borders by land, air, or sea, and making their way to the 
country of prospective destination.”5 
The most important aspect of this definition is that it provides for an alterna-
tive location to control the movement of persons other than the administrative 
territorial border or the national territory. Moreover, the definition reveals that 
interception occurs with the sole intention to stop unauthorized mobility. With 
this intention defining it, interception rather appears as a policy than a practice. 
In fact, it entails “all measures applied by a State, outside its national territory,” 
to prevent that someone without the necessary authorization enters its territory. 
Barbara Miltner underlines that this definition “reflects and emphasizes the ex-
traterritorial character of interception” (Miltner 2006: 79, original emphasis). 
This forward displacement, or extra-territorialization, is not derived from the 
practical difficulties of maritime border control. Rather, it occurs to fend off ob-
ligations, which are triggered when refugees and migrants are encountered or 
picked up at sea. The ExCom correspondingly observed that in “most instances, 
the aim after interception is return without delay of all irregular passengers to 
their country of origin.”6 Effectively, access to the legal border of rights is re-
stricted or even made impossible by relocating, that is, by pushing the frontier 
further off territory. While in 2000 the stock-taking definition of interception al-
so entailed administrative instruments such as the non-issuing of a visa, the Ex-
ecutive Committee narrowed this description to active practices in 2003. It stated 
that  
                                                           
5 Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s program, 18th Meeting of the 
Standing Committee (EC/50/SC/CPR.17), June 9, 2000: Interception of Asylum-
Seekers and Refugees: The International Framework and Recommendations for a 
comprehensive Approach, at: https://www.unhcr.org/4963237411.pdf (accessed Sep-
tember 2, 2019), Section B (i) (Defining interception, para. 10). 
6  Ibid: Section B (ii) (Description of interception practices, para. 12). 
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“interception is one of the measures employed by States to: 
•  prevent embarkation of persons on an international journey; 
•  prevent further onward international travel by persons who have commenced their 
journey; or 
•  assert control of vessels where there are reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is 
transporting persons contrary to international or national maritime law;  
•  where, in relation to the above, the person or persons do not have the required docu-
mentation or valid permission to enter; and that such measures also serve to protect 
the lives and security of the travelling public as well as persons being smuggled or 
transported in an irregular manner.”7 
 
Implicitly, the notion of interception revolves around control practices at sea, 
with regard to vessels repurposed for facilitating migration. Similar to the 2000 
definition, interception is first and foremost thought of to tackle the movement of 
undocumented persons. Interception is thus not part of overall immigration or 
mobility policies, but tackles a particular segment, that is, those cases which 
have no legitimate means of movement in the first place. 
 
Even before 2015 and the operation Mare Nostrum, the legality of maritime in-
terception practices in the Mediterranean has been analyzed and debated widely 
(Gavouneli 2006; Miltner 2006; Fischer-Lescano/Lohr/Tohidipur 2009; Trevisa-
nut 2010; Tondini 2012; Coppens 2012; Papastavridis 2013). Generally, inter-
ceptions on the high seas without flag-state consent are considered a violation of 
the principle of free navigation on international waters under the LOS Conven-
tion.8 Effectively, however, a number of legal constructs have been advanced, 
which allow for the maritime interception of migrants while at the same time cir-
cumventing the principle of non-refoulement. 
In fact, considering a statement given by a commander of the Armed Forces 
of Malta (AFM) already in 2005, it seems as if legal reasoning was constructed 
for a state practice that already functioned all too well. In an interview with Silja 
Klepp, the commander concedes that “the current status of international law […] 
doesn’t really facilitate this type of interception operations” (Klepp 2011: 295). 
                                                           
7  Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Program/Standing Committee 
(2003): Conclusion on Protection Safeguards in Interception MeasuresConclusion on 
Protection Safeguards in Interception Measures, at: https://www.unhcr.org/3f93b 
2894.html (accessed October 19, 2019). 
8 The argument is also advanced by Brouwer/Kumin (2003: 14); Basaran (2011: 74). 
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He briefly mentions the different legal statutes which have been advanced to jus-
tify maritime interception: the Palermo protocols – “about the fact that they still 
believe in flag state permission and these are not wearing a flag” – the LOSC and 
the crimes listed – namely slavery, piracy, illegal transmission – actually “attract 
international jurisdiction,”9 including the Vienna Convention’s concerning drug 
trafficking. According to the commander, the facts which have been used to jus-
tify interception don’t really match with the situation of encountering migrants 
and refugee vessels at sea. The statement of facts under which interception oc-
curs is thus unclear (ibid). With regard to maritime interceptions of migrants’ 
vessels, the AFM commander concluded that  
 
“[t]here is no body of international law which covers it. Now again we have said that state-
less vessels on the High Sea are subject to anyone’s jurisdiction, but A you have to have 
something in your national law which covers it and Malta hasn’t and B you have to talk 
about proportionality.” (quoted in Klepp 2011: 295) 
 
The commander further explains that Malta could only legitimately intervene in 
the case of rescue (Klepp 2011: 296). Similarly, Matteo Tondini (2012: 62-64), 
strategist and former military legal adviser to the Italian Navy, states that the 
SAR regime is the only available legal instrument to contribute to the legality of 
interception. Beyond that, if competences cannot be mobilized under criminal 
law nor for humanitarian reasons, there is a third reason: the suspicion of smug-
gling migrants, which works on the notion of risk and proactivity. These three 
legitimizing constructs will be considered in detail in the following subsections. 
All three deduce the legality of interception from different traits of the vessel: its 
legal, situational and techno-legal traits. 
 
9.2.1 The Stateless Vessel 
 
The legality of interception was first established on the grounds that vessels are 
stateless. As described by the AFM official cited above, it had been argued that 
on the high sea, ships without a flag are subject to anyone’s jurisdiction. They 
may, in accordance with Article 110 (1d) of the LOS Convention, be stopped, 
boarded and seized. Because the rights of international maritime law are rights 
which states grant each other and thus based on reciprocity and mutual recogni-
tion, vessels without a flag cannot count on these rights nor on the protection by 
                                                           
9 LOSC, Art. 99-108. 
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any state. In other words, stateless vessels cannot rely on the principle of non-
interference. Rah adds that “no rights of a foreign state are violated when such 
vehicles [vessels with no flags] are stopped” (2009: 21).  
If a migrant vessel was flying a flag and if there was a genuine link between 
the vessel and the flag state, the vessel could, in principle, profit from the right to 
innocent passage in the territorial waters of a coastal state. It could also profit on 
the principle of non-interference and the freedom of navigation on the high sea. 
In fact, “the act of carrying migrants on the high seas is not an international 
crime as such” (Papastavridis 2009: 163). Yet, despite these principle legal pro-
visions, flying a flag is not part of the optional equipment for a vessel repurposed 
for unauthorized migration. If it were for legalistic reasons, the genuine link be-
tween a ship and the flag state required by Article 91 (1) of the LOS Convention 
is not only implausible but also inexpedient. 
Flag state registration is implausible since the watercraft used for seaborne 
migration – wooden fishing boots, inflatable boats, dinghies, unregistered 
freighters – would regularly not meet the requirement to fly a state’s flag. 
UNODC reported that the fishing vessels used for smuggling “often do not re-
quire registration domestically or internationally, and are [also] not required to 
have satellite or other tracking systems on board.”10 Flag state registration is in-
expedient with regard to the purpose of the journey. Neither the facilitators, nor 
the migrants, nor the refugees would claim the protection of a state (as flag 
state). Which flag could they possibly fly, which would render their movement 
on water acceptable, and which would meaningfully help to identify the vessel? 
If a flag could be flown to indicate the need for protection (for example, a “Nan-
sen-flag”), the migrants’ vessels could fly the flag of the European Union. How-
ever, I dare hypothesize that procedures at sea would remain as they are, with or 
without flag, as the absence of the vessel’s nationality is not the issue at stake, 
but “merely” the basis for interception. 
 
This question or rather omission of a plausible answer demonstrates the absence 
of nationality as legitimate ground for intercepting migrant vessels. It belongs to 
a straw man argument, as the stateless vessel ground builds upon a set-up im-
plausibility. In fact, the reference to a state would rather increase the risk for mi-
                                                           
10  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2011): Smuggling of Migrants 
by Sea, at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Migrant-Smuggling/ 
Issue-Papers/Issue_Paper_-_Smuggling_of_Migrants_by_Sea.pdf, (accessed August 
25, 2015), p. 29. 
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grants and refugees alike for being identified with that state and deported to it. 
Flag state protection thus helps the “tourists” (Bauman 1997: 83-93), who do not 
– by their very movement – contest the authority over the legitimate means of 
movement. Hence, grounding the legality of maritime interception on the state-
lessness of the migrants’ vessel allows one to overlook the possible need of pro-
tection of its passengers. A stateless vessel is argued to be legitimately intercept-
ed on the high seas, and be taken or pushed back to its place of embarkation. The 
principle of non-refoulement can effectively be circumvented by prioritizing the 
boat as object of legal reasoning. This legal narrative avoids the elephant in the 
boat. 
Being on board “such a vessel” therefore entails risking (Bauman 1997) and 
asking for international protection. As a legal figure, the vehicle shows similari-
ties with Agamben’s (1998 [1995]) homo sacer: the seizure and even destruction 
of the vessel can occur exempt from punishment as it does not violate the rights 
of a foreign state or private owner. The migrants’ vessel doesn’t form part of the 
international order of (flag) state affiliation. Consequently, Herman Meyers ar-
gues that the statelessness can be understood as “allocationlessness” (Meyers 
1967: 309), as no rights or duties are attached to a vessel without flag. Moreover, 
its perceived condition reduces it to a piece of material that barely floats. It is not 
treated as territory and thus, the vessel’s deck does not provide its occupants 
with rights. The migrants’ vessels are a bare thing, which according to “general-
ly end up at the bottom of the sea and were never intended for use in more than 
one journey.”11 Effectively, the hybrid “migrants’ vessel” or “refugee boat” is 
vested with a double statelessness – its passengers are not infrequently traveling 
without papers on a stateless vessel. For this hybrid, access to rights is (at the 
very least) protracted and set at an angle. The competences of law enforcement 
authorities over the vessel, by contrast, are ample and declared straightforward. 
It has been stressed that the passengers of a stateless vessel are not automatically 
stateless and that the absence of nationality of the vessel should not affect the na-
tionality of the individuals on board (Meyers 1967: 309; Papastavridis 2009: 
163). However, with state practices and their legal reasoning resorting first and 
foremost to the vehicle, and plainly omit the human cargo, the vulnerability of 
the migrants on board is augmented. Enforcement jurisdiction over the vessel in 
rem allows for one to nullify the principle of non-refoulement applicable to pas-
sengers in search for international protection.  
                                                           
11  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2011): Smuggling of Migrants 
by Sea, p. 29. 
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9.2.2 The Vessel in Distress 
 
A vessel without nationality legally justifies the hunter’s engagement in border 
enforcement. A vessel in distress alarms allies to assist or rescue passengers 
from a capsizing vessel. Interviewees in this study have mentioned that intercep-
tion operations can easily turn into search and rescue operations.12 This is an apt 
description when looking at patrol activities in the Mediterranean. Since many 
vessels used by migrants and refugees to cross the Mediterranean travel in sub-
standard condition and are overcrowded, distress situations are common.13 In 
2009, the European Commission even conceded that “[m]ost of the maritime op-
erations coordinated by Frontex turn into search and rescue operations.”14 When 
patrol vessels encounter boats or ships in distress, they are obliged – just like all 
other ships or coastal states – to “go to the aid of ships in distress regardless of 
where they are” (Brouwer/Kumin 2003: 14). 
                                                           
12 Similarly, Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen quotes a Spanish navel captain who in 2007 
saw that the encounter “may provoke capsizing, either deliberately as migrants seek to 
provoke a rescue operation, or involuntarily if the weight of those on board the often 
overcrowded ships shifts too much to one side” (quoted in Gammeltoft-Hansen 2011: 
141). The researcher thereof concludes that “[i]n practice, interception operations may 
quickly change to a situation of search and rescue” (ibid). The reasons he advances 
are: first, the bad condition of many vessels and second, the difficult situation of en-
counter between intercepting and migrant vessels. 
13  For instance, in 2011 UNHCR published a table with documented distress incidents at 
sea involving refugees and migrants for the period between January 1, 2011 and Octo-
ber 31, 2011. For the investigated period of nine months, UNHCR documented 39 in-
cidents of distress at sea in different regions of the world. In 23 incidents the location 
of distress had been the Mediterranean Basin, which means that almost 60 per cent of 
the distress incidents were documented for the Mediterranean Basin which increases 
the probability of border patrols encountering or being called by a vessel in distress 
and thereby being obliged to rescue. Yet, in the case of the Mediterranean incidents, 
the circumstances of the distress situation remain mostly unelaborated. 
14  European Commission: Proposal for a Council Decision supplementing the Schengen 
Borders Code as regards the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of 
the operational cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the Management 
of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, November 27, 2009, COM (2009) 
658 final: section 2 (Reasons and Objectives). 
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This obligation follows from Article 98 (1) of the LOS Convention, which 
mandates that every vessel, official and private, to “render assistance to any per-
son found at sea in danger of being lost” and “to proceed with all possible speed 
to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance.”15 Se-
line Trevisanut clarifies that although Article 98 “is located in the LOSC section 
on the high seas, the duty to render assistance applies in all maritime zones” 
(Trevisanut 2010: 526) as the duty “could not disappear just because of the 
crossing of a maritime frontier” (ibid: 527, fn. 8). 
In fact, the international search and rescue regime operates beyond the prin-
ciple of territory, which typically structures international relations and agree-
ments. It imposes duties on all coastal and seafaring states independent of the 
maritime zone and encourages them to coordinate their search and rescue ser-
vices (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2011: 141). Unlike in the case of territories, search 
and rescue (SAR) zones can also overlap, as is the case of the Maltese and the 
Italian SAR zones (Trevisanut 2010: 524).16 
While enforcement measures are restricted to a defined territorial area, hu-
manitarian duties such as rescue operations request universal application and 
thus exceptions to territorial references in law enforcement measures. While the 
specific geographical location is central for ascertaining the competences and du-
ties of law enforcement vessels vis-à-vis a vessel in question and its passengers, 
the humanitarian operation of rescue at sea enables and even requires interfer-
ence, regardless of geocodes or juridical-administrative references. Therefore, 
border enforcement activities effectively depart from their designated operational 
purpose and domain by responding to a distress call. To a certain extent, distress 
situations rescind the spatial restrictions to law enforcement competences. A dis-
tress situation both obliges and authorizes its witnesses. However, they only do 
so temporarily and for the purpose of the respective rescue operation. 
                                                           
15  In 2014 the EU has taken a similar formulation into: Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 of 
the European Parliament and of the European Council of May 15, 2014: establishing 
rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of operational co-
operation coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union: 
Preamble (14). 
16  “Malta has unilaterally declared this zone and has not negotiated its delimitation with 
neighboring States. As a result, the extension of the Maltese SAR zone is equivalent to 
750 times its territory” (Trevisanut 2010: 524) Moreover, its extension coincides with 
the Maltese Flight Information Region (Klepp 2011: 341). 
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Distress situations at sea trigger the legal framework of the 1974 International 
Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)17 and the 1979 International 
Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR Convention)18, both of which 
fall under the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC). The SAR Convention defines 
the actual distress phase as a “situation wherein there is reasonable certainty that 
a person, a vessel or other craft is threatened by grave and imminent danger and 
requires immediate assistance.”19 
Practitioners’ statements that interception operations can easily turn into 
search and rescue operations suggest that while patrolling, border guards would 
not only detect vessels but assess whether the vessel in question was in a situa-
tion where “immediate assistance” was required. Their assessment of the situa-
tion would thus change subsequent proceedings with the vessel and its passen-
gers. If the vessel is not found to be in a distress situation, interference with the 
vessel occurs in the framework of border enforcement measures. The lack of a 
flag or the suspicion of smuggling migrants (cf. below) would legitimize the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction over the vessel (and its passengers). 
Without distress, focus is on the rights and the security of states and thus the 
competences of law enforcement agencies vis-à-vis migrant vessels. In case of 
distress, emphasis shifts to the safety of migrants and refugees on board. If the 
vessel is found to be in distress, a rescue obligation according to the LOSC and 
SAR Convention would be triggered. The translation from hunter to friend thus 
partly depends on the assessment of the hunter himself. At the same time, the 
humanitarian character of rescue often conflicts with migration control objec-
tives that underpin border enforcement measures (Miltner 2006: 82). 
 
A common definition of distress shared by EU member states seems particularly 
important for joint operation contexts. Yet, while some member states consider 
all migrants’ vessels to be in distress due to their bad condition, overcrowding, or 
the lack of a professional navigator, others argue that migrants are not in distress 
                                                           
17  International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) (adopted November 1, 
1974, in force May 25, 1980); in: United Nations (ed., 1980): Treaty Series 
1184/18961: 278-453. 
18  International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR Convention) (adopted 
April 27, 1979, in force June 22, 1985), in: United Nations (ed., 1985): Treaty Series 
1405/23489: 118-256. 
19  SAR Convention, Annex, Chapter 1 (1.3.11). 
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until their vessels actually start sinking.20 These diverging interpretations of the 
SAR provisions result in conflicting operational practices between national bor-
der enforcement units. Even the European Commission criticized in 2009 that 
“these rules are not interpreted or applied uniformly by the Member States.”21 It 
even noted that “the fact that the operations become search and rescue operations 
removes them from the Frontex coordination and Community law.”22 In addition 
to these differences in operational practice, the legal basis for intervention and 
subsequent obligations change based on the fact there is a “vessel in distress.” 
 
According to the SAR Convention, “rescue” is defined as an “operation to re-
trieve persons in distress, provide for their initial medical or other needs, and de-
liver them to a place of safety.”23 Rescue fends off the loss of lives at sea. As 
with other emergency operations, it prevents something worse from happening in 
a life-threatening situation. The description evokes a relatively straightforward 
yet temporary operation: rescue persons from danger at sea and take them to a 
place of safety in which the “grave and imminent danger” no longer exists. Yet, 
“the relatively straightforward issue of the disembarkation and subsequent return 
to their country of origin of sailors rescued at sea” (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2011: 
142) has become twisted with the presence of unauthorized migrants and refu-
gees on board vessels.  
The change stems first and foremost from the disembarkation duty and the 
controversies about what constitutes a place of safety. In 2004, the IMO adopted 
amendments to the SAR and SOLAS Convention.24 These were intended to con-
                                                           
20  Among legal analysts this is not a clear-cut issue, either: Violeta Moreno-Lax (2011: 
22-23) argued in 2011 that unseaworthiness entails distress. Coppens (2012: 345) 
summarizes that for “some EU member states, the vessel must be on the point of sink-
ing while, for others, it is sufficient for the vessel to be unseaworthy. Some member 
states require a request for assistance from the people on board while others do not.” 
21  European Commission (2009): Proposal for a Council Decision supplementing the 
Schengen Borders Code as regards the surveillance of the sea external borders in the 
context of the operational cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, November 27, 2009, 
COM(2009) 658 final , Section 2 (Reasons and objectives). 
22  Ibid. 
23  SAR Convention, Annex, Chapter 1 (1.3.2). 
24  Both amendments were adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), 
and entered into force on July 1, 2006. See Maritime Safety Committee, 78/26/Add. 1 
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trol inconveniences for rescuing ships or captains and was supposed to clarify 
what constitutes a place of safety. The amendments stipulate that the state re-
sponsible for the SAR zone should also ensure, as soon as possible, a safe haven 
(place of safety) for the disembarkation of rescued persons. 
Effectively, the crux of disembarkation resides in the state’s responsibility for 
those being rescued. Disembarkation not only terminates the actual rescue 
phase,25 it is also measured by the safety of the rescuees; a place of safety “is al-
so a place where the survivors’ safety of life is no longer threatened.”26 Further 
obligations open up for the rescuing state with regard to unauthorized migrants – 
the same migrants the state had otherwise wanted to prevent from illegally cross-
ing the border. When applied to refugees and asylum seekers, safety bears differ-
ent meanings than when applied to shipwrecked persons in general. In the case 
of refugees, safety entails the right to seek asylum, which complicates the notion 
of a place of safety. The life-threatening situation of a fugitive isn’t resolved 
when the distress situation is terminated – it’s the reason for his or her being en 
route in the first place. In principle, if refugees are on board, their safety is only 
achieved when “effective protection” is provided (cf. Legomsky 2005). 
In order to not be burdened with that obligation, state practices have extend-
ed to rescuing or assisting boats in foreign SAR zones and to disembarking mi-
grant passengers in their place of embarkation. Rescue transforms the operation 
from being a humanitarian obligation to an instant mandate. This provides a ba-
sis for interference where border patrols have no enforcement jurisdiction. Res-
cue is repurposed and submitted to the objectives of border policies. 
Different experts of international refugee law argue that the rights of mi-
grants and refugees on board these vessels cannot be circumvented by declaring 
border enforcement as a series of rescue operations. And yet this is what actually 
happens. The distress situation of the vessel provides a legitimizing narrative for 
circumventing the principle of non-refoulement. The principle of refoulement 
                                                           
Annex 3 and 5 respectively. “The purpose of these amendments and the current guid-
ance is to help ensure that persons in distress are assisted, while minimizing the in-
convenience to assisting ships and ensuring the continued integrity of SAR services” 
(Rah 2009: 120-121). 
25  “A place of safety is a location where rescue operations are considered to terminate” 
(SAR Convention). 
26  “and where their basic human needs (such as food, shelter and medical needs) can be 
met” (Maritime Safety Committee; IMO (2004): Guidelines on the Treatment of Per-
sons rescued at Sea, Resolution MSC.167(78), adopted on May 20, 2004), para. 6.12. 
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becomes part of operations when distress is the basis of intervention. Distress al-
so empowers immediate assistance to a vessel or other craft and tow or escort it 
back to a place of safety, often the shores of the country of embarkation, while 
ignoring the fact that on board the vessel are passengers with mixed legal status-
es (Coppens 2013: 2). Hence, when disguised as assistance, even operations of 
hindrance can find a legitimizing narrative. Violeta Moreno-Lax sees a mala fide 
implementation of maritime law by EU member states and a “direct breach” of 
their protection obligations vis-à-vis asylum seekers (Moreno-Lax 2011: 26). 
However, this doesn’t occur in an alleged grey zone, but rather via the fact that 
legal border policing is stretched out by a humanitarian mandate to conduct sea 
rescues. It is, in fact, the reference to the vessel (in distress) that appears as mo-
bilizing and empowering. 
 
Mare Nostrum and 
the Legitimizing Narrative of Saving Lives at Sea 
Italy’s large-scale rescue operation Mare Nostrum launched 15 days after the 
Lampedusa shipwreck of October 3, 2013 has fostered this argumentative con-
struct. Mare Nostrum lasted for a little more than a year, from October 18, 2013 
to October 31, 2014. Before the operation was launched, defense minister Mario 
Mauro explained the operation’s intention: 
 
“the ships would be escorted to the nearest safe port, in compliance with international law. 
If there aren’t any migrants in need of medical assistance […] and if the ship is able to sail, 
it “will be taken to the safest and nearest port, not necessarily Italian.” (quoted in AN-
SAmed (N.N.) 2013) 
 
These procedures, however, were not what made the news. Even though a care-
ful reading reveals that Mauro’s announcement invited a worsening of the ves-
sels’ condition, the most important operational difference to conventional mari-
time border control was the official extension of the operational area to 70.000 
square miles of sea – three times the region of Sicily. 
Most importantly, in terms of equipment and personnel, operation Mare Nos-
trum spoke rescue. According to the Italian Defense Ministry, Italy deployed 
five Italian navy ships “either patrollers or corvettes – with wide range and med-
ical care capabilities,” One amphibious Landing Platform Dock (LPD) vessel 
with “specific command and control features, medical and shelter facilities for 
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the would-be migrants.”27 Additionally, three aircrafts, one equipped with For-
ward Looking Infrared (FLIR), up to nine helicopters “to be readily deployed to 
Lampedusa or Catania,” and two unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) of the type 
Camcopter S-100 surveilled the sea from above. The coastal radar network and 
the Italian AIS (Automatic Identification System) are shore stations that routine-
ly support operations and have been used during Mare Nostrum as well. Fur-
thermore, submarines have been deployed to investigate the smuggling business 
and other criminal activities. Mare Nostrum operated on a monthly budget of 9 
million euros and was supported with 900 officers – 300 per shift. In total, 
150,810 migrants were rescued during the operation.28 
The fact that a large number of seaborne migrants could potentially find 
space on board an Italian navy ship was a novel idea. With assets acknowledging 
the need for rescue capacity, Mare Nostrum was prepared to function as a search 
and rescue operation – it expected to take on board those spotted at sea. Howev-
er, the approach attracted criticism from other European member states. Oppo-
nents considered Mare Nostrum a pull factor as “the migrants in the boats and 
their smugglers could be fairly certain that they would be rescued by one of 
Mare Nostrum’s ships” (IRIN News (N.N.) 2015a). The British Foreign Office 
minister Baroness Anelay, for instance, argued that the operation “only encour-
aged more people to make the treacherous journey” (quoted in ibid) Overall, the 
discussion about Mare Nostrum challenged and even reversed established argu-
ments and practices of maritime border enforcement: 
 
•  Since the early days of Schengen, opponents of restrictive EU border poli-
cies used to argue that EU policies provoked, increased and perpetuated the 
smuggling business; it’s now the opponents of a humanitarian rescue opera-
tion who argue that a humanitarian approach would fuel the smuggling 
business. 
•  Furthermore, the acceptance of where border enforcement should legiti-
mately occur changed: When the Frontex operation Triton was launched to 
                                                           
27  Ministero della Difesa (2014): Operation Mare Nostrum, at: http://www.marina.difesa. 
it/EN/operations/Pagine/MareNostrum.aspx (accessed November 17, 2014). 
28  The cited information on Mare Nostrum has been summarized in August 2015 accord-
ing to the website of the Italian Ministry of Defense. Additional information, some of 
which differs from the Ministry’s account have been provided by (Andres 2014: 28), 
and in quite a comprehensive graphic of The Guardian (Kirchgaessner/Traynor/ 
Kingsley 2015). 
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replace Mare Nostrum, NGOs and the critics of EU border policies argued 
in a way unthinkable before. They requested that Triton be provided with 
more equipment and an extended operational area. European coastal ser-
vices should expand their activities during the Mare Nostrum operation. So, 
those who before vehemently claimed that Frontex had nothing to search for 
in foreign waters or even on the high seas now support, in addition to an ex-
pansion of the mandate, Frontex’s presence beyond territorial waters. 
•  Since Mare Nostrum, the occurrences at sea no longer happen out of sight. 
A variety of private individuals and non-governmental organizations, such 
as SOS Mediterranée and Sea Watch, interfere with border surveillance and 
border enforcement in the Mediterranean. As a result, not only is the infor-
mation monopoly on the part of border enforcement agencies broken, news 
of rescue ships – rather than boats – with migrants on board is also increas-
ingly reaching public attention. This intensifies the focus on the image of 
the small refugee boat and thus the marginalization and depoliticization of 
the people on board. 
 
Going back to the legitimizing construct of the vessel in distress, on the whole it 
appears that, on the one hand, the purpose of migration control has become im-
possible thanks to vessels in distress. On the other hand, vessels in distress em-
power intervention by providing a mandate to do so. Accordingly, the rights of 
states and ships are no longer bound to maritime legal zones but are subordinated 
to distress. The vessel in distress thus mobilizes law enforcement competences. 
In a distress situation, the goal of patrol vessels transforms from immigration and 
border control to salvage. This mediation (translation) fits the law enforcement 
vessel with a mobilization of its operational area, that is, a situational geograph-
ical extension of the (legal) possibility to intervene. 
According to Latour, translation refers to the “the creation of a link that did 
not exist before and that to some degree modifies two elements or agents” 
(Latour 1994: 2). In this case, the migrants’ vessel translates the law enforcement 
vessel into a rescue vessel – the hunter into a friend. Even though seaborne mi-
grants deploy the vessel as a technology of movement, their vehicle (as a thing) 
also becomes integrated into EU border policy reasoning providing the (situa-
tional) mandate to intervene. 
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9.2.3 The Suspicious Vessel 
 
Considering the merging of interception and rescue operations, it can be stated 
that an enforcement vessel operates as a dual service vessel with a paradox ob-
jective. When this dual service vessel identifies or encounters an unseaworthy 
vessel, flagless under reasonable suspicion of smuggling migrants, this third ar-
gument ultimately legitimizes the latter’s interception. In fact, with the entry into 
force of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol, maritime interception on the high seas 
or in foreign waters was rendered “a legitimate tool” for border control and en-
forcement (Miltner 2006: 105), as reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel is 
engaged in smuggling already provide for the search, boarding and seizure of 
persons and cargo of such a vessel.29 Instead of focusing on the act of illegal 
immigration as such, this third legal reasoning focusses on its facilitation. The 
hunter is not chasing migrants, but smugglers. 
In fact, the Protocol against Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air 
states as its purpose to “prevent and combat the smuggling of migrants, as well 
as to promote cooperation among State Parties to that end, while protecting the 
rights of smuggled migrants.”30 Thereby, the Migrant Smuggling Protocol in-
tends a remarkable balancing act: while the facilitation of illegal border crossing 
is declared a crime in international law, the criminal liability of the facilitated 
migrants is explicitly excluded from the Protocol, with the migrant being de-
clared an “object of [such] conduct,”31 namely of smuggling.32 Smuggling refers 
to the mere physical movement, the transportation of persons across international 
borders “on a payment-for-service basis” (Mallia 2010: 10). The service ends 
with the arrival of migrants at a destination (ibid: 11). 
                                                           
29  Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the 
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Report of the Ad 
Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime on the work of its first to eleventh sessions, U.N. Doc. A/55/383 (2000), Annex 
III, [hereafter cited as Migrant Smuggling Protocol], Art. 8, p. 5-6. 
30  Migrant Smuggling Protocol, Art. 2, p. 2. 
31  Ibid, Art. 5, p. 3. 
32  “Smuggling” is defined in Art. 3(a) of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol as “the pro-
curement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material bene-
fit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a na-
tional or a permanent resident,” 
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Effectively, border surveillance and enforcement practices pursue facilitation 
networks by tackling their vehicular indicator as the final link of the facilitation 
chain: the vessel boarded by migrants who travel without authorization by the 
state of destination. Even though the offense “is constituted by the act of the ille-
gal crossing of an international border” (Mallia 2010: 11), it is the profit that is 
made out of its facilitation which gives way to a criminalization of the conduct 
of smuggling. However, as Papastavridis stresses “the act of carrying migrants 
[…] is not an international crime as such; the only conduct that is criminalized is 
the ‘smuggling of migrants’ and solely for the States parties to the respective 
Protocol” (Papastavridis 2009: 163).33  Yet again, if the facilitation networks 
were non-commercial, the unauthorized migrants would still be tackled by bor-
der enforcement, yet the point of intervention could only be the territorial border, 
or in the case of seaborne migration, in the contiguous zone or the territorial wa-
ters. Interception en route would principally not be legitimate. 
Nonetheless, with the entry into force of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol, 
maritime interception on the high seas or in foreign waters could be justified by 
reference to the (potential) crime of smuggling (Miltner 2006: 105). This legal 
frame criminalizes the commercialized facilitation and tackles the facilitator. 
However, the legalistic frame allows for systematically neglecting empirical 
knowledge about this type of migration. Although the inmates in this narrative 
are victims, their rights can be circumvented by preventing smuggling, under-
stood as the transport in boats for money. 
The suspicious fact in this scenario is the boat, particularly when seen to be 
overcrowded. However, when captured by satellite imagery, small boats are al-
ready suspicious even before someone has entered them. Thereby, border man-
agement is equipped with a different operating logic. The generation of suspicion 
no longer occurs during patrol activities, but in the mode of “proactive” border 
enforcement. While the stateless vessel and the humanitarian ground refer to a 
concrete, individual situation, smuggling tackles structures, a business, and a 
type of migration. Hence, this activity occurs prior to situations in which vessels 
are intercepted or rescued. Surveillance and the suspicion of smuggling legiti-
mize to have a look in the first place. The vessel remains the moment of con-
densed suspicion, its tracking, tracing, monitoring, and identification is part of 
border surveillance activities. In fact, as I have elaborated in chapter 3, the Euro-
                                                           
33  Even though Papastavridis refers to the high seas, his claim that the transport of mi-
grants is not a crime as such also holds for land and air routes. 
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pean Border Surveillance System, EUROSUR tackles vessels rather than mi-
grants. 
The small, overcrowded and unseaworthy boat is regarded as a condensed 
suspicious fact by European border authorities, and mobilizes both control and 
rescue measures. The reference to something “suspicious,” “strange,” “abnor-
mal” or “unidentified” traveling toward the Schengen area is regarded as a legit-
imate factor for further monitoring and eventual interception. As vehicle of mi-
gration, the refugee boat impacts upon, if not determines, the agency and the le-
gal status of the persons it carried. The double statelessness of vessel and refugee 
allows for a patronizing treatment of the refugee-boat hybrid, which oscillates 
between pity and encroachment. 
 
 
9.3 THE REFUGEE BOAT: 
VIRTUALLY (AT) THE BORDER 
 
Tracing the construction of an external border to the EU from the perspective of 
the refugee boat has allowed us to explore the tones, connotations and fantasies, 
as well as the institutional and legal reasoning, along which the refugee boat has 
turned into a moving target for EU border policies. As such, the refugee boat hy-
brid acts as an integrating figure in the construction of a supranational EU bor-
der. Itself the only landmark at sea, a mobile in mobili, it mobilizes repressive 
state practices and humanitarian intervention alike, the hunter and the helper. 
Exploring the international response to the earliest case of the Vietnamese 
“boat-people,” it could be shown that the term had been introduced by political 
actors with the evasive intention not to discuss and decide the refugee status of 
the persons on board. At the same time, the situation on board the vessel was 
taken both as indication for the facilitation business and, in certain dramatic cas-
es, it was in turn used as evidence for the humanitarian refugee status to apply. 
This kind of oscillating reference could also be demonstrated in the context of 
Europe-bound flight and migration since the beginning of the Schengen Process. 
It could be demonstrated that all three attributes: small, overcrowded and unsea-
worthy, share the impetus that this maritime journey is not meant to occur. At the 
same time, the vessel as stateless, in distress and suspicious provides the legiti-
mizing narrative for interception or operations of hindrance at sea. In this man-
ner, the vessel not only facilitates a subversive trip or option of last resort, but 
contributes significantly to the mobilization and justification of EU border en-
forcement measures. 
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The analysis of EUROSUR already allowed to trace this mobilization and man-
dating of EU border enforcement measures. However, while EUROSUR virtual-
ly indicates where reaction capability is needed, the vessel counts as a valid rea-
son for interception. Serhat Karakayli and Enrica Rigo argue that the “ever ves-
sel suspected of transporting ‘illegal’ migrants is considered a virtual border 
when its nationality is unknown or uncertain.” (Karakayali/Rigo 2010: 124, em-
phasis added). They see the virtual maritime border as “one example […] of ex-
ternalization of the European Union’s frontiers” (ibid). In fact, it is not one of its 
examples. It is its driving force. The concept of the virtual border mobilizes both 
a more flexible approach to the geography of border controls and an expansion 
of the competencies of border police. 
 
Overall, analyzing the refugee boat as mediator, it turns out that these vessels not 
only facilitate unauthorized maritime journeys; they are not only utilized as tech-
nologies of movement and mobility, but are also a moving target as well, a vacil-
lating reference and integrating figure of EU bordering. The vessel facilitates, 
juxtaposes and negotiates the migrants’ access to Europe, while also mobilizing 
and legitimizing the control of its access – that is, the practices of border surveil-
lance and control. In this way, the vessel thereby mediates EU bordering. 
 
The migrant vessel’s mediation can be summarized by the following aspects: 
•  Europe’s other: valuating the other by their means of movement. The hybrid 
of the refugee boat mediates Europe’s other as a versatile figure. This versa-
tility does not consist in the fact that the vessel moves on water, nor does it 
refer to the mixed flow of people on board. The vehicle and the attributes at-
tached to it in the European public view, which is to say, as small, over-
crowded and unseaworthy, allow for flexible valuations of the phenomenon 
and the people on board. It could be demonstrated that all three attributes 
applied to the vessel share the impetus that this maritime journey is not 
meant to occur. While the gaze of pity and risk is applied to the migrants, 
the vehicle arouses suspicion and allows for de-individualization and depo-
liticization of the persons on board who appear as a boatload of people. 
•  Mobilization and legitimization of enforcement measurements. With regard 
to EU enforcement of maritime borders, a prioritizing of the vessel in legal 
reasoning could be traced. This allowed for enforcement measures which 
otherwise would have been impossible to justify. In the territorial logic, 
border enforcement at sea can only legitimately occur in the territorial wa-
ters or the contiguous zone of a coastal state. By reference to the migrants’ 
vessel as “stateless,” “in distress” or “suspicious,” interception and opera-
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tions of hindrance found their legal construct. The legitimate reason for in-
terceptions is found in the vessel itself, in fact, more in its condition as un-
seaworthy and overcrowded than in its position or purpose. Although it sub-
verts border surveillance and control, the migrant vessel paradoxically trig-









The stated objective of this study has been to examine the formation of an exter-
nal EU border since the 1985 Schengen Agreement. Starting from a characteriza-
tion of the Schengen Process and reviewing how this political process has influ-
enced the methodological and epistemological premises of border studies, it 
could be shown that most analyses of Europe’s border(s) reflect upon the new 
border as something: as social practices of control, as subversion and movement, 
as institutional integration, as exception, or as the network-centric organization 
of security personnel in Europe. These analyses discuss Europe’s borders in 
terms of Schengen’s variable geometry, in terms of institutional Europeaniza-
tion, in terms of its rules on paper and its contestations on the ground. 
Building upon these assessments, this study has, however, taken a different 
methodological stance. Rather than examining the EU border as something, it 
analyzes the construction of an external EU border via two of its empirical con-
struction sites: EUROSUR and the refugee boat. Gauging the formation of an ex-
ternal EU border by examining two of its mediators, this study offers a detailed 
analysis of the drawing together and networking of a border that remains under 
permanent construction. The two site inspections do not tell the story of a specif-
ic site, but trace and analyze the qualitative imprint EUROSUR and the refugee 
boat have had (and continue to have) on the external EU border. 
The Latourian concept of mediation has been central to the research process 
and analysis. In fact, Mediated Bordering – the title of this book – both implies a 
methodological conviction and points to the most important empirical observa-
tions of this study. 
The methodological conviction is rooted in the spectral character of any bor-
der. If a border as such does not exist or appear geographically, institutionally, or 
materially, if it is only available in proxies, we have to study these proxies, con-
struction sites, and mediators in order to trace and understand how this “thing” or 
“network” that is socially effective in the form of a political border is pro-
grammed. 
284 | Mediated Bordering 
 
This methodological argument entails a twofold statement concerning (a) the 
direction of analysis and (b) the notion of praxeography. The preposition via – 
used and highlighted above – indicates both: with regard to the direction of anal-
ysis, the research object is studied via its proxies or mediators, similar to a train 
going to Berlin via Frankfurt, and similar to receiving information via satellite or 
via email. The preposition via contains both the notion of a point of passage and 
that of a medium – in the sense of a facilitator, means, gateway, corridor, route, 
carrier, or channel. The directionality that the preposition suggests is important 
for this methodology, which explores the kind and quality of the EU’s external 
border (the site of effect) via an inquiry into the sites of intervention: EUROSUR 
and the refugee boat. For “what circulates when everything is in place cannot be 
confused with the set-ups that make circulation possible” (Latour 2013: 32). 
Secondly, via alludes to a praxeographic notion that does not focus on individual 
practices or situations but on relations, processes of stabilization, and the empiri-
cal process of mediation itself. This post-foundational methodology has been 
vindicated, as it has proved to reveal the kind and quality of an emerging EU ex-
ternal border without becoming trapped by questions about the where (ground) 
and what (substance) of political borders. Instead, it bases its findings on the 
many reasons and mediators via which the border is constructed, stabilized, ex-
perienceable, and researchable. 
Analyzing the EU’s external border via the development process of 
EUROSUR revealed quite a peculiar process of co-production. The IT applica-
tion and the EU regulation – EUROSUR on the screen and EUROSUR on paper 
– have been developed in parallel, co-producing each other and providing for 
both a new spatial truth claim (supranational border work follows migratory 
pressures) and a legitimacy claim (a regulation to justify the border policing 
mandate in those terms and a mandate to intervene at calculated hotspots). 
Conducting research on the EU’s external border via the refugee boat has 
shed light on various (legal and symbolic) constructs used to legitimize interven-
tions at sea and to evaluate migratory endeavors without the legal reference of a 
common European immigration and asylum law. Focusing on the refugee boat 
made it possible to trace how boat migration provided the oscillating reference 
that could be flexibly used to reject migrants, intervene in a range of maritime 
spaces, question the status of refugees, and argue nationally while mobilizing 
supranational resources to control the means of movement. 
 
The analyses of both EUROSUR and the refugee boat have pointed to consider-
able ambivalences in EU border policies between which the two sites oscillate. 
More than an effect of EU border policies and operational practices, this oscilla-
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tion appears to be its paramount characteristic. It is itself durable and institution-
alized. The following ambivalences are thus systemic and reappear in different 
disguises, while bordering is mediated between them. 
First, there is the ambivalence between the transcendence of borders, on the 
one hand, and the proliferation of control practices, on the other. The functioning 
logic of EUROSUR mediates between these two ambivalences by concentrating 
the full floodlights of surveillance on the issue of “migratory routes” and migra-
tory pressure” while keeping Europe’s map free from internal borders. 
Second, the ideal imperative of the Schengen Agreement – liberty through 
freedom of movement – came with the promise of cooperative, and thus en-
hanced, security. The security promise, however, has been unfolded as a power-
ful parasitical twin imperative. As a consequence, the interests of internal securi-
ty take precedence over the project of European integration and are considered a 
precondition of the latter. 
The third ambivalence arises from the fact that, legally speaking, there is no 
common European external border. According to the Schengen Agreement, a 
member state that shares a border with a non-EU state has a duty to strengthen 
the security of its national frontier. The double-encoding of these borders as both 
national and European creates a tension, as does the lack of a common European 
immigration and asylum policy. There are some significant national differences: 
While unauthorized, illegal immigration is a criminal offence in one member 
state, in others it is treated as merely an administrative offence. The refugee boat 
in distress at sea calls out for the integration of all these differences; it constantly 
demands a European answer. EUROSUR collects, visualizes and offers the ma-
terial to this very answer: it tracks and visualizes volume, frequency, routes and 
other data concerning “border-related events”; thereby allowing Frontex to pro-
vide member states with a European view on tasks and challenges at the com-
mon border. As an agency and as a coordinator, Frontex has no mandate to deal 
with individual persons at external borders nor does it have a mandate to inter-
fere with any immigration or asylum procedures; Frontex and EUROSUR thus 
tackle routes, boats and other vehicles, or offer its services for the “logistics” of 
return flights. We thus witness viapolitics when Frontex gains competences 
while legal harmonization or political consensus among member states are de-
clared to be stagnating. 
Fourth, the reference to territory with regard to the border-policing mandate 
and the application of rights is itself ambivalent. A great deal of flexibility is 
used to take advantage of this incongruity between rights and territory. It is not 
only border control that is affected, but also the administration of migration and 
asylum – access to spaces of rights thus also appears stratified. While territorial 
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frontiers once determined territorial sovereignty and therefore territorial compe-
tences, this has now definitively been superseded by cross-border cooperation on 
internal security, which constructs extra-territorial areas – transit zones, recep-
tion centers, the high seas as a pre-frontier area – while also defining operational 
areas using risk analysis. While the sovereign power to decide about access is 
mobilized and to a certain extent deterritorialized, access to individual rights is 
tight to someone entering national territory or national databases on arrival. 
At sea, and this is the fifth ambivalence I want to highlight, European border 
management switches flexibly between monitoring and repelling migrants, on 
the one hand, and carrying out rescue missions, on the other. The helper can only 
arrive when the hunter has failed, as in the Lampedusa incident of October 2013 
that I described in the introduction. 
EU border policies are thus not ambivalent but flexibly and strategically os-
cillate between these ambivalences. Bordering, as it occurs, mediates these am-
bivalences. This allows for the integration of what is meant to be kept separate: 
the transcendence of borders and the proliferation of their surveillance and con-
trol; an increase in freedom of movement and security, national competences and 
supranational power, state sovereignty and refugee rights, the ambitions of friend 
and enemy, hunter and helper. 
 
The findings and results of this study (summarized above and in chapters 6 and 
9.3) support a proposition first advanced by William Walters (2011, 2014, 2015): 
the notion of viapolitics. They may even enable the further development of his 
theses and arguments. To theorize viapolitics, Walters calls us to pay attention to 
the symbolic, the political and the material dimension of vehicles in the context 
of migration policies and public discourse on migration and border control. He 
argues that viapolitics “orients us to see migration from the middle, that is, from 
the angle of the vehicle and not just the state” (Walters 2014: 1). More than a 
conceptual proposition or theory, Walters notion of viapolitics calls for us to pay 
attention to particular objects of inquiry, and thus for a certain methodological 
sensibility. Such is the title of the lecture when he first introduced the notion of 
viapolitics “Where are the missing vehicles?”. The lecture’s title took up the 
Latourian impetus to integrate material artefacts into the study of phenomena and 
applied it to the study of migration and migration policies. 
The claim of symmetrical anthropology, namely that we must come home 
from the tropics and apply an equal level of curiosity to “the whole shebang” at 
home (Latour 1993: 101), and that in pursuing this course, we need to pay as 
much attention to artefacts as to humans and to acknowledge them as actants 
(Callon/Latour 1994) and quasi-objects (Serres 2007: 224–234), is, in fact, al-
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ready present in the public imagination of migration: Not only is there a clearly 
stated agency when aircrafts fly, ships sail, and boats carry migrants; vehicles al-
so overdetermine the identity of their animate and inanimate goods and those 
who transport them. In the case of migration however, the question is not wheth-
er the vessel or the captain sails, whether the car or the driver drives, whether the 
pilot, the passengers, or the aircraft flies, i.e. which actant or hybrid is moving or 
migrating. In the case of migration, animated goods already appear entangled 
and move as a strangely indivisible hybrid. Balibar’s hints about the “empirico-
transcendental question of luggage” (Balibar 2002a: 91, emphasis in original; cf. 
chap. 2.2.1) point to this reconfigured agency that differentiates between carrier 
and carried, between technology of movement and the passively mobile cargo. 
From a viapolitical angle, the carrier, the technology of movement the infrastruc-
tures are kept under control in order to indirectly govern movement. 
The example of the visual and verbal image of the overcrowded and unsea-
worthy migrant vessel (cf. chap. 5.1.4) provides the proof of his claim: the legal 
status of the passengers of a refugee boat or migrant vessel is not infrequently 
deduced from and determined by the vessel. The vehicle-body entanglement, this 
hybrid of boat person and refugee boat, functions as a deliberately non-
committal yet all-pervasive point of reference in political rhetoric. Visually inte-
grated with their means of transport and the “masses” on board, migrant passen-
gers are deindividualized and depoliticized. The image evokes legal and moral 
classifications: the irrationality of the journey, the illegality of its passengers, 
and renders the vehicle a legitimate object of intervention. From the perspective 
of the European spectators, this image mediates both the possibility of intercept-
ing the vessel and thereby expanding the legal borders of policing, while at the 
same time disconnecting the vessel’s passengers from the legal border of indi-
vidual rights. The mode of viapolitics becomes apparent as an indirect constella-
tion which systematically condones the “the elephant in the boat”, i.e. the indi-
viduals on board. 
The example of the boat people and the refugee boat allow us to see the clas-
sificatory process that the imagined explanation and evaluation trigger, even to 
the extent that the vessel provides a substitute classificatory identity when no na-
tionality can be advanced or documented. The point of acknowledging vehicles 
as mediators of migration is to underline that they not only transport people but 
also distort and transform their identity and status. Walters notes that migrants 
are not only “specified […] by institutional and legal categories but in their bodi-
ly existence by their forms of transportation. The boat people. The wet backs. 
The stowaway. The hobo. In all these cases an encounter with travel follows you 
around” (Walters 2011: 5). Yet, the moment the decision for a means of transport 
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has been taken, or must be taken in a certain way, velocity, frequency, route, and 
experience, four of the six facets of mobility Tim Crewell (2010: 22-26) puts 
forward, are largely determined.1 Consequently, for those on the move viapoli-
tics have asymmetrical effects, as this mode of politics governs populations 
without addressing the individual. 
Just as “nationality is an ascribed status that cannot be established without 
reference to documents” (Torpey 1998: 256, original emphasis), mobility is a 
mediated capability that is established by differentiated means of movement – 
vehicular, technological, administrative. Torpey already warned that “people 
have to some extent become prisoners of their identities, which may sharply lim-
it their opportunities to cross jurisdictional spaces” (ibid). When nationality and 
identity are neither available nor helpful, as can be the case in unauthorized mi-
gration or flight, classifications are made by reference to the means of move-
ment. In this set-up, the way you move replaces the need for political localiza-
tion. The vehicle carries a person and replaces her or his passport. 
What renders this constellation of mediated mobilities distinct is that it will 
not be found in passports or ID cards nor in biometrics, all of which play an es-
sential role in the operationalization of border control. It is rather in the realm of 
capabilities, that movements are regulated. As a result, vehicles, transportation, 
logistics as means of movement not only characterize the kind of migration and 
determine the condition of the journey. They also essentially determine the path 
to rights and the possibility of avail oneself of them.  
When juxtaposing Walter’s proposition with Torpey’s argument, it is not the 
passport or ID card that may be necessary to gain access to rights and democratic 
participation (ibid: 239–243, 255–257). In viapolitics, it is the kind of vehicle 
that determines access to a certain corridor of rights and of privileges. To put it 
another way: if Walter’s claim holds true, vehicles would unfold a similar effect 
on refugees and migrants as passports, ID cards, and biometric information. Go-
ing by the description that the state holds a monopoly over the legitimate means 
of movement, as it has stripped “individuals and private entities” of their legiti-
mate means of movement (ibid: 239), it can be hypothesized that the access to 
rights and/or privileges can be regulated by means of traffic and transportation 
policies. In this sense, the question of who regulates and authorizes the means of 
                                                           
1  Creswell identifies “six facets of mobility, each with a politics: the starting point [mo-
tivational force], speed, rhythm, routing, experience, and friction” (Creswell 2010: 
26). 
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movement probes the operationalization of political borders, and it does so with-
out needing the concept of the territorial state. 
In consequence, can we take the concept of viapolitics beyond the methodo-
logical gaze, orientation, or sensibility that it bestows to the study of migration 
and border policies? Are there viapolitics in a globalizing world? And, if so, 
what relation to political borders would this mode of politics sustain? In order to 
explore this mode, I shall delineate it from notions of territorial politics and of 
biopolitics. Having researched the practices and policies of EU bordering, I ar-
gue that these three modes of politics – territorial politics, biopolitics, and 
viapolitics – generally come into effect in the operationalization of borders, and 
in a range of constellations. 
Conventionally, borders are associated with territorial politics. Viapolitics 
differ from territorial politics in so far as they do not project power onto a delin-
eated space but rather onto infrastructural means of movement (gateways, corri-
dors, routes) and mobile means of movement (vehicles, other carriers or technol-
ogies of movement). This entails that viapolitics do not operate along an inside-
outside distinction. A notion more apt to describe viapolitics is the on-and-off 
binary, alluding to notions of – online/offline or off the road/on the road or en 
route. Moreover, viapolitics do not know territory, nor do they discuss belong-
ing: Viapolitics identify routes, corridors, and gateways to rights, obligations, 
and markets. While territorial politics are based on the “notion of camp as a safe 
place where no enemy could infiltrate because the borders of a specific space are 
under control” (Bigo 2006: 90), viapolitics are not afraid of the enemy entering a 
territory, but of him entering an airplane.  
Logistics is the ideal-typical set-up of viapolitics, and it appears that viapoli-
tics project their ambitions onto seamless movement or its interdiction (cf. par-
ticularly Cowen 2014: 76–88) – it is just that things get a little more complicated 
when the cargo is animated. 
In contrast to biopolitics, viapolitics do not target individuals but their means 
of movement or the technical systems that enable movement. Superimposed up-
on the delineation of a territory is the definition of criteria that authorize coming 
and going. The attribution of deviance can thus impose a border on a person. 
While, from a territorial perspective, borders mark the range of jurisdiction in 
congruence to terrestrial expanses, the biopolitical angle captures the sites of se-
lection. We are in the mode of biopolitics when populations are not only regulat-
ed at the border, but when the site of the border is “regarded as a privileged insti-
tutional site where political authorities can acquire biopolitical knowledge about 
populations and their movements, health, and wealth” (Walters 2002: 572–573). 
From the angle of biopolitics, bordering authorities protect the physical body of 
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an individual and the political body of a nation by embracing the body and 
shielding it form attacks and risks. 
In the mode of viapolitics, by contrast, the deindividualized person is ad-
dressed by means of traffic rules (Waitz 2014: 96; Augé 2008: 113, 121). This 
fits in with the way EUROSUR maps the external EU border. An important find-
ing of this study is that the digital displaying the European Situational Picture 
(ESP) differs fundamentally from an analogous map of EU territory (chapters 4 
and 6). It does not represent a spatial geography but detects, tracks, and identifies 
targets of intervention. The fact that border-related information is classified and 
visualized by icons which, in their design and idea, are based on traffic signs, 
might only be an illustration. Nonetheless, it does support the notion of politics 
that are designed to prevent individual negotiations.  
While in territorial politics and biopolitics the notion of states penetrating or 
embracing society aptly describes the logic of state power (Torpey 1998: 244-
245), viapolitics unfold its ambitions by spying, tracking, and analyzing data on 
movements and their facilitations (Tazzioli 2018; Broeders/Dijstelbloem 2016; 
Mountz/ Kempin 2014; Amoore 2009, 2011). Likewise, EUROSUR does not 
target migrants, nor does it search for refugees at sea. As a form of invisible pro-
filing, it does not need to embrace subjects – which the state does in the biopolit-
ical mode – it rather targets suspicious constellations by analyzing “surveillance 
information” or, as the jargon puts, it “pre-frontier intelligence”. EUROSUR 
thus talks the language of viapolitics. 
Going by these proposed descriptions of viapolitics, it can be concluded that 
the external EU border is strongly governed in the mode of viapolitics – a mode 
characterized by a projection of power onto the infrastructures and means of 
movement (and not onto the people that move), a mode determined by a surveil-
lance gaze that tracks and archives (Tazzioli 2018) and which is thus depersonal-
ized and depoliticized. A power oscillating between authoritarian power and hu-
manitarian care, in the sense of being on or off. Ultimately, the Schengen Pro-
cess can be considered both an expression of as well as a trigger and catalyst to 
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